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ABSTRACT 
The advent of the New World Order has challenged Syria's role in the Middle East. 
Traditionally viewed as a pariah state, and a Soviet satellite, Syria's future looked 
uncertain. Syria, however, has been able to accommodate the transformation in the 
world order. 
The New World Order amounted to a redistribution of global power. The 
transmutation of Soviet power towards the US culminated in a unipolar world order. 
The withdrawal of Soviet support through the advent of the New World Order 
threatened Syria's quest for regional hegemony. 
Existing in a state of anarchy, the co-ordinates of Syria's foreign policy have been 
founded upon the principles of self-help, national security, and national interest. 
These principles have found their expression through Syria's intractable struggle with 
Israel. 
Syrian foreign policy has been determined by two factors: primarily, by the 
international political system, and secondarily, by the influence of domestic politics. 
Omnibalancing provides an explanatory model for foreign policy behaviour that 
bridges the divide between the determinants of the international political system and 
the influences of the domestic arena. 
Following a rational policy, the Syrian state was compelled to realign with the US-
led world order, in order to pursue regional hegemony. It was able to display its 
accommodation of the New World Order by joining the US-led coalition forces in 
the liberation of Kuwait in 1990/1991. Syria's adjustment to the New World Order 
was rewarded with a place in the post-war regional order, and a central role in the 
Madrid Peace Conference. 
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If a person were to try stripping the disguises from actors while they 
play a scene upon the stage, showing to the audience their real looks 
and the faces they were born with, would not such a one spoil the 
whole play? And would not the spectators think he deserved to be 
driven out of the theatre with brickbats, as a drunken disturber? . . . 
Now what else is the whole life of mortals but a sort of comedy, in 
which the various actors disguised by various costumes and masks, 
walk on and play each one his part, until the manager waves them off 
the stage? Moreover, this manager frequently bids the same actor go 
back in a different costume, so that he who has but lately played the 
king in scarlet now acts the flunky in patched clothes. Thus all things 
are presented by shadows. 
(Erasmus, The Praise of Folly) 
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Introduction 
One is faced with two insoluble problems when writing about contemporary politics. 
The first is the propensity for political change. This alone can challenge the 
authenticity of one's research or alternatively, confirm one's own analysis. I have 
been fortunate with my subject as Syria has enjoyed an unprecedented period of 
stability for the past twenty-seven years, but I have also lived under the speculative 
shadow of President Asad's imminent death. The advent of his death has contained 
the seeds of destruction for my hypothesis. 
It has been my contention throughout this thesis that Syria has been prepared for 
peace since the early 1970s. Contrary to the speculation of Asad's death, the 
possibility of a breakthrough in the peace talks has held the chance of vindicating my 
hypothesis. For now, the moment has passed, and I have to wait alongside other 
Syria watchers to observe history reveal itself. 
Secondly, where there is political stability, one is also faced with the prospect of 
regurgitating existing ideas and analyses. The proliferation of articles and books 
since Syria's entry into the Gulf War coalition in 1990, and its participation in the 
Madrid Peace Conference in 1991, have pre-empted and contributed to my analysis. 
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In order to set these analyses into context, I have attempted to incorporate Syria's 
adjustment to the New World Order into a theoretical framework. 
The contribution of this thesis is its attempt to offer a better understanding of how the 
structural determinants of the international political system have affected Syria's 
foreign policy since the advent of the New World Order. 
Syrian foreign policy 
Syrian foreign policy, since its independence in 1946, has been shaped and justified 
according to Arab nationalism. After the Ba'th party had seized power in 1963, 
Syrian foreign policy called for the total liberation of Palestine, and the overthrow of 
the Arab state system. The military disaster of 1967, however, discredited the 
cogency of Arab nationalism as a dynamic political force. 
Asad's assumption of power, in November 1970, heralded a new era in the 
formulation of foreign policy; since then, a sense of realism has been injected into 
the process. The role of ideology was relegated, and the new determinants of foreign 
policy have been shaped primarily by the international political system. Syrian 
foreign policy has been based on: 
• the preservation of national security, 
• the enhancement of its power and prestige within the regional state-system. 
Hypothesis 
The hypothesis of this research is that Syria has managed to adjust to the New World 
Order following a rational foreign policy. Syria's adjustment to the New World 
Order, which represented a transformation in the global redistribution of power, has 
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been consistent with its regional objectives. Syria's participation in the second Gulf 
War, and its decision to engage in the Madrid Peace Conference are testaments to its 
implementation of rational policies. These decisions were founded upon its national 
interest, national security, and the containment of Israel. 
Methodology 
The methodology of this research falls into three fields: theory, interviews, and case 
studies. 
Theory 
This thesis is grounded in international relations theory. Realism, pluralism, and 
globalism have provided the foundation stones of this study. Concepts borrowed 
from political economy, such as the state, and autonomy have also been used. This 
research builds upon existing literature, and attempt to complement its assessment of 
Syrian foreign policy. 
The paradigms of international relations tlieory 
There are three paradigms of international relations theory, realism, pluralism, and 
globalism, which are useful for analysing foreign policy. Each paradigm operates 
from a different set of assumptions, and offers alternative explanations for state 
behaviour. 
The basic assumption of the realist paradigm, that the state is the principal actor in 
international relations, is applicable to the Syrian case. The pluralist assumption, that 
the state shares its functional role with other non-state actors, does not apply to Syria 
as all domestic and international actors are subjugated to state scrutiny. Additionally, 
the emphasis of the globalist paradigm on dependency perspectives cannot account 
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for Syria's foreign policy, as it has managed to insulate its economy from the 
economic determinants of globalisation. 
I have chosen to adopt realism and neo-realism as the most appropriate paradigms for 
analysing Syria's adjustment to the New World Order. Realists and neo-realists 
suggest that the structure of the international political system determines the 
behaviour of states. The behaviour of states is governed by a rational set of principles 
founded upon the national interest. 
According to realism and neo-realism, foreign policies of states are primarily 
determined by the international political system. The rational actor model, belonging 
to the realist paradigm, will allow us to analyse the structural determinants of the 
international political system, and to assess their impact on the formulation of Syrian 
foreign policy. 
In spite of their utility to this research, realism and neo-realism contain a number of 
flaws. Their application to the First World may be pertinent, but they are not 
adequate for studying Third World states. Their failure to account for the permutation 
of domestic influences upon the unconsolidated states of the Third World leaves 
them open to criticism. 
The realist and neo-realist paradigms, with their focus on the political system, are 
more befitting to the First World than the Third World. They do not account for the 
complexities that have characterised the process of state formation in the Third 
World. They assert that the behaviour of the units of the system, the states, is affected 
either by human nature (realists), or the structure of the system (neo-realists) and not 
by domestic concerns. Realism and neo-realism do not pay attention to the role of 
domestic actors in the foreign policy decision-making process. 
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Alternatively, domestic politics models, which combine elements of pluralism 
(mosaic model) and globalism (Marxism), focus exclusively upon the interaction of 
domestic forces within the state. Adherents of this approach aver that Third World 
states, as out-growths of the colonial period, are fractious, unconsolidated, and lack 
institutional foundations. In effect, the Third World state is often held hostage to the 
influence of primordial groups, domestic and/or international classes. Consequently, 
its foreign policies are determined by the necessity either to appease competing 
domestic interests, or to legitimise the fractious authority of the state. Protagonists of 
this particular view consider Third World foreign policies to be belligerent and 
irrational. 
In this study, I shall attempt to bridge the divide between the realist paradigm and the 
domestic politics model through the concept of omnibalancing. David's model of 
omnibalancing will provide the link between the international political system and 
the domestic politics approaches. By examining the structural determinants of the 
international political system and the domestic politics within the state, I intend to 
account for Syria's adjustment to the New World Order. 
It is the premise of the study that the international political system is the primary 
constituent of the foreign policy decision-making process. The internal process, 
however, does a play a role, particularly, where the state lacks cohesion, and operates 
between a neo-patrimonial and institutional form of governance. The state can 
follow a rational foreign policy when it achieves autonomy from domestic social 
forces. 
Autonomy of the state 
Comprehending the degree of autonomy enjoyed by the state is the key to 
understanding foreign policy in the Third World. The hypothesis of this study 
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proposes that the Syrian state possesses sufficient autonomy from domestic social 
forces to pursue a rational foreign policy. The relative autonomy enjoyed by the 
Syrian state has allowed its decision-makers to follow a consistent foreign policy. 
Examining the relative autonomy of the Syrian state will enable us to identify how 
Syria has managed to adjust to the New World Order, without eroding its domestic 
resilience. From a domestic perspective, the transition from being a client of the 
Soviet Union to working in compliance with the US was aided by the relative 
autonomy of the state. 
The New World Order 
The conclusion of the Cold War was marked by the collapse of the Soviet system, 
and the succession of the US-led world capitalist system. The end of the bipolar 
world order has produced a period of political unipolarity and economic 
multipolarity. Wherever Soviet influence has abated, US political, economic, and 
cultural hegemony have superseded. 
In the absence of the bipolar system, the US has filled the political vacuum, and 
assumed the role of global leader. State and non-state-resistance to US hegemony 
has, in some cases, resulted in punitive measures. The bombing of Libya in 1986 pre-
empted the collapse of the old world order, and set a precedent for the flexibility at 
the core of the changing world order. Without the support of their Soviet patron, the 
pariah states of the Middle East became vulnerable to US foreign policy. 
The implosion of the Soviet Union in August 1991, and the ensuing transformation 
of the world order from a bipolar to a unipolar structure has compelled Syria to 
adjust to the dominant US hegemonic order. Inter alia, the objective of this study is 
to define the New World Order, especially within the Middle East, and to ascertain 
how Syria has adjusted, whilst remaining consistent in its foreign policy. 
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The destruction of Iraq by the US-led coalition, in the liberation of Kuwait, indicated 
the nature and potency of the New World Order. The unipolar dimension of the 
Middle East, perpetrated by the presence of Israel, has become a resounding feature 
of the New World Order. 
Perceived as an irrational, irredentist, and ideological opponent of the US throughout 
the 1980s, Syria's future looked most uncertain. Adjustment without capitulation 
became a necessity for the Syrian state; the political elite required the opportunity to 
display their commitment to the changes of the New World Order. Iraq's invasion of 
Kuwait provided Syria with the prime opportunity to change its strategy, and to 
adjust to the New World Order. 
Interviews 
A series of interviews were conducted in Syria during the periods June-July 1994, 
September-November 1995, and in the West Bank during July-August 1996. I 
conducted a total of 28 interviews in Syria, and was privileged to have access to 
academics, officials, journalists, artists, and diplomats. 
Owing to the sensitive nature of my research, and the web of paranoia that engulfs 
Syrian society, I could not openly declare my interests, and was dependent upon a 
network of contacts provided by Professor Ray Hinnebusch and Patrick Seale. It is 
not possible to conduct surveys in Syria to ascertain information; therefore, the 
researcher is reliant upon qualitative interviews. It was generally not possible to 
record interviews, and taking notes was often unwelcome. In most cases, I was asked 
not to attribute quotes or details; wherever possible, however, I have cited the source 
of information, but in most cases, I have protected the details of my source. 
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In the UK, I was able to work closely with Professor Ray Hinnebusch from October 
1993 to June 1994. I have benefited considerably from his experience and insights 
into the domestic and foreign policies of Syria. 
Case studies 
Syria's accommodation of the New World Order wi l l be appraised through an 
examination of two case studies. Syria's adjustment to the New World Order has 
been illustrated by its inclusion in the US-led Gulf War coalition in 1990/91, and its 
decisive entry into the Madrid peace process in 1991. 
The Gulf War coalition 
With the decline of Soviet influence in world affairs, unipolarity, particularly in the 
Middle East, has defined the structure of the world order in the post bipolar era. The 
absence of Soviet support has accentuated Syria's security dilemma. Its inability to 
resist the pull of the hegemonic world order has compelled it to abandon its former 
foreign policy strategies, and to adopt a more US-centric approach. 
The hypothesis of this thesis asserts that the primary motivation behind Syria's role in 
the Gulf War coalition derived from its necessity to realign its global position. Syria's 
decision was calculated according to a rational set of criteria. The gravity of the 
decision emanated from Syria's new found regional and international vulnerability. In 
order to occupy a role in the post-war regional order, Syria joined the US-led 
coalition. 
Its participation afforded it the chance to move closer to the US without capitulating 
in its foreign policy objectives. The execution of this decision appeared, to some 
observers, to contravene Syria's Arab credentials. It is the contention of the author, 
however, that Syria's decision had been consistent with its Arab nationalist agenda. 
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The US promise to convene an international peace conference underlied Syria's 
motive for allying itself to the conservative Gulf Arab states, and the world's 
hegemonic power. 
The Madrid Peace Conference 
The transformation in the world order created a window of opportunity for Israel and 
the Arab states to reach a resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. The structural 
determinants, namely, the emergence of the US as the world's superpower, coupled 
with a weakened Arab World, have produced a political climate conducive to 
resolving the conflict. International and regional hegemony invested the US with 
enough power to impose peace upon the region. 
The hypothesis of this research proffers that peace for Syria has become a strategic 
option since the decline of Soviet support, and the ascension of US influence in the 
New World Order. This will be examined with special reference to the Madrid Peace 
Conference. The period under review dates back to the beginning of the Madrid 
Peace Conference in October 1991, until the election of Benyamin Netanyahu in 
May 1996. 
The Madrid Peace Conference has initiated an irreversible process in which Jordan 
with a Palestinian delegation, Lebanon, Syria, and Israel participated in peace 
negotiations. Syria's commitment to the peace has been consistent with its foreign 
policy goals, namely: 
• the liberation of the Arab territories occupied in 1967; 
• the restoration of Palestinian rights; 
• the containment of Israel. 
INTRODUCTION X 
Despite popular public perceptions, Syria's participation in the peace process has 
been compatible with its foreign policy. The achievement of comprehensive peace 
has been an option for the Syrians since 1974. The term comprehensive, refers to a 
co-ordinated approach by the Arab states to reach a final settlement with Israel. Prior 
to the Madrid Peace Conference, peace, for the Syrians, included a total Israeli 
withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied in 1967, and the restoration of 
Palestinian rights. 
Egypt's signing of the Camp David Accords in 1979 had severely weakened Syria's 
regional standing, and increased its vulnerability to Israel's hegemonic ambitions. 
Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982, sanctioned by the US, demonstrated Syria's 
vulnerability to the conclusion of the separate peace between Egypt and Israel. 
The Madrid formula gave Syria the chance to place itself at the centre of the peace 
process, and to co-ordinate the policies of its partners, Lebanon, the Palestine 
Liberation Organisation (PLO), and Jordan. The agreements between Israel and the 
PLO, and Israel and Jordan, however, have circumvented the centrality of Syria to 
the peace process. 
Despite the separate agreements, Syria has resisted capitulation, and remained 
resolute in ful f i l l ing its objectives of preserving security, maximising power, 
containing Israel, and extending its hegemony throughout the Levant. Adjusting to 
the New World Order has enabled Syria to attend to its foreign policy objectives. 
Organisation of the Thesis 
This research has been organised into seven chapters. Chapter One unveils the tools 
of analysis used for the theoretical framework of this study. The New World Order is 
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introduced and analysed in Chapter Two. The components of Syria's power, and the 
centres of Syrian power are addressed in Chapters Three and Four respectively. 
Chapter Five examines Syria's role in the regional balance of power, with particular 
reference to its struggle with Israel. And, the two case studies, of the Gulf War and 
the Madrid Peace Conference, are scrutinised in Chapters Six and Seven. This study 
wil l begin by exploring, adapting, and applying the paradigms of international 
relations theory. 
CHAPTER ONE 
THE TOOLS OF ANALYSIS 
Introduction 
Chapter One is designed to provide a theoretical framework for this study. The 
approach followed is grounded in international relations theory, with a few concepts 
borrowed from the political economy approach. The assimilation of these concepts into 
mainstream international relations theory will enable the author to analyse Syria's 
status in the international political system. I shall refer to the three basic paradigms of 
international relations theory, realism, pluralism, and globalism.' 
The paradigms of realism, pluralism, and globalism will provide the foundation stones 
for this study. From the outset, the researcher has encountered numerous problems 
over the semantics and the semi-permeable parameters of each paradigm.2 The state, 
power, and national security are critical variables in international relations theory, and 
will form the basis of analysis for this study. However, the globalisation of the world 
' Smith, S., "Paradigm Dominance in International Relations: The Development of International 
Relations as a Social Science," in C. Dyer, and L . Mangasarian (eds.). The Study of International 
Relations: The State of the Art, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 3-27. 
1 Smith, S., "The Self-images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations Theory," in K. 
Booth, and S. Smith (eds.). International Relations Theory Today, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 
pp. 18-21. 
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economy, and the proliferation of information systems make it necessary to extend the 
boundaries of international relations theory. 
As it is not feasible to construct a paradigm that can resist the demands of time, I have 
found it appropriate to appraise the interacting elements of each paradigm.3 This is an 
4 
apposite starting point to examine the paradigms of realism, pluralism, and globalism. 
After presenting a summary of the paradigms, a revised version of Steven David's 
concept of omnibalancing is offered as the most suitable framework for this study.5 
Omnibalancing will enable us to gain a more comprehensive understanding of Syria's 
foreign policy, as it addresses some of the issues neglected by the Western-centric 
paradigms. 
Before discussing the paradigms of international relations theory, as part of the 
foundation of this study, we need to look at four main concepts, which are crucial to 
the understanding of the paradigms of international relations: 
• the state; 
• power; 
• security. 
According to M. Masterman, in T h e Nature of a Paradigm," in I. Lakatos, and M. Musgrave (eds.). 
Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 61-
65, Thomas Kuhn uses the term paradigm in twenty-one different ways. 
4 Smith, S., T h e Self-images of a Discipline: A Genealogy of International Relations Theory," in K. 
Booth, and S. Smith (eds.). International Relations Theory Today, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 
pp. 15. 
5 David, S., "Explaining Third World Alignment," World Politics, vol. 43, no. 2, January 1991, pp. 
233-256. 
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The State 
Traditionally, the state has been regarded as the principal actor in international 
relations, but throughout this century, the state has been forced, by economic 
determinants, to share its role with non-state entities.6 The author acknowledges that 
the state-centric approach to international relations encompasses many inadequacies, 
which will be dealt with in the following section. 
Many attempts have been made to define the term state. For a working definition, I 
have chosen to use a Weberian model as prescribed by Nordlinger. This definition is, 
particularly, valuable due to its universality. 
The state refers to all those individuals who occupy offices that 
authorise them, and them alone, to make and apply decisions that are 
binding upon any, and all parts of a territorially circumscribed 
population. The state is made up of, and limited to, those individuals 
who are endowed with society wide decision-making powers\ 
If the state is endowed with society wide decision-making powers, it is useful to 
examine the extent of its autonomy in making decisions. Autonomy from domestic 
forces and international pressures enables a state to pursue objectives that do not 
comply with the interests of a particular domestic class or the interests of an external 
power. Autonomy, however, remains in a fluid state, and is more likely to be found in 
a relative form." 
6 For more details see: Ayubi, N., Over-stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle 
East, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995), and Owen, R., State, Power and Politics in the Making of the 
Modern Middle East, (London: Roudedge, 1992). 
7 Nordlinger, E , "Taking the State Seriously," in S. Huntington, and M. Weiner (eds.). Understanding 
Political Development, (London: IittleBrown, 1987), pp. 362. 
8 
Potter, D., "The Autonomy of Third World States within the Global Economy," in A. McGrew 
(ed.). Global Politics: Globalisation and the Nation-state, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), pp. 222-
225. 
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Pluralists believe that the state is an autonomous actor, and that the competition for 
influence guarantees state neutrality.' Realists consider the state to be a hostage to the 
dominant social forces within society; and globalists pay attention to the international 
forces that hold states to ransom.10 
State autonomy and foreign policy decision-making are two interdependent variables, 
which are essentially responsible for conducting relations among states. In order to 
appreciate the relationship between these variables, I have referred to Finer's typology 
of states." The extent to which a state enjoys autonomy, from both domestic and 
international constraints, can often depend upon the state form. 1 2 Before we launch into 
considering the concept of autonomy, we will draw reference to the various state forms 
under question. 
Typologies of the state 
The state has numerous typologies, and from these I have selected Finer's models. 
They are not ideal, as state forms are not static, nor do they conform to every 
characteristic. The state forms have been identified as: 
• liberal-democratic; 
• totalitarian; 
9 
Hague, R., and M. Harrop, Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction, (London: 
Macmillan, 1987), pp. 37-38, and Skocpol, T., "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis 
in Current Research," in P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and T. Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back 
In, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 3-43. 
10 
Potter, D., "The Autonomy of Third World States within the Global Economy," in A. McGrew 
(ed.),Gbbal Politics: Globalisation and the Nation-state, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), pp. 224. 
" Finer, S., Comparative Government, (Middlesex: Penguin, 1985). 
" Skocpol, T., "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in P. Evans, 
D. Rueschemeyer, and T. Skocpol (eds.). Bringing the State Back In, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), pp. 14. 
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• Third World." 
Although the state forms that Finer presents here are in absolute terms, and they 
emerge from a Western pluralist tradition, they contain some utility as a benchmark for 
comparison. 
The liberal democratic state 
In principal, liberal-democratic states enjoy a large degree of autonomy from any 
organised domestic constraints. To recognise society as being pluralistic, therefore, 
carries the additional assumption that the government sets out to rule, not in the interest 
of any one group, or alliance of groups, but in the common interest of all. 1 4 As the 
mediator of interests, the state exists above competition, and enjoys autonomy from 
domestic constraints. 
The totalitarian state 
It is difficult to delineate an accurate picture of the totalitarian state, as some of the 
terminology that appears in Western academic texts is coated in ideologically motivated 
language. During the era of the Cold War, the Soviet Union was depicted as the 
archetypal totalitarian state. "The association of totalitarianism with the evils of Soviet 
communism, the ideological opponent of the West, fulfilled the stereotypes used by 
Western policy-makers.1* 
I Finer, S., Comparative Government, (Middlesex: Penguin, 1985), pp. 62-96. 
U Finer, S., Comparative Government, (Middlesex: Penguin, 1985), pp. 64-65. 
I I Orwell's Animal Farm provides an allegorical depiction of the totalitarian state. Its origins lay in the 
inevitable outcome of the revolutionary process. 
Hague, R., and M. Harrop, Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction, (London: 
Macmillan, 1987), pp. 55. 
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The totalitarian model of the state entails the following features: 
• one inclusive ideology; 
• a single mass party; 
• control over the economy; 
• control over the means of coercion; 
• control of the media and propaganda; 
• a demagogic leader.17 
Based on these six features, Finer identifies two conditions of the totalitarian state: 
(i) the total politicisation of society; 
(ii) the reduction of that politicisation to one single stand point." 
Al l conscious and arbitrary movements, or organisations, are totally controlled and 
engineered by the state. The state is totally expressed in the actual governing 
authorities, and coincides totally with the ruling body." In the Soviet Union, the state 
remained autonomous from domestic forces through its seizure of all instruments of 
power the economy, the military, education, agriculture, industry, and science." 
Although the Soviet state managed to achieve autonomy from domestic forces, through 
the implementation of coercion, it could not insulate itself from the constraints of 
global capitalism. Both Halliday and Wallerstein elucidate upon the Soviet Union's 
vulnerability towards the global economy, and the erosion of its state autonomy by the 
1 7 Schapiro, L . , Totalitarianism, (London: Pall Mall, 1977), pp. 18-20. 
" Finer, S., Comparative Government, (Middlesex: Penguin, 1985), pp. 95. 
19 
Finer, S., Comparative Government, (Middlesex: Penguin, 1985), pp. 95. 
" Finer, S., Comparative Government, (Middlesex: Penguin, 1985), pp. 90-95. 
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dominant economic system. Both authors attribute the subsequent demise of the Soviet 
Union to its inability to resist the centripetal forces of the global economy.2' 
The Third World state 
Acknowledging that it is nearly impossible to place all of the seventy or more Third 
World states under one heading, when defining Third World states, Finer opts for the 
use of authoritarianand oligarchic labels. The four states that emerge from these terms 
are: the dynastic; the military; the historical oligarchy; and the neo-oligarchy states." In 
each example, the state is controlled by an interest group, either placed in position by 
colonial heritage, or through national revolution." In this study, we are most interested 
in the Third World state; our case study belongs to this categorisation. 
The legacy of colonialism and the contemporary policies of imperialism have helped to 
shape the domestic and foreign policies of the Third World state. Unlike the liberal-
democratic state, the Third World state is a new and artificial creation. Its borders had 
often been circumscribed by the previous colonial powers, according to the diktat of a 
divide and rule policy. Hence, nations living across the new states' boundaries were 
divided as these states were carved from existing political and economic units. 
The new states have inherited a complex ethnic mixture of people with each group, 
community, or confession pledging its allegiance to its natural leadership. As a result, 
Third World states have been embroiled in numerous civil wars as each group in 
society has attempted to assert its interest or create cross-state ties with its parent 
group. 
" Little, R., "International Relations and the Triumph of Capitalism," in K. Booth, and S. Smith 
(eds.), International Relations Theory Today, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 42-43, and 76-
77. 
" Finer, S., Comparative Government, (Middlesex: Penguin, 1985), pp. 123. 
" Clapham, C , Third World Politics: An Introduction, (London: Croom Helm, 1985), pp. 39-40. 
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Third World states have been compelled to implement state-building programmes in 
order to ensure their survival. State-building has taken a violent path as the ruling 
group, that controls the state, has monopolised the coercive means, and has depended 
upon coercion to quell civil unrest and potential civil wars. This experience is not 
unique to the states of the Third World. 
The historical experience of state formation in Europe was also a violent and protracted 
affair. State-formation was achieved through the melting of local identities and regional 
affiliations in a cauldron of political nationalism. Nationalism emerged as a potent force 
that adhered the population to the state, and invested the state with legitimacy. 
The states of the Third World, however, have not been successful, to date, in 
producing a compliant population that adheres to one nation. Moreover, the state has 
not been able to consolidate its hold on society beyond the facade of the democratic 
processes that characterise the political system. The lack of an institutional framework 
invested with powers derived from the tacit, or overt consent of the population, has 
meant that Third World states have continued to rely upon the military for support. 
Thus, the Third World state can be characterised as authoritarian. 
The autonomy of the state 
The political scientist is beset with enumerate problems when attempting to quantify the 
autonomy a state enjoys. It is crucial, however, to appreciate how much autonomy a 
state enjoys if one to is to understand the role of the state in international relations." 
Skocpol, T., "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in P. Evans, 
D. Rueschemeyer, and T. Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back In, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), pp. 9. 
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In this section, I shall assess the concept of autonomy in relation to the domestic arena 
and international environment by utilising the models offered by Potter" and 
Nordlinger.26 Before discussing the components of autonomy, four points, suggested 
by Potter, should be taken into account: 
(i) State autonomy and state power are not synonymous. States are autonomous 
when they are free to decide on, and pursue their own goals. States are 
powerful when they also have the capacity to achieve these goals despite 
opposition." 
(ii) The autonomy of states in relation to the global economy can vary on different 
dimensions. States in economically disadvantaged countries can be largely 
autonomous in relation to domestic groups; meanwhile, they have little 
autonomy from transnational corporations (TNCs) and internationally dominant 
groups." 
(iii) A state is composed of a collection of entities, where one part may be more 
autonomous in relation to domestic and international forces than another part. 
For example, the military and security departments are often more autonomous, 
" Potter, D., "The Autonomy of Third World States within the Global Economy," in A. McGrew 
(ed.),Gbbal Politics: Globalisation and the Nation-state, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), pp. 221. 
" Nordlinger, E . , "Taking the State Seriously," in S. Huntington, and M. Weiner (eds.), 
Understanding Political Development, (London: LittleBrown, 1987). 
27 
Potter, D., "The Autonomy of Third World States within the Global Economy," in A. McGrew 
(ed.), Global Politics: Globalisation and the Nation-state, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), pp. 223. 
" Niblock, T. , "International and Domestic Factors in the Economic Liberalization Process in Arab 
Countries," in T. Niblock, and E . Murphy (eds.). Economic and Political Liberalization in the 
Middle East, (London: British Academic Press, 1993), pp. 17. 
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from domestic forces, than the economic department," though this trend is 
gradually being challenged by the success of global capitalism.30 
(iv) State autonomy is not static; its study, therefore, must be undertaken with 
respect to the historical moment. Harris refers the analyst to the case of the 
Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs). The autonomy of these states was 
originally considerable as their propulsion towards the semi-periphery was 
engineered by the state.3' However, domestic private capital has benefited from 
the change in the economic climate; it has become increasingly integrated into 
the global economy. In the NICs, private capital has strengthened the position 
of the capitalist class vis-a-vis the state, and the autonomy of the state in some 
cases is diminishing.32 
By incorporating these notes of caution, when considering the autonomy of the state, I 
shall now offer a working definition of autonomy that is suitable for the purposes of 
this research. A significant proportion of the literature dedicated to the autonomy of the 
state has analysed the state in the West. Although I have utilised a universal concept of 
autonomy, the framework I have adopted is particularly suited to the Middle Eastern 
state conceived within the Arab state-system.33 
29 
Potter, D., T h e Autonomy of Third World States within the Global Economy," in A. McGrew 
(ed.). Global Politics: Globalisation and the Nation-state, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), pp. 223 
The term success is borrowed from Fukuyama, who does not attach any value to its use. See 
Fukuyama, F . , The End of History and the Last Man, (London: Penguin, 1992). 
" Chomsky, World Orders, Old and New, (London: Pluto Press, 1994), pp. 146-147. 
3 1 Potter, D., T h e Autonomy of Third World States within the Global Economy," in A. McGrew 
(ed.). Global Politics: Globalisation and the Nation-State, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), pp. 
223-224. 
3 3 Noble, P., T h e Arab System: Pressures, Constraints, and Opportunities," in B. Korany, and A. 
Dessouki (eds.), The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Change, (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1991), pp. 49-102. 
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Definitions of autonomy 
There are several preferred definitions of the autonomy of the state. Marxists believe 
34 
that the state is held hostage by the bourgeoisie within society. In order for a state to 
achieve relative autonomy, it must overcome the opposition of the dominant capitalist 
class within the civil society." Relative autonomy, therefore, represents the flexibility a 
state has to pursue interests that are not necessarily in line with the dominant capitalist 
I have chosen a hybrid version that integrates the writings of Skocpol and Krasner. 
Skocpol refines the Marxist definition of relative autonomy, and makes it more 
flexible, by identifying other dominant interests in society. Skocpol avers that 
autonomy refers to the extent to which a state may formulate, and pursue goals that are 
not simply reflective of the demands and/or interests of social groups or society within 
the state." So, the more a state pursues the goals of others, say the ruling class or 
international capital, the less autonomy it has.38 Accordingly, "an autonomous state is 
one that prevails when its interests conflict with those of whichever class is 
economically and politically dominant".3' 
Marx, K., and F. Engels, The Communist Manifesto, (London: Penguin, 1985), pp. 82. 
« 3 5 Smith, B., Understanding Third World Politics: Theories of Political Change and Development, 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996). pp. 178-181. 
3 < Smith, B., Understanding Third World Politics: Theories of Political Change and Development, 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 178-182. 
3 7 Skocpol, T. , "Bringing the State Back In: Strategies of Analysis in Current Research," in P. Evans, 
D. Rueschemeyer, and T. Skocpol (eds.). Bringing the State Back In, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), pp. 9. 
38 
Potter, D., 'The Autonomy of the Third World States within the Global Economy," in A. McGrew 
{ed.). Global Politics: Globalisation and the Nation-state, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992), pp. 225. 
39 
Skocpol, T. , States and Social Revolutions, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 
29-30. 
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Krasner's contribution to this concept is replacing the notion of a dominant class with 
other powerful actors.*" This direction is more complementary to the pluralist patterns 
of analysis."' The definition of an autonomous state, which seems most appropriate to 
this study, is one that prevails when its interests conflict with those of other powerful 
actors. 
The autonomy of the state can be determined by assessing the relationship between the 
state and powerful domestic and international actors. To determine to what extent a 
state's autonomy is secure or insecure, it is necessary to elaborate upon the variables 
that constitute autonomy. 
Nordlinger identifies four variables which are useful for determining the degree of 
autonomy a state enjoys. The first two refer to the positive sides of autonomy: 
insulation and resilience; the second two refer to the challenge to autonomy: 
malleability and vulnerability."' Although the four variables tend to overlap, and some 
parts seem rather obvious, it is, nevertheless, useful to delineate them for the 
convenience of this study. 
Malleability 
Malleability refers to the responsive features of the state. I f a state is particularly 
receptive and sensitive to certain domestic interests, it is deemed malleable. The extent 
of malleability can be gauged through the cohesion of the state.45 I f the cohesive factor 
Krasner, S., Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials, Investments, and US Foreign Policy, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 56. 
For other powerful actors, one can read non-state actors of the global economy. 
Nordlinger, E . , Taking the State Seriously," in S. Huntington, and M. Weiner (eds.). 
Understanding Political Development, (London: LittleBrown, 1987) pp. 372. 
4 3 Nordlinger, E . , "Taking the State Seriously," in S. Huntington, and M. Weiner (eds.). 
Understanding Political Development, (London: LittleBrown, 1987) pp. 373-374. 
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of the state is high, the level of porosity is low, and the state enjoys some autonomy. 
The level of cohesion depends upon two factors: 
(i) The historical formation of the state: I f the state has emerged from a long 
struggle with domestic actors, as in a revolutionary struggle, its cohesion tends 
to be durable. Whereas a struggle with an external power might produce 
cohesion, usually based on nationalism, the durability of that cohesion is short-
lived, due to the disparate and latent forces of the nationalist struggle waiting to 
re-emerge/" 
(ii) The role and the function of the bureaucracy: Where a bureaucracy is 
highly developed and self-perpetuating, the state is cohesive and less malleable. 
When a bureaucracy is less developed and based on patrimonialism, the state's 
cohesion is less and the degree of malleability is high.4 3 
The malleability of the state is one factor that allows the analyst to understand the 
degree of autonomy a state may enjoy. History and the nature of bureaucracy are the 
keys to examining malleability. The more cohesive a state is, the less malleable it will 
be to dominant domestic interests. I f a state lacks cohesion, it is likely to become 
malleable to the interests of a powerful domestic actor. The cohesion of a state, 
however, is a transitory experience and developing states, such as those in the Middle 
East, cannot depend upon a constant level of cohesion.44 
44 
Nordlinger, E . , Taking the State Seriously," in S. Huntington, and M. Weiner (eds.), 
Understanding Political Development, (London: LittleBrown, 1987) pp. 373-374. 
4 5 Nordlinger, E . , Taking the State Seriously," in S. Huntington, and M. Weiner (eds.), 
Understanding Political Development, (London: LittleBrown, 1987) pp. 374-375. 
46 
Clapham, C , Third World Politics: An Introduction, (London: Croom Helm, 1985), pp. 42-44. 
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Vulnerability 
Vulnerability refers to the ability of a state to implement a policy that may run against 
public opinion, and the interests of powerful domestic groups. Nordlinger suggests 
that public officials realise that some policy goals cannot be realised by offering 
material incentives, or by simply issuing laws and regulations.47 
Vulnerability is not constrained to the domestic sphere; states are becoming 
increasingly vulnerable to the vagaries of the global economy. For example, the 
constraints placed upon developing states, to conform to the regulations of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), often resulting in the implementation of unpopular 
economic policies, add to the states' vulnerability.48 
The impact of the global economy upon the state and the effect of the information 
revolution have universally elevated the status of economic security above all other 
ideologies, beliefs, and value systems. Universal public opinion has become 
susceptible to global flows of information and influences. Consequently, the state is 
under increasing pressure to provide economic security. In order to fu l f i l such 
demands, the state can respond in one of two ways: 
• either resort to coercive measures, a short-term answer; 
• or accommodate the change in environment, and accept a diminution of its 
autonomy. 
In other words, the state is vulnerable from the correlation of domestic and 
international factors. 
Nordlinger, E . , Taking the State Seriously," in S. Huntington, and M. Weiner (eds.), 
Understanding Political Development, (London: LittleBrown, 1987), pp. 383. 
Niblock, T. , "International and Domestic Factors in the Economic Liberalization Process in Arab 
Countries," in T. Niblock, and E . Murphy (eds.). Economic and Political Liberalization in the 
Middle East, (London: British Academic Press, 1993), pp. 56. 
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Insulation 
Insulation refers to the degree to which a state can act without considering the interests 
of other social actors. Weber characterised "sultanism" as the most insulated form of 
state. The absolutist rule of the Sultan rested upon patrimonial credentials, and did not 
take heed of societal demands. Weber commented: "The ruler's authority over [the 
society] is appropriated just as he would any ordinary object of possession allowing 
him to sell it, to pledge it as security, or to divide it by inheritance."4' 
The ultimate source of insulation, that ensures autonomy for the state, is its ability to 
exercise monopoly over coercive means. I f the autonomy of the state is under direct 
threat, it may resort to coercive measures. The willingness to use such coercive means 
is often dependent upon, though not necessarily, the history of the state, and the 
legitimacy of its ruling institutions. I f the institutions of the state are not well defined 
and tacitly accepted amongst the domestic population, opposition to the state may take 
the form of an insurrection." 
The extent of insulation cannot be a constant feature of any state. In this respect, 
insulation is similar to malleability. As societies become more diverse and open to 
transnational organisations, the state loses its ability to insulate itself from the interests 
of domestic groups and international actors." 
Weber, M., The Theory of Economic and Social Organisation, (New York: Free Press, 1947), pp. 
347. 
" Clapham, C , Third World Politics: An Introduction, (London: Croom Helm, 1985), pp. 138-139. 
" Niblock, T. , "International and Domestic Factors in the Economic Liberalization Process in Arab 
Countries," in T. Niblock, and E . Murphy (eds.). Economic and Political Liberalization in the 
Middle East, (London: British Academic Press, 1993), pp. 61-66. 
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Resilience 
Insulation and resilience are closely interrelated and help develop the concept of 
autonomy. Insulation is the protection of autonomy, and resilience is the maintenance 
of that autonomy. The resilience of the state refers to its capacity to counteract potential 
and actual opposition, whose aims may range from challenging the administrative rule 
to the overthrow of the state." The ability to resist a challenge to a state's autonomy is 
largely influenced by the extent to which it is centralised. Centralisation makes all the 
resources of the state, for instance, the economy, education, welfare, and the military, 
immediately available. 
Resilience can exist in the form of coercive means, the transfer of ideas, or a 
dependency upon national issues." Traditionally, the state's monopoly over 
information has served the interests of the state, but the growth of information 
technology has divested the state of such controls. In its more primitive forms," 
information could be disseminated in conjunction with the objectives of the state. 
Resilience has been perpetuated by the constant portrayal of internal and/or external 
threats to the national interest" 
In conclusion, it is possible to recognise that the subjective variables of malleability, 
vulnerability insulation, and resilience can help the analyst investigate the levels of 
autonomy a state enjoys. With an understanding of autonomy, we are now in a 
Nordlinger, E . , "Taking the State Seriously," in S. Huntington, and M. Werner (eds.). 
Understanding Political Development, (London: LittleBrown, 1987), pp. 379. 
Nordlinger, E . , Taking the State Seriously," in S. Huntington, and M. Weiner (eds.), 
Understanding Political Development, (London: LittleBrown, 1987) pp. 379. 
1 4 These forms are national television, radio, newspaper, and party propaganda. 
"David, S., "Explaining Third World Alignment," World Politics, vol. 43, no. 2, January 1991, pp. 
233-256. 
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position to examine power and its relationship to the state and the international political 
system. 
Power 
Power is a key concept to understanding the behaviour of states. Power is omnipresent 
in all forms of human behaviour; it can be detected at the individual, the state, and the 
systems level." Power is a concept that is extremely difficult to quantify owing to its 
existence in both tangible and intangible forms. 
Power can exist in a potential or a realised form. The conversion from potential power 
to realised power, however, is not always proportionate; this can lead to a situation 
where a state acts beyond its means and capabilities. This makes power a difficult 
commodity to quantify when making decisions, such as, entering a war, or engaging 
in political negotiations." 
Power can simply be considered the ability to get others to do what they would, 
otherwise, not do." This definition works on the assumption that the state attempts to 
influence the decisions taken by other states; nevertheless, the structural determinants 
of the international system compel the state to take decisions that are not in favour of its 
perceived interests." With this working definition, it is possible to proceed to the 
determinants of power. 
36 
Waltz, K. , Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis, (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1968). Waltz makes this distinction between the levels of analysis, and refers to them as the 
first (individual), second (state), and third (system) images. 
5 7 Hindess, B., Discourses of Power: From Hobbes to Foucault, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996), pp. 27-35. 
" Dahl, R., "Balance of Power and World War I," in J. Nye (ed.). Understanding International 
Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History, (New York: HarperCollins, 1993), pp. 50. 
39 
See Syria's entry into the Gulf War coalition in chapter six. 
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The determinants of national power 
If a state is to impose its preferences onto another state, its power projection should be 
greater than the projection of its adversary to succeed in a bilateral challenge or 
exchange.'" Exchanges rarely, include just two actors, as the structure of the 
international system and the existence of interdependent interests invite third parties to 
intervene diplomatically or otherwise. To gauge the power projection of a state it is 
necessary to define the repositories of power, and analyse their relative value. 
If one is to appreciate the role of power in international relations, one has to identify its 
sources. Power can exist in both tangible and intangible forms. The more tangible 
forms of a state's power can be found in: 
• geography; 
• population; 
• natural resources. 
The less tangible repositories of power are located in history and nationalism. I f one 
considers these variables as inputs, the state as the converter, then the power outputs 
can be characterised as: 
• themilitary; 
• economy; 
• information.61 
Couloumbis, T . , and J. Wolfe, Introduction to International Relations: Power and Justice, 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1987), pp. 63-64. 
61 
Merle, M., The Sociology of International Relations, (Leamington Spa: Berg, 1987), pp. 115-187 
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Power inputs 
Before one can assess the power capabilities of a state, one should look at the sources 
of power. The tangible sources of power are the determining variables, and long-term 
guarantors, of a state's position in the international system. 
Geography 
Geography refers to the geopolitical location of a state, and the size of its territory. The 
location of a state, and the number of boundaries it shares with other states often 
determine the level of state vulnerability. Syria, for instance, shares borders with 
Lebanon, Jordan, Israel, Turkey, and Iraq; its geographical location fragments its 
power potential, and increases its vulnerability." Alternatively, the US, with its 
location far away from Europe, could delay its entry into the two contagious wars of 
the twentieth century. Its geographical isolation, from Europe and Africa, has allowed 
it to maximise its geopolitical power potential. 
The size of the territory can endow a state with abundant indigenous resources." South 
Africa and the US have benefited from vast reserves of natural resources, such as 
gold, diamonds, and oil. The size of the US and the Soviet Union contributed to their 
status as superpowers. 
Size, however, has also proven to contain debilitating factors. Before the 
transportation and communication revolution, large territories, such as Russia, and 
China, were rendered vulnerable to the excesses of Turkish, British, and Japanese 
" Seale, P., The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics 1945-1958, (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1965), pp. 46-57. 
" Morgenthau, H., Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, (New York: Knopf, 
1968), pp. 109-110. 
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imperialism. The utility of geography, as a source of national power, depends on the 
cohesion and distribution of its population." 
Population 
The size, composition, and distribution of a population can have an important impact 
upon national power. A large population can provide an input into industrialisation, 
militarisation, and national purpose." It can sustain a long-term war (Iran-Iraq), and 
can provide an engine for economic change (China)." A large population is not, 
however, sufficient in itself to produce these goals. Algeria and Egypt have substantial 
populations, but they have not propelled their respective states towards the centre or 
the semi-periphery of the global economy." For a state to achieve empowerment 
through its population, the state must enjoy: 
• social cohesion; 
• high level of universal education; 
• an adequate distribution, and maintenance of skills; 
, 68 
• a national purpose. 
Natural resources 
Resources are another tangible form of state power. Natural resources can elevate the 
position of a state in the international system. I f they are successfully converted and 
realised, natural resources can enhance the influence of a state, both in regional and 
64 
Merle, M., The Sociology of International Relations, (Leamington Spa: Berg, 1987), pp. 123-126. 
" Morgenthau, H., Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, (New York: Knopf, 
1968), pp. 118-121. 
66 
Merle, M., The Sociology of International Relations, (Leamington Spa: Berg, 1987), pp. 127. 
67 
Farques, P., "Demographic Explosion or Social Upheaval," in G. Salame (ed.), Democracy Without 
Democrats? The Renewal of Politics in the Muslim World, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1994), pp. 158-
160. 
" Merle, M., The Sociology of International Relations, (Leamington Spa: Berg, 1987), pp. 154. 
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global terms. The extraction, appropriation, and control of natural resources 
correspond to the conversion of potential power into realised power. The educated 
population factor applies at this point to the efficacy of the state's control over its own 
resources and concomitantly to its own power. When a state is unable to manage its 
resources, through a lack of technical expertise and training, it must sacrifice part of its 
power to external assistance." 
Natural resources, such as oil , have given global priority to some of the Middle 
Eastern states. Although a number of these states are confined within small territories, 
the presence of oil has emboldened their position in the international system. These 
states have undergone rapid development, and their relevance to global matters has 
become paramount.70 
Oil has, however, significantly impinged upon the power of these states. The 
independent power of oil-producing Gulf Arab States reached its apogee in 1973/1974, 
during the imposition of the oil embargo, but since then the supply of oil has been 
regular and progressively cheaper.7' The major powers of the international system 
exercise power according to their national interests. Their economies have become too 
dependent upon an inexpensive, uninterrupted supply of oil , and cannot sustain a 
reduction in the levels of production, or a price hike. 
Being a source of power, natural resources can empower or enslave a state. Many of 
the Third World states exist in the periphery of the global economy. Through policies 
of economic imperialism, their natural resources have been appropriated, by the core 
69 
A clear cut example of this is the case of the Gulf Arab states which have depended upon migrant 
labour and Western expertise. 
7 0 The US-led coalition of the Gulf conflict demonstrated the significance of the Gulf Arab states. 
7 1 Luard, E . , The Globalization of Politics: The Changed Focus of Political Action in the Modern 
World, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 152-153. 
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states, on unfavourable terms. The dependency of the periphery upon the core is 
perpetuated by an uneven exchange of natural resources in return for expensive 
consumer products. Natural resources, therefore, have been a double-edged sword for 
the Third World. 
Evidently, it is easier to perceive geography, population, and natural resources as 
sources of power whereas history and nationalism are more difficult to ascertain. 
History and nationalism 
History is a psychological source of power; it plays a major role in constructing self-
perception and national identity. States perceive themselves either as the pioneers and 
standard bearers of modern history (the US), or the losers of glorious empires (Great 
Britain). Common historical experiences, founded in culture, religion, and linguistics, 
produce cohesion within confessions, communities, states, and civilisations." These 
historical experiences often feed into another ephemeral base of power - nationalism." 
Utilised as an instrument of power, nationalism can empower a state, by mobilising a 
population behind a national cause. It is an esoteric force that can energise a 
population, often over territorial and economic issues, and can produce dynamic 
results, such as a propensity for independence, industrialisation, and war.74 The 
Germanic expression of nationalism, and the more recent cases in the former 
Yugoslavia, provide some indication of the power of nationalism. 
7 2 See Halliday's rebuff of Huntington's seminar paper on the Gash of Civilisations: Halliday, F. , "A 
New World Myth," New Statesman, 4 April 1997, pp. 42. 
" Hinsley, F . , Nationalism and the International System, (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1973), pp. 
11-24. 
4 Stoessinger, J . , "The Anatomy of the Nation-state and the Nature of Power," in R. Little, and M. 
Smith (eds.), Perspectives on World Politics, (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 31. 
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The relevance of nationalism to state behaviour is open to fluctuation. Nationalism can 
imbue the state with legitimacy, particularly, when the state's security is under threat. 
Hence, nationalism cannot be described as a static input; it is subject to the changes that 
take place in the political environment. For example, nationalism in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Serbia, and Croatia has been on the increase since the collapse of 
Yugoslavia whereas the second Gulf War rang the death knell for any remnants of 
Arab nationalism. The state's ability to convert the potential of nationalism is 
dependent upon its potency. 
The state can transform the power inputs of geography, population, natural resources, 
history, and nationalism into power outputs. This allows a state to project its 
capabilities onto the regional and international political system. 
Power outputs 
The conversion of power inputs into outputs has traditionally been perceived within the 
context of the military and/or security capabilities of the state. Power outputs have 
served the interests of high politics, especially in areas such as national security." 
Economic security, and personal security have played subordinate roles to the issues of 
high politics.76 The following section will highlight the outputs of power and their 
contributions to national power. The outputs of power mainly include: 
• the military; 
• the economy; 
• information. 
7 5 Buzan, B., People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold 
WarEra, (Boulder Lynne Rienner, 1991), pp. 60. 
7 < Knorr, K. , On the Uses of Military Power in the Nuclear Age, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1966), pp. 17-34. 
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The military 
The military is the most familiar repository of national power. Military capability, in 
both quantitative (troops and armaments) and qualitative (high tech weapons systems, 
training, morale, and cohesion) terms, is the residual power base of any state; it is the 
ultimate source of diplomacy" The military capability of a state can act as a deterrent, 
in real terms and in reputation, to a threatening state. 
The relationship between the state and the military is critical. In the states of the West, 
the military forms part of the institutional framework of the state, and is accountable to 
the public. It is firmly sited in the barracks. The military in the Third World, however, 
has enjoyed a different experience to its peers in the First World. 
The military is more pervasive in the new states of the Third World. Owing to their 
contemporary role in the formation of states, the leaders of the military often occupy 
sensitive posts in the regime. The military constitutes the backbone of the regime 
because of the deficit of legitimacy prevalent in the Third World states. The military in 
some Third World states has been called upon to support their regimes when facing 
insurrections or civil wars. Moreover, the military has intervened on numerous 
occasions in domestic politics without the behest of the state. For example, the military 
in Pakistan has frequently intervened in political affairs, since independence in 1947;™ 
in Algeria, the military and security services overturned the democratic experiment, in 
1991/1992.7' 
Tickner, J . , "Re-visioning Security," in K. Booth, and S. Smith (eds.), International Relations 
Theory Today, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 176, and Carr, E . , The Twenty Years Crisis: 
1919-1939, (London: Macmillan, 1939). 
Ballard, R., "Effects of Labour Migration from Pakistan," in H. Alavi, and J. Harriss (eds.). 
Sociology of "Developing Societies": South Asia, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989), pp. 119. 
Ghiles, R , "Algeria Again at the Crossroads," Middle East International, no. 417, 24 January 1992, 
pp. 3-4. 
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The economy 
The economy as an output of the state's power can affect the behaviour of other states 
without incurring or precipitating war. Trade and commerce form a mutual point of 
contact among states. A buoyant national economy will allow a state to influence the 
behaviour of its trading partners, especially those within its regional sub-system. The 
US, for instance, holds considerable sway over the economic policies of its southern 
neighbours. The competition that emerges among trading states assumes an economic 
persuasion in their quest for markets. 
The competition amongst the imperial powers of Great Britain, Germany, and France, 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was motivated by their desire to acquire 
economic power. This competition intensified their struggle for controlling colonies. 
These powers sought to acquire resource-rich colonies in order to secure the inputs for 
their production at home. The exportation of consumer goods to their respective 
colonies, allowed the imperial states to increase their power base. The military 
capabilities of the imperial powers enabled them to conquer new territories, then 
subvert the indigenous economies to their own interests. 
Though this form of economic colonialism has passed, its legacy is now manifest in 
the structure of the global economy. The conclusion of this period of history and the 
advent of the global economy have transformed economic colonialism into economic 
imperialism. The use of military force has receded into the annals of history; the rise of 
Japan as an economic power without a military base provides a clear cut example of 
Chomsky opines that this hypothesis is based on a false premise. He asserts that the Cold War and 
the second Gulf War demonstrated that force still guarantees the economic interests of the major 
powers. This idea is elaborated upon in chapter two. 
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As the system of states becomes increasingly globalised, and the economies of these 
states move towards integration, a defining feature of a state's economic power can be 
found in its ability to compete effectively in the global market. National economies 
have become dependent upon the ability of states and their respective non-state actors 
to compete in a rigorous global market. This intensive competition is represented in the 
activities of TNCs, that have been facilitated by the globalisation of production. Basing 
their operations in different countries enables TNCs to minimise their costs, by 
enjoying access to cheap resources, whilst gaining entry to multiple markets." 
These TNCs are contained in a global economy which is built upon: 
• the expansion of high technology; 
• the growth of service industries; 
• the information systems revolution. 
Information 
Information has become an output of state power, in its own right; and yet it contains a 
potential to circumvent the national power of the state. As a source of power, 
information can be used to control or mobilise the masses. Alternatively, information 
can subvert the predominant ideology of the state, expose the fallibility of the 
government, and challenge the state's monopoly of truth. 
Traditionally, information has been open to manipulation by the state to serve its own 
interests." The control of information has often been exercised by regimes, or states, 
either in a direct or indirect method. The direct method operates where the state owns 
81 
Chase-Dunn, G , Global Formation: Structures of the World-Economy, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 
pp. 236-237. 
82 
McQuail, D., Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction, (London: Sage, 1989), pp. 56. For 
more details on this subject see: Gramsci, A., Selections from the Prison Notebooks, (London: 
Lawrence & Wishart, 1971). 
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the various media outlets. Regulation and censorship guarantee that the subject matter 
does not contain any subversive references to the state or its leadership. The indirect 
method of information control was identified by the Frankfurt School. They point to 
the complex patterns of ownership of the media, and to the ideological content of its 
information." Althusser writes: 
Ideology, in the form of a distorted definition of reality, the picture of 
class relationships, and the imaginary relationships of individuals to 
their real conditions of existence, is not dominant in the sense of being 
imposed by force or by ruling classes, but is a pervasive and deliberate 
cultural influence which serves to interpret experience of reality in a 
covert but consistent matter.84 
In this analysis, the media transmits the values of the dominant social group in the 
society, thus providing legitimacy for the prevailing order." 
The history of the press, in nineteenth century England, lays testament to the influence 
and the potential of the press.86 It represented a struggle between the state and the 
society; the state often reverted to seizing and closing printing presses, and the 
imprisonment of newspapers editors. The state attempted to incorporate the press into 
the establishment in order to control the flow of information. This rather crude 
relationship still characterises the dynamics between state and society in some Third 
World states.87 Television stations, publishers, and the press are not all state-owned. 
Si 
For details of the Frankfurt School see: Marcuse, H., One Dimensional Man, (London: Routledge. 
1964). 
84 
Althusser, L . (ed.), "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," Lenin and Philosophy and Other 
Essays, (London: New Left, 1971). 
ss 
Mouffe, C. (ed.), "Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci," Gramsci and Marxist Theory, (London: 
Roudedge, 1979), pp. 180. 
Si 
McQuail, D., Mass Communication Theory: An Introduction, (London: Sage, 1989), pp. 11-12. 
SI 
In Syria and Jordan, television is limited to three channels, and each channel appears to be 
sycophantic to their respective state leaders. Their newspapers are equally subservient to the interests 
of its leaders. 
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but they serve the political interests of the ruling elite, and are generally referred to as 
the mobilisation press.™ 
The revolution in information technology has set a challenge to the traditional 
relationship between the society and the state. Access to information from numerous 
sources has given populations an alternative source of news. Information can be 
transmitted through a variety of ways that transcend terrestrial and national control. 
The proliferation of satellites has contributed to the global flow of information and the 
delivery of information and intelligence in real time. Electronic mail has started to 
establish a global network between international and national institutions, 
governments, interest groups, populations, and individuals. States, therefore, can be 
made more accountable to their constituencies as their monopoly over information is 
broken. 
Modern information technology as an output of power operates beyond the limits of 
international boundaries. The dissemination of information is no longer confined to 
distribution through cassettes, as in the case of Iran, or the Voice of America. Its 
global impact is immense, particularly in relation to its potential to promote 
homogeneity over heterogeneity, capitalism over communism, and consumerism over 
religion. Those countries which are at the pioneering edge of information technology, 
are able to circumvent the culturally, religiously, and ideologically-specific orientations 
of states. Their method of achieving this is to disseminate voluminous amounts of 
information stressing their own values. For example, the US-led information 
Rugh, W., The Arab Press: News, Media, and Political Process in the Arab World, (London: Croom 
Helm, 1979), pp. 31. 
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technology played a significant role in combating Soviet influence during the latter 
stages of the Cold War." 
Security 
Traditionally, national security has focused on the physical security of international 
boundaries. The preoccupation of decision-makers within the state has been the 
maintenance of secure borders against external threats. From this perspective, national 
security is tangible and quantifiable as it is concerned with ensuring the territorial 
integrity of the state.'0 
National security vs state security 
National security implies safety for the nation. In the First World, where nation-states 
are the norm, it is relatively easy to connote national security. The security of the 
French nation, for instance, corresponds to French territory. However, this is not the 
case for all nations. 
National security is a difficult concept to analyse where state and nation are not 
synonymous. In the Arab World, where states are a new creation; the Arab nation 
encompasses the states of the region giving rise to the Arab system." National security 
has often been used to refer to the protection of the Arab nation, rather than specific 
states. 
Nye, J . , W. Owens, and E. Cohen, "A Technological Revolution Is Transforming the Nature of 
Power. And the United States Is Clearly in the Lead," Foreign Affairs, vol. 75, no. 2, March/April 
19%, pp. 20-36. 
90 
Buzan, B., People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold 
WarEra, (Boulder Lynne Rienner, 1991), pp. 60. 
91 
Noble, P., T h e Arab System: Pressures, Constraints, and Opportunities," in B. Korany, and A. 
Dessouki (eds.). The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Change, (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1991), pp. 49-102. 
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In the unconsolidated states of the Third World, identifying the recipient of security 
adds another complication to the notion. As most of these states were artificially 
created, by the imperial powers, the incumbent states lack legitimacy, and, therefore, 
their regimes feel insecure. In their attempt to legitimise their existence, these regimes 
are willing to jeopardise the security of their populations in order to preserve their own 
survival. This leads one to pose the question: who are the beneficiaries of state 
security? 
Security for whom? 
In established democracies, it is reasonable to expect that the state, its institutions, and 
population are the beneficiaries of national security. The tacit contract between the state 
and the society is reflected in the faith the population places in the state to conduct 
affairs." Nonetheless, this does not apply to the Third World states. 
The newly emerged states in the Third World have yet to stabilise their positions vis-a-
vis their societies. Unpopular authoritarian or minority regimes often face dissension. 
From this perspective, a dialectic arises about where and to whom the concept of 
security applies. For example, in Iraq the regime prioritises its survival over the 
welfare of the population; in domestic terms, the security of the population is 
subordinate to the security of the regime while the security of the borders is vital to the 
survival of the state." State security for the regime of Saddam Hussein does not 
include the welfare of the Kurds in northern Iraq, or the Shi'as in the southern 
marshlands.'4 
92 
Hague, R., and M. Harrop, Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction, (London: 
Macmillan, 1987). pp. 115. 
93 
Ball, A., Modern Politics and Government, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 32. 
94 
North, A., "Southern Iraq: Flight from the Marshes," Middle East International, no. 458, 10 
September 1993, pp. 20. 
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However, conceiving security in terms of the protection of the regime is a very limited 
approach. Defining security as such does not take into consideration the security needs 
of the population. Security, in other words, must encompass the welfare of the citizens 
of the state. Therefore, the definition of security needs to be broadened to include 
aspects of economic and personal security." Thomas focuses upon economic and 
environmental issues, such as the quality of life in terms of financial stability, welfare 
provision, universal education, and social cohesion; all of these factors contribute to a 
more comprehensive definition of the security of the state.'* This moves the concept of 
security beyond safety from violence to safety from the degradation of the quality of 
life." 
In this section, I intend to incorporate this broader definition of security for the 
purposes of this study. I shall examine the notions of national security (state), 
economic security (international), and personal security (domestic). 
National security (state) 
National security refers to: 
• the durability of national borders; 
• the ability to maintain the territorial integrity of these borders; 
• the maintenance of domestic order ; 
• the preservation of existing political systems of government. 
95 
Tickner, J . , "Re-visioning Security," in K. Booth, and S. Smith (eds.). International Relations 
Theory Today, (Cambridge: Polity Press. 1995), pp. 190. For more information see: Walker, R., 
"Security, Sovereignty, and the Challenge of World Politics," Alternatives, vol. 15, pp. 3-27. 
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Tickner, J . , "Re-visioning Security," in K. Booth, and S. Smith (eds.), International Relations 
Theory Today, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 182. 
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Tickner, J . , "Re-visioning Security," in K. Booth, and S. Smith (eds.). International Relations 
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According to these criteria, national security depends on a state's capacity to defend its 
borders and institutions either by consensus, or force. Being the repository of power, 
the state is responsible for national security." 
National security is the ultimate responsibility of the state., but weak states are often 
compelled to join security pacts with more potent allies. Where collective security is 
organised, for example, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), South East Asian 
Treaty Organisation (SEATO), and the former Warsaw Pact, its prime objective is to 
deter aggression against member states. Collective security can adopt a regional and/or 
international characteristic." 
During the Cold war, the organisation of these pacts was determined by the interests of 
the superpowers. The superpower conflict between the Soviet Union and the US was 
reflected in the balance of power between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Some 
theorists, however, are doubtful about the efficacy of collective security. They point 
out that the durability of such collective security units cannot be guaranteed, as 
ultimately state interests prevail over collective interest of those units.100 
Economic security (international) 
Economic security has become dependent upon the global economy. Many Third 
World states, often debt-laden, as recipients of international loans are being 
encouraged to implement programmes of economic liberalisation recommended by the 
98 
Buzan, B., People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold 
WarEra, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991), pp. 57-58. 
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(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1987), pp. 87. 
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IMF."" As these programmes demand the removal of subsidies from staple products, 
states are losing control over the provision of welfare for their populations. These 
states are being forced to trade their economic autonomy for the guarantee of loans. 
The economic determinants of the global economy often work to the detriment of social 
security, and help to polarise the divisions within society.'" 
The inclusion of economic factors into the formulation of national security should take 
heed of the experience of the states of the South. It should also pay attention to the 
regularity of secure systems of food, and health. The gross structural inequality 
between the North and the South, preserved by international capitalism, according to 
Wallerstein, can only exacerbate the insecurity of the South, thereby infringing upon 
the security of the North.'" 
The interdependent features of the global economy have integrated the economies, and, 
thus, the fortunes of the Southern and Northern states. The states of the North are 
exigent upon Southern markets to sell their products, and evidently, i f the Southern 
states are economically insecure, eventually , they wil l not be able to purchase the 
produce of the North. A principal known in economics as beggar thy neighbour. 
Bienefeld, M., "Is a Strong National Economy a Utopian Goal at the End of the Twentieth 
Century?," in R. Boyer, and D. Drache (eds.), States against Markets: The Limits of Globalization, 
(London: Routledge. 19%), pp. 421-422, and Chomsky, N., World Orders, Old and New, (London: 
Pluto Press, 1994). pp. 129. 
Bienefeld, M., "Is a Strong National Economy a Utopian Goal at the End of the Twentieth 
Century?," in R. Boyer, and D. Drache (eds.), States against Markets: The Limits of Globalization, 
(London: Routledge, 19%), pp. 422-425, and Snow, D., Distant Thunder: Third World Conflict and 
the New International Order, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), pp. 39-43. 
Gilpin, R., The Political Economy of International Relations, (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1987), pp. 270. 
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Personal security (domestic) 
The quality of life cannot be solely measured by material means; Falk suggests that 
security in one's personal life is fundamental to the quality of life. Falk implies that the 
state is responsible for providing sufficient security to engender a high quality of life 
for all its citizens. In this respect, the security of the individual will enhance social 
cohesion, and, therefore, improve national security. The security of the individual is 
not confined to personal safety. It is also dependent upon other factors, such as, race, 
class, and gender, which reach across state, regional, and international boundaries.'" 
Falk further claims that the creative energy for reformulating the concept of security, in 
less exclusive terms, is coming from social movements which operate between and 
across national and international boundaries. Issues such as feminism, 
environmentalism, and freedom from structural violence have bridged elements of 
societies that share common beliefs or interests."" They have arisen from areas where 
personal insecurities are particularly high. They have originated from groups that are 
more concerned with human security than national security.106 
The discipline of international relations has been forced, by current events, to 
reconsider the more narrow versions of the character of security. To appreciate the 
complex nature of security in the late twentieth century it is important to recognise its 
multidimensional character. The interdependent features of global organisation have 
demonstrated how security may exist in numerous forms. Thus, the focus of national 
security has moved away from the purely military perspective, and is beginning to 
Tickner, J . , "Re-visioning Security," in K. Booth, and S. Smith (eds.). International Relations 
Theory Today, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995). pp. 190-192. 
Mishra, R., "The Welfare of Nations," in R. Boyer, and D. Drache (eds.), States against Markets: 
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Tickner, J . , "Re-visioning Security," in K. Booth, and S. Smith (eds.). International Relations 
Theory Today, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995). pp. 190. 
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concentrate more on the security of individuals within the state, and the structural 
inequalities of the international system. 
Having explained the concepts of the state, power, and national security we are now, 
in a position to deal with the three basic paradigms of international relations theory, 
realism, pluralism, and globalism. 
The Paradigms of International Relations Theory 
Realism 
Realism is considered to be a timeless study of power politics; it proffers a universal 
and conclusive understanding of international relations. Power is central to realism: it 
exists in the three levels of analysis, the individual, the state, and the system.107 For the 
realist, power is accumulated, monopolised, and exercised by the state. The presence 
of power in realism has often been sighted as generating a self-fulfilling prophecy in 
the eyes of policy makers."" It is folly, though, to dismiss the role of power in 
international relations as power is an omniscient feature of human activity. 
The balance of power 
109 
The balance of power theory belongs to realism. There are many definitions of the 
balance of power. Ernst Haas proposed eight meanings,"0 Hans Morgenthau made use 
Waltz, K., Man, the State and War, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968). 
Waltz, K. , "Anarchic Orders and Balances of Power," in R. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and Its 
Critics, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 117. 
The author recommends this book: Shcehan, M., The Balance of Power, History and Theory, 
(London: Routledge, 19%). 
Haas, E . , Beyond the Nation-state, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964). 
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of four different notions,'" and Martin Wight identified nine variants of the theory."2 
Of the numerous definitions of the balance of power, the most appropriate one to this 
study is codified as the distribution of power in the international political system.113 
The balance of power theory operates from the assumption that the structure of the 
international political system is anarchic; "self-help is necessarily the principle of action 
in an anarchic order"."4 States are motivated by their national interests, and naturally 
compete with each other for resources both within a regional and international context. 
Morgenthau identified two modes of balance of power: 
• pattern of direct opposi tion; 
• pattern of competition."5 
" Morgenthau, H., Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, (New York: Knopf, 
1968), pp. 168. 
" J Waltz, K. , "Anarchic Order and Balances of Power," in R. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and Its 
Critics, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 116. 
" J Waltz, K. , "Anarchic Order and Balances of Power," in R. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and Its 
Critics, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 117. 
I M Waltz, K., Theory of International Politics, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), pp. 111. 
" S Morgenthau, H., Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, (New York: Knopf, 
1968), pp. 166-171. 
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At the international system level, the balance of power is believed to deter war, as it 
governs the distribution of power. The functions of the balance of power have been 
summarised by Hedley Bull as: 
• the existence of a balance of power throughout the international system as a 
whole has served to prevent the system from being transformed, by conquest, 
into a universal empire. 
• the existence of local balances of power has served to protect the independence 
of states, in particular areas, from absorption or domination by a locally 
preponderant power. 
• both general and local balances of power have provided the suitable conditions 
for other institutions,"4 on which international order depends, to operate."7 
As a perfunctory instrument for governing the world and regional orders, the balance 
of power has fulfilled these functions. 
Bull and Hoffman, however, suggest that not only is the balance of power theory a 
crude tool of analysis, but also it has been responsible for the numerous wars that have 
taken place since 1945."8 Although there is considerable debate about the utility of the 
balance of power, it will become clear later that the balance of power, as a concept, is 
critical to this study. The balance of power is recognised by realists as a policy-making 
instrument utilised by those who exercise power within each state. It is considered to 
116 
These institutions refer to diplomacy, war, international law, and great power management. 
" 7 Bull, H., T h e Balance of Power and International Order," in R. Little, and M. Smith (eds.), 
Perspectives on World Politics, (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 115. 
118 
Buzan, B., People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold 
WarEra, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991), pp. 165. 
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be the most effective instrument for averting war or checking the hegemonic 
pretensions of emerging states."' 
As a regulating instrument, the balance of power is exclusively concerned with states. 
The acquisition of power, which is a transmutable product, remains rooted at the state 
level. In other words, the distribution of power within the international political system 
resides with the state. 
The emphasis placed upon the central role of the state, and the primacy given to power 
acquisition make realism the most appropriate paradigm to this study. However, before 
one can debate the applicability of realism, it is necessary to provide a basic outline of 
its tenets. There are four main assumptions in the realist paradigm that can be 
summarised as follows: 
(i) the state is the principal actor in international relations; 
(ii) the state is unitary; 
(iii) the state is a rational actor; 
(iv) the state is pre-occupied with national security.'10 
The state is the principal actor 
The realist considers the state to be the main actor in international relations. The state is 
responsible for all the activities that take place within its territories. As a sovereign 
entity, the state organises and conducts its foreign policy according to its national 
119 
Luard, E , The Balance of Power: The System of International Relations 1648-1815, (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1992), pp. 1-29. 
120 
Keohane, R. (ed.). Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond," Neorealism and Its 
Critics, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 164-165. 
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interest. Domestic and international organisations are regulated according to the rules 
of the state, and are subordinate to its decision-making process.121 
The state is unitary 
According to realism, states exist in an international political system that is governed 
by anarchy. The system lacks a central authority or supranational government to 
impose international law upon the state. In this environment, the state is compelled to 
become unitary in order to counter the potential threat from other states. The inherent 
insecurity of the state, a derivative of the international political system, serves as a 
common interest to unify the actors within the state.1" Differences within the state are 
necessarily resolved in order to evade the threat to national security. 
The state is a rational actor 
The state is ordered and organised according to the pursuit of its national interest. The 
process of decision-making within the state, determined by national interest, is 
achieved through the employment of a rational process. A rational foreign policy 
decision-making process would include: 
• a statement of objectives; 
• the consideration of all feasible alternatives in terms of the existing capabilities of 
the state; 
• the possibility of attaining these objectives using the alternatives under 
consideration; 
• the benefits and costs associated with each alternative. 
Viotti, P., and M. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, 
(London: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 6. 
Viotti, P., and M. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, 
(London: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 6. 
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The rational determinants of the decision-making process are an expression of national 
interest concurring with the concern for national security.'" 
National security 
Anarchy is inherent in the international political system; it produces the enduring 
competition for the balance of power. A transition in the balance of power provides the 
aggressor state with puissance, and increases the national insecurity of the lesser state. 
A significant shift in the balance of power produces an environment for contagious 
war. War, it is deemed, is an inevitable feature of the state of anarchy.124 
National security is critical to the paradigm of realism. Determined by the requisites of 
national interest, national security takes precedence over all aspects of domestic policy. 
This introduces the useful distinction between high politics (military security and 
strategic issues) and low politics (economic and social issues). Realism asserts that 
low politics is subordinate to the interests of high politics in the field of international 
relations.'" 
'" Viotti, P., and M. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, 
(London: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 6-7. 
'" Brown, S., International Relations in a Changing Global System: Toward a Theory of the World 
Polity, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 62, and Waltz, K., "Anarchic Orders and Balances of 
Power," in R. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and Its Critics, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1986), pp. 111-115. 
2 5 Viotti, P., and M. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, 
(London: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 7. 
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Realism and Neo-realism 
The study of realism has been attributed to numerous historical thinkers, such as 
Thucydides'" and Machiavelli,127 thus providing realism with an ahistorical pedigree. 
Realism is grounded in a basic understanding of human nature. As a timeless and 
universal constant, human nature is depicted by realists as egoistic. Self-preservation 
and self-interest motivate human behaviour. Human destiny is, therefore, marked by 
the struggle for survival through a competition for finite resources.'2' Throughout their 
competition, individuals have formed themselves into organisational units to maximise 
their potential. The historical progress of human organisation has led to the complex 
form of the state. 
The state and the international political system are constructs of human endeavour. The 
behaviour of states and the nature of the international system owe their characteristics 
to the blue-print of human nature. According to this perception, human nature pervades 
the Second and Third Images of international politics.'2' 
Neo-realism is based on the same assumptions as realism, but rather than locate human 
nature as the source of state behaviour, neo-realism places its emphasis on the structure 
of the international political system. Neo-realism, or structural realism, identifies the 
natural state of anarchy, within which states exist, as the main determinant of state 
126 
Thucydides wrote bis memoirs of the Peloponnesian War (431-404 B Q ; he identified the balance of 
power as a source for regulating relations between states. See Couloumbis, T. , and J. Wolfe, 
Introduction to International Relations: Power and Justice, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1987), 
pp. 167. 
1 2 7 Machiavelli, N., The Prince, (Oxford: Oxford University, 1986). Machiavelli's handbook for 
Princes was based upon the central tenets of what Morgenthau has termed political realism. 
128 
Waltz, K. , Man, the State and War, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 85-86. 
1 2 9 Waltz, K. , Man, the Slate and War, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968). 
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behaviour. Survival is the primordial reason for the state, where behaviour is governed 
by self-help in a system of states."0 
Neo-realism avers that the behaviour of states is dictated by universal laws that 
emanate from the structure of the system of states. The differentiation among states in 
terms of size, population, and geopolitics affects the power-ratio of relations, 
nevertheless, all states function according to the determinants of the international 
political system. Consequently, the behaviour of states is codified by the system rather 
than domestic concerns. 
Both realists and neo-realists agree that the internal dynamics of states, such as the 
domestic political system, are not relevant to the formulation of foreign policy. Foreign 
policy should be based upon a rational set of objectives i f the state is to survive in the 
anarchic arena. The balance of power presents the opportunity for states to protect their 
sovereignty. 
Pluralism 
Pluralism owes its legacy to a combination of idealism and liberalism. Unlike in 
realism, power is not the central theme in pluralism, it is more concerned with the 
notions of co-operation, co-existence, and interdependence. The role of co-operation 
and interdependence in pluralism places the stress away from the state of anarchy and 
towards the notion of peaceful co-existence. For the realists, Thomas Hobbes1 
Leviathan"1 provided an insight into human nature, social organisation, and 
'J<> Brown, S., International Relations in a Changing Global System: Toward a Theory of the World 
Polity, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), pp. 61. 
1 3 1 Hobbes, T. , Leviathan, (London: Penguin, 1985). 
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international relations. Pluralists, on the other hand, regard Rousseau's social contract 
theory'" as more apposite to understanding international relations. 
Pluralists stress the interdependent nature of the global economy. The success of 
global capitalism is considered to be an inevitable triumph for the common good; in 
fact, it was thought to mark the end of history.'" Fukuyama applauds the globalisation 
of capital, and sees this development as the end point of a rational working out of 
historical forces.'34 The demise of the Soviet Union was the indicator that capitalism 
had subdued the evils of communism: "It was the struggle for recognition ... of the 
world-wide ideological struggle that called forth daring, courage, imagination and 
idealism".'3' 
The pluralist image of international relations is based on four main assumptions: 
(i) non-state actors are important; 
(ii) the state is not an unitary actor; 
(iii) the state is not a rational actor; 
(iv) the agenda of international politics is extensive. 
Rousseau, J . , The Social Contract, (London: Penguin, 1987). 
1 3 3 Little, R., "International Relations and the Triumph of Capitalism," in K. Booth, and S. Smith 
(eds.), International Relations Theory Today, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 78. 
1 3 4 Little, R., "International Relations and the Triumph of Capitalism," in K. Booth, and S. Smith 
(eds.). International Relations Theory Today, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 62. 
1 3 5 Booth, K., "Dare Not to Know: International Relations Theory versus the Future," in K. Booth, 
and S. Smith (eds.), International Relations Theory Today, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 
338. 
3 6 Viotti, P., and M. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, 
(London: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 192-193. 
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Noti'State actors 
Protagonists of the pluralist school recognise that non-state actors can play an 
important role in international relations. TNCs, international agencies, and international 
137 
organisations have emerged as major players in world affairs. TNCs can circumvent 
the constraints placed upon them by host states, through their substantial economic 
powers. They have managed to invert the power relationship by using the threat of 
138 
withdrawal, from the host state, i f they are not offered adequate concessions. In 
139 
some cases, states have become hostages to the will of TNCs. 
Non-state actors have risen in prominence in the global economy during this century.'40 
One only has to consider the function of the IMF and the World Bank to appreciate 
how non-state actors have shaped the policies of the global economy. Many Third 
World economies have been unable to resist global capitalism and its prescription of 
economic liberalisation."" 
From a political perspective, many states have lost a degree of their autonomy, due to 
the activities of non-state actors. Political decisions have become more accountable to 
1 3 7 In fact Chomsky calls TNCs "de facto world government," as they own and control one-third of the 
world's private capital. See: Chomsky, N., World Orders, Old and New, (London: Pluto Press, 
1994), pp. 181. 
I3S 
Krasner, S., "Power Politics Institutions, Transnational Relations," in T. Risse-Kappen (ed.). 
Bringing Transnational Relations Back In: Non-State Actors, Domestic Structures and International 
Institutions, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 267-276, and Petrella, R., 
"Globalization and Internationalization: The Dynamics of the Emerging World Order," in R. Boyer, 
and D. Drache (eds.), States against Markets: The Limits of Globalization, (London: Routledge, 
19%), pp. 74-75. 
139 
Dunning, J . , The Globalization of Business, (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 309. 
140 
The TNC of the twentieth century is not a new phenomenon; its precursor could be identified as the 
East India Company, which started trading in the seventeenth century. See Chase-Dunn, C . Global 
Formation: Structures of the World-Economy, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), pp. 72 
1 4 1 Penrose, E . , "From Economic Liberalization to International Integration: The Role of the State," in 
T. Niblock, and E. Murphy (eds.). Economic and Political Liberalization in the Middle East, 
(London: British Academic Press, 1993), pp. 3-25. 
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the requisites of economic policy, especially for Third World states where autonomy is 
limited, and economic policy is determined by the policies of international agencies, 
such as the IMF. Non-state actors cannot be ignored in light of an increasingly 
integrated global economy, and the concentration of communication systems that 
remain outside the orbit of state control."" 
The state is not an unitary actor 
A familiar interpretation of pluralism rests on the assumption that the state is composed 
of competing pressure groups.'43 The state is the mediator among these various groups, 
and remains autonomous from any one dominant interest group. To the pluralist, the 
state cannot be considered as unitary, as this would fail to appreciate the multiplicity of 
actors that constitute the state. This characteristic model of the state suggests that 
foreign policy decisions are determined by competition, compromise, and coalition-
building. 144 Non-state actors can participate in this process by lobbying governments 
145 
and political parties. 
The state is not a rational actor 
Pluralists contend that the competitive nature of the interest groups, within the state, do 
not create an environment where rational decision-making can take place. The 
competition among interest groups, the compromises, and coalition-building processes 
detract from a coherent and rational foreign policy being formulated. Foreign policy is 
issue-led and open to the influence of apposite interest groups and public opinion. 
4 1 I shall address this issue later in this chapter when referring to information as a major output of 
power. 
1 4 3 Hague, R., and M. Harrop, Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction, (London: 
Macmillan, 1987), pp. 115. 
144 
Hague, R., and M. Harrop, Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction, (London: 
Macmillan, 1987), pp. 37-38. 
143 
Falk, R., "State of Siege: Will Globalization Win Out?," International Affairs, vol. 73„ no. 1, 
January 1997, pp. 123-136. 
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Public opinion can act as a restraining order on policy decisions i f they are deemed to 
contravene the perceived national interest.146 
Agenda of international politics 
Pluralists believe that states are becoming progressively interdependent. As involuntary 
subscribers to the dominant economic system, state economies are organised through 
an international division of labour. Economic issues have gained primacy in 
determining international relations as economic security has acquired a universal 
character in the diminishing world. Issues, such as national security, are losing their 
relevance as economic interdependence ties the economies of each state to the success 
of the global economic order.'47 
Non-state actors and state actors are both playing a role in the integrated global 
economy. Interdependence, according to this paradigm, will promote co-operation 
amongst all actors, and will reduce the necessity for war. As states lose their autonomy 
to international agencies and organisations, and information systems encourage social 
integration, the prospect of war further decreases.'48 
Globalism 
The last paradigm to be used in this study can be termed 'globalism'. It shares some 
features with both realism and pluralism, but is distinguished in its perception of the 
world capitalist system. The emphasis of globalism can be found in its study of 
Hague, R., and M. Harrop, Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction, (London: 
Macmillan, 1987), pp. 36-38. 
1 4 7 Keohane, R., and J. Nye, Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, (Boston: 
LitUeBrown, 1977), pp. 6-8. 
1 4 8 Halliday, F. , "International Relations and Its Discontents," International Affairs, vol. 71, no. 4, 
October 1995, pp. 743. 
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dependency. Whereas pluralists consider the global economy in terms of 
149 
interdependence, globalists view the global economy in terms of dependence. 
Globalists contend that the structure of the world capitalist system perpetuates an 
inequitable relationship between the North and the South.'50 Wallerstein demarcates the 
organisation of the global economy into tfie core and the periphery. In this model, the 
periphery serves the interests of the core; and the inequitable level of exchange ensures 
that the core remains the dominant partner in the relationship. He identifies a transition 
belt between the two poles, known as the semi-periphery, that accommodates NICs, 
such as: Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong.' 5' Japan has been elevated to the core 
group although its military power base does not reflect its economic power.'52 Mobility 
between the poles, however, is strictly limited, and this ensures that the states of the 
periphery remain dependent upon the states of the core.'" 
Globalists use systems analysis as their mode of enquiry. They perceive the economic 
relations between the North and the South as dependent. The outcome of the structure 
and processes of global capitalism represents the next stage of imperialism. Wallerstein 
approaches the succession of capitalism from a diametrically opposed position to the 
pluralists. He denotes that global capitalism perpetuates dependency and oppression. 
149 
Hopkins, K. , and I. Wallerstein (eds.), "Patterns of Development of the Modem World-System," 
World-System Analysis: Theory and Methodology, (Beverley Hills: Sage, 1982), pp. 72. 
ISO 
Wallerstein, I . , "The Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for 
Comparative Analysis," Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 16, no. 4, Autumn 
1974, pp. 387-415. 
' 5' Ehteshami, A., "The Rise and Convergence of the 'Middle' in the World Economy: The Case of the 
NICs and the Gulf," in C. Davies (ed.). Global Interests in the Arab Gulf, (Exeter: Exeter 
University Press, 1992), pp. 141. 
1 5 2 Wallerstein, I . , T h e Rise and Future Demise of the World Capitalist System: Concepts for 
Comparative Analysis," Comparative Studies in Society and History, vol. 16, no. 4, Autumn 
1974, pp. 389. 
'" Chase-Dunn, C , Global Formation: Structures of the World-Economy, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 
pp. 238. 
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His work concentrates on identifying anti-systemic forces that will initiate the next 
systemic phase of global economic and political organisation. 
Globalists adhere to four main assumptions: 
(i) economic globalism defines the international system; 
(ii) the international system defines the level of analysis 
(iii) historical analysis is relevant; 
(iv) dependency is perpetuated by mechanisms of economic domination. 
Economic globalism 
Globalism characterises the international system through the role of the global 
economy. Economics is regarded as the currency of the international system. Instead 
of analysing global politics in terms of a bipolar or a unipolar system, protagonists of 
globalism opine that global capitalism is the defining feature of a hegemonic economic 
order. Global capitalism is the dominant system to which all states belong. There are 
alternative ideologies and economic systems that are considered anti-systemic, but they 
do not constitute a threat to the dominant system. Moreover, anti-systemic forces are 
unable to resist the centripetal force of the global economy.'" 
The international system 
The level of analysis for globalists resides in the international system. Whereas realists 
perceive the state to be the principal actor in the international system, and pluralists 
154 
Little, R., "International Relations and the Triumph of Capitalism," in K. Booth, and S. Smith 
(eds.), International Relations Theory Today, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 62-63. 
"Viotti, P., and M. Kauppi, International Relations Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism, 
(London: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 9-10. 
156 
Wallerstein, I., T h e World System versus World-Systems: A Critique," in A. Gunder Frank, and 
B. Gills (eds.), The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand?, (London: Routledge, 
1993), pp. 295, see also: Wallerstein, I. , "Crisis as Transition," in S. Amin, G. Arrighi, A. Frank, 
and I. Wallerstein (eds.), Dynamics of Global Crisis, (London: Macmillan, 1982), pp. 11-54. 
THE TOOLS OF ANALYSIS 54 
conceive that non-state actors are important, Wallerstein, as a world systems analyst, 
like neo-realists, believes in the primacy of the international system for explaining state 
behaviour. In this instance, the state is not considered to be the primary unit of 
analysis, nor the only receptacle of power. The structure of the system and the 
processes that characterise it are fundamental to understanding the behaviour of 
states.'" 
Historical analysis 
158 159 
Scholars, such as Wallerstein, and Marx, devoted considerable time to 
understanding the historical process, and the evolution of the international system. 
Wallerstein's conception of the global system differs fundamentally from that of the 
neo-realists. Through his study of the evolution and ascent of capitalism, Wallerstein 
characterised the global system not according to the division of the world into a bipolar 
order, but by the succession of a hegemonic economic order.'40 In contrast to the realist 
interpretation of the bipolar structure,16' Wallerstein viewed the Soviet Union and the 
US as being both incorporated into the dominant economic system.'" The balance of 
power theory, therefore, is not relevant to understanding the bipolar period. 
'" Galtung, J . , "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," in R. Little, and M. Smith (eds.). Perspectives 
on World Politics, (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 295-300. 
158 
Wallerstein, I . , Historical Capitalism with Capitalist Civilization, (London: Verso, 1996), and 
Chase-Dunn, C , Global Formation: Structures of the World-Economy, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 
pp. 203. 
139 
Marx, K., and F. Engels, The Communist Manifesto, (London: Penguin, 1985). 
160 
Little, R.," International Relations and the Triumph of Capitalism," in K. Booth, and S. Smith 
(eds.). International Relations Theory Today, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 82. 
161 
The bipolar structure of the world order will be discussed in chapter two. 
' S J Little, R., "International Relations and the Triumph of Capitalism," in K. Booth, and S. Smith 
(eds.). International Relations Theory Today, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 76. 
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Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet Union was not such a remarkable event; it did 
not represent the termination of an alternative economic system.'" 
Mechanisms of economic domination 
The globalist paradigm identifies institutional mechanisms of domination that are 
responsible for the uneven development between the states of the North and the South. 
The mechanisms in the international system serve the interests of those states closer to 
the core. They can be located in: 
• the inequitable distribution and allocation of world resources; 
• the terms of the international division of labour; 
• the allocation of transferred technology; 
• the operation of Western banking systems.'" 
Omnibalancing - the way forward? 
If it is possible to reduce the above paradigms to their absolute minimum, they can be 
summarised by the following terms: 
• realism - power; 
• pluralism - interdependence; 
• global ism - dependence. 
Omnibalancing manages to incorporate components of each paradigm and presents a 
multidimensional model that is more appropriate to the Third World. Omnibalancing 
1(3 
Little, R., "International Relations and the Triumph of Capitalism," in K. Booth, and S. Smith 
(eds.). International Relations Theory Today, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 76-78. 
1 6 4 Gaining, J . , "A Structural Theory of Imperialism," in R. Little, and M. Smith (eds.). Perspectives 
on World Politics. (London: RouUedge, 1992), pp. 295-596. 
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attempts to bridge the division between the international perspective, which is lodged 
in systemic or world systems analysis, and the domestic analysis of state behaviour.'" 
Omnibalancing is unique as it links international and domestic politics; the interaction 
between systemic analysis and domestic politics produces the tenets of omnibalancing. 
It provides us with a model that can account for the multiplicity of inputs that affects 
the behaviour of states. It operates from a realist perspective in the international realm, 
and integrates pluralist and globalist maxims in the domestic field. Omnibalancing is 
founded on the following assumptions: 
(i) power is the focus of international politics; 
(ii) Third World states are not unitary; 
(iii) the leader of the state is a level of analysis; 
(iv) foreign policy is conducted according to a rational criteria.'" 
Power is the focus of international politics 
In keeping with realist thought, omnibalancing stresses the centrality of power to 
governing relations among states. The balance of power emerges as the most effective 
mechanism available for regulating international relations. The balance of power, 
however, is considered to provide an inadequate explanation for Third World states 
behaviour. This is because it is confined to international relations and dismisses the 
relevance of the internal dynamics of states.'" 
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Third World states are not unitary 
Omnibalancing departs from realist and neo-realist analysis when addressing the issue 
of the state. Unlike in realism, the state in the Third World is not considered to be an 
unitary actor. The state is divided and open to vociferous competition from a variety of 
social, ethnic, confessional, and sectoral groups. Competition deviates from that 
portrayed by pluralists, owing to the turbulence of state-building, survival of the 
regime is dependent upon the subjugation of one's opponents. In this case, the 
environment of the domestic arena is perceived as anarchic rather than hierarchical. 
Omnibalancing transposes the anarchy present within the international system onto the 
domestic system. Without an indigenous institutionalised political system to channel 
opposition, through a political process, Third World regimes have been obliged to 
balance the interests of competing groups in order to limit domestic unrest. For David 
then, the balance of power can be used to examine domestic politics, and is an 
analytical tool for explaining state or regime behaviour. 
Regimes of the Third World have tended to be composed of specific ethnic or linguistic 
groups that benefited from the divide and rule policies of previous colonial powers. 
These ruling minority groups have depended upon authoritarian rule, and the creation 
of patrimonial structures to guarantee their survival. With a narrow base of support and 
a constant threat to regime survival, the policies of such ruling groups have been 
conducted according to their particular interests rather than national interests. This has 
been particularly true with the role of state leaders.Ui 
David, S., "Explaining Third World Alignment," World Politics, vol. 43, no. 2, January 1991, pp. 
236. 
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The leader of the state 
A common result of the independence struggles in the Third World has been the 
contagion of coups, and the absence of legitimate governments. Due to the recent 
historical experiences of most Third World states, where states were created artificially 
and not according to contiguous precedents, social cohesion has tended to be low. 
Where social cohesion has been low, state-society relations have often lacked an 
institutional framework to support the role of civil society, and, therefore, a disjuncture 
between regime and society has developed.'" 
David intimates that leaders constitute one of the levels of analysis. In the Third World, 
authoritarian rule has been accompanied by the development of personality cults. State 
leaders have occupied positions that have remained largely uncontested and 
unaccountable to the public.'70 The decision-making process rotates around the interests 
of the leader and his closest aides; decisions taken by the regime are supported by the 
security services and the regime barons to secure regime survival. 
Regime survival is the foremost objective of Third World leaders; this can be achieved 
through balancing the interests of domestic groups, and forming alliances according to 
the regional balance of power.'7' This has led David to re-assert that state interests, in 
the Third World, are necessarily subordinate to the requisites of regime survival. 
Smith, B., Understanding Third World Politics: Theories of Political Change and Development, 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 19%), pp. 175-178. 
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Foreign policy • a rational criterion? 
Systemic factors are held partially responsible for the foreign policies of Third World 
states, but for David, domestic politics play the primary part in shaping the 
determinants of foreign policy."2 Despite the importance that David attaches to the role 
played by domestic politics and the structural forces of the international system in 
forming foreign policy, omnibalancing recognises that foreign policy is based upon a 
rational decision-making process. The political elite balance the constraints and the 
opportunities of the domestic arena against the international system, exercising rational 
policies to maximise the longevity of the regime. By doing so, they offer the regime a 
degree of flexibility and autonomy from both domestic and international constraints. 
David does, however, prioritise the use of internal threats to explain foreign policy 
over the presence of external threats; in this vein Goode suggests that foreign policy is 
domestic policy pursued by other means.'" 
David, S., "Explaining Third World Alignment," World Politics, vol. 43, no. 2, January 1991, pp. 
235. 
Goode, R., "State Building as a Determinant of Foreign Policy in the New States," in L . Martin 
(ed.). Neutralism and Non-alignment, (New York: Praeger, 1962). 
THE TOOLS OF ANALYSIS 60 
Conclusion 
Within chapter one, I have introduced the tools of analysis that will enable us to 
understand how Syria has adjusted to the New World Order. From the tool-kit, I have 
selected to use three principal concepts, the state, power, and national security. These 
concepts are fundamental to analysing state behaviour, especially the formulation of 
foreign policy. 
The state is crucial to comprehending the dynamics of international relations. It has 
been the principal actor in foreign affairs, but is being increasingly forced to share 
some of its responsibilities with other non-state actors, such as TNCs, international 
agencies, and trans-governmental organisations. In effect, the state may be losing 
elements of its autonomy to these international forces. 
Autonomy is the key to understanding how resilient the state is to dominant domestic 
interests. I f the state enjoys relative autonomy from such interests, it can pursue a 
rational policy governed by the national interest. Achieving state autonomy, however, 
does not imply that a state can fulfil its ambitions. In order to pursue its objectives, the 
state must acquire sufficient power. 
Power is central to analysing state behaviour and the international political system. 
States accumulate power in order to preserve their national security, and to exert 
influence over their neighbours. Power can be located at the following levels of 
analysis: the individual, the state, and the system. It exists in at least two forms: 
potential and realised. When realised, power can be used in a number of ways to exert 
influence: diplomatic persuasion, economic aid or sanction, and coercion. 
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States are the foremost repositories of power in the international political system. They 
are responsible for converting potential power into realised power. In the process of 
conversion, the state uses tangible and intangible sources of power to enable it to 
compete in an anarchic environment, and to maximise its national security. In the 
twentieth century, power has become less unidimensional, and possibly more evasive 
to state control. 
The increase in inter-state relations, and the matrix of interdependence and dependence 
amongst the world's states has given economic power a new status. Traditionally, 
where coercion has characterised state relations, complex economic patterns have come 
to dominate the field of international relations. TNCs, international agencies, and trans-
governmental organisations, as the masters of the global economy, have challenged the 
primacy of the state as the principal power broker in the international political system. 
Despite this possible diminution of state power, the state remains the cardinal player in 
the domestic and international areas of politics. This role alone invests the state with 
the responsibility to harness the tangible and intangible sources of power towards the 
preservation of national security. 
National security is a pre-occupation of states. In a world, where states exists in 
anarchy, national security is constantly under threat from the ambitions of hegemonic 
states. It has always been associated with the preservation of national boundaries, and 
the maintenance of territorial integrity. Power accumulation has served the state in its 
pursuit to meter the challenge of hegemonic neighbours. 
Nevertheless, this perception of national security has certain limitations. In an 
integrated global economy, the threat to national security may radiate from a less 
tangible range of sources. Threats to the national security of Third World states, for 
instance, are just as liable to come from the imposition of economic reforms, 
THE TOOLS OF ANALYSIS 62 
provoking domestic unrest, as from the hegemonic agendas of their neighbours. 
National security as a concept, therefore, has recently been broadened, by political 
economists, to incorporate less discernible threats to national security. These include 
the notions of economic security, and personal security. 
The paradigms of international relations theory are constructed from these tools of 
analysis. Each paradigm offers a different conceptualisation of international relations; 
they view these tools of analysis through a kaleidoscopic lens. 
Realism 
Realism contends that the state is the principal actor in the international political 
system. It is solely responsible for conducting foreign relations amongst states. It is 
unitary in form, and extracts power from society, thus enabling it to conduct policies 
according to the national interest and the pre-requisites of power politics. 
Realism asserts that human nature is governed by self-interest. This assessment is 
superimposed onto state behaviour. The imprint of human nature ensures that states 
compete for finite resources, and that the international political system is anarchic. 
Neo-realism, works within the same framework of realism, but claims that the 
structure of the international political system is responsible for governing the behaviour 
of states. Both are in agreement that anarchy characterises the relations amongst states, 
and international politics is an ahistorical process. 
The anarchy within the international political system means that national security takes 
precedence over all forms of foreign policy decision-making. The preservation of 
international order can only be adequately attained through a balance of power achieved 
by the main powers of the international system in the form of a multipolar, bipolar, or 
unipolar structure. The accumulation of power, extracted from intangible and tangible 
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sources, equips the state with the ability to resist potential invasions. Only a unitary 
state can perform this function, and this guarantees the longevity of the state as the 
principal actor in international relations. 
According to realists, the impact of the global economy and the information revolution 
has not managed to circumvent the centrality of the state in international relations. 
Moreover, the increasing role of TNCs in domestic and international affairs have not 
constituted a diminution of state autonomy. The state remains the singular sovereign 
power that conducts the relations among states. International organisations, trans-
governmental bodies and TNCs are compelled to negotiate with the state, i f they are to 
operate within its sovereign territory, and as a result are subordinate entities.'74 
Pluralism 
Pluralism offers an alternative approach to the study of international relations. Whereas 
realism stresses the ahistorical process of international relations and the avaricious 
character of human nature, pluralism recognises the significance of history to the 
processes of human development. The essence of human nature is transmutable; the 
co-operative and benevolent features of human nature can be cultivated and transposed 
from the domestic arena into the international political system. 
Pluralists do not believe that the state is the principle actor in international relations, nor 
do they agree that the state is unitary. The state has been dislodged as the principal 
actor, and has been forced to share its international functions with prominent non-state 
actors. The growth of TNCs, international agencies, and trans-governmental bodies in 
international affairs have undermined the sovereignty of states in conducting their own 
affairs. 
174 
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Pluralists argue that non-state actors are increasingly influencing economic policies, 
and this is beginning to have a profound effect upon the state's autonomy. States are 
experiencing a loss of autonomy in the decision-making process to non-state actors. 
The state then, is in the process of losing its significance, as a principal actor, power 
broker, and economic administrator.'75 
Protagonists of the pluralist paradigm purport that the global economy is integrating 
into a system managed by international agencies. In this system, the state can exercise 
control over its natural resources,'76 but its leverage over the economy is being 
substituted with non-state actors, such as the IMF, trans-governmental bodies, and 
TNCs.' 7 7 
The interdependence that has arisen from the role of TNCs is represented, by 
pluralists, as evidence of historical progression in international relations. 
Interdependence is fundamental to reducing the constant risk of war. Supported by the 
information revolution, interdependence has helped to reduce animosity amongst 
nations, and produce a climate conducive to international co-operation. 
Globalism 
Globalists do not share the optimism of pluralists. They substitute the term 
interdependence with dependence, thus portraying international relations as a 
manifestation of global dependency based upon the exploitation of the Southern 
hemisphere by the Northern hemisphere. 
Streeck, W., "Public Power beyond the Nation-state: The Case Study of the European 
Community," in R. Boyer, and D. Drache (eds.). States against Markets: The Limits of 
Globalization, (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 308-313. 
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Similarly to neo-realists, globalists identify the international system as the principal 
determinant of state behaviour. The globalist paradigm is based upon the dependency 
school, and focuses upon the structural determinants of the world capitalist system. 
Globalists, such as Wallerstein and Gaining examine the mechanisms of domination 
that contribute to the uneven development between the First and the Third Worlds. 
Their analyses shift the focus of realism and pluralism away from the First World 
towards the Third World. Their study of imperialism stresses the economic domination 
of the South by the North, and the permeability of the Third World state to the 
activities of international state and non-state actors. 
Omnibalancing 
The three paradigms alluded to above contain relevant assumptions for this study, but 
they are inappropriate for the following reasons. The emphasis of realism and 
pluralism upon the First World makes these paradigms too general for our research; 
realism is the most apposite paradigm, but its Western-centric approach misses the 
subtleties of our case study. Globalism's focus upon the economy over the role of 
politics may be suitable for the Third World as a whole, but in the case of Syria, it 
would fail to accommodate the primacy of politics in the Syrian state. 
Omnibalancing represents an integrated paradigm that focuses specifically on the states 
of the Third World. It pays attention to the link between domestic and international 
politics, thereby ascertaining their relative influences upon state behaviour. Departing 
from David's analysis, however, the focus of this study will invert his order of 
preference. It will place its emphasis upon the international political system, whilst 
recognising the impact of domestic politics upon foreign policy formulation. 
THE TOOLS OF ANALYSIS 66 
Syria's adjustment to the New World Order wil l be analysed using the revised 
omnibalancing model construed from the three paradigms of international relations 
theory. Owing to Syria's location in the Third World, and in the highly penetrated 
region of the Middle East, this research will be based upon the following assumptions: 
• the state is the principal actor; 
• national security dominates the concerns of the state; 
• the state balances international politics against domestic politics; 
• power accumulation serves the objectives of the state. 
Unlike in any other part of the world, the threats, opportunities, and constraints to the 
states of the Middle East are especially acute. They owe their existence to the 
continuous presence of international actors in the Middle Eastern state-system. The 
penetration of the Middle East region by the world's powers has guaranteed that the 
international political system impinges upon states' foreign policies. In contrast, the 
lack of institutionalisation in many of the states of the Middle East has made them 
particularly susceptible to the configurations of power within the domestic realm. 
To examine Syria's adjustment to the New World Order, it is necessary to understand 
the relationship between the Middle Eastern state-system and the international political 
system. This relationship can be identified in the structure of the international political 
system. The relationship between the two systems has undergone a transformation 
with the advent of the New World Order in 1991. We are, therefore, compelled to 
scrutinise the co-ordinates of the New World Order. 
CHAPTER TWO 
T H E NEW WORLD ORDER 
Introduction 
Before one can ascertain Syria's ability to adjust to the New World Order, it is 
essential to understand the character of that order. The emergence of the New World 
Order did not represent a collapse of an ideological system, but it amounted to a 
radical change in the global balance of power. The new configurations of power have 
radically altered the patterns established during the Cold War, and they have ushered 
in a period of uncertainty. Chapter Two will examine the characteristics of the New 
World Order in order to provide a context in which we can study Syria's role in that 
world order. 
Before proceeding with an analysis of the New World Order, one needs to define the 
concept of the world order, which will be examined according to the three paradigms 
of international relations theory, mentioned in chapter one. 
The World Order 
World order, for the realist, means the regulation of world stability through the 
balance of power mechanism. For Gilpin, the distribution of power among states 
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constitutes the principal form of control in every international system.' World order is 
the product of a stable distribution of power among the major states.2 
The world order is not governed by international law administered by a supranational 
government, but by the competition among the world's hegemonic powers, through 
the balance of power.3 Realism opines that there are two conditions that militate 
against the creation of a supranational political entity: 
(i) the structure of the international political system 
The international political system comprises structure, units, and interaction. 
Neorealists, such as Waltz, consider the structure of the international system 
to be anarchic.4 Systemic theory asserts that the behaviour of units, in this 
case states, is constrained by the structure of the system. In other words, 
anarchy, as the structure of the international political system, determines the 
behaviour of states. The absence of a hierarchical system means that states 
exist in a self-help system, where considerations of security are paramount to 
survival.' States, as the primary units of the international system, compete in 
an anarchic environment where national interests constitute the mode of 
interaction. 
Keohane, R. (ed.). Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and Beyond," Neorealism and Its 
Critics, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 171. 
Nye, J . , "What New World Order?," Foreign Affairs, vol. 71, no. 2, Spring 1992, pp. 83. 
Waltz, K., Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
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Buzan, B., People, States, and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold 
War Era, (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1991), pp. 153. 
Waltz, K., "Anarchic Order and Balances of Power," in R. Keohane (ed.), Neorealism and Its Critics, 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 104. 
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(U) the national interests of states 
Due to the structural constraints placed upon states, the creation of a world 
government is not deemed possible. Waltz notes: 
each state pursues its own interests, however defined, in ways it 
judges best. Force is a means of achieving the external ends of states 
because there exists no consistent, reliable process of a reconciling of 
interests that inevitably arise among similar units in a condition of 
anarchy.' 
Consequently, a stable world order can only be achieved through the impositions of 
hegemonic actors or through a balance of power among states. The distribution of 
power and the maintenance of that balance provides the source of world order for the 
realists. 
The pluralist paradigm emphasises a deterministic view of world history. Human 
civilisation has set upon an historic journey where the elimination of war is a realistic 
and an achievable goal. Achievements within the domestic realm, for example, the 
benefits of universal education, can be transposed onto the international realm. 
The distinction between international and domestic politics is not as pronounced as in 
realism. There is a direct correlation between the progressive tendencies of the state 
and the international political system. For instance, the tendencies of Western states 
towards democratisation, economic liberalisation, and human rights can be 
superimposed onto the international political system. 
World order is developed through the institutionalisation of processes, inter-state 
communications and a progression towards an international society rather than an 
6 Waltz, K., Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1968), pp. 238. 
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international order.7 World order derives from the establishment of universal norms, 
values, and international law. Harmony amongst states is an obtainable objective; 
pluralists argue that it can be achieved through a world order built upon universal 
interest. The interest of world government would supersede the national interests of 
states. 
The domination of the Southern hemisphere by the Northern hemisphere is the 
depiction of the world order by globalists. According to globalists, the world order is 
a system that owes its identity to the pattern of economic exploitation of the South. In 
effect, the world order is governed by the spread of global capitalism, and the 
promotion of free markets which operate against the interests of the indigenous 
populations of the Southern states. The debt crisis guarantees a relationship of 
dependency.8 
The most apposite definition of the world order, for the purpose of this study, is 
codified as the global distribution of power. A change in this distribution of power 
can lead to a transformation in the world order. The following section will elaborate 
on this concept, and validate its applicability to this research. 
The distribution of power 
The transition from the previous world order to the New World Order can be 
attributed to the change in the distribution of global power. The change in the 
balance of power has transformed the international political system from a bipolar 
system to a unipolar or multipolar system. In order to understand the system of the 
7 Watson, A., The Evolution of International Society, (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 299-309. 
8 
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Tauris, 1988), pp. 39-40. 
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New World Order, I shall examine the three different configurations of the balance of 
power. 
Bipolarity 
Bipolarity is a form of balance of power that polarises the world into two hegemonic 
camps. The polarisation is based upon the distribution of power between the two 
main antagonists. It is also a system in which power is distributed in such a way that 
the two states are so powerful that they can defend themselves against any 
combination of states.' 
The distribution of power that characterised the world order between the conclusion 
of World War II and the breakdown of the Soviet Union was bipolar; it is thought to 
have produced far more stability than the multipolarity of the early twentieth 
century.'" Waltz argues that "the bipolar power structure is best in terms of 
international security as it is simpler, more stable and less accident-prone than more 
diffuse systems"." 
It was asserted that the bipolar system was made more sustainable via the addition of 
the nuclear option to international politics. The acquisition of a nuclear capacity was 
considered to have diminished the likelihood of war.12 The absence of pervasive 
9 
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world war between 1945 and 1989 was a testament to the security that bipolarity had 
produced.13 
The hegemonic ambitions of the superpowers were pursued in the states of the Third 
World, but the central powers, the US and the Soviet Union, were insulated from 
regional aspects of the zero-sum game. The zero-sum game was not a definitive 
expression of superpower relations, as there was sufficient flexibility within the 
system to allow for the loss of some states. The Soviet's loss of Egypt, as a client 
state, after Camp David demonstrated the flexibility within the system to allow for 
the loss of superpower influence.'4 Moreover, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
1979 demonstrated the unwillingness of the superpowers to engage in direct conflict, 
despite the prospect of gaining or conceding a client." 
The balance of power between the superpowers during the Cold War was unique in: 
• its definitive separation of Europe; 
• the continuing quests for influence in the Third World; 
• the enormous acquisition of both nuclear and conventional arsenals. 
The conceptualisation of the bipolar political era was reminiscent of previous orders, 
where the main actors searched for power. 
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Multipolarity 
The multipolar division of the world implies that power is distributed among a 
variety of major states; each one contains different sources of power. Through a 
coalition of alliances, a balance is struck among the states, thus curbing any 
hegemonic ambitions of expanding states.18 Where one state develops its capabilities, 
at the expense of its neighbours, thereby constituting a security threat, a realignment 
of forces takes place to curtail the power of the aggressor state. Thus, equilibrium 
governs the anarchic state of affairs that is inherent in international relations. The 
failure to counter-balance the hegemonic traits of developing regional states leads to 
an increased prospect for regional war, and potentiality of contagious wars. 
As a regulator of global stability, multipolarity is less effective than bipolarity in 
providing a mechanism for global security. The extensive number of variables that 
must be taken into consideration before foreign policy decisions are formulated and 
executed increases the likelihood of errors. The multipolar character of Europe, after 
the Westphalian peace of 1648, has often been attributed to generating instability in 
Europe, which has led to two contagious world wars." 
Hegemonic theory, alternatively connotes that, the predominance of one power in a 
system is more conducive to peace. The prevailing power cannot be significantly 
challenged, hence stability becomes a feature of international relations." In 
accordance with this theory, the demise of a hegemonic state and the transfer of 
power into more diverse channels, or the emergence of a new challenger, produces 
Luard, E . , The Balance of Power: The System of International Relations 1648-1815, (New York: St 
Martin's Press, 1992), pp. 1. 
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the potential for an escalated war. The outbreaks of hegemonic struggles, Gilpin 
comments, have most frequently been triggered by fears of ultimate decline, and the 
perceived erosion of power." 
Unipolarity 
Unipolarity is a system of international relations where there is only one dominant 
power in the world which provides stability for the anarchic system through the 
processes of regulation. Regulation, in this sense, can be achieved through the 
traditional methods of control, such as economic assistance, economic threat, and 
military threat. 
Unipolarity places the responsibility of policing the globe upon the hegemonic 
power. It is incumbent upon the unipolar power to placate the economic tensions 
among the major states, and to contain the military threats within the Third World. 
The task is burdensome for a unipolar power, and it is dependent upon the economic 
support of its allies. Consequently, the unipolar power can share the responsibility of 
the world order when dealing with the First World, therefore constituting a soft-form 
of multipolarity, but is assertive of its unipolar hegemony in the regions of the Third 
World. 
The Rise of the New World Order 
The Soviet policies of perestroika and glasnost, introduced after 1985, produced a 
climate for change. They initiated a process that led to the demise of bipolarity as the 
defining feature of international relations, and resulted in the redistribution of global 
power. The changes in the structure of Soviet-US relations in the late 1980s signified 
19 
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a move away from the period of confrontation of the Cold War. It signalled a 
movement towards co-operation between the superpowers. The ubiquitous economic 
crisis of the Soviet Union led its leaders to concede to US political hegemony. The 
power of the Soviet Union was diffused throughout the international political 
system.20 
The reconfiguration of global power gained momentum in 1989. The collapse of the 
Soviet system throughout Eastern Europe, the Velvet Revolution of Czechoslovakia, 
the overthrow of Ceausescu in Romania, and the fall of the Berlin Wall marked the 
end of the Cold War.21 The post-World War I I structures, established in Yalta in 
1945, fell away, and a new structure of international relations started to rise. 
The New World Order, however, did not emerge until August 1990; the intervening 
period was transitory and lacked any coherent definition. The New World Order was 
the successor to the bipolar era though its character was not clear until Iraq invaded 
Kuwait. "Should Iraq be successfully expelled, it would be possible to speak 
optimistically of a 'new world order'."22 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, on 2 August 1990, provided the main actors of the 
New World Order with an opportunity to illustrate the depth of the changes taking 
place in the international political system. Iraq's behaviour constituted a threat to the 
ordinates of the New World Order.25 The Iraqi invasion challenged one of the 
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foundations of the previous world order, which remained fundamental to the new 
order. Enshrined in the United Nations (UN) Charter was the principal of the 
inviolability of territorial integrity; the invasion of Kuwait was presented as the first 
challenge to the New World Order." 
The concept of the New World Order emerged at the time of the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait, and according to US policy-makers, it marked the triumph of a liberal world 
order over a world governed by force." The New World Order, according to this 
perspective, heralded a new era in peaceful relations among nation-states; global 
relations were undergoing a far-reaching transformation. According, to this analysis, 
the institutionalised conflict of the Cold War was being replaced with co-ordination, 
co-operation, and mutuality between the Soviet Union and the US. The repercussions 
upon the world's states were presented in a constructive and positive light; the Third 
World conflicts were no longer driven by the ideological or strategic interests of the 
superpowers.24 
The role of the second Gulf War, as the "defining moment" of the New World 
Order,27 wil l be addressed as a case study in chapter six. In chapter two, however, I 
shall attempt to define the New World Order. Once an understanding of the New 
World Order is established, it will be possible to examine how Syria has adjusted to 
its demands. In order to facilitate this process I have chosen to divide chapter two 
M Chomsky, N., World Orders, Old and New, (London: Pluto Press, 1994), pp. 9, and Hendrickson, 
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into four sections: an historical perspective; the end of the Cold War; the New World 
Order; and the New World Order and the paradigms. 
An Historical Perspective 
If one intends to understand the dynamics of the New World Order, it is fundamental 
to appreciate the structure of the previous world order. Bipolarity was the defining 
feature of the previous world system. The configuration of global power, prior to the 
end of the Cold War in 1989, was distributed between two competing international 
actors, the US and the Soviet Union. The Yalta Conference of 1945 set the precedent 
for the succeeding forty-five years; the world was divided by the two global powers.28 
The world's spheres of influence were divided between the US and the Soviet Union. 
A third force sought to project itself into the international political system, the non-
aligned movement. However, this group failed to impose its agenda upon the 
superpowers because it lacked sufficient influence.19 
The basic division of the globe into two contesting superpowers provided the world 
with relative stability. As both the US and the Soviet Union contained the capacity 
(nuclear) to destroy the earth, they arrived at a point of balance and stalemate. 
Stability was managed at the core of the international system, especially after the 
Cuba crisis in 1961, whilst low-level conflicts became extensions of superpower 
influence in the Third World. 3 0 
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The US and the Soviet Union pursued their contest for international and regional 
influence through a variety of means: ideology, cultural imperialism, economic 
systems, Third World porosity, and the military option.31 The encompassing 
economies of the two superpowers, combined with their military superiority, allowed 
them to intervene in Third World affairs. 
The competition between the two superpowers took on the form of a Cold War. The 
Korean War (1950) has traditionally been considered the official starting date of the 
Cold War," although the Azerbijian crisis between Iran and the Soviet Union in 1946 
initiated the process towards the Cold War.33 From this point in history, the 
competition between the superpowers assumed a new dimension. 
There are several explanations for the origins and significance of the Cold War; but 
to all protagonists, this era has represented a modern phenomenon in the annals of 
world history. The Cold War has been assessed by competing perspectives, namely, 
orthodox, realist, and revisionist. The following section will endeavour to analyse 
these perspectives. 
The orthodox perspective 
The consensus of understanding achieved among the US elite during the 1945-1947 
period was mainly shaped by the orthodox perspective.34 The Pentagon and 
3 1 Thompson, K. , Cold War Theories: Volume I, World Polarization, 1943-1953, (Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1981), pp. 23-46. 
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Washington policy-makers were persuasive in promoting the Cold War as an 
ideological war, and their assertions went largely uncontested until the Vietnam War. 
The Truman doctrine of 1947 reified the US position," and formed the foundation of 
US foreign policy from 1947 to 1989. 
The Cold War, according to the orthodox school, was described in the fatalistic and 
vivid terms of the US Cold War document, NSC 68, of April 1950.34 The doctrine 
was conceived according to an imminent Soviet threat to the peoples of the free 
world. The document stated: "the Cold War is in fact a real war in which survival of 
the free world is at stake".37 
The Soviet Union was depicted, by policy-makers, as an expansionist empire with 
pretensions of global domination.38 The orthodox school portrayed the Soviet Union 
as a major threat to the ideology, institutions, norms, and values of the free world. 
Laquer and Krauthammer contrasted the motives of the US with those of the Soviet 
Union by writing: "Unlike the Soviet Union, the US does not want to convert anyone 
to a specific political, social, or economic system".3' The global objective of the 
Soviet Union culminated in the overthrow of the US-led capitalist system, and its 
Bernstein, B., "Walter Lippman and the Early Cold War," in T. Paterson (ed.), Cold War Critics: 
Alternatives to American Foreign Policy in the Truman Years, (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1971), pp. 39-
41. 
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accompanying democratic features. Hence, US foreign policy was preoccupied with 
containing the Soviet threat* 
Apparently, the orthodox interpretation of the bipolar division of the world was 
created in response to Soviet expansionism, expressed through the messianic 
message of communism. The division of the world fell into two competing 
ideologies, good and evil. The Cold War had, according to this perspective, evolved 
into a limitless contest between freedom and tyranny, a totally revolutionary struggle 
propelling history down its final dangerous course."" 
The realist perspective 
For the realists, the Cold War represented another manifestation of the balance of 
power. They viewed the Cold War as another phase of international politics; power 
remained the defining feature of the international political system, and the balance of 
power determined the structure of that system. Bipolarity, as a form of power 
distribution, replaced the fractious and unstable multipolar balance of power that 
characterised European relations after 1648/° This took place after World War I I ; it 
was resolved by the eternal quest for power among states struggling for ascendancy 
in the natural state of anarchy* 
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The Cold War was based upon the distribution of power between the US and the 
Soviet Union after the destruction of Germany and Japan. The US and the Soviet 
Union were the only powers that could enter the contest and achieve a balance of 
power. In doing so, they locked horns and charged towards the spheres of influence. 
Bipolarity was the resulting structure of the international political system. After the 
Yalta conference, in 1945,** the future of Europe was agreed upon, and the semblance 
of the balance of power was set in motion. The Cold War, then, can be perceived, 
from the realist perspective, as the maintenance of the traditional balance of power, 
but with the displacement of the multipolar balance of power by the bipolar balance 
of power. 
The revisionist perspective 
The revisionist perspective grew from the aftermath of the Vietnam war; it 
challenged the prevailing orthodox interpretations of the Cold War, and focused upon 
the global ambitions of the US. Haunted by the Great Depression of the 1930s, the 
US sought to control the prevailing economic order. Accordingly, the US foreign 
policy was thought to be motivated by securing its economic aspirations. The 
ideological dimension of the Cold War served to legitimise the US' economic 
prerogatives.45 
The threat of communism served to legitimise the US decision-making process. The 
spectre of communism, as an evil ideology, was invoked to instil a sense of paranoia, 
both within the US and throughout Europe. The period of McCarthyism, in the 
1950s, was a symptom of US foreign policy, as it helped to demonise the Soviet 
4 4 Thompson, K. Cold War Theories: Volume I, World Polarization, 1943-1953, (Baton Rouge: 
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Union. Revisionists, such as Chomsky, doubted whether the Soviet Union posed a 
real threat to the free world. On the contrary, to them the free world was under threat 
from the dark and authoritative forces of global capitalism and liberalism. He wrote: 
It is true that by its very nature, the USSR constituted an unacceptable 
challenge. Specifically, its autarkic command economy interfered with 
US plans to construct a global system based on (relatively) free trade 
and investment, which, under the conditions of mid-century was 
expected to be dominated by US corporations and highly beneficial to 
their interests, as indirect as it was* 
The revisionists acknowledged the threat of the Soviet Union to US interests, but 
attributed the rhetoric of communism more to the historical insecurity of the Russian 
state, rather than an expression of its desire to conquer the capitalist world. The 
Soviets had encountered numerous European sponsored counter-insurgency plans 
since the 1917 revolution;47 they had also suffered two invasions emanating through 
Poland.*8 The geographical, social and political vulnerabilities of the Soviet Union 
accentuated its sense of insecurity due to the enormous losses, both in human and 
economic terms, during World War I I . Within this context, the discourse between the 
superpowers was motivated by Soviet vulnerability, and the economic ambitions of 
the US. 
Europe was devastated by World War I I , and the US emerged as a dominant actor in 
world affairs. The economies of the major European powers were destroyed during 
World War I I ; this period succinctly concluded the reign of the British and French 
Chomsky, N., Deterring Democracy, (London: Vintage, 1992), pp. 27. 
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empires. The US attempted to compensate for the diminishing roles of the European 
centres of power.*' At this stage, the primary concern of US foreign policy, according 
to Thompson, was to sustain the growth of its domestic economy through access to 
the world's markets. The competition for influence over Europe appeared to be the 
first stage in securing markets for the US, and the building of political allegiances for 
the succeeding world order." 
The revisionist writings of Thompson confirm Chomsky's assessment of US 
aspirations. In order to replace the vacuum of the multipolar world, they opine, the 
US was required to expand its political and economic hegemony through the 
management of the global capitalist order. The achievement of hegemony required an 
underlying ideology to legitimise US foreign policy initiatives.31 
The promotion of a pervasive and persuasive global ideology, one based on 
traditional US liberalism, was achieved via two means. The first was the vilification 
of a mortal enemy. The demonisation of the Soviet Union, aided by the ruthless 
regime of Stalin,53 fulfilled this aspect. The second means was the promotion of the 
interests of the free world, a pejorative concept with resonance to the liberal-
democracies of Europe, and the states of the Third World. Colonialism and 
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imperialism belonged to the previous era; capitalism became the ideology of the free 
peoples of the world." 
The end of World War I I pronounced the end of colonialism. The states of Western 
Europe rescinded from their Third World ventures, and internalised their national 
struggles. They became dependent upon US aid, and were incorporated into the 
economic strategy of the US. The ideology that accompanied US economic aid was 
utilised to counter the socialist ideology of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In 
the free Third World, the US presented itself as the guarantor of newly independent 
states. In accordance with US ideology, it was incumbent upon the US to preserve 
the independent states from socialism. The US was the central power of the West, 
and liberating force of the Third World.5 4 
Thompson challenges this interpretation, and suggests that the liberation of 
independent states, based on the premise of liberal and democratic values, was a 
myth designed to extend the economic ambitions of the US.5 5 The containment of the 
Soviet Union became a vital concern to the maintenance of US political and 
economic hegemony. The US capitalised upon its hegemonic position within the 
Middle East and systematically attempted to displace the more traditional interests of 
Britain and France. 
The Middle East, as a regional sub-system, became a natural obsession for the US as 
the region's oil had been responsible for the rapid reconstruction and industrialisation 
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of Western Europe. The US State Department described the region "as a stupendous 
source of power, and one of the greatest material prizes in world history ... probably 
the richest economic prize in the world in the field of foreign investment".56 
Thus, the advent of US aid to Europe and its support of the newly-independent states 
were not based on humanitarian motives.57 The propagation of US influence was 
determined by the economic opportunities found in each region or state. The 
cultivation of the world market was fuelled by the prerogatives of US economic 
hegemony and the interests of the US elite.58 
Chomsky opined that US foreign policy was guided by the interests of the political 
and economic elite. After the self-imposed destruction of Europe, the US became a 
global power. Not surprisingly, the state and corporate managers of the US hoped to 
use their power to design an economic order that would serve the interests they 
represented.59 
The contradiction between liberal ideology and the implementation of capitalist 
economic policy illuminated the dichotomy amongst the decision-makers of the US 
political elite. America's economic expansion and its quest for free markets clashed 
with the demand for the political and economic independence of other states. 
Due to the irresistible pressures of US capitalism and the power of 
economic elites in the shaping of foreign policy, the US pursued a 
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policy of imperial anticolonialism rationalised in the language of 
humanitarianism and national self-determination, but motivated by 
the quest for free markets essential to US prosperity." 
The ideological content of the Cold War was convincingly deconstructed by the 
revisionist historians. For them, ideology was used to cultivate economic 
opportunities for the US. The state socialism of the Soviet Union conflicted with US 
interests in developing the global capitalist order. The US drive for markets and free 
trade could lead one to the conclusion that socialist forms of national development 
and state control were inimical to the global design of the US." Hence, the US 
opposed the economic strategy of the Soviet Union, and vilified its ideology in order 
to extend its sphere of influence through the new markets in Europe and the Third 
World.6 2 
Summary of the perspectives 
Although the three perspectives operate from a different premise, they are all united 
in their evaluation of power. Power appears to be central to all three perspectives. 
The orthodox analysis focuses upon the competition between the ideologies of 
communism and capitalism. The orthodox perception of the Cold War focused on the 
ideological war between the US and the Soviet Union. Specifically, the Soviet Union 
was seeking power in order to impose its totalitarian system of government on the 
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free peoples of the world. For the orthodox school, the ideological division of the 
world represented a unique moment in world history.*8 
Realists focused on the ahistorical character of power politics in international 
relations. Working from this perspective, realists placed the primacy of national 
interests above ideology. They perceived the contest between the US and the Soviet 
Union as a struggle of national interests. The structure of the international political 
system was bipolar, and was governed by the omniscient balance of power. 
The Cold War, for the realists, was characterised by the pursuit of power. The 
distribution of power after World War II was transformed from multipolarity, based 
in Europe, to bipolarity between the Soviet Union and the US. The division of the 
world was maintained as each actor sought to maximise its power. 
The revisionists also challenged the role of ideology in the superpower contest. Their 
analysis was based upon a critical enquiry of the US agenda. Revisionists sought to 
demystify the ideological aspects of the Cold War.*4 Revisionist historians suggest 
that the Cold War was engineered and fostered by the US economic elite as it 
provided suitable justification for: 
• the development of a US-led capitalist economic order; 
• the expansion of US economic interests across the globe; 
• the subjugation of the former European colonies by economic imperialism. 
The Great Depression of the 1930s was embedded into the US psyche, and the 
expansion of guaranteed markets through the Cold War was the option chosen to 
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eliminate any chance of a return to the 1930s. The reconstruction of Europe and 
Japan was the first stage of ensuring US survival, predominance, and hegemony. 
In examining the Cold War, I am working from the assumption that the global order 
is defined by the distribution of power, rather than the Utopian goals of freedom or 
the contest of ideology. It is possible to identify the distribution of power as the main 
feature of the bipolar era. The Soviet Union and the US were the successors to an 
imploded multipolar order; their assertion in world affairs moved the orientation of 
global politics towards two mutually exclusive political and economic systems 
under-written by the pursuit of power. 
The hegemonic struggle between the Soviet Union and the US ended due to the 
Soviet's economic over-extension, and a New World Order was born without a 
name.45 The collapse of the Soviet system throughout Eastern Europe led to the end 
of the Cold War. 
The End of the Cold War 
There was not a definitive end to the Cold War. The process of its demise was 
symbolised by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. This process culminated on the eve 
of the liberation of Kuwait in January 1991. Bartley is most dogmatic in his 
observation: "On November 9, 1989, our era ended. The breaching of the Berlin Wall 
sounded the end of, not merely, the Cold War, but an epoch of global conflict that 
started with the assassination of Archduke Francis Ferdinand on June 28, 1914.n<< 
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The end of the Cold War cannot be attributed to any one event. The string of events 
that marked the end of the bipolar era were: 
• the fall of the socialist regimes in Eastern Europe; 
• the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact; 
• the ultimate breakdown of the Soviet Union. 
The structural causes of the end of the Cold War can be identified within the 
changing structures of the international political system. Between 1985 and 1991 the 
US-Soviet relationship was redefined. President Gorbachev was forced, by structural 
constraints, to attend to the compressed economic problems of the Soviet Union. 
Unlike his predecessors, he confronted the economic constraints faced by the Soviet 
economy, and embraced the policies of economic reconstruction." The Soviet 
economic system could no longer sustain the challenge of global capitalism, and it 
was compelled to accede to the prevalent global economic order. 
Gorbachev's implementation of new thinking into international relations initiated a 
restructuring of the bipolar relationship of world power. New thinking in Soviet 
foreign policy energised a process that led to a distinct improvement in East-West 
dialogue. The development of the programme for nuclear disarmament (START I & 
I I ) , and the gradual liberalisation of the ailing Soviet economy arose from the 
policies of perestroika and glasnost." 
The cessation of the Cold War was greeted with euphoria throughout the West. It 
sounded the death knell of a political structure that had forcibly separated Europe, 
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and polarised the peoples of the world. The future remained precarious, but after the 
evils of communism had been overcome, it looked brighter. The proliferation of 
global communications, the role of TNCs, and the prospect for international 
institution-building resembled the spirit of the post-World War I era.*9 
The denouement of the Cold War and the birth of the New World Order did not 
occur simultaneously. The transitory period was filled with uncertainty, particularly 
when the Soviet Union was rocked by the attempted putsch of 1991. The attempted 
seizure of power by the Emergency Committee indicated the level of resistance 
present in the Soviet Union. The intentions of the Soviet leadership and the 
contention among policy-makers and policy implementors remained illusory for 
Soviet observers. The ambivalence and apparent collision course between the Baltic 
states and the Soviet Government provided an example where the more familiar 
features of the Cold War appeared to be returning.70 The birth of the New World 
Order was, therefore, long in gestation, as the determinants of the bipolar era showed 
resistance to succession. 
The term the New World Order entered into the official US lexicon in August 1990 
when National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft told a CNN reporter. "Tell them 
we just can't let Iraq get away with this - there is a New World Order developing".71 
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Kuroda casts doubt upon the coherence of the concept or its value as an anchor for 
policy formulation at that stage, in retrospect, he believes the philosophy came later.73 
For Kubursi and Mansur, the New World Order did not begin until the second Gulf 
War. The Gulf War defined the "moment in international politics of a major 
transition, when the old order that had begun to fall apart was finally pushed aside 
and a glimpse of the new emergent order was for the first time clearly discernible".73 
The New World Order 
President George Bush pronounced on 11 September 1990: 
A hundred generations have searched for this elusive path to peace, 
while a thousand wars have raged across the span of human 
endeavour. Today, that New World Order is struggling to be born, a 
world quite different from the one we have known, a world where the 
rule of law supplants the rule of the jungle, a world in which nations 
recognise the shared responsibility for freedom and justice, a world 
where the strong respects the rights of the weak.1* 
President Bush made his pronouncement of the New World Order after Iraq had 
invaded Kuwait, and before the US-led coalition liberated the Gulf state. The 
language of his speech was evocative and reminiscent of Wilsonian optimism.75 The 
7 1 Kuroda, Y . , "Bush's New World Order: A Structural Analysis of Instability and Conflict in the 
Gulf," in T. Ismael, and J. Ismael (eds.). The Gulf War and the New World Order: International 
Relations of the Middle East, (Gainsville: University Press of Florida, 1994), pp. 184. 
7 3 Kubursi, A., and S. Mansur, "Oil and the Gulf War: An 'American Century' or a 'New World 
Order1," Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 15, no. 4, Fall 1993, pp. 15. 
Cochran, M., "The New World Order and International Political Theory," Paradigms, vol. 8, no. 1, 
Summer 1994, pp. 107. 
7 5 For a good account on the Wilsonian period consult: Ambrosius, L . , Wilsonian Statecraft: Theory 
and Practice of Liberal Internationalism during World War I, (Wilmington: SR. 1991). 
THE NEW WORLD ORDER 92 
emergence of the New World Order inspired hope, as it represented an end to the 
years of confrontation and the dawn of a new era. 
As previously mentioned, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait set the first challenge to the 
emerging world order. It provided a pretext for the world's powers to cooperate and 
implement a set of policies based on the principles described above. The central role 
played by the US was fundamental to the organisation and orchestration of the 
diplomatic and military initiatives that resulted in the liberation of Kuwait. 
This New World Order signified the succession of liberal ideology.™ Capitalism, as 
the universal economic mode of life, surpassed the experiment of communism, and 
was reinforced with its complementary tenets of freedom and justice. Democracy and 
human rights were also built into the terminology of the New World Order. The rule 
of law would deter and repel aggression against sovereign states.77 Sovereignty and 
self-determination became the buzz words of the Bush administration, as it chartered 
the waters of the New World Order. 
At the beginning of the crisis, Bush had remarked that US interest and involvement 
in the Gulf were not transitory. US interest in the area had predated the invasion. 
There would be, Bush said, "a lasting role for the United States in assisting the 
nations of the Persian Gulf".78 Kuroda comments: "the New World Order was thus 
7 6 Freedman, L . , and E Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World 
Order, (London: Faber & Faber. 1993), pp. 21. 
7 7 Huntington, S., "The Clash of Civilisations?," Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 39-
41. 
7 8 Hill, E , "The New Order and the Gulf War: Rhetoric, Policy, and Politics in the United States," in 
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not so new after all. It was to be a continuation of past interests and involvements."1' 
This distinction became most obvious in the Spring of 1992, when a Pentagon 
document, under discussion, was leaked to the press. The document entitled, the 
Defense Planning Guidance for the Fiscal Years 1994-1999, proposed to renege on 
US obligations towards collective action (delineated by the UN); furthermore, it 
suggested a dependence upon the military superiority of the US to maintain the New 
World Order.™ In other words, the New World Order reflected the contemporary 
realities of the global distribution of power. The US adopted the cloak of a liberal 
ideology to disguise the underlying presence of force in defining the New World 
Order. 
The official US definition of the New World Order, however, does not conform to 
the interpretations of the three paradigms of international relations theory. In order to 
complete the theoretical framework of this study, I shall elucidate upon the 
proclivities of realism, pluralism, and globalism. 
The New World Order and the Paradigms 
The realist perspective 
For the realist school, the New World Order signified a reconfiguration of global 
power after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Bipolarity itself had become 
institutionalised, and neo-realists such as Waltz, accepted the permanence of 
bipolarity as the system of international order." There had been few signs of 
w Kuroda, Y . , "Bush's New World Order: A Structural Analysis of Instability and Conflict in the 
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structural flexibility as the status of bipolarity was underwritten by the prospect of 
nuclear conflict.82 The bipolar distribution of power was thrown into a state of 
disequilibrium, with the collapse of the Soviet system; this produced a period of 
instability and uncertainty. The sudden displacement of the bipolar system, and the 
potential change in the structure of the international political system, seemed to 
obviate a return to multipolarity.0 
Multipolarity and the New World Order 
It is possible to characterise the poles around which a multipolar order could develop. 
The US is the world's largest power; its function in a multipolar order would be 
critical to the formation of alliances. Europe, Japan, China, and Russia appear to be 
other potential centres of gravity around which a multipolar balance of power could 
exist. 
At present, Europe and Japan cannot form alternative poles to the US. They remain 
subordinate in economic and military terms to the US. The experience of the Cold 
War and the effect of the Marshall Plan to incorporate the European economies into 
the global capitalist economy has integrated the interests of Europe and the US. A 
concert of powers between Japan, Europe, and the US could form a possible 
alignment countered by a coalition of China and Russia. It is difficult, however, to 
treat Europe as a single political unit 
Despite the progress of economic integration, Europe has not resolved the issues of 
its members competing foreign policies. National interests still tend to dominate the 
collective interests of Europe, and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait provided an 
Waltz, K., "Toward Nuclear Peace," in R. Art, and K. Waltz (eds.), The Use of Force: International 
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illustrative example of this. During the Gulf crisis the divisions within Europe 
prevented the formulation and implementation of a unified foreign policy.*' France 
and Britain, in particular, pursued their national interests, and in the British case the 
Thatcher/Major government tried to re-activate the potency of the US-UK axis." 
For Germany and Japan to participate as full partners in a multipolar world, they 
would be required to revoke their constitutions and to rebuild their military capacity.*5 
Krauthammer is very dismissive of the Japanese and European roles in the New 
World Order: 
The most striking feature of the post-Cold War world is its 
unipolarity. No doubt, multipolarity will come in time. Only a few 
montfis ago it was conventional wisdom that the new rivals, the great 
pillars of the new multipolar world, would be Japan, and Germany 
(and/or Europe). How quickly a myth can explode. The notion that 
economic power inevitably translates into geopolitical influence is 
materialist illusion 
A coalition between Russia and China is unlikely to occur in the near future. Russia 
is recovering from the loss of its republics, and is engaged in re-building its regional 
role. Since the breakdown of the Soviet Union, Russia has become dependent upon 
economic aid from the US and its allies, thus its global ambitions are constrained. 
** Buettner, F. , and M. Landgraf, "The European Community's Middle Eastern Policy: The New Order 
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Furthermore, the ideological and strategic rivalry between the Soviet Union and 
China may prevent a convergence of interests forming betwixt Russia and China. 
Although China is gaining a critical role in the Far East, and will indubitably play a 
future role in world affairs, its process of inward industrialisation is still taking place. 
This will delay its entry into the global game. In the meantime, in the absence of 
substantial competition, the US remains a unipolar power in world politics. 
Unipolarity and the New World Order 
As the world's predominant power, the US has been considered, by some 
commentators, as the apex of the international political system. The structure of the 
New World Order is depicted as unipolar, and focuses around the US. Krauthammer 
suggests, however, that this state of affairs is transitory, as the US cannot assume 
global responsibility for the world's affairs.™ 
In a unipolar system, the US would take on the burden of the world's policing duties 
to guarantee the stability of the global economy. In the bipolar system, the power of 
the US and the Soviet Union, compared to the power of their allies, became so 
overwhelming that through their preponderant weight they determined the balance of 
power between them." In the unipolar system, the US would not be able to f i l l the 
vacuum left by the Soviet Union. This would require the US to extend its access to 
the global markets, through more aggressive economic policies in order to sustain its 
dominant role. Such a move would entail the grave risk of over extending itself.90 In 
Krauthammer, C , The Unipolar Moment," Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, no. 1,1991, pp. 22. 
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1990, Kubursi and Mansur noted how the US slipped economically to a position no 
longer unassailable by its immediate industrial and financial rivals; the US' global 
hegemony rests precariously on one pillar, notably, the military." 
The relationship between military power and economic power is stressed by 
Kennedy. He notes: 
Wealth is usually needed to underpin military power, and military 
power is usually needed to acquire and protect wealth. The 
relationship between wealth and military power, which is at the heart 
of strategic thinking and decision-making, becomes a problem either 
when a state allocates a greater portion of its resources to military 
purposes over investments needed to generate more wealth, or when a 
state over extends itself as a result of military conquests, or the need to 
control vital resources outside its territory" 
At present, US economic hegemony guarantees its domination of the world's 
markets, but as the emerging competition from the East imposes itself upon the US 
economy, the US may resort to a dependency upon military intervention to secure 
markets. 
Chomsky's analysis of the New World Order would seem to confirm this possibility.'8 
In addition, it also accounts for the inflated role of the UK during the second Gulf 
War. In the world system of the New World Order 
there is one very powerful military force (US) and a lieutenant (UK) 
... However, neither of them is dominant economically and both are 
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very weak politically. This means that they tried to shift the 
confrontation to the arena in which they are strong, that is they move 
the thing over into an arena in which they are likely to win, and in the 
process, show that force is the way you rule the world. That's the New 
World Order" 
Economists have long noted that i f the largest consumer of a collective, such as 
order, does not take the lead in organising its production, there is little likelihood that 
the good will be produced by others.95 I f the US intends to secure access to world 
markets, it is incumbent upon it to provide the necessary global order. As the most 
potent military state, the US can police the globe, but not without damaging its 
domestic economy. 
As a unipolar power, the US needs to cultivate Europe and Asia through a two-fold 
strategy. Firstly, the US has an interest in promoting a secure and prosperous 
Western Europe that would incrementally absorb the East European economies. The 
rationale behind this is that as East European economies become more integrated into 
the global economic order, their potential for challenging US hegemony dissipates. 
Secondly, to ensure stability at the centre of the international political and economic 
systems, the US needs to develop a strategy to incorporate the rise of Japan's 
economic power into mutually constitutive channels that wil l support international 
institutions rather than destabilise regional military investments.96 The inclusion of 
Europe and Asia into a power sharing scheme, in the form of multipolarity or 
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institution-building, would devolve the responsibility and economic burden 
shouldered by the US." 
It follows from the above argument that the vacuum left by the Soviet Union cannot 
be adequately filled by any of the medium powers. In realist terms, the US will 
remain the world's largest power until Europe, Japan, Russia, and China are 
sufficiently developed to share the responsibility of global management, or are ready 
to challenge the US. 
Multipolarity vs unipolarity 
The contemporary debate between multipolarity and unipolarity is inconclusive. The 
current status of the international political system may be called unipolar, but this is 
only a period of transition. The US cannot sustain its hegemonic status without 
undermining its own economic position. An over extension of resources will enable 
the middle powers to secure their location at the centre of the global economy, but at 
the expense of the US. 
Until this transformation has taken place, international relations will be governed by 
the unipolar system. The term 'governed' is dependent upon the active role played by 
the US. US intervention in regional and international conflicts is not guaranteed, and 
US response may be confined to strategic interests. As Nye implies "the implications 
for stability and welfare depend heavily upon whether the largest state takes a lead in 
organising collective action among other states, or simply allows a feudalism to 
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develop". The Middle East, however, is one area where the US wil l continue to 
maintain an influential presence because of its strategic interests in the region. 
The pluralist perspective 
The New World Order was distinct from the previous orders, based on European 
multipolarity and Soviet-US bipolarity. The pluralist perspective of the New World 
Order is based on the framework of Wilsonian utopianism, but was founded on a 
more secure platform than the Utopian ambitions of the Wilsonian era." Historic 
lessons have been learnt from the failures of the previous multipolar periods. 
The basic premise of pluralism intimates that there is an historic and developmental 
progression within the international political system that will supersede the political 
divisions of the past. The succession of global capitalism in 1991, and the subsequent 
collapse of the bipolar world order, appeared to be a crucial moment in history when 
progression looked to be a distinct possibility. The fundamentals of international 
relations were in a state of transformation, as the era of superpower rivalry passed, 
and peaceful co-existence gained momentum. 
The New World Order represented a break from the requisites of the previous world 
order. It connoted a significant movement towards a change in the international 
political system. International cooperation, communication, and social/political 
integration provided the foundations of the new order. The discourse that emerged 
from the pluralist camp started to identify global organisation, and world order, 
through the operations of TNCs and international agencies. These agencies have 
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diminished the role of the state as the primary ordinate of analysis. The pluralist 
perspective of the New World Order works from a different set of assumptions to the 
realists, as noted in chapter one. 
Whereas realists have stressed factors, which have helped sustain the independence 
and autonomy of the state, pluralists have been more conscious of the interdependent 
factors that characterise international relations. Interdependence, a feature of the 
global economy, reinforced by information technology, has tied the economies and 
welfare of the world's states together. The integration of the world's political and 
economic units is believed to have reduced the inevitability of war and increased the 
prospect of achieving global harmony."" 
The New World Order, according to pluralism, presented the world's powers with the 
opportunity to realise the rule of international law without the intervention of 
competing superpowers.m It initiated a movement towards a system established on 
the basis of human rights, democratisation, and liberty. Pluralists, in the tradition of 
Woodrow Wilson and Jimmy Carter, focus upon relations among peoples, as well as 
states."8 They saw a sustainable world order arising from broad values, such as 
democracy and human rights, found within societies. 
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Pluralists: power and the New World Order 
Power within the international system is still of primordial importance to pluralists; 
but its nature is fundamentally different to that epitomised by realists. Power, 
according to pluralists, is multidimensional and resides in a multitude of forms, and 
at varying locations within the international system.m Power originates in the units of 
human society; its existence extends from the individual in society to TNCs, 
international agencies, and trans-governmental organisations, at the apex of 
international society. The individual forms the basic unit of humanity; at this level, 
the pluralist assumes that human interaction is based upon co-existence. 
Pluralism works from the assumption that people are inherently benevolent and co-
operative. Its traditions belong to the philosophies of Kant, who considered human 
experience to be universal.106 The advent of the information revolution and the 
conclusive expansion of the global capitalist economy are thought to have 
universalised a human experience. They were also believed to have homogenised 
cultural determinism and personal economic aspirations. Al l factors affecting human 
existence have been reduced to the concept of providing familial economic security 
based on a system of fair e x c h a n g e . ^ 
Information technology has permeated state borders and allowed direct 
communication among the populations of states; thus, reducing the power of the state 
as the principal mediator between the domestic population and/or business 
community, and international society. The distribution of power, within the 
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international political system, is not restricted to state power, as in realism, but is 
allocated according to a more diffuse pattern at a variety of levels and amongst 
various international, national, and local actors and agencies.'08 
Working with this more diffuse understanding of power, pluralists have labelled the 
New World Order as a multi-levelled interdependent order, where no single 
hierarchy adequately describes the world order.m Nye portrays the New World Order 
as a layered cake. The distribution of power is unipolar in a military sense, and 
multipolar in an economic sense. In this perception of the New World Order, the US 
is still the predominant military power, but Europe and Japan are the emerging 
economic centres in the international political system. Hil l confirms this analysis 
with the observation that power in the New World Order will be a nexus of political, 
military, and economic assets. Accordingly, the US wil l , be one power among others 
that are emerging in Asia and Europe."0 
The distribution of global capital and global markets have created an interdependence 
amongst the states of the world. Relations amongst these states are regulated by 
national and international institutions in an attempt to achieve the required co-
ordination. The New World Order, from the pluralist perspective, assumes a very 
distinctive character through its adoption of interdependence and international 
integration."' 
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The forces of integration 
Pluralists purport that the integration of societies reduces or eliminates the security 
dilemma."2 The forces of integration can be identified as the flow of ideas, 
commodities, capital, and people across international boundaries."3 The succession of 
global capitalism, at the expense of the socialist economic system, has ensured that 
the forces of integration promote global interdependence. This interdependence will 
diminish the propensity for war, and promote the prospect of peace by integrating the 
_ 114 
interests of states. 
Rosenau claims that the New World Order and the forces of integration are 
manoeuvring international relations into a post-international politics era. States have 
become permeable to a proliferation of transnational activities which include: 
• the flow of international capital markets; 
• the spread of information technology; 
• the growth of culture hegemony; 
• the formation of trans-state interest groups; 
• the expansion of TNCs. 
Consequently, the sovereignty of the states is disintegrating under the strains of two 
forces: 
(i) an ethnic-national force from within the state; 
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(ii) expanding and more demanding transnational linkages. 
States are becoming less able to perform their traditional functions as the power of 
trans-national actors is increasing. The autonomy enjoyed by the state in conducting 
its traditional functions is receding. The provision of welfare, domestic security, and 
employment still fall under the jurisdiction of the state, but the state's ability to affect 
the provisions of these services is limited."" Global factors are impinging upon the 
decision-making process of the state and eroding its status. 
As the level of interdependence increases and the role of the state diminishes, 
according to Bull and Watson, the international political system will be incrementally 
replaced with an international society. In the international political system, the 
primary units are states; the modes of interaction among these states include war, 
diplomacy, trade, the flow of ideas, and migration."7 As global migration continues 
and as people re-assert their primordial ties, whilst demanding access to universal 
commodities, identity patterns are becoming increasingly complex."" These form the 
ingredients for the new international society. Bull and Watson define international 
society as a group of independent communities that systemise their patterns of 
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relations through institutions, according to a criteria of common rules, behaviour, 
consent, and a common interest in maintaining these arrangements."' 
Watson has observed that the evolution of the international system into an 
international society occurs as "the regulating rules and institutions of a system 
usually, and perhaps inexorably, develop to the point where the members become 
conscious of common values and the system becomes an international society".'30 
The New World Order viewed from this angle departs radically from realism. 
Pluralism operates from an institutional framework; it suggests that a harmonious 
world order can be achieved through integration. The roles of national and 
international institutions are fundamental to incorporating the interests of states and 
their citizens.m The institutional framework, adopted by the Western European states 
after World War I I , provides an illustrative model for the pluralist approach. This 
analysis also assumes that the progressive tendencies within states wil l mirror 
institutional development and create an international society based on common 
norms, rules, where identities are held by individuals across the system.>a 
Although pluralists stress the positive and creative aspects of integration, they 
recognise new forces of fragmentation that have been unleashed since the end of the 
Cold War. The bipolar division of the world froze many historical conflicts among 
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nations and communities. The fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, a symbol of 
the end of the Cold War,'3 was accompanied by the thawing of many hidden conflicts 
and disputes. 
The forces of fragmentation 
Between the end of the Cold War and the declaration of the New World Order, the 
forces of fragmentation started to emerge throughout Eastern Europe. Gaddis 
recognised the end of the totalitarian threat, associated with the bipolar era, but 
meanwhile identified a pernicious threat emanating from the forces of 
fragmentation.'1' He commented: 
Another form of competition has been emerging that could be just as 
stark and just as pervasive as was the rivalry between democracy and 
totalitarianism at the height of the Cold War: it is the contest between 
the forces of integration and fragmentation in the contemporary 
international environment.™ 
Gaddis denotes two forces of fragmentation, namely, nationalism and religion. The 
vacuum left by the collapse of the Soviet Union has been filled by numerous 
disenchanted groups and communities, motivated either by a fervent nationalism or a 
religious crusade. '* 
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Nationalism 
There has been a substantial rise in nationalism since the end of the Cold War. Many 
of the nations that re-emerged from the former republics of the Soviet Union have 
reasserted their national identity. Nationalism and its revisionist manifestations were 
responsible for: 
• the civil war in Yugoslavia; 
• the conflict between Armenia and Azerbijian; 
• the Ossetian demands for independence from Georgia; 
• the rise of neo-Nazism in East Germany; 
• the conflicts in Ethiopia and Somalia. 
Nationalism, as a forceful and aggressive assertion of identity returned to the former 
Soviet Union, satellite, and client states of the Soviet Union after 1989. A 
rediscovery of nationalism, based on economic insecurity, operates against the 
universal spirit of integration. When nationalism is defined by common heritage, 
common language, and territorial co-ordinates, it focuses upon the nation-state as the 
natural home. The state, in this case, becomes invested with national unity and a 
national mandate. In short, it is a primary unit of interest, and the natural vehicle for 
mobilisation and organisation.w 
One could argue that the states of the Soviet Union lacked sufficient autonomy from 
their centre power, Russia. The dissolution of the Soviet Union divested the centre of 
its power, and devolved a new lease of power to the newly-independent states. The 
states of the former Soviet Union became the primary units of power again."8 
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Smith, G. (ed.), "Nationalities Policy from Lenin to Gorbachev," The Nationalities Question in the 
Soviet Union, (London: Longman, 1992),pp. 12-17. 
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Religion 
The resurgence of Islamist activism in Iran in 1979, Gaza in 1982, Algeria in 1991, 
Egypt in 1992, and Turkey in 1996, provides a testament to the hypothesis that 
fragmentary religious forces are operating within the international system. The rise of 
Christian fundamentalism in the US and Europe reinforces this perception of 
fragmentation based on religion. 
The public of Middle Eastern states is disenchanted with the promises and the 
failures of national liberation movements, and the secular programmes of modernity 
imposed by their Western oriented elite. The imported ideologies and philosophies 
of nationalism, socialism, liberalism, capitalism, and secularism have failed and were 
rejected. Widespread disaffected communities within Iran, Gaza, Egypt, and Algeria 
have found personal and economic salvation through an indigenous path. Islam, as a 
faith, a system of government, and a way of life is believed to contain the solution to 
the alienation found within these post-colonial states.139 
The Islam prescribed by Iran, FIS, GIA, Hizbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad offers 
an alternative to the Western inspired capitalist system. These groups represent the 
forces of fragmentation and are located around the Mediterranean and the Persian 
Gulf. They challenge the hegemony of economics, culture, power, religion, and 
morality of the West.130 
However, their methods of challenging Western hegemony do not comply with the 
established patterns of compromise and diplomacy. They are, by definition, anti-
Hardy, R., "Is Islam a Threat to the West?," lecture in Centre of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies 
on Wednesday 19 February 1997. 
Hardy, R., "Is Islam a Threat to the West?," lecture in Centre of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies 
on Wednesday 19 February 1997. 
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systemic forces that exist outside the system of states. The inequitable nature of 
global capitalism has fostered disenchantment among those communities, and other 
131 
states existing on the periphery of the global economic order. 
Pluralists insinuate that the universal familial needs of social and political stability 
are realised through economic security. They reason that economic security would be 
attained in the New World Order as a result of the dominance of global capitalism. 
Global capitalism, nevertheless, does not necessarily have the capacity to fulf i l this 
demand for economic security."2 This is because the structures of global capitalism 
serve the interests of the states at the centre of the global economy, and operate 
against the economic fortunes of the Southern states. In other words, economic 
organisation of the globe functions through institutionalised patterns of inequality.'2 
In effect, global capitalism could lead to the formation of an amalgam of anti-
systemic forces that seek to subvert the prevailing economic and political order. 
These anti-systemic forces could potentially coalesce around the existing pariah 
134 
states, such as Iran, Iraq, Cuba, Libya, and North Korea. Together, they could 
represent an alternative axis to the prevailing hegemonic order. 
Christian fundamentalism is also returning to the fore, especially in the US. The issue 
of abortion has demonstrated the strength and fanaticism of pro-life groups. Doctors 
°' Wallerstein, I., Historical Capitalism with Capitalist Civilization, (London: Verso, 19%), pp. 60-
61. 
m Wallerstein, I. , Geopolitics and Geoculture: Essays on the Changing World-System, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 11. 
m Gereffi, G., "Power and Dependency in an Interdependent World: A Guide to Understanding the 
Contemporary Global Crisis," International Journal of Comparative Sociology, vol. 25, no. 1&2, 
1984, pp. 509. 
134 
See: Najem, T. and N. Quilliam, "Issues in Political Economy of the Middle East: The Assimilation 
of Pariah States into the Hegemonic World Order: A Case Study of Syria and Lebanon," 
Conference at the University of Coventry, unpublished manuscript 
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performing abortions are being persecuted or, in some cases, even murdered. The 
Waco siege and the recent discovery of cults observing racial and anti-establishment 
sentiments give an indication of the fragmentary forces working within the US.134 
The Oklahoma bombing137 linked the two religious forces of Islamic activism and 
Christian fundamentalism together. Islamic and/or Arab militants were immediately 
implicated in the bombing directly by the US media machine, and indirectly by the 
Clinton administration.138 Ignoring the racist overtones of their assumptions, the 
disclosure that Tim McVeigh, who belonged to a radical cult, was the perpetrator of 
the crime,'3' connotes that both international and domestic fragmentary forces are 
considered to be pursuing an anti-systemic agenda. 
Forces of integration and fragmentation 
According to Gaddis, the forces of integration and fragmentation wil l be the 
proponents of the next configuration of power. Importantly, it is not state power, but 
the processes transcending states, in the forms of extreme integration and 
fragmentation that will determine the world order. These extremes cannot be entirely 
divested from states, as they share domestic and international characteristics. '* 
"US Moves on Protesters," Financial Times, Tuesday 25 January 1994, pp. 5, and "Two Shot Dead 
at US Abortion Clinic," Financial Times, Saturday 31 December 1994, pp. 1. 
Martin, J . , "International Patience Paid Off, Say FBI: Peaceful End to Montana Seize as Authorities 
Leam Lessons of WACO," Financial Times, Saturday 15 June 1996, pp. 4. 
Martin, J . , "Political Extremes Dance on Dark Side of the Moon: Revolutionary Left and Right in US 
Sometimes Share Anarchic Hatreds," Financial Times, Thursday 6 June 1996, pp. 3. 
Gaddis, J . , 'Toward the Post-Cold War World," Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, no. 2, Spring 1991, pp. 
107. 
"Oklahoma Bombing Incident," Financial Times, Friday 11 August 1995, pp. 4. 
Gereffi, G., "Power and Dependency in an Interdependent World: A Guide to Understanding the 
Contemporary Global Crisis," International Journal of Comparative Sociology, vol. 25, no. 1&2, 
1984, pp. 114. 
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The pluralist vision of a fully integrated world would depict a world, where states 
forfeit control over their borders; mutual dependence among states would guarantee 
the flow of resources and capital, and access to open markets. As envisioned by 
Rosenau, sovereignty would be surrendered, identity consumed by the international 
society, and security emboldened to include psychological, physical, emotional, and 
economic needs.M Global capitalism will satisfy those needs and bring about peace 
and harmony in the international political system. 
The more ominous aspect of this interpretation of the New World Order recognises 
the diffusion of threats, that were released with the collapse of bipolarity, and their 
inherent anti-systemic motivations. These threats contain the potential to aggravate 
the harmony of the emerging world order. In particular, some theorists believe that 
142 
the clash of civilisations may characterise the nature of the New World Order. 
The Clash of Civilisations? 
Huntington's prophetic paper "The Clash of Civilisations?" '* utilised the concepts of 
fragmentation and integration in an alternative way. He wrote: "In the politics of 
civilisations, the peoples and governments of non-Western civilisation no longer 
remain the objects of history as targets of Western colonisation but join the West as 
movers and shapers of history."'* The civilisations, that Huntington identifies, fall 
Roseau, J . , "Normative Challenges in a Turbulent World," Ethics and International Affairs, vol. 3, 
no. 1,1992, pp. 16. 
Huntington, S., The Clash of Civilisations and the Remaking of World Order, (London: Simon & 
Schuster, 1997). 
Huntington, S., "The Gash of Civilisations?," Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 22-
49. 
Huntington, S., "The Clash of Civilisations?," Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 23. 
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into the following categories: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-
Orthodox, Latin American, and African. 
Due to the rise of these civilisations, Huntington attests that the state will diminish as 
the principal unit of identity; and organisations as groups defined by kinship will 
form new poles of power. For Huntington, the foundation stones of these civilisations 
will be based upon the kin-country syndrome™ where political ideologies and the 
traditional balance of power wil l be superseded by the broader parameters of 
147 
common anthropological and historical experience. Binyan contests this view; he 
claims that in most states of the late twentieth century, their assignment is not to 
reinforce civilisational divisions, within their borders, rather their functions are to 
assimilate, and aggregate them into a loose homogeneity. "" 
Civilisations, in Huntington's scenario, will form alliances and oppose counter-
alliances based upon an assimilation of historical or religious compatibilites. 
Huntington observes the origins of a Confucian-Islamic relationship, and annotates it 
149 
as a formulaic military alliance designed to undermine Western hegemony. 
McCurdy, whilst acknowledging the apparent alliance between North Korea and 
China, and Iran, offers an alternative interpretation. He intimates that the relationship 
owes its origins to the renegade status of these states. They are accidental members 
of a heterogeneous group that oppose the global hegemony of the West. Their 
Huntington, S., The Qash of Civilisations?," Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 25. 
Huntington, S., The Qash of Civilisations?," Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 35. 
Huntington, S., The Qash of Civilisations?," Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 37. 
Binyan, L . "Qvilisation Grafting: No Culture an Island," Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 4, September/ 
October 1993, pp. 19. 
Huntington, S„ The Qash of Civilisations?," Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 29. 
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membership in the group is neither permanent nor grounded in cultural and/or 
religious compatibility, but is founded on a common oppositional plane.150 
In accordance with Huntington's hypothesis, the second Gulf War was a 
manifestation of a New World Order that derived its character from the clash of 
civilisations. The liberation of Kuwait was framed as an East versus West 
confrontation. Kirkpatrick dismisses this analysis and resorts to realist accounts by 
writing that the liberation of Kuwait was no more a clash between civilisations than 
World War I I , the Korean, or Vietnamese Wars. The actions of the US-led coalition 
were not dictated by civilisational imperatives; they were simply motivated by the 
universal pursuit of self-interest.'51 
Ajami concedes that civilisations are a permanent feature of international relations, 
"there is an astonishing measure of permanence about them, but the hypothesis that 
their ability to supplant the organisation of state power is made without 
foundation".'2 In his retort to the "Clash of Civilisations?", Ajami claims that 
civilisations do not control states; states control civilisations. The pre-eminence of 
states in the international political system continues; in fact, the disorder in the 
contemporary world order has rendered the state more important than international 
organisations, such as the UN. 1 5 3 
Huntington, S., The Clash of Civilisations?," Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 37. 
Kirkpatrick, J . , and others, "The Modernising Imperative: Tradition and Change," Foreign Affairs, 
vol. 72, no. 4, September/October 1993, pp. 23. 
Ajami, F. , T h e Summoning," Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 4, September/October 1993, pp. 9. 
Ajami, F. , T h e Summoning," Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 4, September/October 1993, pp. 9. 
THE NEW WORLD ORDER 115 
The UN and the New World Order 
The UN was set to be the main beneficiary of the New World Order. With the 
conclusion of the bipolar division of the world, the role of the UN had been elevated. 
The UN was invested with a coalition of support from the members of the Security 
Council. The rise of the New World Order appeared to mark the optimum moment 
for the UN to redefine its position in international relations, and to fu l f i l its 
mandate. '* 
The New World Order provided the occasion to reinforce and reinvigorate the ambit 
and jurisdiction of the UN. The UN had the opportunity to divest itself of the 
competitive climate, that had immobilised it during the years of the Cold War. The 
invasion of Kuwait was the first significant test of the UN's authority, after the 
collapse of the bipolar order. Hence, the invasion of Kuwait presented a threshold for 
UN action; it was thought to be the primary moment, in contemporary times, when 
the management of global affairs would be presided over by the legitimate global 
135 
institution. 
Pluralists supported the actions of the UN in the liberation of Kuwait, as it was seen 
to fulf i l its institutional obligations. The liberation of Kuwait demonstrated the utility 
of global organisation through the legitimate body of the UN. Springborg detected, 
with some irony, the thinly-veiled hypocrisy of US realists and isolationists towards 
the role of the UN. The UN's acquiescence to Washington's diplomatic persuasion 
Russett, B., and J. Sutterlin, "The UN in a New World Order," Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, no. 2, 
Spring 1991. pp. 69. 
Parsons, A., "The United Nations Comes into Its Own," Middle East International, no. 382, 31 
August 1990, pp. 29. 
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brought forth praise and admiration from those US circles that had berated the UN as 
an agent of Third World excesses. '* 
Though the UN's original response to the invasion was welcomed, the imposing 
guidance of the US appeared to undermine the independence of the UN. The 
confusion between US foreign policy and UN co-ordination became acute, and to 
critics such as Falk, the UN's position was subverted by a strident US policy. The 
subordinate status of the UN became apparent and was crystallised on 29 November 
1990, when Security Council Resolution 678 was adopted. The resolution which 
sanctioned the use of military force, after the deadline of 15 January 1991, was 
engineered and pursued by a rapacious US administration. 
In retrospect, it is difficult to consider the UN as a legitimate body that represents the 
interests of its constituent members, and processes decisions according to an 
independent institutional framework. The resistance to rotate the residency of the 
permanent seats on the Security Council, among constituent members of the General 
Assembly, reflects the function of the UN as a post-World War I I institution 
designed to serve the interests of the victors. 
The globatist perspective 
Globalists understand the term, New World Order, as a reference to the political 
ramifications of 1989. Proponents of world systems analysis, allege that the Soviet 
Union did not represent an alternative economic system to global capitalism. 
Furthermore, the Soviet Union existed in the semi-periphery of the global economic 
156 
Springborg, R., "The United Nations in the Gulf War," in T. Ismael, and J. Ismael (eds.), The Gulf 
War and the New World Order: International Relations of the Middle East, (Gainsville: University 
Press of Florida, 1994), pp. 40. 
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Falk, R., "Reflections on the Gulf War Experience: Force and War in the UN system," in T. Ismael, 
and J. Ismael (eds.), The Gulf War and the New World Order: International Relations of the Middle 
East, (Gainsville: University Press of Florida, 1994), pp. 26. 
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order.13 The succession of global capitalism over state socialism, therefore, did not 
fundamentally alter the configurations of economic power in the global economy. 
The globalist perception of the Cold War located the Third World at the periphery of 
the bipolar system. The Third World served as a reservoir from which natural 
resources were procured. It was also a site for the zero-sum game contest between the 
superpowers. 
The New World Order has not radically affected the economic circumstances of the 
Third World. The structure and processes of dependence, cultivated by the global 
capitalist economy, have remained in place. In fact, the situation of the latter has 
deteriorated due to the granting of loans to Russia and Eastern Europe.'" 
The political and economic distinction between the Northern and Southern 
hemispheres have been pronounced owing to their colonial and imperial histories. 
Despite the rhetoric of the US and its commitment to self-determination, the Third 
World gained prominence due to its vulnerability to superpower penetration. 
Buzan suggests that the Third World will decline in importance in the twenty-first 
century as there will be little ideological or strategic incentive for the great powers to 
compete for Third World allegiance.'0 This analysis deserves qualification as there 
are areas of the Third World, such as Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Arab states, where 
the strategic interest of the West remains paramount. 
19 
Little, R., "International Relations and the Triumph of Capitalism," in K. Booth, and S. Smith 
(eds.), International Relations Theory Today, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), pp. 80. 
Snow, D., Distant Thunder: Third World Conflict and the New International Order, (New York: St 
Martin's Press, 1993), pp. 55. 
Graham, G., "Account Offers Credit to Countries in Economic Transition," Financial Times, Friday 
16 December 1994, pp. 4. 
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Buzan, B., "New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-First Century," International Affairs, 
vol. 67, no. 3, July 1991, pp. 439. 
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Buzan's analysis implies that the security of those states in the Third World, where 
there are border disputes and resources are scarce, would come under threat. 
Security, in the traditional sense, was provided by the superpowers during the Cold 
War. Threats to security, in the New World Order, would not, however, necessarily 
come from the great powers, they would emerge from regional and domestic 
instability. '* Snow identified three sources of continued instability and conflict in the 
Third World: 
(i) the continued presence of internal grievances both within and among Third 
World states; 
(ii) the absence of formal constraints; 
(iii) the limited resources required to ameliorate the conditions that cause 
conflict. i a 
The internal grievances in the Third World, according to Buzan, would emanate from 
the legitimacy of their one party states systems being undermined by the collapse of 
the old world order. Additionally, the failures of the post-independence nationalist 
parties to fu l f i l their promises have led to a potential increase in instability. The 
Soviet and American support for the authoritarian regimes of the Third World often 
guaranteed the survival of regimes built upon fractious foundations. The change in 
the world order has withdrawn the contract between patron and client, thus 
undermining the relationship between regimes and their domestic constituencies. 
Formal constraints, operative under the bipolar system, may no longer dominate the 
nature of relations between the major powers and the Third World states. In the state 
Snow, D., Distant Thunder: Third World Conflict and the New International Order, (New York: St 
Martin's Press, 1993), pp. 43-47. 
Snow, D., Distant Thunder: Third World Conflict and the New International Order, (New York: St 
Martin's Press, 1993), pp. 19. 
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of transition, the unipolar character of the world order may not be sufficient or 
ambitious enough to thwart the regional ambitions or domestic turbulence of the 
Third World states. The US and Western policies will most certainly be formulated 
in accordance with their national interests. According to this analysis, the code for 
intervention would be determined by three kinds of situations: 
• conflicts among and within Third World states (South-South) that clash with 
the interests of the First World; 
• newly emerging problems, such as the flow of narcotics from South-North; 
• the continuing North-South debate over economic and political development. '** 
There is a danger, however, that if the Northern states neglect their international 
responsibilities, the regional changes within the Third World may escalate and result 
in a segregation of the globe and the disruption of the global economy."5 
The absence of the East-West division of the world has led some globalists to 
postulate that the global division has moved towards a North-South dimension. It is 
difficult, though, to envisage such a competition due to the asymmetrical nature of 
the relationship. The South cannot set a co-ordinated challenge to the North; the most 
they can achieve is to create a negative-sum game in which all parties involved 
Snow, D., Distant Thunder: Third World Conflict and the New International Order, (New York: St 
Martin's Press, 1993), pp. 19-22. 
Ravenhill, J . , T h e North-South Balance of Power," International Affairs, vol. 66, no. 4, October 
1990, pp. 742. 
Ravenhill, J . , T h e North-South Balance of Power," International Affairs, vol. 66, no. 4, October 
1990, pp. 742. 
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Krauthammer, using the example of Iraq, alluded to the prototype of the new 
strategic threat to the Northern hemisphere, the so-called 'weapon state'.147 The 
proliferation of states acquiring and developing intercontinental and ballistic missiles 
poses a threat to both regional and global stability. Advances in military technology 
and technological transfer have removed the insulation of the North from the 
vagaries of the South; hence, the regional conflicts of the South cannot be ignored. 
In conclusion, the New World Order has not produced a significant change in the 
economic order of the Third World. The global economy remains entrenched in the 
economics of inequity, and the levels of dependence are deepening. The economic 
implications of the New World Order, therefore, have been stable. In political terms, 
the withdrawal of Soviet and US support might create a vacuum, where instability 
results. 
Krauthammer, C , The Unipolar Moment," Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, no. 1,1991, pp. 30. 
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Conclusion 
In this chapter I have alluded to the various interpretations of the New World Order 
offered by three schools of thought, realists, pluralists, and globalists. The concept of 
the New World Order was conceived in pluralist terms and espoused by the Bush 
administration on the eve of the liberation of Kuwait. The connotations of the term 
conveyed a new era in international relations, cast in hope and optimism. The 
conclusion of the Cold War and the emergence of the New World Order were 
presented as a progression in international relations. Fukuyama claimed that the 
world had reached the End of History.>a 
There existed, however, a large gulf between rhetoric and reality. Bush's New World 
Order sought to liberate the world from dictatorship, communism, and repression. 
Capitalism, democracy, and liberalism triumphed at the failure of communism. 
Nevertheless, the actions of the Bush administration during the second Gulf War 
contradicted the liberal ethic of the New World Order and illustrated the predominant 
role of force in international relations. 
Realists work from the perspective that international relations are governed by forces 
that are universal to history. Wight denied that progression was possible in 
international relations." Anarchy is the natural state for inter-state relations, and a 
variety of mechanisms based on the balance of power are arrived at to produce 
equilibrium and avoidance of war. The balance of power manages global and 
regional affairs, but it cannot produce a permanent solution to the competition among 
Fukuyama, F . , The End of History and the Last Man, (London: Penguin, 1992). 
Booth, K., "Security in Anarchy: Utopian Realism in Theory and Practice," International Affairs, 
vol. 67, no. 3,1991, pp. 512. 
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states. Motivated by the security dilemma, states are cast into an endless race for 
security. 
The New World Order for realists represents a reconfiguration of global power. The 
implosion of the Soviet Union created a significant power vacuum, and the US 
attempted to accommodate the change. In pluralist language, the dislodging of the 
Soviet Union from its global role was portrayed as an ideological victory. Realism, 
avoiding the lexicon of the Cold War, recognised a traditional change in the balance 
of power brought about through the demise of one hegemonic power and the 
succession of another. The US became the unipolar power in the 1990s. 
Unipolarity is the feature of the existing realist model of international relations, but 
this will be replaced by a more fractious multipolar balance of power. The primary 
position of the US can only be guaranteed by its military superiority. Without a 
decisive industrial edge, the US will be challenged by the emerging economic centres 
of Europe, Japan, and China. The New World Order, cast in this mould, refers to the 
transition from a bipolar organisation, of international relations, to a multipolar one. 
Globalists were aware of the unipolar position of the US before the announcement of 
the New World Order. Their conceptualisation of international relations, based on the 
model of dependency, located the states of the Third World in the periphery of the 
global economy. The arrival of the New World Order confirmed the supremacy of 
the US as the economic and military leader in global affairs. The unprecedented 
succession of the US has not, however, directly affected the levels of dependence 
endured by Third World states. 
Owing to a shift in global affairs, Third World states are confronted with significant 
political implications, not from the ideological perspective of the New World Order, 
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but from the consideration of the realignment of power. US and Soviet favoured 
regimes were supported throughout the Cold War despite some of their precarious 
domestic positions. The demise of the Soviet Union has led to an era where this 
support is no longer guaranteed. Two possible scenarios can arise from this 
denouement of assistance: 
(i) The US and emerging centres of power wil l try to compensate for the 
withdrawal of Soviet support through policies of economic assistance; 
(ii) these Third World states will be consumed by their dissatisfied domestic 
constituencies. 
Globalists believe that the constraints of the global economy will continue to produce 
discontent within these Third World states, and may result in a breakdown of 
domestic order. Anti-systemic forces arising in the Third World may try to challenge 
the hegemony of the US order. Alternatively, they will be segregated from the First 
World until they form another pole that centres around a regional player such as 
China. 
The second Gulf War and the role played by the UN in the post-Cold war period 
demonstrates that the institutional features of the New World Order have not 
significantly changed. The UN is still dominated by the permanent members of the 
Security Council, that founded the UN after World War I I . 
The New World Order cannot be defined as a humanitarian moment in history. De 
Tocqueville captured the essence of the misplaced optimism, and the rhetoric that 
accompanied the language of the US administration when he wrote: 
It is unbelievable how many systems of morals and politics have been 
successively found, forgotten, rediscovered, forgotten again, to 
reappear a little later, always charming and surprising the world as if 
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they were new, and bearing witness, not to fecundity of the human 
spirit, but to the ignorance of men.™ 
The New World Order is most accurately portrayed as a systemic flux in the 
configuration of global power. The world is still governed by the balance of power. 
Although this may manifest itself through the forces of integration and 
fragmentation, the author supports the notion that states are still the primary units of 
analysis. 
The succession of the US as the unipolar power dictates the momentum of 
contemporary international relations, but the US cannot continue to perform this task 
alone, or for a sustained period. A sentence in the "Defense Planning Guidance for 
the Fiscal Years 1994-1999" captured the substance of the US interpretation of the 
New World Order when it stated: "We will retain the pre-eminent responsibility for 
addressing selectively those wrongs which threaten not only our interests, but those 
of our allies or friends, or which could seriously unsettle international relations.""1 
Consequently, the New World Order within which Syria finds itself, is a world order 
that is dominated by the US, its culture, politics, military and economic system. A 
system where US interests remain paramount and under the protection of its military 
superiority and hegemony. 
Roberts, A., "A New Age in International Relations?," International Affairs, vol. 67, no. 3, July 
1991, pp. 509. 
Kubursi, A., and S. Mansur, "Oil and the Gulf War: An 'American Century' or a 'New World 
Order1," Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 15, no. 4, Fall 1993, pp. 15. 
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CHAPTER T H R E E 
SYRIA: T H E COMPONENTS OF POWER 
Introduction 
Historically, Syria has been a victim of the various regional and international 
balances of power in the Middle East In their attempts to extend their hegemony, the 
empires of the past have battled over Syria as a key to maintaining their political 
authority, hence producing the protracted struggle for Syria.' Since Asad seized 
power in November 1970, Syria has extracted itself from this struggle and engaged in 
a broader struggle for the Middle East.1 
As discussed in the previous chapters, according to realism, the balance of power is a 
universal mechanism for regulating international relations within a state-system. 
Syria's role in the contemporary Middle Eastern state-system has been determined by 
the balance of power in two regional sub-systems: 
• Arab-Israeli sub-system; 
• the Persian Gulf. 
' Seale, P., The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-War Arab Politics. 1945-1958, (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1965). 
2 Seale, P., Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988). 
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The foreign policy of Syria has been guided by the conflicts that have arisen from 
both sub-systems. In the Arab-Israeli conflict, once Asad came to power, Syria's 
raison d'etat became the recovery of the Arab territories lost in the June War of 1967, 
and the restoration of Palestinian rights. With a foreign policy conceived in realist 
terms, Asad has tried to maximise Syria's power potential in order to balance the 
power of Israel. Asad has inscrutably aspired to balance Israel's military, political, 
and economic power before engaging in limited wars or peace negotiations. 
In the Persian Gulf, Iraq and Iran constitute the major powers around which the 
region's states coalesce; they form the poles of the balance of power. The states of the 
Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC) are geographically encased by both middle 
powers, and have remained vulnerable to their regional aspirations. Syria's eastern 
border with Iraq has guaranteed it a role in the politics of the Persian Gulf. Its 
involvement in the Iran-Iraq War of 1980 to 1988, allowed it to counter-balance the 
impinging power of Iraq through its support of Iran. The balance of power was 
instrumental to Syria's decision to intervene against its Arab neighbour. 
In the above cases, the balance of power defined Syria's self-perception, within the 
region, and the course of its behaviour. Power is the currency of politics; and Syria's 
position in the Middle Eastern state-system is largely dependent upon its power, and 
its power projection.' Syria's tangible power base is small when compared to the 
region's large powers, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, or compared to Israel's military and 
economic foundations. In spite of this, Syria has attained a middle power status 
beyond its natural resources through skilful politicking/ 
3 Ma'oz, Z. , T h e Evolution of Syrian Power 1948-1984," in M. Ma'oz, and A. Yaniv (eds.), Syria 
under Assad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks, (London: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 69. 
4 
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Despite its small, heterogeneous population, and the lack of substantial natural 
resources, Syria has been able to exert considerable regional influence since 1970. 
Syria's disproportionate role in the region can largely be attributed to its unique 
geographical location, and historical experience. This chapter wil l examine the 
factors that have enabled Syria to play a role beyond its capabilities.5 The purpose of 
this chapter is to establish a context within which Syria's foreign policy capabilities 
can be identified. 
Chapter Three will provide an insight into the components of Syria's tangible and 
intangible power base. Any analysis of Syria's power or power projection must study 
the following repositories of power 
• geography; 
• natural resources; 
• history; 
• population; 
• the military; 
• the economy. 
Chapter Three wil l focus upon these elements of Syria's power. The term Syria, 
however, requires further definition before we can proceed. 
Defining Syria 
The term Syria entails a number of differing meanings; it carries both historical and 
contemporary connotations. Historical Syria refers to the region rather than the 
modern state, and is commensurate with the land along the Eastern Mediterranean 
5 Drysdale, A., and R. Hinnebusch, Syria and the Middle East Peace Process, (New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations, 1991), pp. 3. 
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between the Sinai Peninsula and the mountains of Southern Turkey. The Arabs 
labelled historical Syria as Bilad al-Sham, which included the modem states of Syria, 
Lebanon, Israel, Gaza, the West Bank, and Jordan.6 The role of Bilad al-Sham was 
considered to be crucial to the formation and proselytisation of Arab nationalism in 
the early twentieth century, where Syria represented the beating heart of Arabism 
owing to its location as the historical capital of the Umayyad empire.7 
Greater Syria is the conceptualisation of Syria used by the Syrian Socialist National 
Party (SSNP). Greater Syria incorporates the states mentioned above, in addition to 
Cyprus. As a concept, it is more exclusive than Arab nationalism as it envelopes a 
pan-Syrian nationalism." It is more of a regionalist idea than a pan-Arab idea. It 
should not be confused with the Fertile Crescent (Iraq) or Greater Syria (Trans-
Jordan) schemes of the Hashemite families during the struggle for Syria.' 
The Syria of this thesis is defined by the term modern Syria which refers to the state 
of the Syrian Arab Republic, so named in 1961. The republic is coextensive, except 
for Alexandretta, with the League of Nations Mandate of 1923-1946.10 
6 
Kessler, M., Syria: Fragile Mosaic of Power, (Washington: National Defense University Press, 
1987), pp. 4. 
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and A. Dessouki (eds.). The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Change, (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1991), pp. 377. 
' Seale, P., The Struggle for Syria: A Study ofPost-War Arab Politics, 1945-1958, (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1965) pp. 64-72. 
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Geography 
Physical geography 
The land area of Syria amounts to 185,180 sq. km, and comprises six distinctive 
natural regions:" 
[1] The Mediterranean coastal plain extends along the length of the country's 
seacoast. The plain is agriculturally productive, and includes the base for the 
main port of Latakia, the oil-export terminal at Baniyas, and the port of 
Tartous. 
[2] To the east of this coastal plain lies the mountain range that characterises 
Syria. In the northern region, one can find Jabal al-Nusayriyah; in the centre, 
the Anti-Lebanon range delineates Syria from Lebanon; and in the south, 
Mount Hermon impinges upon the landscape. 
[3] Beyond the mountain ranges, there is an extensive plateau which is divided 
by a south-west and north-east zone of complex folds and faults associated 
with the Palmyra Folds. 
[4] To the west of the Euphrates and north of Palmyra, there is the steppe land 
that produces the bulk of the country's grain. Aleppo, Hama, and Horns are 
situated within this region. 
[5] Jabal al-Druze, south-west of Palmyra, is surrounded by the cultivated plain -
Hawran. 
" Syria - Country Profile, Economist Intelligence Unit 1993/94, pp. 2. 
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[6] The north-east of Syria, Deir al-Zor, was empty desert inhabited by nomads; 
the discovery of oil in the 1970s has transformed the region into Syria's main 
source of income. 
The majority of the population, 80%, live in the western 20% of Syria.11 
Political geography 
Syria has been the keystone of the Middle East for over 3,500 years. Lying between 
the Mediterranean and the Euphrates, it has served as the trade route between the 
Occident and the Orient. As pointed out by Hourani: "Syria's geographical and 
strategic position at the eastern end of the Mediterranean Sea and near the 
convergence of three continents established its political importance long ago."" 
Damascus and Aleppo, the two competing trading centres of the region, have been 
located on the main trade corridors. The control of these corridors, through the 
Palmyra oasis and the Turkish mountain wall, gave successive administrations power 
over their neighbours. 
Throughout history, Syria has been subjected to the endless invasions and political 
machinations of great empires and regional powers. Syria has been part of the 
Assyrian, Chaldean, Persian, Greek, Roman, Islamic, Seljuk, Mongolian, and 
Ottoman empires. Egypt and Iraq, the region's major players, have continually 
competed for influence over Syria in order to extend their hegemony." Due to its 
1 1 Bannerman, M., "Syrian Arab Republic," in D. Long, and B. Reich (eds.). The Government and 
Politics of the Middle East and North Africa, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 203. 
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1991), pp. 1. 
4 Kessler, M., Syria: Fragile Mosaic of Power, (Washington: National Defense University Press, 
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strategic location, Syria has continuously played a pivotal role in the regional, and 
more recently, international dynamics of religious, economic, and political affairs. 
The termination of the French mandate, in 1946, the last period of external rule, did 
not end Syria's subjugation to external players. The ensuing struggle for Syria was 
extended during the era of the Cold War, when the US and the Soviet Union were 
competing to assert their global hegemony through the Middle Eastern state-system. 
Syria was one of the key pieces for the Soviet Union in the zero-sum game.15 
Syria's geographic location at the centre of the Levant has helped to shape the 
orientation of Syrian foreign policy towards the Arab World." Syria's relatively small 
population and lack of strategic depth has rendered it vulnerable to the contingencies 
of the region. Its contiguous borders with Jordan, Turkey, Iraq, and Israel have made 
it inherently vulnerable, as each of these states has at some stage, posed a threat to 
Syrian national security. The dominance of Syria's regional environment by threats 
and constraints makes security a prime pre-occupation for the Syrian regime and 
population." 
Natural Resources 
Syria is not endowed with the quantity of natural resources, such as land and oil, in 
the proportions enjoyed by its neighbours. One third of Syria's land is agriculturally 
productive. Of the total cultivable area, of 6 million hectares, 93% was cultivated in 
1 5 Chomsky, N., Deterring Democracy, (London: Vintage, 1992), pp. 47. 
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1992." Cyclical variation and seasonal distribution in rainfall are critical factors in 
the western Fertile Crescent, as they are primarily responsible for producing 
enormous swings in grain production. Since virtually all of the country's grain crop is 
subject to such variations, the average yield is low. Consequently, the average 
income of grain farming families is also low." 
Oil was first discovered in Syria in 1956, by the Menhall Company, at Karachuk-
Hamzah oilfield. New fields were discovered at various locations in the north-eastern 
region of Syria under the auspices of West German and Soviet guidance. Since 
Syrian crude contained high levels of sulphur, its value was reduced. It was not until 
1986, when the Tayyim field started its production, that Syrian oil could be mixed 
domestically to produce a sweeter more profitable oil. The output of crude oil had 
been steady and in the 1980s averaged 9.4m tons/year, but it increased quite 
suddenly in 1987 to 11.9 million tons. In 1995, Syrian crude production reached its 
peak at 610,000 b/d in the second part of the year. Syria's domestic requirement for 
oil was around 220,000 b/d in 1993,2 0 and its total proven oil reserves are around 2.5 
billion barrels." 
Phosphate extraction started in 1974 at the Horns plant, but the Syrian phosphates are 
of a lower quality than those of its neighbouring states. Since the early days of 
production, exports have risen from $19.3 million in 1978 to a peak of $54.8 million 
18 
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in 1987. It is estimated that phosphate reserves in Syria amount to 1 billion million 
22 
tonnes, but production is set to decline in the following years. 
History 
Syria's ancient and modern history has been shaped by its regional location. It has 
been subject to constant regional and international competition, it has for most of its 
political existence remained under the tutelage of foreign powers. Since achieving 
independence in 1946, Syria has remained at the centre of a regional and 
international competition. Unlike the past, however, Syria is no longer the subject of 
external control, as it has consolidated its regional position and asserted its regional 
hegemony. 
Ancient History 
The northern and western sections of Syria contain some of the earliest villages 
discovered with settlements dating back to the ninth millennium BC. Its capital, 
Damascus, is considered to be the oldest continuously inhabited city in the world. 
Late in the second millennium, the Syrian region became an area contested for 
among the great empires. 
Alexander the Great's conquest of the Persians, in 334-326 BC, was followed by the 
inclusion of the Syrian realm into the Selucid empire for 200 years. After Rome had 
supplanted the Selucids and made Syria a Roman province in 64 BC, the evolving 
Greco-Roman culture became infused with Christianity. The new sect gained its first 
major urban foothold in Antioch, and flourished under the eastern Roman Empire 
n Held, C , Middle East Patterns, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 215. 
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and the successor Byzantine Empire. In AD 540, the contest between the Byzantines 
and the Persians erupted and created considerable destruction to the Syrian society.23 
The Arab Muslim invasion took Syria in AD 636; the impact of this particular 
invasion has left an indelible imprint on Syria and the region as a whole. Damascus 
became the capital of the Umayyad Empire during the Golden Era of the Islamic 
Age. The centre of power shifted to Baghdad, in AD 750, when the Abbasid dynasty 
became the principal family of the Muslim order. For the ensuing 800 years, the 
region of Syria became open to contest between the Abbasids, the Ayubids, 
Mamluks, Seljuks, Crusaders, and the Mongols. The Ottomans conquered Syria in 
1516, and had administered it for the following 400 years until the Sick Man of 
Europe imploded in 1918." 
Modern history 
Syria's modern history started with the collapse of Ottoman rule in 1918, and the 
establishment of the French mandate over Bilad al-Sham in 1922. Unlike the British 
authorities, the French authorities were suspicious of the potency of Arab 
nationalism; they believed it to be a tool of the British empire.15 
The French postulated that Britain encouraged, if not inspired, Arab 
nationalism and helped to translate it into a political movement in 
order to weaken French influence in the Arab East and eventually to 
drive the French out of the region altogether. * 
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In order to inhibit Arab nationalism from developing potency and challenging their 
administration, the French authorities operated an imperial policy of divide and rule.37 
The dismemberment of Historical Syria into artificial statelets signified a policy that 
sought to thwart the appeal of Arab nationalism.28 As the region is ful l of ethnic, 
religious, and linguistic minorities, the dismemberment followed a logical pattern 
that generated structural problems for the future. Mount Lebanon was detached from 
Syria with the surrounding Muslim environs of Sidon, Tripoli, and Beqa'. The 
remaining territory was sub-divided into four mini-states: Aleppo, Damascus, 
Latakia, and Jabal al-Druze,w thus disrupting the coherence of Arab nationalism 
within Bilad al-Sham. In 1925, Damascus and Aleppo were united to form what is 
now known as Syria.30 But it was not until the end of World War I I , under Britain's 
insistence, that Syria officially became an independent state.31 
The new leaders of Syria inherited a truncated state without a coherent nation. 
Modern Syria was a state surrounded by artificial borders; even its constituent parts, 
namely, Aleppo, Latakia, and Jabal al-Druze, resisted centralisation after France had 
encouraged regional autonomy. French policy had divided Syria into convenient 
regional and ethnic compartments. Sub-national loyalties, engendered by the French, 
1 7 Antonius, G. , The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement, (London: Hamish 
Hamilton, 1961), pp. 248. 
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formed pockets of resistance to the ambitions of the post-independence leadership. 
The one point of unity that had pulled the population together was the struggle for 
independence. Arab nationalism provided the Syrian leadership with the cement to 
adhere the Syrians to one cause. This cause was pan-Arab in character, and 
circumvented the issue of the central authority of the Syrian state. 
Arab nationalism, with its broad appeal, invested its leaders with social and political 
leverage over the French and British occupying powers. As a revolutionary force, it 
cohered the Arab population behind a single cause. The Great Revolt in Syria, 
between 1925 and 1927, was a manifestation of Arab nationalism, and encaptured the 
essence of the Syrian resistance to the French rule. It gave the political leaders of the 
movement a pretext to challenge the authority of their imperial counterparts. The 
project of national construction was aided by the potential offered by Arab 
nationalism. 
Arab nationalism had been a central doctrine for the disparate communities of Syria 
and the Arab states of the Middle East. It united the Arab communities of the 
Mashreq and the Maghreb through a common linguistic and cultural prism. Arab 
nationalism found its expression, at the turn of the twentieth century, in Bilad al-
Sham.33 It started as a response to the exclusive nationalist policies of the Young Turk 
movement in the Ottoman empire. It was originally conceived in secular terms, and 
was guided by a messianic message to restore the dignity and the glory of the Arab 
civilisation. 
" Van Dusen, M., "Political Integration and Regionalism in Syria," Middle East Journal, vol. 26, no. 
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Through the ambit of Arab nationalism, Syria's national leaders, in the form of the 
National Bloc and People's Party, started to construct the Syrian state. They 
attempted to integrate the constituent parts of Syria with Arab nationalism as their 
legitimising theme. One of the first steps taken by the Syrian government after 
independence, as part of the trend towards national integration, was to reduce 
communal representation in parliament. Between 1947 and 1949, the parliamentary 
representation of the Christian communities was reduced from 19 to 14 delegates, the 
'Alawi from 7 to 4, and the Druze from 5 to 3." The French legacy of divide and rule, 
however, left a segregated society rife with the animosities of minority privilege. The 
ossification of regionalism, and the wider attraction of Arab nationalism beset the 
emerging Syrian state with problems of authority. In the midst of establishing its 
authority, the state received a more direct challenge from the creation of Israel in 
Palestine. 
The creation of Israel 
The creation of Israel in May 1948 represented the most immediate threat to the 
states of the Middle East in general and Syria in particular. After only two years of 
independence, Syria was confronted by a new form of imperialism, with the creation 
of a colonial-settler state in its midst. As Israel was carved from Bilad al-Sham, in 
Palestine, and created under the auspices of the imperial powers, it constituted a 
double-edged challenge to Syria: 
(i) With the support of the world's imperial powers, the US and the Soviet 
Union, Israel managed to establish a foothold in the region at the expense of 
Syria and the indigenous Palestinians." 
34 
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(ii) The failure of the Syrian bourgeois elite to prevent the creation of Israel and 
to liberate Palestine gave rise to a generational rift between the radical and 
conservative Syrian nationalists." This division gave credence to the Arab 
Socialist Ba'th party, whose ideological foundation rested upon the 
revitalisation of the Arab World. 
The Ba'th party and Israel 
The Ba'th party, founded in 1947, represented a more visionary form of Arab 
nationalism." Its appeal, as a revolutionary movement, far exceeded the chivalrous 
objectives of the early leaders of Arab nationalism, whose acceptance of the Arab 
state-sub-system, and their acquiescence to the creation of Israel was habitually 
denounced.M 
The ideology of the party was expounded in the constitution, which saw the Arab 
World as a single eternal nation.3' As an ideology, Ba'thism called for: 
• the renaissance of Arabism; 
• a regeneration of the great Arab empires; 
• the eradication of all occupying powers.* 
Michel Aflaq, one of the founders of the Ba'th party, established the core ideology of 
the party and wrote that: "The ultimate objective of the Party was embodied in its 
3 4 Lapidus, I., A History of Islamic Societies, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 647. 
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very name, Ba'th, meaning renaissance or rebirth."4' This term referred to effecting a 
fundamental change in the spirit of the Arab people, which would lead to a 
reconstruction of the glorious Arab civilisation. 
In conjunction with the spiritual element of Ba'thism, yrmfom, socialism, and unity 
formed the political trinity of the party. The goal of freedom was fundamental to the 
spiritual renaissance of the Arabs, and it called for the rejection of imperial tyranny. 
The socialist component of Ba'thism was devised to remove the means of production 
from the bourgeois class and the landed elite. Regeneration required the levelling of 
social and economic distinctions within the Arab society. The final encompassing 
element of Ba'thism espoused by Aflaq was unity. Arab unity was the key factor to 
the realisation of Arab civilisation. Freedom and socialism were dependent upon the 
fruition that Arab unity would deliver to the Arab World. The trilogy of the party was 
the essence of Ba'thism, and it offered the Arab World a system for reclaiming its 
glorious past. 
Between 1958 and 1961, Syria embarked on a unity scheme with Egypt. Whereas the 
union with Egypt served its original purpose of forestalling a communist coup in 
Syria, the hegemonic pretensions of Nasser's Egypt offended the Syrians."0 After 
three years of dominance by Egypt, rather than equal partnership, Syria withdrew 
from the UAR, and has not acceded to any similar relationship since then.43 
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The Syrian Ba'th party seized power in 1963. As part of its rhetorical foundation, the 
party called for the destruction of Israel, and the breakdown of the Arab state-sub-
system. At the sixth National Congress, the party revealed its radical political and 
social agenda.** The ideology was composed of Marxist-Leninist thought infused 
with Aflaq's romantic vision of Arab nationalism. Revolution was to emanate from 
Syria before fulfilling its pan-Arab mission.45 
Damascus became the revolutionary centre for social and political transformation of 
the region. Through constructing a Leninist party-state, the Ba'th party mobilised the 
Syrian rural population in support of its radical programme. The socialist 
transformation of the state entailed a process of nationalisation and land reforms. The 
power of the urban and land-owning elite was destroyed as the leaders of the Ba'th 
started a policy of national integration through social and economic levelling. * 
The proclaimed enemies of the Ba'th party, and their brand of Arab nationalism, were 
Israel and the Western-supported regimes in the region, such as Saudi Arabia and 
Iran. Conflict between Syria and Israel became an inevitable and enduring feature of 
the Middle East.47 Syria's first direct confrontation with Israel, under the leadership of 
the Ba'th party, exploded on 6 June 1967. 
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The Six Day War 
The Six Day War erupted when Israel launched its encompassing offensive against 
Syria, Egypt, and Jordan in June 1967. Israel occupied the Sinai, the Golan Heights, 
the West Bank, and Gaza. The event represented a watershed in the Middle East, as 
Israel scored a resounding military victory and established its military superiority 
over the Arab states. The extent of the Arab defeat changed the face of the region's 
48 
dynamics. Israel's existence could no longer be denied. 
As a consequence of the Six day War, Arab nationalism lost much of its resonance as 
a revolutionary ideal. The revisionist message of Arab nationalism had failed to fulf i l 
its historic requisite; unity had not prevailed, moreover, Palestine was unequivocally 
lost to Israel. As a result of the defeat, the Arab state-system became more 
established. State leaders refuted the efficacy of Arab unity whilst reinforcing the 
role of the state in the regional environment. Although the high levels of inter-state 
communications and co-ordination continued, the political differences among the 
state elites ossified, and their foreign policies became more state-centric. 
In Syria, the Ba'th party was held responsible for the disastrous performance in the 
war. The revolutionary leadership had not produced the fruits of its rhetoric. Despite 
receiving the military and political support of the Soviet Union, the Ba'th leadership 
had increased the vulnerability of the state. The repercussions were manifest in the 
internal challenges set by the military wing of the Ba'th party against the civilian 
wing of the party* 
48 
Ma'oz, M., Syria and Israel: From War to Peace-making, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 103. 
* Kienle, E . , Ba'th v Ba'th: The Conflict between Syria and Iraq, 1968-1989, (London: I.B. Tauris, 
1990), pp. 51-58. 
SYRIA: COMPONENTS OF POWER 143 
The military coup of November 1970 saw Asad assume office as the leader of the 
Ba'th party and the Syrian state" The new regime implemented a set of domestic and 
foreign policies based upon realpolitik, rather than ideological imperatives. The 
change in the policies of the regime was reflective of the changing regional 
environment, and the primacy of the state in conducting regional relations. 
From this brief review of Syria's history, it is possible to see that its power potential 
is inextricably linked to its geopolitical position. Syria has been the focus of 
numerous regional and international struggles. Its historical experience has left an 
indelible scar on the demographic composition of Syria. 
Population 
Population is another tangible source of a state's power. However, population alone is 
not enough to embolden a state's power, as a large population can be burdensome to a 
state with a small resource base. The cohesion of the state determines how effective 
the population is as a source of power. Cohesion can be founded through the 
existence or creation of a national purpose. The national purpose of a state often 
emanates from the presence of a constant external threat. The potential threat from a 
hegemonic neighbour serves to heighten the sense of unity. Where traditional 
rivalries and insecurities exist, in states such as Turkey/Greece, Serbia/Bosnia, 
Iran/Iraq, and Syria/Israel, national unity is critical. 
As alluded to above, Syria's ancient and modern history have militated against the 
formation of a cohesive population. The policies conducted during the period of the 
French mandate reinforced the social and ethnic divisions that existed in the 
so 
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artificially created states of the Levant." The complex social and ethnic cleavages 
that characterised modern Syria presented the central authorities with an 
insurmountable problem. The regional autonomy granted to the different minorities, 
during the mandate era, generated a series of confrontations between the state and the 
regions. The creation of Israel acted as an antidote to Syria's social ailment. It yielded 
a national mission for the Syrian state and population, notably, to channel their 
energies towards a national purpose. 
According to Tilly, war is the crucible for creating nation-states.53 The Syrian-Israeli 
conflict has produced an environment conducive to occasion a Syrian nation-state. 
The centralisation of the political process, exacerbated by the conflict with Israel, has 
engineered a centripetal force that has propelled the population towards unity. Arab 
nationalism, as a source of regime legitimacy and a broader reference to national 
identity, nevertheless, has circumvented the evolution of a Syrian nationalism. The 
impasse between the two competing nationalisms produced a flourishing 
environment for minorities. Adding to the paradox, the legacy of French rule 
cultivated a climate in which the 'Alawi and Druze minorities extracted themselves 
from social degradation, and elevated themselves towards the centres of political and 
military power. 
The dissension among the pursuit of social cohesion in the Syrian state, the 
fulfilment of Ba'th (Arab nationalist) ideals, and elevation of minorities in the state 
5 1 Ma'oz, M., T h e Emergence of Modern Syria," in M. Ma'oz, and A. Yaniv (eds.), Syria under 
Assad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks, (London: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 15. 
5 1 Tilly, C , "War Making and State Making as Organised Crime," in P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer, and 
T. Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State Back In, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 
169-190. 
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leadership has led to the Syrian paradox. To appreciate this dynamic nature of 
Syrian society, it is rudimentary to examine its composition. 
The current population of Syria is 16.5 million.* The traditional population 
concentration axis, along the humid steppe belt, Damascus, Horns, Hama, and 
Aleppo, has more recently extended into the Latakia and Tartous areas. Although 
Syria's population is small in absolute terms, it doubled between 1963 and 1987, and 
its current birth-rate, 3.4%, is one of the highest growth rates in the world. The 
population is set to rise to 18 million by the year 2000; and the demographic 
composition of Syria (currently 59% of the population is under the age of 20), is 
likely to undergo a radical transformation.55 The distribution of the population 
throughout the provinces of Syria is as follows: 
Population of provinces in 000 
Aleppo 2,677 Tartous 644 
Damascus 2,824 Latakia 783 
Hama 1,046 Suwaida 281 
Hassaka 965 Deir al-Zor 565 
Horns 1,209 Deraa 568 
Idlib 870 Raqqa 485 
Quneitra 41 
Ma'oz, M., and A. Yaniv (eds.), "The Syrian Paradox," Syria under Assad: Domestic Constraints 
and Regional Risks, (London: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 254-255. 
54 
Butter, D., "Special Report: Syria," Middle East Economic Digest, vol. 39, no. 39, 29 September 
1995, pp. 9. 
• 
53 
Syria - Country Profile, Economist Intelligence Unit 1993/94, pp. 12. 
5 6 Syria - Country Profile, Economist Intelligence Unit 1993/94, pp. 12. 
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A heterogeneous society 
The Syrian population, despite a measure of cultural uniformity, continues to lack 
cohesion and a cogent universal identity. The Syrian population was most accurately 
portrayed by Hourani when he described Syrian society as: 
composed of a large number of groups, local, tribal, linguistic, and 
religious. On the whole, these groups formed closed communities. 
Each was a world, sufficient to its members and exacting their 
ultimate loyalty. The worlds touched but did not mingle with each 
other; each looked at the rest with suspicion and even hatred. 
Almost all were stagnant, unchanging, and limited; but the Sunni 
world, although torn by every sort of internal dissension, had 
something universal, a self confidence and sense of responsibility 
which the others lacked. They were all marginal, shut out from 
power and historic decision* 
The ethnic composition of Syria has become the focus for several academic studies 
of the region, where horizontal and vertical stratification are counterpoised to each 
other. Van Dam provided one of the most detailed insights into the ethnic 
composition of Syria.* He identified the following factors as contributing to the 
multi-ethnic fabric of Syrian society: 
(i) Syria (Bilad al-Sham) has been the cradle for the three major monotheistic 
religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. 
(ii) The Fertile Crescent, as a region, has always been the centre for tribal 
movements and the focus of empire contests. 
(iii) Syria has been an area of refuge for displaced peoples. 
57 
Hourani, A., Minorities in the Arab World, (London: Oxford University Press, 1947), pp. 22. 
3 8 Van Dam, N., The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society under Asad and the Ba'th Party, 
(London: LB. Tauris, 1996). 
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(iv) The differences in tribal and national set up have become infused with 
religious diversity leading to a reinforcement of distinct community identity. 
(v) The religious, tribal, and linguistic differences have been accentuated by the 
physical separation of the communities by geographical features. 
(vi) Due to their physical isolation, the communities have enjoyed substantial 
autonomy from the central government. * 
The population can be divided according to language, religion, or ethnic groups. 
Approximately 82.5% of the population speak Arabic as their first language. The 
dominant group has, for more than 1,000 years, been Syrian Arabs, who constitute 
nearly 90% of the population." The great majority of the Syrian Arabs are Sunni 
Muslims. However, other Arab sub-groups, especially religious confessions, form 
alternative constellation centres. These subgroups are: the 'Alawis 11.5%, Druze 3%, 
Isma'ilis 1.5%, Christians 14.1%, of whom 4.7% are Greek Orthodox Christians,4' 
and Jews 0.78%." The majority of the population, 68.7%, are Sunni Muslims.63 The 
ethnic minorities include: Armenians 4%, Kurds 8.5%, and Turcomans 3%. The 
" Van Dam, N., The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society under Asad and the Ba'th Party, 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 19%), pp. 1. 
60 
Kessler, M., Syria: Fragile Mosaic of Power, (Washington: National Defense University Press, 
1987), pp. 30. 
61 
Van Dam, N., The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society under Asad and the Ba'th Party, 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 19%), pp. 1. 
62 
Khuri, F . , T h e Alawis of Syria: Religious Ideology and Organisation," in R. Antoun, and D. 
Quataert (eds.), Syria: Society, Culture, and Policy, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1991), pp. 49. 
Van Dam, N., The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society under Asad and the Ba'th Party, 
(London: LB. Tauris, 19%), pp. 1. 
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Kurds and Turcomans, though ethnic minorities, are Sunni Muslims, thus, they 
belong to the majority of the population.64 
" Van Dam, N., The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society under Asad and the Ba'th Party, 
(London: LB. Tauris, 19%), pp. 1. 
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The 'Alawis 
The largest, and probably the most significant of the confessional groups, in Syria, is 
the 'Alawis. The 'Alawis originate from the Jabal al-Nusayriyah region of western 
Syria, they are an off-shoot of the Shi'a family of Islam. Their creed is very secretive, 
and is reputed to incorporate elements of Islam and Christianity." 
Due to their religious deviation from orthodox Islam, they were traditionally 
persecuted by the Sunni majority, who believe that the 'Alawis "have strayed so far 
from Sunni (Orthodox) Islam that they are no longer truly Muslims." * As they were 
suppressed for their beliefs, their social status within Syrian society was low; they 
found employment as agricultural workers and domestic servants to Sunni 
landlords." Since the mid-1960s, however, the 'Alawis have dominated the political 
and military apparatus of Syria, and the system of political and social patronage has 
been inverted. There are concerns within the state, especially from other minorities, 
that the ruling 'Alawis will be overthrown by the majority of Sunnis. The 'Alawis, 
however, have showed no fear for their sect as they function according to the broader 
Syrian national interest." 
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The Druzes 
The Druzes' faith is based on Isma'lyya; it emerged at the time of the Fatimid caliph, 
al-Hakim bi-Amr Allah, whom they expect to return.w"Their beliefs are a mystical 
offshoot of Shi'a Islam combined with features of other religions."™ They have secret 
doctrines and they believe in reincarnation. Their community is very closed as they 
do not accept inter-marriage. 
The Druzes are primarily located around Jabal al-Druze and form 90% of the 
population in the al-Suwaida province.71 The Druzes also benefited from their role in 
the military. They frequently confronted the authorities during the French Mandate 
and gained a reputation for their resilience. As a minority they seized the opportunity 
to rise through the military ranks although they were later to be purged with the 
succession of the 'Alawi leaders.71 
The Isina'ilis 
The Isma'ilis are an off-shoot of the Shi'a branch of Islam. According to Glasse\ 
Isma'ilism is a manifestation, within Islam, of ancient Persian religious systems.75 
Historically, Isma'ilism seemingly began as a splinter from the Twelver Shi'a sect.74 
69 
"Druzes," Islamic Desk Reference Compiled from the Encyclopaedia of Islam by E. Van Donzel, 
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7 1 Van Dam, N., The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society under Asad and the Ba'th Party, 
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Since the mid nineteenth century there have been two groups of Isma'ilis in Syria: 
one located in the Qadmous-Masyaf west of Hama, and the second in Salamiyah. In 
the ninth and tenth centuries Salamiyah had been the centre of Isma'ili activism.75 
Since the eleventh century, in terms of their access to political power, the fortunes of 
this group have passed their zenith.™ 
Isma'ili fortunes have slowly improved in Syria since the Ba'th party seized power in 
1963. As a vehicle for promoting minorities, the military academies within Syria 
helped the Isma'ilis to achieve some upward social mobility in society. 
Many Isma'ilis now hold positions in the bureaucracy, and the education sector. The 
traditional rivalry between the Isma'ilis and the 'Alawis in the Latakia region has, 
however, prevented the descendants of the Assassins from acquiring an independent 
power base.77 
The Christians 
Syrian Christians have a longer tradition than any other Christian group, and their 
ancestors pre-dated the Muslim Arabs by 500 years. Syrian Christians subscribed to 
Arab nationalism at the turn of the century and identified their interests with the Arab 
World. Christians, apart from the Armenians, all belong to the broader Arab family. 7 8 
7 5 Lewis, N., T h e Isma'ilis of Syria Today," Royal Central Asian Society Journal, vol. 39, no. 1, 
January 1952, pp. 69-77. 
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The Kurds 
The largest ethnolinguistic minority in Syria is the Kurds. They have their own 
distinctive culture, language, and history, which foster their tribal identity. They are 
located in the northern region of Syria across the mountains of the north-west and 
north-east. In addition to the main Kurdish belt in the north, where they are primarily 
agriculturists, several thousand Kurds live in the cities, especially in Damascus.19 
The Armenians 
The second largest ethnolingusitic minority is the Armenians. They are the least 
assimilated group in the country due to their strong Armenian identity. They fled 
Turkish persecution in Armenia, during the 1920s and 1930s, and settled in and 
around Aleppo. They are responsible for a lot of Aleppo's small industries, as they 
concentrate on skilled craftwork, especially gold." 
The Jews 
The Jews had been present in Syria for over 2,000 years. Under the various Muslim 
empires, as people of the book (ahl al-kitab), they enjoyed a similar status to the 
Christians. Jews, in a similar fashion to the Armenians, lived and worked in Aleppo 
and Damascus. They amounted to 30,000 before the advent of the World War I I . The 
position of the Jews, in Syria, became ambivalent after the creation of the state of 
Israel. In 1992, under pressure from the US and as a concession for confidence 
building measures, Syria declared that any of the remaining 4,000 Syrian Jews were 
free to emigrate. By the end of 1992, 2,600 had received exit visas, and of the 1,400 
left, about 400 indicated a desire to stay in Syria." 
7 9 Bannerman, M., "Syrian Arab Republic," in D. Long, and B. Reich (eds.). The Government and 
Politics of the Middle East and North Africa, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995). pp. 204. 
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Irrespective of the ethnic or religious divisions within Syria, the constant threat posed 
by Israel has been an issue of national unity since 1948. The threat of an external 
power has congealed the aspirations of Syrian society. The state has been able to 
channel the insecurities of its citizens into a state-building programme. This 
programme has sought to develop Syria's military into a formidable counter-threat to 
Israel. 
The preponderance of the armed forces, however, in the state-building programme 
produced a dialectic between the civil leaders of the state and its military officers. A 
dichotomy arose where the interests of the military, a minority dominated institution, 
clashed with the interests of the Sunni political elite. This led to a period of 
instability as both groups jostled for power; the army, with coercion as its weapon 
managed to seize power in 1949." 
The composition of the army was not representative of the ethnic or religious 
divisions within the state. Whilst Sunni power could be identified in the form of land 
ownership and mercantile trade, the minorities, especially the 'Alawis and the Druze, 
started to occupy prominent posts in the military.*5 The military provided the only 
vehicle through which the minorities could elevate their social status, and improve 
their standard of living. The combination of domestic and regional insecurities 
promoted the interests of the minorities as they gravitated towards the pillars of 
power. The rise of the 'Alawis and the Druze in the Syrian military*4 indicated a shift 
82 
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away from the traditional centres of power in the suqs, towards the military 
academies throughout Syria.85 
The centre of power within Syria rests firmly in the hands of the military and the 
security services. Through its direct access to the state apparatus, the military has 
gained a crucial role in the state-building process. Instead of dislocating the power of 
the Syrian state, the sectarian nature of society has enhanced its power. The 
population of Syria has constituted a source of potential power for the state.86 The 
state has converted this potential together with geography, history, and nationalism 
into power outputs. Power outputs are manifest in the form of the military and the 
economy. The next section addresses the outputs of the power ratios. 
The Military 
The military provides Syria with its most tangible and quantifiable source of power. 
By expanding its military, through the auspices of its geopolitical position, Syria has 
managed to dominate the policies of Lebanon, circumvent the threat of Iraq, and 
confront, to a limited extent, the ambitions of Israel. Despite the constraints Syria has 
faced, Asad has successfully managed to transform the Syrian state into a middle 
power in the region. This has been achieved in two ways: 
(i) constructing a strong state; 
(ii) enjoining the regional and international balance of power.87 
"Middle Eastern Political Cliches: Takriti' and 'Sunni' Rule in Iraq; 'Alawi' Rule in Syria, A Critical 
Appraisal," Orient, vol. 21, no. 1, January 1980, pp. 42-57. 
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Syria's domestic and foreign policies owe their origins to the intervention of the 
military in political affairs since the early days of independence. Since the first coup 
of 1949, when Zaim seized control of the state apparatus, the military has played an 
instrumental role in state affairs.™ The confrontation between Jadid, Syria's ruler," 
and Asad, Minister of Defence and Commander of the Air Force, in November 1970, 
marked the ascendancy of the military in political affairs, and the subordination of 
the civilian sector in determining state policies." 
The efficiency of the military and security apparatus has served to maintain the life 
of the incumbent regime. Additionally, it has enabled Syria to engage in the regional 
competition for hegemony. This is because the security of the state has been a 
preoccupation of the Syrian regime." The domestic and regional vulnerability of the 
Syrian state has made military intervention a feature of post-independence life. 
Since its independence in 1946, the Syrian state has been forced to balance the 
complexities of a truncated and ethnically divided country, against the imminent 
threat posed by the creation of Israel, and by the ambitions of its irredentist 
neighbours, in the form of the Fertile Crescent and the Greater Syria schemes, as 
previously mentioned. Domestically, the centrifugal force of the minorities and their 
semi-autonomous status rendered centralised rule impractical and improbable. 
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Disillusioned with civilian rule and the debacle of the 1948 war, the army leaders 
considered themselves as the natural repository of state power." 
The military intervened in Syrian politics in 1949, and maintained an intermittent 
presence in political affairs through a myriad of coups and counter-coups. The 
disillusionment of the military with the political leadership of the state took on a new 
form after the 1967 war. Although both the civilian and military leaderships 
belonged to the ruling Ba'th regime, the military divested the civilian wing of the 
party of its power and took full control of the state." 
The size of the 1967 defeat rocked the military establishment in Syria as a new era of 
purges began. The failure of 1948 was revisited, and only a few leading military men 
escaped without loss of rank or position. Defence minister, Asad, was one of the few 
who managed to excuse his role in the war, and even enhanced his position in the 
military junta.*4 Upon seizing control of the state, in November 1970, Asad inherited 
a truncated state, as a result of the loss of the Golan Heights, and a severely defeated 
army. The new regime set about re-equipping the army to secure its own position at 
home, and to avenge the humiliation of 1967. From the defeat emerged a new 
military doctrine based on the accumulation and maximisation of power. 
Henceforward, realist politics dictated Syria's role in the Middle East." 
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As a relatively small state with few resources, compared to its larger neighbours, 
Israel, Turkey, and Iraq, Syria's critical power projection can be located in its 
military. Asad was aware of this fact; accordingly, he tried to accumulate military 
power as this was the only possible route to secure Syria a role in both the regional 
and international political systems.96 The energies of the state have been directed 
towards national security from a domestic, regional, and international perspective. 
The military came to be the most visible and dominant output of Syria's power. This 
can be attributed to the fact that in Syria, the distinction between high and low 
politics is still pronounced. Although, in general, the economy of a state is a valuable 
output of power, in Syria, it remains subordinate to the interests of security.97 
The Economy 
The Syrian economy is most accurately described as state capitalist, where the state 
exercises control over strategic industries, but allows the private sector to operate in a 
controlled market.9" Endowed with limited natural resources, a small population, and 
an unstable political heritage, Syria has faced many constraints in the path of its 
economic development. Apparently, economic growth has been constrained due to 
two main factors: 
(i) natural factors; 
(ii) government economic policies; 
9 6 Syria's military power will be discussed in more detail in chapter five when we examine its regional 
balance of power. 
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(iii) political instability in the region." 
The Ba'th leadership of the 1963-1970 era introduced radical economic reforms that 
transformed the existing liberal economy into a socialist oriented one. Land reform 
and nationalisation epitomised the socialist character of the Syrian economy under 
the Ba'th rule. 
Although the Syrian economy experienced some growth between independence and 
1970, mainly in industries controlled by the state, such as textiles, food processing, 
and tabacco, the pace of this growth was hindered by the socialist orientations of the 
state."" In addition, Syria's recent history has shaped its economic policies, and 
wherever possible, the economy has remained subordinate to foreign policy. In other 
words, the Syrian economy has been held hostage to the fortunes of the regime and 
the successes or failures of Asad's foreign policy. 
The policies of economic liberalisation, otherwise known as infitah, followed by 
Asad in the 1970s resulted in growth; gross domestic product (GDP) grew by more 
than 150%."" Infitah served two purposes: firstly, it was used to embolden the 
legitimacy of the regime. By attracting the support of the disaffected bourgeoisie, 
Asad could strengthen the state.Secondly, the incorporation of the business class 
into the economy could provide an engine and a platform through which Syria could 
" Bannerman, M., "Syrian Arab Republic," in D. Long, and B. Reich (eds.). The Government and 
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challenge the economic superiority of Israel and balance its economic advantage. 
The project of national integration, followed by the Syrian Ba'th party, dictated that 
the economy served the reconstruction of Syrian society, and helped to sustain the 
Syrian state in its conflict with Israel. 
The role of the public sector in the economy has somewhat diminished since the mid-
1980s. The state's ability to lead the economy and to determine the course of socio-
economic development has receded due to the austerity budgets of the 1980s, and the 
rationalisation programme introduced to reduce inefficiency within the 
bureaucracy.104 
The private sector experienced new growth between 1986 and 1990. Its share of 
foreign trade was reduced to 10% in the first part of the 1980s, but reached 20% in 
1986, and 45% in 1990.'" The manufacturing industries benefited from the 
incorporation of the private sector into the national economy as they contributed 43-
44% to net domestic product in 1990, compared to 30-35% in the early 1980s. "* 
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By 1990, the private sector contributed an estimated 55% of Syria's GDP. The 
private sector had employed 60% of the industrial labour force in the 1970s and the 
1980s; this figure had reached a remarkable 75% by 1991."" 
The introduction of economic liberalisation measures in 1972, 1986, and 1991, 
expressed a change in economic policy. Though the changes were precipitated 
according to differing circumstances, they indicated a new flexibility within the 
Syrian political system.108 They also connoted the impending influence of the global 
economy and the vulnerability of the Syrian state. 
Sources of income 
The four main sources of income for the modern Syrian economy are: 
• agriculture; 
• mineral industries; 
• manufacturing; 
• foreign aid.1™ 
Agriculture 
Traditionally, agriculture has been a major component of the Syria economy. The 
development project of the Euphrates Dam system has revolutionised Syrian 
107 
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irrigation systems and electricity generation. Like the Aswan High Dam project in 
Egypt, the project was financed by the former Soviet Union. The power station, 
inaugurated in 1978, generated over 90% of Syria's electrical energy for several 
years; its significance, however, is decreasing due to the introduction of new thermal 
power plants. An equally significant long-range purpose of the Euphrates Dam is the 
irrigation of 640,000 hectares of land along the Euphrates and its east-bank 
tributaries. This undertaking wil l require the rest of the century and wi l l , when 
complete, more than double the area under irrigation in Syria."0 
The programme of land reform implemented during the brief unity scheme of Syria 
and Egypt, between 1958 and 1961, has continued to characterise Syrian agricultural 
production. A large share of the capital invested in economic development, after the 
late 1960s, went into: 
• land reclamation; 
• land improvement; 
• irrigation schemes; 
• agricultural programmes."' 
Presently, there are 20 state collective farms, and a co-operative organisation that 
contains 570,000 members."1 The size of land holdings has changed during the period 
1963 to 1995, depending upon the political and economic climate. Despite state 
intervention, private-sector farming has remained the dominant force in agricultural 
110 
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production, and between 1987 and 1991 it accounted for two thirds of the cultivable 
land."3 
The liberalisation programme of the 1990s has altered the relationship between the 
farmer and the state. The private sector has started to assume greater control over 
production, pricing, and the marketing of commodities."4 Despite the agrarian 
character of the economy, Syria has continued to be a net importer of foodstuffs.'" 
The economic plan of 1991-95 sought to return agriculture to the core of the 
economy with the aim of securing long-term self-sufficiency. "6 
With the impact of the oil boom, and the stress on industrial production, by the end 
of the 1970s, the emphasis of the economy gravitated towards a manufacturing and 
commercial base. Although the Syrian economy has become more diversified, a brief 
look at the country's macro-economic indicators show that a structural transformation 
from an agrarian to an industrial economy has not taken place. " 7 
Mineral industries 
Syria's main mineral industries are oil and phosphate extraction. Mining and 
manufacturing contributed 28.1% to Syrian GDP in 1993, with petroleum and its 
derivatives forming 66.7% of Syria's principal exports. From the mid-1970s to the 
mid-1980s, and again from 1992 onwards, oil exports made-up some 70%, or more, 
I D Held, C , Middle East Patterns, (Boulder: Wesrview Press, 1994), pp. 212. 
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of Syria's total export value, which rendered the country heavily dependent on world-
market oil prices."' 
Manufacturing 
For many centuries, Damascus was famous for its metalwork, fabrics, muslins, 
linens, silk brocades, tapestries, and carpets. Al l of these crafts have survived to the 
present time, but they are an inadequate basis for a national manufacturing complex 
in the modern technological world. The Third Five-Year Plan (1971-75) was 
designed to upgrade manufacturing industry; and 46.3% of public investment was 
directed towards the emboldening of the established industries. Heavy industry was 
the recipient of public investment, as phosphate and fertiliser plants were developed 
in conjunction with chemical and engineering plants.'20 
The main manufacturing industries in Syria are state-owned and include: food, sugar, 
textiles, chemicals, engineering, cement, and building materials. Although mining 
and utilities have remained under the jurisdiction of the state, the private sector 
contributed 40% towards manufacturing output in 1991. The private sector is most 
active in the production of textiles, food, leather, paper, chemicals, electrical goods 
and machinery.m 
Foreign aid 
With its small resource base, the economic development of Syria has been 
constrained by natural factors. By way of compensation, Syria's unique geopolitical 
position in the Middle Eastern sub-system has enabled it to extract aid and rent from 
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its Arab and Iranian neighbours. Syria's support for Iran in the Iran-Iraq War, and 
Syria's participation in the liberation of Kuwait, proved to be two cases where Syria's 
political orientations generated disposable income for the regime. This was made 
possible by being a Bonapartist state. The Bonapartist state, as defined by Marx, is 
able to conduct a rational and coherent policy conceived away from the constraints of 
the dominant social forces in the domestic arena.12 The unique position occupied by 
the state vis-a-vis society, has allowed the state to subjugate the domestic necessities 
of the economy to achieve its political ends both from a domestic and regional 
perspective. 
Foreign aid and rent have contributed substantially to the Syrian economy. The fact 
that foreign aid, as a source of state revenue, has risen by an estimated 400%, in 
recent years, suggests that a form of rentierism has dominated the characteristics of 
the economy.'25 This rent can be attributed to the critical role played by the Asad 
regime in the region's two arenas of conflict: the Arab-Israeli dispute; and the Iran-
Iraq war. 
As a front-line state in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Syria has been the recipient of 
foreign aid from the Gulf Arab states; foreign aid accounted for 40.9% of state 
revenues in 1979.m Receiving foreign aid has afforded Syria the opportunity to 
maximise its limited resource and to concomitantly increase its power projection. It 
has achieved this via two means: 
Magraw, R., France 1815-1914: The Bourgeoisie Century, (London: Fontana Press, 1987), pp. 165. 
Robinson, L . , "Rentierism and Foreign Policy in Syria," Arab Studies Journal, vol. iv, no. 1, Spring 
19%, pp. 36. 
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(i) Through balancing the interests of the Gulf Arab states with Iran, Syria 
managed to seize the role of regional mediator, hence promoting its own 
diplomatic and political agenda. Syria's accumulation of diplomatic credit 
with the GCC states and Iran gave it the pretext to extract rent from both 
parties, whilst Syria's main Arab rival, Iraq, was engaged in a putative war 
with Iran. With Iraq effectively removed from the Arab-Israeli conflict, Syria 
became the central actor and requested further economic aid from the Gulf 
Arab states. 
(ii) Through the support of the Gulf Arab states, Iran, and the Soviet Union, Syria 
was able to embark on its quest for strategic parity. 
One could contest, that due to Syria's relatively poor resource base, it has been 
necessary for the Syrian regime to utilise its geopolitical position to ascertain rent in 
the form of aid. Sometimes the state has implemented unpopular foreign policies to 
126 
secure rent. 
The state's careful balancing of domestic and international interests carries a high risk 
and cost. As long as there is a margin for political manoeuvring and there is 
sufficient aid to prop up the Syrian economy, the state can manipulate regional 
insecurities. A consequence of Syria's rentierism, is that the economy has, at times, 
become hostage to the fortunes of Syria's political role. 
To recape, the Syrian economy is tied to two factors: the fortunes of the region's 
major oil producers, and the regional configurations of power. The combination of 
these factors have guaranteed that Syria could remain economically strong and seek 
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its regional objectives. Syria's economy flourished during the 1970s after the oil 
boom, and particularly after Syria had become the only front-line state in 1979. The 
crisis of the 1980s, however, reflected how the Syrian economy had become 
dependent upon the region's economic position as it suffered a foreign exchange 
crisis in 1986.137 Soviet and Iranian aid did not alleviate Syria's economic ailments; 
the gradual move towards economic liberalisation appeared to present the most 
viable option for reviving its economy.'28 
The economy and foreign policy 
Despite its structural adjustment programmes, the Syrian economy is still dependent 
upon the security of the regime and the success of its foreign policy. Although 
domestic industry and agriculture formed part of Syria's economic power base, the 
largest component of economic strength has appeared to emanate from Syria's ability 
to extract rent for its military services and alliance potential. 
The Syrian state has managed, to date, to insulate itself from the determinants of the 
global economy. Whereas most of the states on the periphery of the global economy 
have traded part of their autonomy for aid, loans, and international investment, Syria 
has, to a large extent, insulated its autonomy. This has been achieved through two 
ways: the subjugation of economics to power politics; and the extraction of geo-
political rent 
Sukkar, N., "The Crisis of 1986 and Syria's Plan for Reform," in E. Kienle (ed.). Contemporary 
Syria: Liberalization between Cold War and Cold Peace, (London: British Academic Press, 1994), 
pp. 27-28. 
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The area of low politics, within Syria, has been relegated to the field of high 
politics.'29 The stability of the state has taken precedence over economic policy. 
Unlike in most Third World states, prescribed economic policies to cure Syria's 
ailments have been introduced independently of external pressure. The introduction 
of piecemeal reforms was designed to alleviate the immediate economic problems, 
meanwhile maintaining the over-staffed public services. The continuation of these 
inefficient services offered the state a residual base of legitimacy and support. 
Even during the crisis of 1986, Syria did not apply for standby credits or other IMF 
facilities that could have involved economic reforms. Neither did it conclude any 
agreements with the World Bank that could have demanded the implementation of 
structural adjustment programmes.'30 
Syria's debt with the World Bank, which amounted to $400 million in 1993, has not 
forced it to concede to World Bank pressures.13' The most the World Bank has been 
able to achieve is the provision of advice; the World Bank, IMF, and the European 
Union have all conducted economic studies that offer recommendations to revive the 
economy.132 The withdrawal of credit facilities has effected Syria's ability to borrow, 
yet Syria's geo-political position has enabled it to receive rent or loans from the Gulf 
Arab states. The Gulf Arab state loans have not been made conditional upon the 
implementation of economic reform, as their own economies might prove to be 
susceptible to the destabilising force of regional change.m 
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The pattern of dependency between the peripheral and core states has not been 
reproduced in the Syrian case. By exploiting its geopolitical position, Syria has 
resisted the incremental loss of autonomy to the global economy and non-state 
actors. Pre-empting the policies of perestroika, Syria administered an ad hoc package 
of economic reforms that awarded the state some room for political manoeuvring. 
During the Cold War, the international political system had provided Syria with 
enough leverage over the Soviet Union to avoid encasing itself in internationally 
administered debt relief.1* The demise of the Soviet Union and the advent of the New 
World Order granted Syria with the fortuity to attract Gulf Arab aid and international 
loans. 
Syria's estimated debt of $10 billion in 1991 has largely been written off the by Soviets, in return 
for hard currency payments, and access to the Aleppine markets. 
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Conclusion 
Syria's physical resources are the most tangible sources of its power, and they can be 
identified as: geography, natural resources, and population. However, they have not 
been sufficient to endow the Syrian state with adequate power in its contention with 
its neighbours. The intangible sources available to the state, especially nationalism, 
appear to have offered the most potent form of power. 
Syria's geographical location, at the keystone between the Orient and the Occident, 
has subjected it to endless invasions throughout its history. The history of Syria has 
been dominated by the rivalries amongst the region's major powers. Consequently, 
the Syrian state, inherited by its post-independence leaders, was fractious and lacked 
credible legitimacy from its society. History had denied the state a coherent nation, 
and implanted centripetal forces that tore at the very heart of Syrian society. 
Geography and history have weakened the Syrian state. The matrix of ethnic and 
religious communities that compose Syrian society has often undermined the 
authority of the state. Challenged by several ideologies, such as Arabism, Ba'thism, 
and socialism, Syrian society has had to consider its primordial and supranational 
loyalties. Syrian society has been under pressure since independence to foster their 
Syrian Arab identity above their other religious or ethnic identities. Arab nationalism 
has proven to be the most effective vehicle for conveying a national purpose for the 
Syrians. 
Utilising Arab nationalism, the Syrian state has attempted to convert its population, 
from a potential source of power, into realised power. A growing population, united 
by a national purpose, has proffered the seed for development. A cohesive and 
SYRIA: COMPONENTS OF POWER 171 
educated population offered the state a firm foundation to build a strong economy. 
As urbanisation has taken place, the potential for industrial growth has risen. 
Arab nationalism, as a source of power, provided the adhesive for Syria's 
heterogeneous society, and empowered the state to implement a state-building 
process. The conflict with Israel has intensified Syria's national insecurity, and 
provided a crucible in which the state could forge a national identity. The state, 
however, has remained vulnerable to the existence of an external threat, and it was 
malleable to the activities of Syria's civilian and military leadership. 
The succession of the military leadership over the civilian leadership in 1963, when 
the Military Committee of the Ba'th party seized power, marked a significant change 
in the vulnerability of the Syrian state. The ensuing struggle between the two wings 
of the Ba'th party, the military and the civilian, produced the climate for the 1967 
War against the Israelis.135 
The defeat of the 1967 War was devastating for the whole Arab World. Not only did 
it rupture the dream of Arab nationalism, but it also indicated the permanence and 
pre-eminence of the state of Israel. The qualitative edge of the Israeli military 
hardware and its superior military organisation led to a resounding defeat for the 
Arabs. 
After the humiliating defeat, Hafez al-Asad moved into position to occupy the post of 
state leader. The emergence of Asad as the ruler of Syria in 1970, represented a 
climax to Syria's arduous road to stability. Asad initiated a policy of state 
consolidation, a prerequisite to balancing the power of Israel. 
135 
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Despite its rupture, Arab nationalism has remained a source of power for the Syrian 
state. The dream may have lost some of its resonance, but it did not lose its appeal as 
a mobilising force. Arab nationalism has afforded the state the opportunity to 
coalesce the interests of the society into a national form. The advent of the October 
War in 1973 rallied the Syrians behind their state, and the relative success of the war 
restored some of the dignity lost in the June War of 1967. With an injection of 
legitimacy, accumulated through the war, Asad embarked on a state-building project 
that sought to transform the vulnerability of the Syrian state. 
As a front-line state in the Arab-Israeli conflict, Syria managed to attract rent from 
the Gulf Arab states. Being the beating heart of Arabism, Syria became a major 
recipient of financial aid. In other words, Syria was able to change its main source of 
weakness, notably, its strategic position as the keystone in the Middle East, into a 
military, political, and diplomatic advantage. This transformation has enabled the 
Syrian state to develop a military doctrine based on attaining a balance of power with 
Israel. 
The military has proven to be one area where Syria's geographical position, as a 
tangible source of power, combined with the potential of its population, has 
translated itself into a quantifiable output of power. The expansion of the Syrian 
military owed its roots to the unique position occupied by Syria in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict and Middle Eastern sub-system of states. Syria's vulnerable location in the 
heart of the trade routes between: 
• the East and the West; 
• the competing zones of Egypt and Iraq; 
• the imperial contest of the French and British governments; 
• and the interests of the Soviet Union and the US; 
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has been transformed into a source of power as the Syrian state has gained in 
resilience. The policies of Asad have successfully insulated the Syrian state from the 
domestic, regional, and international interventions of the past. In conclusion, 
although the endowment of the Syrian state is limited in natural resources, the appeal 
of Arab nationalism, and the skilful politicking of its political elite has enabled Syria 
to assume a regional role beyond its capabilities. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SYRIA: 
T H E CENTRES OF POWER 
Introduction 
The hypothesis of this research acknowledges the primacy of the international political 
system in affecting state behaviour; meanwhile, it endorses the role played by domestic 
factors in foreign policy formulation of Third World states. Syria's adjustment to the 
New World Order, which has amounted to a change of strategy in foreign policy, has 
been facilitated by the structure of its domestic political process. The state in Syria is 
sufficiently insulated from domestic social forces to orchestrate a radical change in 
foreign policy. Its resilience to domestic challenges has been incorporated into the 
structures of the state and the political process. Under Asad, the orientation of the state 
changed decisively from an instrument of class revolution to a machinery of power in 
the service of raison d'dtat.1 
Since he came to power, President Asad has instituted a process of state consolidation. 
The consolidation of the state has enabled Syria to engage in a protracted regional 
struggle with Israel. The pursuit of regional hegemony, manifested through its 
1 Ehteshami, A., and R. Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System, 
(London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 15. 
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competition with Israel, particularly in Lebanon, has been Syria's raison d'dtat since 
1970.2 
The national interest, in other words the regional competition with Israel, has been 
central to the consolidation of the state. Asad has consolidated the Syrian state into a 
quasi-corporatist state that serves the national interest. He has constructed a state that is 
construed from a patrimonial system and an institutional form of government. 
Without a cohesive social and political entity, the consolidation of the state has been 
governed through the balancing of interests within Syria. One can identify three main 
centres of interest within Syrian society: 
• the Ba'th party; 
• the Armed Forces and Security Services; 
• the bourgeoisie. 
These centres of interest have become centres of power in Syria; they command their 
own constituencies through the allocation of patronage. The Ba'th party and the Armed 
Forces have dominated the state apparatus and the decision-making process, since 
Asad's ascent to power, whilst a reconstructed bourgeoisie has remained subordinate 
to the state.3 
In more recent times, the permutation of power amongst the three centres of interest 
has reconfigured. Set within the context of the global reconfiguration of power, and 
the succession of capitalism, the bourgeoisie has started to gain in stature at the 
2 Seale, P., "Asad's Regional Strategy and the Challenge from Netanyahu," Journal of Palestine 
Studies, vol. X X V I , no. 1, Autumn 19%, pp. 28. 
3 
Hinnebusch, R., "Does Syria Want Peace? Syrian Policy in the Syrian-Israeli Peace Negotiations," 
Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. X X V I , no. 1, Autumn 19%, pp. 45-48. 
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expense of the Ba'th party. Before charting the rise of the bourgeoisie and the decline 
of the Ba'th party, I intend to examine the structures of the state and illustrate their 
impact upon the decision-making process within Syria. 
Realism and the Decision-making Process 
Power in Syria is personalised through the politics of Asad. His stamp on Syrian 
politics and his omnipresence in the life of Syrians cannot be ignored. Asad's portrait 
adorns the buildings of Damascus, his statues remind the citizens of each province of 
his paternal leadership, and the press serves to reinforce his persona upon the public 
psyche. Despite these symbols of Asad's primary role in Syria's decision-making 
process, there is a danger of oversimplifying the chain of command within the Syrian 
political system. Beneath the role of the president lies a state built upon corporations of 
interest. They constitute agencies of communication and support between the president 
and the populace.4 
The forging of the state, through balancing the interests of the dominant social actors, 
has produced a unitary state that is responsible for the conception and implementation 
of domestic and foreign policies. Existing above the dominant social forces, Asad has 
conducted policies based upon rational considerations. The president has not been held 
hostage to the dominant social actors; moreover, he has sown a layer of insulation 
around the decision-making process. Insulation, protected by the state's resilience, the 
means of coercion, has produced an environment for autonomous decision-making. 
From the domestic perspective, the state is the principal actor in Syria's foreign 
relations. 
4 
Perthes, V., The Political Economy of Syria under Asad, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1995), pp. 223-226. 
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This coincides with the realist paradigm, which suggests that the state is unitary and 
the principal actor in international relations. Realism is the most apposite paradigm to 
understanding international relations when the state is a consolidated and legitimate 
feature of its own political environment. In neo-realist thinking, the state is governed 
by the structures of the international political system. The adoption of neo-realism's 
emphasis upon the international political system makes realism a more appropriate 
model to this study. Realism is a universal paradigm, but its weakness lies in its 
Western-centric perceptions. In its universality, it fails to address the peculiarities of 
the Third World. 5 
Realism is suitable to the study of the First World, where states have evolved through 
a protracted historical struggle. We can charge realism for being too Eurocentric in its 
approach to international relations. Its utility to this study is limited as it does not 
address the issue of the unconsolidated states in the Third World. 6 
Many new states were created as the era of imperialism receded after the major world 
wars of the twentieth century. The new states belonged to the pole of the Third World, 
which represented a constellation of modern independent states. Although these states 
enjoyed their new found independence, the legacy of imperialism left a pattern of 
economic dependency and ethnically fractured societies. Many of these states were 
created across ethnic, cultural, religious, and linguistic boundaries; each factor 
deprived the new states of common legitimacy.7 
Nickolson, M., Causes and Consequences in International Relations: A Conceptual Study, (London: 
Pinter, 19%), pp. 173-176. 
David, S., "Explaining Third World Alignment," World Politics, vol. 43, no. 2, January 1991, pp. 
235. 
Huntington, S., Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 
pp. 117. 
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Without a historical legacy of their own, many of the states of the Third World were 
unable to consolidate their positions vis-a-vis their societies. Imported political systems 
were used to govern state-society relations, but the absence of a legitimate framework 
caused the states to depend upon the military to maintain social order. The use of 
coercion has remained an instrument of control in many Third World states.8 
After 1945, neo-realism asserts, the international political system continued to govern 
the behaviour of the world's states. The bipolar division of the world incorporated the 
states of the First, Second, and Third Worlds. Third World states, such as Syria, were 
drawn into the competition for international hegemony between the superpowers. The 
Soviet Union built its alliance with Syria through the transfer of arms in an attempt to 
counter the imperial designs of the US. Syria's behaviour, in other words, was guided 
by the structure of the international political system.9 
The structure of the international political system, and its sub-systems, have continued 
to shape the formulation of states' foreign policies. In the newly independent states of 
the Third World, however, the evolutionary phases of state consolidation have thrown 
up domestic anomalies that affect the formulation and implementation of these policies. 
I f one is to assess the determinants that influence the foreign relations of Syria, it 
would be negligent to omit the internal dynamics within the Syrian state. The Syrian 
state followed the pattern described above. With its fractious past, the Syrian state was 
open to the influences of the imperial powers and the dominant domestic actors. The 
Smith, B . , Understanding Third World Politics: Theories of Political Change and Development, 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996), pp. 246-247. 
Karsh, E , The Soviet Union and Syria: The Asad Years, (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 3-4. 
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state was shackled to the interests of international forces, and the ethnic and religious 
cleavages present within society.10 
Between 1946 and 1970, the Syrian state lacked legitimacy and was exposed to a 
period of social and political instability. Due to the complex ethnic composition of 
Syrian society, the state was unable to compel allegiance from the populace to the new 
Syrian state. A combination of the distrust between the ethnic cleavages, amongst the 
states of Bilad al-Sham, and the autonomous enclaves of Jabal Druze, Latakia, Horns, 
Hama, and Aleppo undermined the national function of the state and the central rule of 
Damascus. This effectively invited the military to intervene in state affairs in 1949.11 
Its involvement in Syrian politics has continued to define the nature of the relationship 
between the state and the society. 
Military intervention has proven to be an endemic feature of Third World states. Where 
states have not been able to assert their authority, through an institutional political 
process, they have often depended upon the military for support; alternatively, they 
have been subordinated to the authority of the military. 1 2 In both cases, domestic 
politics has tended to impinge upon the autonomy of the state. The decision-making 
process has been subjected to the competition that has arisen among the dominant 
actors within the state. 
With its emphasis on the unitary nature of the state, realism fails to capture the impact 
of domestic actors upon the Third World state. The lack of consolidation in many 
states of the Third World have rendered them malleable to the influences of dominant 
Longrigg, S., Syria and Lebanon under French Mandate, (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), 
pp. 117. 
" Petran, T., Syria, (New York: Praeger, 1972), pp. 96-97. 
12 
Clapham, C , Third World Politics: An Introduction, (London: Croom Helm, 1985), pp. 137-139. 
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ethnic and/or religious groups. We are obliged, therefore, to adopt the features of 
another paradigm that can account for the effect of the international political system, 
and is more sensitive to the impact of domestic politics. 
Omnibalancing 
The concept of omnibalancing allows us to bridge the difference between the domestic 
politics model and the rational actor model, and to gauge their respective effects upon 
the state. The key to omnibalancing is the degree to which a state enjoys autonomy 
from the structural determinants of the international political system, and from the 
constraints present within the domestic system.13 
In modern Syria, the state has been said to be semi-autonomous from the interests of 
one group.1 4 Asad has successfully constructed a Bonapartist state, that is balanced 
between the interests of competing social forces, namely, the Ba'th party, the Armed 
Forces and Security Services, the bureaucracy and the bourgeoisie. Hinnebusch has 
suggested that Asad sits above the corporate agencies and balances their demands and 
interests.15 
Asad's programme of state building sought to free the state from the undue influence 
of domestic forces, and to elevate the decision-makers of the state above those forces. 
From this position, the coterie of the regime could enact unpopular policies, but 
deemed to be taken in the national interest. This degree of autonomy in decision-
1 3 David, S., "Explaining Third World Alignment," World Politics, vol. 43, no. 2, January 1991, pp. 
233-256. 
14 
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between Rational Actor and Regime Legitimacy," BRISMES, unpublished manuscript. 
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making has been achieved through the creation of a quasi-corporatist state whose 
origins lie in the aftermath of the June War of 1967. 
State-building in Syria 
The June War of 1967 significantly altered the regional order of the Middle East. The 
Arab regimes were faced with a resounding defeat in their contest with Israel. The 
extent of the loss was far reaching, as Israel extended its regional hegemony through 
the occupation of the Sinai, West Bank, Gaza Strip, and the Golan Heights.16 
Post-independent Syria had been enfeebled by numerous military coups and counter-
coups ultimately resulting in the humiliation of the 1967 war. 1 7 Against this 
background, Hafez al-Asad, as the Minister of Defence, seized power through an 
internal-coup from within the existing Ba'th regime, on 14 November 1970.18 The 
new leadership, faced an immediate task, notably, the survival of the new regime. 
Security of the regime and the state, both from a domestic and external perspective, 
herein took precedence over all policies of the state. Security has since then been 
pursued through the maximisation of power. The survival strategy of the regime was 
built upon three tiers: 
(i) coercion; 
(ii) the struggle with Israel; 
(hi) a state-building programme. 
16 
Diab, M , "Have Syria and Israel Opted for Peace," Middle East Policy, vol. iii, no. 2, 1994, pp. 
79-81. 
17 
For more details of Syria's tumultuous past see: Seale, P., The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-
war Arab Politics 1945-1958, (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), and Rathmell, A., Secret 
War in the Middle East: The Covert Struggle for Syria, 1949-1961, (London: LB. Tauris, 1995). 
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Coercion has provided the backbone of the regime; it has sustained the regime, 
especially, during the late 1970s and early 1980s, when Syria was engulfed by internal 
dissension. Without the intervention of the Security Services, namely, Rifat Asad's 
Defence Companies, civil war would have enflamed Syria, and threatened the 
leadership of the state.19 
The state's legitimacy has been built upon insecure foundations. As the cement of Arab 
nationalism has fallen away, the state's legitimacy has dissipated. Economic shortfalls 
have served to weaken the state's allocative abilities, and exposed the vulnerability of 
the state's institutions. Lacking sufficient legitimacy, the state has depended upon 
coercion to maintain its authority, and implement unpopular policies, especially in its 
taciturn struggle with Israel.20 
The struggle with Israel has been the primary concern of the new regime. The regional 
competition with Israel took on the form of a balance of power contest. The balance of 
power between Israel and the collective Arab states unduly impinged upon Syria's 
foreign policy. Despite Arab nationalism losing much of its political resonance after the 
1967 war, it had helped to legitimise Syria's rejection of the Arab Cold War. Syria was 
able to do so by engaging in alliances with both the radical and conservative Arab 
states.21 
This will be discussed later in the chapter when I deal with the Hamah massacre to illustrate the 
potential of instability in Syria. 
20 
Perthes, V., The Political Economy of Syria under Asad, (London: LB. Tauris, 1995), pp. 151-152. 
2 1 See Kerr, M., The Arab Cold War 1958-1964: A Study of Ideology in Politics, (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1965). 
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Asad sought to consolidate the gains and losses of the June War, and pursue a more 
realist path in foreign policy. 2 2 The grand goals of pan-Arabism were tailored 
according to the realities of Arab capabilities. In effect, Syrian aspirations were 
curtailed to: 
• the recovery of the Arab territories lost in 1967; 
• the restoration of Palestinian rights; 
• the incorporation of Lebanon into Syria's sphere of influence. 2 3 
To achieve these ambitions, Syria had to balance the military potential of Israel. 
Balance could be found through the expansion of regional alliances, especially with the 
oil-rich Gulf Arab states. Another route to balancing the power of Israel was through 
the consolidation of the Syrian state, and the cultivation of a Syria-centric base of 
power. In a new state, without a definitive national identity, the prospect of war 
proved to be a crucible for state-building. The perpetual threat posed by Israel invoked 
a preoccupation with security and superimposed, albeit temporarily, a national Syrian 
consciousness. 
State-building was inextricably linked to securing Syria's regional status. The conflict 
with Israel provided justification for the regime's departure from the political and 
economic policies of the radical wing of the Ba'th party. 2 4 This radical wing had 
believed in "the primary need to replace the old guard's reformist socialism with a 
Hinnebusch, R., "Revisionist Dreams, Realist Strategies: The Foreign Policy of Syria," in B. 
Korany, and A. Dessouki (eds.), The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Change, 
(Boulder Westview Press, 1991), pp. 380. 
23 
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Peasant, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 145. 
24 
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(Aldershot: Gower, 1988), pp. 103. 
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radical social transformation to improve socio-economic conditions in Syria".25 On the 
other hand, the policies of Asad's regime were motivated by Arab nationalism, but 
their perception was less exclusive than the radical wing of the Ba'th party, as it 
included all sectors of society. The regime sought to mobilise the energies and assets 
of the Ba'th constituency and the merchant class. The struggle with Israel required a 
united effort, and Asad's task was to engender a sense of loyalty to the Syrian state.26 
Evidently, there was a distinct break from the ideological policies of the 1966-1970 
period; Israel was still a central feature of Syrian foreign policy, but the new strategy 
was based on the balance of power instead of ideology. State-building was the first 
step towards the realisation of this goal. This required that the base of the regime was 
broadened through an appeal not only to the traditional followers of Ba'thism, but also 
to those sectors of society who had opposed Ba'thi rule and had suffered under it. The 
socialist content of Ba'thism was diluted as elements of the Syrian bourgeoisie were 
brought into the state-building project.27 
The most immediate concern of Asad was to construct a durable state in order for Syria 
to ful f i l its regional ambitions. The priority of the new Syrian regime turned towards 
domestic matters. This required a restructuring of state-society relations imbued with a 
national agenda, and was attained through the creation of a new governing system. 
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The Governing System 
The contemporary Syrian political system was implemented soon after Asad had seized 
power in 1970. It has been construed from two forms of governance: 
• institutional system;28 
• a neo-patrimonial system.29 
The decision-making process in Syria has existed somewhere between these two 
competing systems.30 
The institutional model assumes that state structures are organised according to a 
society's norms, values, rules, and functions. 3 1 Hinnebusch suggests that the 
institutional system exists beyond the exigencies of personal or primordial motives. He 
comments: 
authority of office; routinized ideology; political skills and procedures 
and votes in assemblies and bureaus become crucial resources in the 
political process, subordinating or at least channelling and checking the 
role of societal resources such as wealth and kinship.32 
Weber refers to the institutional system as the legal authority. See: Weber, M., The Theory of 
Social and Economic Organization, (New York: The Free Press, 1968), pp. 329-341. 
29 
Weber, M., The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, (New York: The Free Press, 1968), 
pp. 346-358. 
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The institutional policy-making model can be seen to operate in the states of the First 
World, where the political process has been institutionalised through a long historical 
process. A rational policy, according to Huntington, derives from an institutional 
decision-making system that contains a series of checks and balances.33 
On the other hand, patrimonial ism is incapable of delivering consistent policies based 
upon a rational set of objectives, as there are often more pressing concerns emerging 
from the domestic arena. Where patrimonialisation deepens, the coherence, rationality, 
and popular base of the state are all increasingly at risk. A rational decision in Syria, as 
well as in many Third World states, must include a calculation of regime survival. The 
relationship between the state and the regime, in the Third World, is often ambiguous 
especially where the primordial interests of a ruling minority coincide, or conflict, with 
the national interest.34 
With the advent of oil wealth in the Middle East, the patrimonial state, founded upon 
traditional forms of patronage, has been replaced with the neo-patrimonial state.35 In 
the neo-patrimonial state, the distribution of favours, in return for support, has been 
exchanged for the allocation of economic rewards. Hence, the patrimonial state has 
been transformed into a neo-patrimonial state as the state has gained a more allocative 
role. 3 6 
Huntington, S., Political Order in Changing Societies, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), 
pp. 160. 
34 
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The neo-patrimonial system allows the state to finance a network of support, usually 
built upon ethnic, cultural, social, or religious ties. It fosters patterns of patronage and 
cronyism throughout society, in return for rent, thereupon stabilising the support of the 
state. In the Middle East, where states have assumed control over considerable natural 
resources, the state plays an allocative role. This acts as a source of empowerment, as 
the allocation of contracts entails building layers of support and allegiance. The Gulf 
Arab states have successfully transformed their patrimonial states into neo-patrimonial 
states through the auspices of oil. 
Syria has been less successful in cementing patronage through the allocation of state 
contracts and favours based upon oil rent. The ideology of the Ba'th party has acted as 
a substitute for the lack of rent oiling the political system. The extensive network of the 
Ba'th party in the rural districts of Syria has ensured the longevity of the Asad regime. 
Counterpoised to the efficacy of the institutional model, is the loyalty paid to the Asad 
regime by the system of neo-patrimonialism. "The Ba'ath recruited from all those who 
were outside the system of connections, patronage or kin on which the old regime was 
built: the educated sons of peasants, the minorities, the rural lower middle class, the 
'black sheep1 from lesser branches of great families."3 7 
Functioning between intitutionalism and neo-patrimonialism, the resulting system of 
governance has been based upon three overlapping structures: 
(i) the political system; 
(ii) the Ba'th party and its corporate bodies; 
(iii) the Armed Forces and the Security Services that constitute the shield of the 
regime. 
Richards, A., and J. Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East: State. Class, and 
Economic Development, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 313. 
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This system of governance can be conceptualised as a quasi-corporatist structure. 
The political system 
Asad sought to stabilise and consolidate the state through a carefully designed political 
system. The system operating in Syria has remained unchanged in character since 
1970, despite the limited alterations of 1990.39 The political system includes a 
presidency, parliamentary chamber, formal political parties, and a constitution. 
The political system in Syria comprises two main national institutions: the Presidency 
and the People's Council. The president resides above the political system and 
oversees its functions; all of the political bodies of the state are subordinate to the 
president. The location of the presidential palace, set high above Damascus and 
isolated from the social contagion of Syria's capital city, is symbolic of Asad's 
relationship to the Syrian state and people: the presidential monarch rests above the 
domestic forces of Syria. 
The presidential monarchy is instrumental in the foreign policy decision-making 
process, but it would be folly to ignore the role of the state institutions and their impact 
on this process. It is very tempting to oversimplify the influence of the president 
because the modern state of Syria is in part a creation of Asad. As Asad claims to be a 
man of institutions, he has set to endorse the institutional foundation of the Syrian 
state.40 There is, however, a contradiction between Asad's proclamations and his 
Perthes, V. , "Stages of Economic and Political Liberalisation in Syria," in E . Kienle (ed.), 
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actions. A closer examination of the president's powers will enable us to perceive this 
contradiction and the prevailing chain of command in Syria. 
The Presidency 
At the apex of the political system, the bureaucracy, the Ba'th Regional Command, the 
Armed Forces and the Security Services stands the President. The President has the 
right to: 
• appoint the prime minister; 
• appoint the speaker of the People's Council; 
• make laws when the Council is not in session; 
• legislate without the Council's consent,41 
• veto parliamentary laws; 
• dismiss the People's Council.4 2 
On 31 January 1973, the People's Council approved a new constitution which limits 
the president's term of office to seven years, but bestowed upon him (Asad) the rank 
of Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, the power to declare war, instigate a 
state of emergency, and to legislate when the parliament was in recess 4 3 The powers 
of the President are constitutionally absolute. The constitution was ratified by a 
referendum on 12 March 1973.44 
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Despite its approval by 88.9% of the electorate, the Constitution provoked a series of 
riots in Horns and Hama. The traditional Islamic communities of Horns and Hama 
rejected the secular disposition of the constitution, especially as it described Syria as a 
democratic, popular, and socialist state.45 It did not stipulate that the head of state had 
to be Muslim. Although the military was the tool of the regime to exercise social 
control, it did not prevent the outbreak of riots in Horns and Hama. Consequently, the 
constitution was amended declaring that the head of state had to be Muslim. 
As an 'Alawi, Asad existed outside the community of the Sunni majority. The 'Alawis 
were not recognised by Sunnis or Shi'as, moreover, they were maligned as heretics.46 
For Asad to be head of state, he had to belong to an official branch of Islam. Asad tried 
to satiate the religious establishment by persuading Musr Sadr, the spokesman for the 
Shi'a community in Lebanon, to issue a fatwa, declaring 'Alawis as Shi'as in 1973.47 
The amendment of the constitution and the issue of the fatwa demonstrated two points: 
(i) the resonance of religion in the traditional sectors of Syria and its resistance to 
secular rule; 
(ii) Asad's pragmatic approach to state-building. 
By appeasing the religious sector of the population, Asad sought to defuse a potential 
problem, by adapting the constitution to incorporate the Islamic essence of Syrian and 
Arab culture. 
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Asad has clearly concentrated the power in the presidency; the institutions of state, 
such as the People's Council and the Progressive National Front, were created to 
conduct the more mundane business of state. These institutions allowed the regime to 
divest itself of some of its daily responsibilities. They were designed to broaden the 
base of the regime without soliciting power. 
The People's Council 
After taking the final step in seizing power, in mid-November 1970, Asad, enforced 
the authority of the military wing of the Ba'th over the civilian wing. On 21 
November, Asad formed a cabinet, which included fifteen Ba'thists, six Nasserists, 
two Communists, two Independents, and supporters of Akram Hourani. 4 8 Asad 
assumed the portfolios of prime minister and defence minister. 
In February 1971, Asad established a parliament, the People's Council, where 
members were originally appointed, and after 1973, they have been elected by 
universal mandate.49 The Syrian parliament was composed of 195 members until May 
1990. From 1990 onwards, the number of obtainable seats was increased to 250. 5 0 
The People's Council most closely resembles a majlis al-shura, in the traditional 
Islamic sense; it does not possess sufficient power to preside over high politics, or 
legislate without the permission of the President.51 Parliamentary discussion has been 
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confined to the non-political issues of state, such as government performance in the 
fields of economy and services.52 It is a discussion chamber that serves as a forum for 
functional groups within Syrian society. 
The main function of the assembly is to represent the different interest groups, rather 
than constitute a sovereign body that generates and implements policies.5 3 The 
President is responsible for submitting bills to the parliament, he promulgates laws that 
the parliament has passed, but he has the right to veto these laws. Technically, the 
parliament is invested with the power to over-rule his veto by a two-thirds majority, 
but this situation has never arisen.54 
The People's Council is not an autonomous component of a democratic political 
system. In its current form, it owes its legacy and allegiance to the President, who has 
granted it nominal powers. The creation of the People's Council was not a derivative 
of class consciousness or a demand for greater democratisation, rather, it was an 
imposition from above.55 The establishment of the political system served the interests 
of the elite by broadening the base of support, incorporating members perceived to be 
outside the immediate boundaries of the Ba'th party, but it did not necessarily serve the 
interests of democracy. As a consultative, quasi-corporatist body, the People's Council 
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is an integral part of the process that governs the relationship between state and 
society.56 
The local government 
There are fourteen provinces in Syria. Each province is sub-divided into administrative 
areas, districts, and municipalities. At the head of this local structure is the governor, 
who consults with a local council of one hundred members; these members are elected 
every five years.57 
The local governments are invested with powers to attend to local affairs. They are 
responsible for the everyday running of provincial affairs, and need only to defer to 
Damascus when seeking project approval or the acquisition of budgets.58 
It is at the local level that we can see the three institutions of the state interacting. In 
each province there is a close liaison amongst the governor, the security chief, and the 
Ba'th party secretary. Each officer observes the policy decisions and actions of their 
counterpart, as a mechanism for regulating provincial affairs and for engendering 
loyalty and accountability to the state.59 
The balance of power amongst the three provincial leaders is often dependent upon the 
political environment of the province. Seale alludes to the primacy of the security chief 
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in a province such as Deir al-Zor, due to its proximity to Iraq, whereas in Raqqa', 
where industry takes priority, the governor would take pre-eminence.60 
The interplay amongst the various governing structures allows the state to incorporate 
the interests of its constituencies, both within the provinces and the urban centres. The 
policy of incorporation has been a distinctive feature of Asad's rule. In the People's 
Council, the creation of the National Progressive Front (NPF) allowed the state to 
envelope the diverse sentiments of the left wing parties. 
The National Progressive Front 
In the provincial elections, which took place on 3 and 4 March 1971, the Ba'th party 
suffered a number of unexpected setbacks. In a series of public speeches, Asad 
promised to restore some of the public liberties abolished by the previous regime. This 
reinforced the necessity to develop a wider base of support.61 On 7 March 1971, the 
President divested the Ba'th party of some of its nominal powers by establishing the 
NPF with an 18-member central leadership consisting of President Asad, 9 other 
Ba'thists together with 2 members from each of the four non-Ba'thist parties, 
including the Syrian Communist Party (SCP), and the Arab Socialist Union (ASU). 6 2 
The formation of the NPF signified a change in direction. The inclusion of the left-
wing and Nasserist groups coalition into the governing establishment incorporated a 
60 
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level of opposition into the state apparatus.63 Incorporating the above mentioned 
political parties, the NPF represented the only official channel of opposition. 
However, the role of the NPF was dominated by the Ba'th party. The Ba'th 
programme and its conference resolutions, according to the NPF charter, provided the 
political direction of the NPF. The charter of the Front also disqualified all parties, 
except the Ba'th, from recruiting amongst students and from the Armed Forces.64 The 
parties themselves, by accepting the conditions of admission, were divested of their 
powers as centres of criticism. 6 5 The agenda was firmly set from a top-down 
perspective. Accordingly, constitutional power sharing did not result from the creation 
of the NPF. It provided the regime with an inflated sense of legitimacy, and, hence, 
further increased its exercise of central power. 
The NPF provided a forum for formal parties, recognised by the regime, to participate 
in selected matters of state, and under these circumstances the Ba'th party controlled 
and orchestrated the agenda. Besides members of the NPF, independent candidates 
were allowed to stand for election, but only after ratification had been granted by the 
regime.66 There was no significant competition among the political parties operating in 
the system; they formed a joint list for each province and issued a common election 
manifesto.67 
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The functions of the People's Council and the actions of the NPF have been largely 
cosmetic. Although a coalition of interests is represented through the parties, the NPF, 
according to Hinnebusch, has "never constituted more than a transparent attempt, by 
the regime, to disguise the Ba'th's monopolisation of power."68 The inclusion of legal 
parties was only an attempt to legitimise Ba'th rule through the co-option of small but 
compatible interest groups. 
The Ba'th party 
The Ba'th party is one of the foundations of the Syrian state. It was originally built as a 
party of opposition during the period of the French mandate. It was constructed from 
the inspiration of Michel Aflaq and the organisational skills of Salah al-Bitar. 6 9 
Although the Ba'th party was formed as an opposition movement, after it had taken 
power in 1963, it became a party of government. 
Before addressing the dynamic between the Ba'th party and the state, we should 
review the organisation of the party. The ideological component of the party has been 
referred to in chapter three, but the organisation of the party requires further definition. 
The organisation of the Ba'th party 
The organisation of the party is very distinct and it pervades all sectors of Syrian 
society. The National Command is the highest authority of the Ba'th party and is an 
inter-Arab and trans-state body. The Regional Command is responsible for the party in 
each state. It is composed of 21 members and meets once a week.70 The organisational 
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Abu Jaber, K. , The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party: History, Ideology, and Organization, (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 1966), pp. 143. 
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aspect of the party was construed after the Communist model of the Soviet Union 
resembling a pyramidal structure. The party cell is the smallest unit of the party 
structure. Between 4 and 7 members belong to each cell, and they are most operative in 
the workplace or amongst friends. There are five levels between the party cell and the 
National Command and they include: cell, company, division, branch, Regional 
Command, and the National Command.71 
71 
Abu Jaber, K. , The Arab Ba'th Socialist Party: History, Ideology, and Organization, (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 1966), pp. 140. 
omana 
Command 
Regions 
Bra nch 
Divi sion 
Compa 
Cell Cell 
Regional Convention 
Secretary 
Command 
Branch Branch Convention 
Secretary 
Command 
Division 
Secretary 
Command 
Company 
Division Convention 
Company Members 
1 I 
Cell Cell Secretary 
Cell 
elects 
Ba'th Party Organisation Chart a p p o m t s 
urce: Abu Jaber, K. , Socialist Party: History, Ideology, and Organization, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1966), pp. 145. 
SYRIA: THE CENTRES OF POWER 200 
The structure of the party was carefully designed so that communication flowed from 
the junior body to the parent body, for example, from the company to the division. The 
system of authority within the Ba'th party was originally based on democratic 
socialism, but since Asad took power, the flow of information has been displaced and 
flows from top-down.72 The revolution from above has ensured that policy decisions 
emanate from the Regional Command, and then radiate throughout the Ba'th party 
organisation. High politics remains in the domain of the Regional Command and the 
president's close advisers. The party, therefore, approves the decisions taken by the 
party elite, rather than proposes or challenges the leadership. 
Adjacent to the hierarchy of levels in the Ba'th party are the corporatist bodies. They 
are organised according to sectoral interests within Syria. They comprise the 
Peasants', Students', Workers', Women's, and Youth unions. These syndicate 
agencies were constructed to articulate the interests of each group. As corporate bodies 
they are granted access to the decision-making process via representation on policy 
issues. 
Patrick Seale suggests that the secretary of each sectoral body acts as the conduit 
between leadership and membership. The secretary can voice the concerns of the 
membership on policy matters, hence transmitting some form of party sentiment, but 
policy initiatives transcend from the party leadership to the designated corporate body. 
The influence of the syndicate bodies is, however, limited. For instance, when a 
faction of the trade union proposed to pull out of the Ba'th system because of the 
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regime's economic policies, the president warned that freedom had to be understood 
within the framework of responsibility and not contradiction and fragmentation.73 
Populist corporatism, as a system of state management has been effective since Asad's 
rise to power. It includes the incorporation of political elite groups, popular 
organisations and organised business.74 The corporations are "divided into 
compulsory, non-competitive, functionally differentiated, hierarchic associations 
which are considered to be representative for their members and the membership of the 
functional groups within society."75 Each group enjoys some access to the decision-
making process, but these privileges are dependent upon the political and economic 
environment.76 In this form then, the corporate bodies of the Ba'th party serve two 
purposes: 
(i) they are conductors of party opinion; thereby, they indicate levels of legitimacy 
within the party; 
(ii) they act as agents of socialisation for the party. 
The relationship between the bodies and the party leadership remains somewhat 
ambiguous, depending on the directional flow of information and decisions. 
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Dynamism between the Ba'th party and the state 
The Ba'th party is one of the state's principal sources of power. It has been 
responsible for political recruitment, indoctrination, education, and mobilisation of the 
population. More recently, the party has become a ladder of upward mobility providing 
access to positions of influence. In this sense, it has become more of a bureaucracy, a 
power broker, and a source patronage than a revolutionary movement.77 To quote 
Sadowski: 
Twenty-two years in power have changed the Ba'th from a 
revolutionary movement into a virtual appendage of the state. But this 
transformation did not destroy the party's influence. Along with the 
army and the bureaucracy, it remains one of the foundations of the 
Asad regime.78 
The state and the Ba'th party are ultimately linked in the governing of Syria through the 
parallel structures of the state and Ba'th party. The president, the prime minister, the 
speaker, and the officers of the state are all members of the Syrian Regional Command 
of the Ba'th party. The Ba'th party is dominant in the People's Council, and the state 
bureaucracy; additionally, it operates alongside the provincial assemblies.79 
The Ba'th party has also provided the state with a supply of legitimacy. It has appealed 
to those groups previously omitted from access to the state, such as: unionised 
workers, public employees, agricultural workers, and peasants. These groups have 
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remained loyal to the Ba'th and provided some legitimacy for the regime.80 In trying to 
establish and maintain legitimacy, the Ba'th party has "redistributed income, promoted 
growth, spread literacy, and in general improved the economic lot of their citizens".81 
The Ba'th party established its credentials with the peasantry, the minorities, and the 
urban youth as a national party with a radical agenda for change.82 The socialist and 
nationalist aspects of the party attracted the disenchanted minorities who had suffered 
from the urban politics of the political elite. The party offered the opportunity of 
advancement in a system otherwise determined by the patronage of the notable families 
of Damascus, Horns, Hama, and Aleppo.8 3 The families of the political elite were less 
inclined to join the party as it challenged the foundations of their heritage and wealth. 
This produced an environment where peasants and minorities could rise through the 
ranks of the party, and influence the direction of its politics. The Ba'th party also 
represented a political and national alternative to the enervated struggles of the National 
Bloc and the People's party.8 4 
The status of the relationship between the Ba'th party and the state has become less 
certain since 1985. There has been a qualitative down-grading of the party's influence 
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in the decision-making process. Three occasions have suggested that a transition may 
be taking place in the balance of interests in Syria's domestic arena: 
• Syria's admission into the US-led coalition without prior consultation with the 
Regional Command; 
• The pressure placed upon the political and economic interests of the party from 
the economic liberalising measures introduced in 1986; 
• The failure to convene a Regional Congress, which should take place every five 
years, since 1985. 
These occasions are indicative of change in the substance of the relationship between 
the party and the state.85 According to Hinnebusch, the Ba'th party has been 
"downgraded, de-ideologised and turned into a patronage machine with little capacity 
for independent action."86 
The Ba'th party and Syrian society 
The distinctive pyramidal chain of command gave the Ba'th leadership access to a 
class-based clientele that had been excluded from influencing the policies of the 
traditional Syrian leadership. The Ba'th party invested the inhabitants of the provinces 
with the power of organisation, and the chance to mobilise their support in exchange 
for legitimacy. 
Although it penetrated Syrian society, the Ba'th party never became a mass party. The 
emphasis of the party between 1940 and 1966 was to recruit an active membership. 
Interview with a Syrian academic, 10 September 1995. 
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Despite its popularity in the provinces and amongst the poorer sections of Syrian 
society, the leadership of the Ba'th party came from the Syrian middle classes. The 
philosophy of Aflaq was cased in the moderate language of the middle classes, which 
proved to be a cause of antagonism between the Aflaq mindset and the more radical 
peasantry. 
The division between the peasantry and the middle class, within the Ba'th party, 
manifested itself through the two wings of the party. The peasants and the minorities 
captured the military wing of the party whilst the urban middle class retained leadership 
through the civilian wing of the party.87 The leaders of the rural and urban centres were 
polarised. The civilian leadership, and the middle class, were opposed to the nascent 
leadership of the radicals within the Ba'th party. 
A contest for leadership erupted, on 23 February 1966, when the military wing, under 
the guidance of Jadid and the Military Committee, usurped the civilian wing of the 
party.88 Their social and political agenda were more strident than their successors, as 
they sought to base the Ba'th party on a Leninist model of organisation. This regime 
could well have been described as a dictatorship of the petite bourgeoisie. Land 
reforms, nationalisations, and government control over the market struck at the bases 
of the bourgeoisie.89 
The radical regime transformed the class composition of the state. The Ba'thisation of 
the army replaced the Sunni upper-class and middle class officers with ones of 
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plebeian, rural, and minority origin. The Ba'thists had seized power by military coup, 
but not at the head of a broad cross-classed movement. Their road to power dictated 
the omnipresence of the military in political affairs and culminated in the overthrow of 
the civilian wing. Asad's ultimate manoeuvre into position from Minister of Defence to 
secretary-general of the Regional Command signified a permanent role for the military 
through the Ba'th party. 
The Armed Forces and Security Services 
The Armed Forces and the Security Services have remained the most durable 
repositories of state power. These sectors has been responsible for projecting Syria's 
power in its conflict with Israel, it has also guaranteed the survival of the regime. 
These corporate bodies have become distinct centres of power. Their access to the state 
and the regime is underwritten by their indispensability to state and regime security. 
They are directly accountable to the president. Unlike the People's Council, and the 
NPF, the relationship between the military centres of power and the president is not 
one of subordination. Both parties are mutually dependent upon each other for their 
existence. The president requires a pervasive network of Security Services to guarantee 
his rule against insurrection; the Security Services need the authority of the president to 
maintain their power.90 
The intimate marriage between the military and the regime had taken place prior to the 
action of the Corrective Movement in November 1970. As a student leader, with a 
successful career in the airforce, and as the Minister of Defence for the Jadid regime, 
Asad had cultivated a bedrock of support within the military establishment. The 
Interview with a Syrian businessman, 2 July 1994. 
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disproportionate number of 'Alawis in the military and the Ba'th party enabled Asad to 
cement his ties through the system of patronage.91 
Systems of patronage are most apparent in the appointment of sensitive posts in the 
armed and Security Services. As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, the 
President is responsible for appointing the key positions within the military 
establishment, which is the main guarantor of the regime.9 2 Appointments have 
traditionally been awarded to the diktat of alliance building. Neo-patrimonialism, 
instead of meritocracy, has governed the advancement of officers. The levers of 
control rest firmly in the hands of Asad's loyal commanders, known as regime barons, 
most of whom derive from the 'Alawi community. The following list of officers are all 
'Alawis and hold critical posts in the armed services: 
Shafiq Fayyad Division commander 
Ibrahim Safi Division commander 
•Ali Asian Deputy Chief of Staff 
'Ali al-Salih Missile Corps 
'Ali Duba Head of Military Intelligence (until 1993) 
'Ali Haydar Special Forces 
'Adnan Makhluf Presidential Guard 
It has not been in Asad's interest to alienate the Sunni officers within the Armed Forces 
and the Security Services. Motivated by power politics, Asad has balanced the interests 
of the Sunni officers against the pre-dominance of the 'Alawis. Asad's selection of 
The 'Alawis occupy key positions in both the military, and the Security Services, such as: security 
chiefs, party bosses, divisional commanders, and links to the business community. 
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senior Sunni military officers has been effective in preserving a semblance of non-
sectarianism within the regime elite.9 3 The presence of key Sunni officers, such as 
Hikmat al-Shihabi, the Chief of Staff, and Mustafa Tlas, the Minister of Defence, has 
served to strengthen the regime, thereby reducing the likelihood of a Sunni-led coup.94 
The Armed Forces, Security Services and the state 
The Armed Forces and the Security Services are the least accountable corporate bodies 
of the Syrian state; there are no constitutional mechanisms to govern their activities. 
Whereas there are institutional processes that govern the functions of the constitutional 
political system and the Ba'th party, the omniscient Security Services exist above 
institutional reproof. The commanders of each security service exercise some 
autonomy from the state. One result of this, has been the growth of military fiefdoms 
that exercise influence over security, the bureaucracy, and social affairs. The power 
base of these fiefdoms emanates from their access to the regime, and more 
independently, through the accumulation of capital in the parallel economy. 9 5 
Syria's continuous role in Lebanese affairs, since 1976, has created an environment 
for a flourishing parallel economy. The army's role in Lebanon has enabled many 
. officers and regular soldiers to amass small fortunes through practices of corruption 
involving smuggling and drug-trafficking.9 6 Working as the coordinators and agents 
of the black market, the regime barons have been free to trade in consumables, 
otherwise unavailable, irrespective of the harsh penalties of the law. The operation of 
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protection rackets in the suqs, and the military warehouse sales in Damascus, are clear 
demonstrations of the independent power bases of the regime barons. 
In return for guaranteeing the survival of the Asad regime, the regime barons enjoy 
special privileges. These privileges represent negative manifestations for the state as 
they form a major obstacle to institutionalising the political system. When the regime 
barons live outside the confines of the law, they can circumvent the domestic policies 
of the state. In conjunction, they can contribute to the de-legitimisation of the regime 
by contradicting state policy without penalty. Such a case occurred in 1977, when the 
Islamists openly rebelled against the state's policy in Lebanon, and the ill icit 
accumulation of wealth by the 'Alawi regime barons. The barons were extorting 
monies in smuggled trade from Lebanon and rackets working within the state 
bureaucracy.97 
After June 1977, Syria had been besieged with assassinations, riots, and public 
executions. Public figures from the 'Alawi sect became targets for the Islamic 
opposition. In order to appease public unrest, Asad ordered a crack down on 
corruption in October 1977. The anti-corruption drive aimed at improving the 
efficiency of the state machinery, and satisfying public demand that the state would 
work for the national good. Asad criticised the bureaucracy for ineptitude and 
inefficiency, and appointed the Committee for the Investigation of Illicit Gains.98 
The Committee was granted wide ranging powers which incorporated the power of 
attorney, arrest, detention, and the sequestration of money. To eliminate the 
corruption, however, the Committee would have had to penalise the regime barons. 
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This would have challenged the backbone of the regime, the security and military 
interests, including the Defence Companies of the president's brother, Rif'at Asad.9 9 
The de-facto power of the Committee, therefore, was very limited. Evidently, it had 
been designed to produce nominal figure-heads to alleviate the regime of 
responsibility. 
Asad's dependence upon the regime barons has set a constraint upon his freedom of 
action. They are a source of support, and at the same time represent an obstacle to 
reform. It is in the interests of the regime barons, entrenched in the Armed Forces and 
Security Services, to maintain the domestic and regional status quo. The prospect of 
change in the domestic arena, for instance, the upgrading of the People's Council, or a 
transition in the regional environment, the conclusion of a peace deal with Israel, could 
threaten the fiefdoms of the regime barons. As a consequence, Asad's leverage over 
the barons has been constrained, but this has not prevented him from emasculating 
them when necessary. The rotation of military positions has given Asad the initiative in 
preventing the barons from congealing their fiefdoms into independent bodies. There 
are two cases which illustrate this point: 
In 1993, it was thought that 'Ali Duba was removed from his office of military 
intelligence. After an internal dispute with his co-equals, he was kicked upstairs as one 
of three assistant chiefs of staff. 1 0 0 His fiefdom was disbanded as his clients were 
displaced by new recruits, although some of the clients dismissed were appointed by 
Rif'at Asad, such as Muhammad Nassef and General 'Abboud who were also 
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powerful people in their right. Nevertheless, the fiefdom of 'Ali Duba was not able to 
reconstitute itself into an independent centre of power.101 
In an earlier case, Asad effected a Syrian Military High Command reshuffle. In August 
1974, General Yussef Shakur, the Chief of Staff during the October War was forced to 
retire. Despite Shakur's popularity and considerable power base, the president 
dispersed his foundations of support and appointed a new chief of staff, hence, 
removing the potential threat of Shakur's centre of power.1 0 2 
The patrimonial appointment of commanders in the Armed Forces and the Security 
Services has ensured that the state is caught between the two forms of governance, 
patrimonialism and institutionalism. Although Asad continues to reside above the 
Bonapartist state, balancing the interests of the competing structures, he cannot afford 
to alienate the support of the regime barons. Thereupon, he has become encased 
between the demands of an institutional base and a hostage to his past. 
The New World Order presented Asad with more room for manoeuvre between the 
patrimonial and institutional systems. The advent of perestroika, glasnost, and new 
thinking in Soviet foreign policy, precipitated change in the world order. Due to the 
failure of state-led economic policies, the foreign exchange crisis of 1986, and the 
monumental changes that took place in Eastern Europe in 1989, the Syrian state altered 
the course of its domestic policies. Asad was presented with the opportunity to 
counter-balance the primacy of the regime barons through the cultivation of the 
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bourgeoisie. Although its role has never been institutionalised beyond the Chamber of 
Commerce, the succession of global capitalism added weight to Syria's bourgeoisie.103 
The lack of an institutionalised decision-making process in Syria has meant that the 
process is governed by the balance of power. As in all balances of power, the flow of 
power amongst the main actors is not constant. The flux in the system allows some 
actors to gain at the expense of others. A zero-sum game can exist amongst various 
domestic actors, who are perceived in the polarised forms of the public and private 
sectors. In the case of Syria, until recently, the bourgeoisie has been a subordinate 
partner in the state. The dominance of the Ba'th party, the Armed Forces, and Security 
Services throughout the political system and the corporate structures of the state has 
ensured that the power of the bourgeoisie has stayed negligible.1 0 4 
The Bourgeoisie 
During the Ottoman rule and the French mandate, Syrian society was classified 
according to the interlocking features of vertical and horizontal stratification. As Syrian 
society became increasingly urbanised, the land-owning class, which formed the 
political elite, cohered into a bourgeoisie. The nationalist struggle against the Ottomans 
and the French helped to reinforce the bourgeoisie's class identity and further defined 
their relationship with the rural peasants and the urban proletariat. The policies of the 
state were conducted through the auspices of the Syrian notables in the form of 
intermediaries between the foreign administration and the Syrian population.105 
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The dominance of the bourgeoisie in Syrian politics ended abruptly with the Ba'thist 
coup in 1963. As described earlier, the power of the bourgeoisie was destroyed by the 
policies of land reform and nationalisation. The policies of social levelling removed the 
threat posed by the bourgeoisie to the new state. It allowed the state to free itself from 
the constraints of the old class, and to pursue an autonomous path. The bourgeoisie 
were the declared enemy of the Ba'th party and the Syrian state.106 
Asad's overthrow of the Jadid regime and his ascent to power was welcomed by the 
surviving elements of the bourgeoisie.107 Throughout his term as president, Asad has 
tried to balance the interests of the various groups in Syria. The alienation of the 
bourgeoisie by the Ba'th has been tentatively reversed throughout Asad's tenure of 
office. 
On assuming power, Asad's priority became national development. Development of 
the state became synonymous with national strength. A l l aspects of the national 
economy, wherever possible, were harnessed to boost the power projection of Syria: 
"Defence of the homeland, steadfastness, and victory, Asad time and again told his 
compatriots, were impossible without development".108 He wished to circumvent the 
harmful policies of his predecessors who restricted the activities of private enterprise. 
Accordingly, Syria embarked on a more mixed economic path to development. In 
order to combat economic stagnation, the flight of capital, and the ensuing brain-drain, 
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Asad inaugurated a number of liberalising measures in 1971. 1 0 9 Import restrictions on 
certain goods were lifted, and registered importers became entitled to import certain 
quantities of goods which were effectively banned from importation. 1 1 0 In 1972, 
imports without foreign exchange transfers were permitted, thus enabling merchants to 
repatriate some of their wealth. An amnesty on capital flight was declared to facilitate 
the return of capital, and other offences against economic laws were transmuted.111 
Asad recognised the potential of allying the state with components of the bourgeoisie. 
Such an alliance would not adversely affect the regime's strategic interests, but enable 
the entrepreneurial skills of the bourgeoisie to energise the economy under the auspices 
of the regime. 1 1 2 The bourgeoisie represented a useful engine for developing the 
national economy as long as it refrained from making political demands. Realising this, 
he dispensed with the levelling philosophy and policies of the Ba'th, and implemented 
a strategy of limited incorporation.113 
The demise of the Soviet Union, the collapse of the East European regimes, and the 
termination of the socialist economic systems have had a resounding effect upon the 
domestic balance of power within Syria. The reconfiguration of the international 
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political system and the succession of global capitalism have produced a shift in the 
interplay amongst Syria's corporate actors.114 
Up till now, the state is still dominated by the Ba'th party and the security apparatus, 
but a visible down-grading of their importance has been identifiable since 1990. The 
recipients of the political advantage belong to the bourgeois class. This does not, 
however, represent a simple transition of power from the public sector of the state to 
the private sector. The zero-sum game analysis bears little fruit, as the interests of the 
new bourgeoisie are synonymous with the interests of the regime elite. 1 1 5 Before 
examining the dynamics of the military-mercantile complex, it is necessary to identify 
which groups constitute the bourgeoisie. 
Constituents of the bourgeoisie 
Bahout advises against using the term 'bourgeoisie', for it connotes that this group has 
developed into class-for-itself. He acknowledges that there are splinters of the old 
bourgeoisie and a newly emerging business class in existence, but they have not 
coalesced to constitute a class. Their interests have remained separated from each 
other, and tied to those of the state. The state has fostered a dependency between the 
various parts of the business community and itself. 1 1 6 Bahout identifies four main 
groups that make up the business community in Syria: 
• the old bourgeoisie; 
• theinfitahi; 
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• the nouveaux riches; 
• the state bourgeoisie. 
A brief description of these four groups will enable us to understand their relationship 
with the state, and their role in the balance of power. 
The Old Bourgeoisie 
The old bourgeoisie is that element of the landed-class who managed to survive the 
policies of the Ba'th party. They come from the notable families of the Syrian cities of 
Damascus, Horns, Hama, and Aleppo. They carry the values of the Syrian upper 
classes and perceive themselves as the natural heirs of Syrian leadership. Due to their 
enduring influence, they were able to recycle their economic surplus through trade and 
medium scale industry.117 
The Infitahi 
The infitahi resemble the petite bourgeoisie in economic activity and political culture, 
although they are not organised into a political or social unit. They are a group of 
actors responsible for light industry, manufacturing, commerce, and services. The 
infitahi have grown from the early policies of the Asad regime, and, therefore, owe 
their allegiance to the Syrian state. Articulating political or economic demands has not 
developed as part of their repertoire or political culture.1 1 8 
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The Nouveaux Riches 
The most immediate beneficiaries of the 1973 oil-hike, and the subsequent economic 
development, have been the nouveaux riches. Since then, they have played an 
important role in the national economy. They are different from the two previous cases 
in that they are intimately connected to the state. Their relationship with the state has 
cultivated a mutually constitutive alliance expressed in the allocation of contracts. 
The contracts allocated to the nouveaux riches, financed by external rent received from 
the Gulf Arab states, have engendered an intractable loyalty between the contractors' 
bourgeoisie and the state. One result of this has been the movement of this group into 
the privileged areas of real estate, construction, tourism, and transportation, which are 
reserved for the exclusive preserve of the state's dependent business sector.119 
The State Bourgeoisie 
The state bourgeoisie refers to the select club that guides the implementation of state 
policies. This group has been able to use its privileged access to the state to proffer 
favours upon selected contractors. Their links to the children of the regime have 
proved to be particularly lucrative, and instrumental, in forging links between the state 
and business classes.120 
The children of the leaders of the present regime are reputed to have entered business, 
instead of following their fathers' paths into the military or security apparatus. They 
are playing a conciliatory role in binding the fortunes of the state to the interests of the 
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indigenous business class. This shift in orientation bears many consequences as the 
children of the regime, many of whom are 'Alawis, are undergoing the experience of 
embourgeoisment. The transition in the social class of the new political elite from 
peasant, to soldier, to bourgeoisie, has started to cement the future of the state with the 
old and new bourgeoisie.121 
The bourgeoisie and the state 
Having identified the four components of the Syrian business class, it is possible to 
recognise the dependency that each group owes to the state. Asad's regime has 
successfully incorporated the energies of the business class, and tailored their demands 
for political expression through a relationship based upon patronage and 
subordination. 
After 1970, the ideological motivation of the regime was replaced with the priority of 
power accumulation. As part of the struggle with Israel, Asad attempted to construct a 
national economy that channelled the energies of both the private and the public sector 
into a national project. The rehabilitation of a compliant business class, operating 
alongside the public sector, was perfunctory to upon achieving the national purpose. 
The role of the business community, however, was secondary to the Ba'th party, the 
Armed Forces, the Security Services.122 
The bourgeoisie has remained a lesser corporate interest in the state apparatus. Its 
access has been very limited owing to the ideological disposition of the Ba'th party and 
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the origins of the regime. The relationship between the bourgeoisie and state has 
remained volatile and unreliable since Asad's advent to power. The state granted the 
bourgeoisie a role in the national economy through the implementation of economic 
liberalising measures. The policies of the state have taken heed of capital accumulation 
and the specific role played by the bourgeoisie in generating it. Their role, however, 
was not protected by the rule of the law; it was governed by the rule of the domestic 
and regional climate.1 2 3 
Politics has dominated the economic realm since 1970. Decisions determined according 
to political preferences have allowed the regime to protect its autonomy in decision-
making, but prevented it from creating a viable, dependable, and sustainable economy. 
Due to the precarious nature of the regime's legitimacy, society needed to be insulated 
from the failures of economic policy. The regime has had to cushion diminishing 
support, from the populace, through the provision of services. 
The self-imposed economic reforms of the first infitah, in 1971, were designed to 
broaden the base of the regime and to extend its legitimacy.1 2 4 The state's economic 
policies were instrumental in harnessing the support of the urban population, with 
whom the Ba'th party had traditionally failed to establish a stronghold. 
The first infitah ended in 1977. The state started to reverse some of its liberal policies 
due to political and economic reasons. The infitah had led to widespread corruption. 
Importing without foreign exchange transfers had encouraged illegal currency exports. 
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Economic security courts were established to erase the culture of corruption, that 
sought to circumvent the policies of the state. Both the private sector and the regime 
barons had seemingly abused the liberalising measures. As the growth and 
independence of the private sector was deemed to be a threat to the state, the privileges 
granted through liberalisation were removed.125 
Syria's Lebanon policy also proved to be problematic for the state. The disillusionment 
with the secular activities of the Syrian state, and the predominant 'Alawi composition 
of the regime, fuelled an environment sensitive to Syria's policies in Lebanon. The 
response of the traditional sectors of Syrian society, and the disaffected youth, found 
its expression in a series of attacks against high-ranking members of the government 
and the Ba'th party. The 'Alawis were deliberately targeted by the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The domestic repercussions of Syria's role in Lebanon caused the pace 
of economic reform to stall, and, eventually, to retract towards state-led socialism. The 
focus of the regime turned away from economics and towards the maintenance of the 
state against an assault from the Muslim Brotherhood.126 
With the failings of the socialist model of development, the dramatic fall in the price of 
oi l , and the ensuing foreign exchange crisis of 1986, 1 2 7 Asad reinstituted the 
programme of economic liberalisation. These moves did not allow the former 
bourgeoisie to reconstruct itself or institutionalise its relationship with the state, 
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nevertheless, some entrepreneurs were granted informal admission to the decision-
making process.128 
The private sector was granted controlled access to the economic decision-making 
process. 1 2 9 The appointment of Muhammad al-Imady to the post of Minister of the 
Economy, in 1987, signified a new economic direction for the state. Imady's ability to 
reform the structure of the economic system was limited due to the entrenched interests 
of the regime in the existing state apparatus. He did, however, have the approval of the 
president to test the waters and proceed at an incremental pace.130 
The Syrian economy was steered between those domestic forces which supported a 
more socialist-oriented policy, and those forces that promoted a more progressive 
programme of economic liberalisation. The economic policies that emerged from these 
two opposing factions were carefully selected and applied in accordance with the 
variety of interests balanced by the regime. 
In an economy where the state purchases part of its legitimacy, the loss of state 
revenues inflicts a severe handicap upon the state to service its loyalists. The elite that 
steers the state, therefore, are not insulated from economic failures. Although the state 
may be resilient and flexible in the political realm, it is, nevertheless, vulnerable i f it 
fails to fu l f i l its basic economic agenda. In this instance, the state turns to the 
bourgeoisie to compensate for the economic gap. Once this occurs, Heydemann 
observes: 
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economic reform no longer represents the leading political threat. 
Increasingly, the continued erosion of domestic production, of capital 
accumulation, and thus of prospects for extraction, undermine the 
regime's ability to reproduce its system of rule. Under these conditions, 
the logic of politics becomes, in some measure, the logic of reform.131 
This time, the economic measures were more far-reaching than the earlier period, and 
have been deemed to be irreversible. In return, the state had to undertake to offer 
concessions to the business community; semi-institutional access to the economic 
policy process assuaged the interests of the growing private sector. As Hinnebusch 
suggests: 
The door of liberalization was thus opened, but liberalization cannot go 
very far without the reconstruction of an entrepreneurial bourgeoisie 
which, being willing to invest, can provide a viable alternative to the 
public sector.132 
To reconstruct and rehabilitate the business community, the state created several 
openings to the economic decision-making process, which took the form of: 
• independent representation in the People's Council; 
• the creation of a quasi-corporate body, the Prime Minister's Committee for the 
Guidance of Imports, Exports, and Consumption.133 
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In 1990, one third of the seats in the People's Council were reserved for independent 
candidates, who essentially emanated from the private sector.134 The independents 
have not formed a bloc to thwart the dominance of the Ba'th party, but their relevance 
to the institutional process is gaining precedence. In May 1990, a member of the 
Aleppo Chamber of Commerce, and two from the Damascus Chamber of Commerce 
were elected to the People's Council. They were the first agents of the private sector to 
serve a term in parliament since 1963.135 
In the election of 1994, the tone of the election address indicated the new respectability 
accorded to private enterprise and the business community. Ihsan Sankar campaigned 
on the election platform to repeal populist measures, such as land reform ceilings, and 
progressive taxation.136 Understood against the background of Ba'th ideology, the call 
for these measures illustrated the flexibility of the state and the increasing gravity of the 
business community in Syrian economic life. This was also a sign that the Ba'th party, 
though still a patronage-generating entity, was beginning to lose its ideological 
leadership and its pivotal role in the policy process.137 
The business community has gained through the policies of economic liberalisation. 
Notwithstanding, one should not conceive of the state as losing out in a zero-sum 
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game. The state, managed by Asad, has existed above the various social forces in 
Syrian society. As Heydemann points out, the state must: 
simultaneously persuade the private sector of its sincerity and 
commitment to reform, without which it would abstain from investing, 
while persuading its clients and beneficiaries that their positions are 
secure, that they will be protected from the demands of stabilization, 
and that economic reform will not interrupt their privileges and 
benefits}16 
By selecting a programme of economic restructuring the state has stood to benefit from 
economic reform. As an economic system, state-led socialism had failed to alleviate the 
paucity of the Syrian economy. The state remained partially dependent upon a 
diminishing flow of rent, and the cessation of soft loans from the Soviet Union served 
to exacerbate Syria's ailing economic situation. 
Through a carefully managed process, the state began to incorporate a reconstructed 
business class into the economic realm. This class has yet to develop an appetite for 
political power. Stability and state protection from the external markets continues to 
occupy the interests of this group. A comment by a prominent industrialist and trader 
from Damascus was very revealing when he said: "All we want is economic freedom 
and political stability; for us, democracy often means a coup d'etat every two years."139 
The emerging mutuality of interest between the state and the business class has meant a 
zero-sum loss to the Ba'th party and its loyalists working in the public sector. The 
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regime's natural constituency looks set to lose out in the domestic realignment of social 
forces. Balancing the interests of the two groups has produced competition between 
the Ba'th party and the business class. 
This competition has started to manifest itself in the dialogue between Muhammad al-
Imady, the Minister of the Economy, and 'Izz al-Din Nasser, who is a member of the 
Ba'th party Regional Command and head of the Trade Union Confederation. Both 
figures represent the interests of ideologically opposed groups. The minister's remit to 
liberalise the economy, according to the needs of the state, has been challenged by 
Nasser's attempted reforms of the public sector.140 
Power-sharing between the public and private sector has become a feature of Syrian 
politics. In fact, the recent change in the economic direction of the state can be traced to 
the Eighth Ba'th party Regional Congress, in 1985, when Asad bestowed honour 
upon the private sector and called for a wider but responsible role for this group. The 
balance between the Ba'th party and the business community has not altered radically 
because the Ba'th party has remained the more institutionalised of the two, but the 
elevation of the private sector has indicated a shift in the internal balance of power.1 4 1 
Whilst the state has been balancing the forces of the Ba'th party and the private sector, 
the relationship between the state and its corporations has been changing. The formerly 
populist-dominated corporatist system, where workers and peasants had access to the 
decision-making process, has been opened to the private sector through the offices of 
the Chambers of Commerce and Industry. Consequently, the business class and the 
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new political elite, have started to tie their fortunes and futures together in a new 
alliance referred to as the military-mercantile complex.142 
The military-mercantile complex 
The forging of a new bourgeoisie is taking place in Syria. The new alliance between 
the state elite, 1 4 3 and the rising business community is transforming the social order of 
Syria. The state is still the dominant partner in this relationship, and resides above all 
social forces in Syria, but the incremental transfer of its loyalties towards a capital-
generating class is in evidence.144 The children of the political elite have facilitated this 
transfer by entering the business world, and engaging their interests with the business 
community. 
The children of the regime have taken a leading role in the civilianisation of the state 
elite. The new 'Alawi generation, raised in a privileged environment, consider 
themselves to be part of Syria's upper class.145 The incessant fear of the Sunni 
majority and the threat of revenge is starting to lose credence as the binding of 
economic interests holds them together. The sons of high-ranking officers have started 
to establish flourishing businesses. The sons of 'Ali Duba and Khaddam, for instance, 
belong more to the business association than to the officers' club, 1 4 6 thus congealing 
the alliance of the state to the new class. 
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The pace of economic globalisation is proving to be an irresistible force to the young 
generation of Syria. The extensive network of global communications has put the 
Syrian youth in touch with a global youth culture.1 4 7 The arrival of satellite television, 
the significant improvement of the telephone system, and the legalisation of fax 
machines have helped to free the youth from their ideological isolation. 1 4 8 The 
universal youth culture, a hegemonic force radiating from the US, is changing Syrian 
self-perceptions, and attitudes towards the West. The ideology of the past is being 
surpassed by the lowest common denominator - the American factor. 1 4 9 
The global emphasis upon the primacy of capitalism as the dominant economic system 
rests easily upon the shoulders of the new elite. Receiving their university education in 
the US and Europe, the children of the political elite are more disposed to the 
philosophy of capitalism than socialism. Seduced by the excesses of Western 
consumerism, the young generation has started to adopt a new lifestyle. Music, 
fashion, and cuisine are unduly influenced by the West, indicating a rejection of their 
indigenous culture and the austerity measures imposed by Ba'thism.1 5 0 
The former antagonism between the state and the private bourgeoisie is being bridged 
as the political elite acquire a stake in the new economic system. This finds an 
expression in the intermarriage between the political elite and the new bourgeoisie.151 
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The business community and the political elite are reaching a modus vivendi. Their 
interests are beginning to coincide, but the terms of their co-operation remain firmly in 
the hands of the political elite. Neither social actor is interested in comprehensive 
economic liberalisation. Such a move would hurt the state's original constituency. The 
state cannot afford to alienate its public sector support, as it credits the state with 
legitimacy. Extensive economic liberalisation would create widespread dissatisfaction 
amongst the Syrian population. The state's ability to insulate itself from unpopular 
sentiment would be severely restricted as unemployment, the removal of basic food 
subsidies, and a diminution of welfare services would erode legitimacy. 
On the other hand, comprehensive economic liberalisation would not benefit the 
bourgeoisie as it would expose it to intense competition. Incremental liberalisation 
protects the bourgeoisie from domestic, regional, and international competition. 
Sharing the spoils, therefore, with the political elite is a minimal cost for establishing 
flourishing businesses and quasi-monopolies.152 
As Hinnebusch has suggested: "A modus vivendi may be shaping up between a state 
which needs a wealth generating, conservative social force, and a bourgeoisie which 
needs the economic opportunities and political protection provided by the state."1S3 The 
bourgeoisie looks set to inherit the privilege once enjoyed by the Ba'th party, as the 
balance of interest swings towards the private sector. 
The swing in the business community's favour, at the expense of the Ba'th party, was 
symbolised by Asad's endorsement of independent candidates during the 1994 
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elections. His appearance at the Damascus Chamber of Commerce received wide 
coverage in the state-controlled press, further reinforcing his support of the business 
community. The autonomy enjoyed by the state has enabled it to nurture the economic 
potential of a reconstructed bourgeoisie whilst ensuring that its political aspirations are 
minimal, and its future is inextricably linked to the fortunes of the state. 
The State: Balancing the Interests 
The dependence of the Ba'th party and the bourgeoisie upon the state has given the 
state a large of degree autonomy in the decision-making process. Asad has been able to 
balance the interests of each group against the other, according to the demands of their 
constituency. The regime barons, who control the Armed Forces and the Security 
Services underscore the autonomy of the regime. Their role has yet to be 
institutionalised. 
The state's relative autonomy from domestic social forces enhances its freedom of 
action. The decision-making process exists above the centres of power; the Ba'th 
party, the bourgeoisie, or the Security Services cannot impose their interests upon the 
state. Foreign policy decisions, in particular, are essentially insulated from overt 
domestic influences. Chapters six and seven provide two resounding examples where 
the state has pursued policies, otherwise, considered to be inimical to domestic 
interests. 
It would be incorrect, of course, to suggest that the centres of power do not exert 
influence, but the degree of influence is the crucial factor. More recently, we have 
witnessed a decline in the Ba'th party's role in the decision-making process, and the 
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elevation of the bourgeoisie in the economic field. The state's preoccupation with 
security naturally gives precedence to the Armed Forces and Security Services.154 
Although the Asad regime has proved to be the most durable one in modern history, 
the flux between institutional and patrimonial rule serves as a flashpoint of instability 
for Syria. The state's dependence upon the Security Services to preserve civil order, 
and the Armed Forces to meter Israel's military threat has militated against social 
cohesion and the prominence of civilian rule. Security still dominates the political 
realm, and Asad's dependence upon the 'Alawi generals and commanders to guarantee 
the survival of the regime and state prevents the institutional process from ossifying. 1 5 5 
As the Security Services are called upon to contain and repress the possibility of 
domestic instability occurring,, it is difficult to determine the level of opposition to the 
state. Nevertheless, opposition does exist. 
The following three examples illustrate the potential for domestic instability within 
Syria. 
The Islamic uprising 
During the period between 1979 and 1982, Syria experienced serious domestic 
repercussions from its policy in Lebanon, and was on the edge of falling into a civil 
war. Throughout this period, the future of Asad's regime looked precarious. Syria's 
regional isolation, resulting from its support of Iran, in the Iran-Iraq War, added to the 
insecurity of the state. 
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On 16 June 1979, over 60 cadets at the Aleppo artillery school were massacred by 
adherents of the Muslim Brotherhood.156 The majority of those killed belonged to the 
'Alawi sect; the massacre seemed to be part of an anti-'Alawi campaign. The most 
worrying aspect of this event for the regime was the role played by Ibrahim Yussef, 
who was a captain and a high-ranking member of the ruling Ba'th party. He was 
implicated in the plot, and was thought to have facilitated the operation. As a result, 
300 dissidents, including a number of high-ranking officers, were rounded up and 
executed.157 
A proliferation of car bomb attacks on government and Soviet buildings marked the 
return of civil confrontation. The most significant attacks took place in August, 
September, and November 1981. In August, three members of the prime minister's 
team were killed in their offices; in September, a car bomb exploded outside the 
airforce command headquarters in Damascus killing 20 people; and in November 
another car bomb exploded outside a school killing a further 90 people.158 
The institutions of the political process had failed to contain the dissension expressed 
by the Muslim Brotherhood. The regime relied upon coercion to quell the riots. The 
repressive tactics against the opposition elicited an equally violent response from the 
Muslim Brotherhood pushing the country towards a violent civil war. Homs and Hama 
remained the centres of anti-regime activities. The regime engaged in the first of a 
series of massacres in Hama in April 1981. The defence units, operating under the 
leadership of Rifat Asad, were responding to attacks against an 'Alawi village, where 
Syria - Country Profile, Economist Intelligence Unit, no. 3, August 1979, pp. 5. 
Syria - Country Profile, Economist Intelligence Unit, no. 3, August 1979, pp. 5. 
i 
Syria - Country Profile, Economist Intelligence Unit, no. 4, December 1981, pp. 7. 
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attendants at a wedding were killed. 1 5 9 The sectarian nature of the violence 
demonstrated the acrimonious tensions existing beneath the surface of Syrian society. 
The regime's ruthless massacre of the civilian population at Hama, throughout 
February 1982, has left an indelible mark upon Syria's modern history. The town of 
Hama lived through a month of outright civil war which culminated in the destruction 
of the town and the eradication of the Muslim Brotherhood's opposition to the 
„ „ ; „ „ 160 
regime. 
The Hama massacre eliminated the opposition to the regime. Asad imposed his rule 
through coercive means illuminating the backbone of his support. The political process 
was unable to accommodate the discontent of the Muslim Brotherhood's opposition. 
Opposition, according to this model of governance, requires incorporation and 
management. The post-Hama domestic policies of the state sought to eliminate the 
radical voices of the Brotherhood whilst assimilating the interests of the less combative 
elements of the Muslim opposition.161 
With the memory of the Iranian Revolution fresh in its mind, the Syrian regime routed 
the opposition through a relentless massacre in Hama that reverberated throughout the 
region. This massacre indicated the president's determination to remain in office, and 
IS9 
Syria - Country Profile, Economist Intelligence Unit, no. 4, December 1981, pp. 6. 
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Drysdale, A., The Asad Regime and Its Troubles," MER1P, no. 110, November/December 1982, 
3-11, and Fisk, R., Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War,.(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 
181-187. 
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A peaceful Islamic movement focused on pious personal behaviour is starting to spread again, and 
so long as it does not challenge the regime, this safety valve will be tolerated. The regime knows 
that under political liberalization the Islamists, the main beneficiaries of the ideological vacuum, 
would widen their base. It is unlikely to allow them to operate politically unless they support the 
regime. Moderate conservative Islamic leaders who have cooperated with the government, such as 
Muhammad Said Rahman al-Buti, professor of shari'a, and the mufti, Ahmad al-Kaftaro, have some 
followings in Sufi brotherhoods and old quarters like al-Midan. 
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maintain control over the levers of power. The next significant threat to the regime, 
however, emerged from within the regime elite in the form of Rif'at Asad and his 
defence units. 
The intra-elite struggle 
President Asad's heart-attack, in November 1983, provided the pretext for another 
assault on the Syrian state. This time it arose from within the regime's political elite in 
the form of a struggle between the president's chosen coterie and the president's 
brother, Rif'at, and his allies. 
From his hospital bed, Asad instructed the following men to form a committee of 
command: 
• Defence Minister, Tlas; 
• Chief of Staff, Shihabi; 
• Foreign Minister, Khaddam; 
• Prime Minister, Kasm; 
• assistant secretary-general of the Ba'th Regional Command, 'Abdallah al-
Ahmar. 1 6 2 
Rif'at Asad was excluded from the ruling committee. 
As an entrenched baron of the regime, with his interests ultimately tied to the health of 
the Defence Companies and the 'Alawi generals of the regime, Rif'at was persuaded to 
jockey for a leading position in the case of succession. A full meeting of the Regional 
Command was then convened without the President or the Information Minister, 
Syria - Country Profile, Economist Intelligence Unit, no. 1, March 1984, pp. 9. 
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Ahmed Iskandar Ahmed. 1 6 3 The Regional Command voted to replace the six-man 
committee appointed by Asad with Rifat Asad. A showdown between the recovering 
president and his ambitious younger brother determined the fate of Syria. The political 
elite looked intent on pursuing a course of self-destruction.164 
Asad's ful l recovery led to a muted military confrontation amongst the forces loyal to 
both brothers. The president, in a personal showdown with Rif'at, asserted his 
authority over his younger brother. As a result, the Defence Companies were reduced 
in size and importance. The appointment of three vice-presidents: Foreign Minister, 
Khaddam, the assistant regional secretary of the Ba'th party, Zuhair Masharqa, and 
RiPat Asad, constituted a new chain of command designed to accommodate the 
succession problem. RiPat Asad and his rivals 'Ali Asian, the Commander of the 
Special Forces, and Shafiq Fayyad, the Commander of the Third Division, were part 
of a delegation sent to the Soviet Union to cool off. 1 6 5 
Asad's appointment of the six-man committee displayed two features: 
(i) the absence of an institutional process to accommodate the death of the 
president; 
(ii) the extent of praetorianism within the state. 
Although the Ba'th party constitution provides the Regional Command with forty days 
to select a new president, who in turn must be elected according to universal franchise, 
this incident illustrated the fragility of the institutional process. The institutions of the 
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state have not been invested with the sufficient authority to sustain a transition of 
presidency. I f Asad's institutions cannot command respect from his closest aides, it is 
unlikely that they have taken root within Syrian society.166 
The true nature of power in Syria was revealed through the succession crisis. The 
patrimonial system of government, reinforced through the creation of military units 
loyal to regime barons, removed the pretensions of the institutional process, and 
exposed the military authority of the regime. The ensuing struggle amongst the political 
elite indicated the divergence of opinions, and the potential for conflict between the 
interested parties of the regime. The political process, in this instance, was 
underpinned by the various military divisions and their cross-cutting loyalties to the 
barons of the regime. 
International pressures and political change 
The advent of new thinking in Soviet foreign policy wrought new changes in Syria's 
domestic political situation. Its impact was not felt until the fall of Ceaucescu's regime, 
in the final days of 1989. Graffiti appeared on the walls of Damascus drawing 
comparisons between Asad and Ceaucescu.167 The regime was forced to take action as 
the sweeping reforms and silent revolutions of Eastern Europe did not bode well for 
the regime. Syria embarked upon a process of political decompression.168 
Political decompression was introduced to accommodate the rising tensions within the 
state, provoked by the change of political systems throughout the Soviet bloc. The 
Notes from Hinnebusch's interview with Seale, London, May 1994. 
Perthes, V., The Political Economy of Syria under Asad, (London: LB. Tauris, 1995), pp. 138. 
Hinnebusch, R., "Liberalization in Syria: The Struggle of Economic and Political Rationality," in 
E. Kienle (ed.), Contemporary Syria: Liberalization between Cold War and Cold Peace, (London: 
British Academic Press, 1994), pp. 107. 
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structural changes within the Soviet bloc could not have gone unnoticed by Asad's 
regime. The Syrian state had illustrated its resilience to the Islamist uprisings of the 
1980s, but its corporatist structures were modified to coalesce the more moderate 
critics of the regime, and to isolate the radical elements within society.169 
Asad expanded the People's Council and gave the bourgeoisie a semi-institutional role. 
As previously mentioned, the members voted to the People's Council in 1990 was 
increased from 195 to 250. One third of these seats were reserved for independent 
candidates, who essentially came from the bourgeoisie, hence guaranteeing them a 
significant voice in the parliament.170 Although the Ba'th party still held the majority in 
the People's Council, the presence of independent candidates signified a labefaction in 
the role of the Ba'th party, and the elevation of businessmen in the low politics of 
The expansion of the People's Council, in May 1990, and the creation of the prime 
minister's Committee for the Guidance of Commerce and Industry were political 
concessions to the regime-friendly bourgeoisie. These moves, however, did not imply 
that a power sharing programme had been adopted, as the power relationship between 
the political elite of the regime and the bourgeoisie remained unambiguous. The desire 
of the bourgeoisie to engage in the political process, as a subordinate partner but with 
Hinnebusch, R., "Asad's Syria and the New World Order: The Struggle for Regime Survival," 
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access to the economic decision-making process, meant that a modus vivendi was 
arrived at with the state.172 
172 
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Conclusion 
To conclude, this research recognises the primacy of the international political system 
in determining state behaviour. State behaviour is governed by the inherent anarchy 
that characterises the international political system. The absence of hierarchy within the 
international political system means that states are pre-occupied with the issue of 
national security. As a result, states are conditioned to act according to a set of rational 
criteria 
Omnibalancing refers to the balance, attained by the state, between domestic interests 
and the determinants of the international political system. The reservation of the author 
with omnibalancing lies in its priority of the domestic arena over the international 
political system. Working from the assumption that the international political system 
provides the prime motivation for state behaviour suggests that states must attain a 
degree of relative autonomy from domestic forces to pursue a rational policy. 
Following a policy of balancing domestic forces within Syria, the state has been able to 
acquire relative autonomy from society. Between 1966 and 1970, the Ba'th state 
destroyed the economic and social base of the bourgeoisie. This gave it the possibility 
to free the state from interests of dominant social actors. The Syrian state, therefore, 
was able to elevate itself above the social classes in society. 
Autonomy from the bourgeoisie has enabled the state to engage in a regional struggle 
with Israel in accordance with a set of rational principles. The accumulation of power, 
pursued in its competition for regional hegemony, has remained a priority of the state 
since 1970. In order to balance the power of Israel, Syria needed to consolidate and 
develop its power base. This process required the incorporation of the domestic centres 
of power into a state-building project 
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Asad initiated a process of state-building after assuming power; this project set out to 
restructure state-society relations in service of the national interest. The resulting quasi-
corporatist state was built upon three pillars: the Armed Forces and Security Services, 
the Ba'th party, and the institutional political system. Owing to the transitory nature of 
state-society relations, the state was governed by two systems, namely, neo-
patrimonialism and institutionalism. 
The Syrian president has forged a state around the issue of national security, and the 
national interest. The struggle with Israel has formed the basis of Syria's national 
interest, and invested it with a historical mission. The responsibility assumed by the 
Syrian state towards Palestine has helped to legitimise the authoritarian nature of the 
state. Furthermore, it has granted the state a chance to rise above the competition 
amongst domestic forces, and to preserve exclusive rights to the area of high politics. 
The decisions of high politics are formulated within the Regional Command of the 
Ba'th party, and amongst Asad's closest advisers. Policies are then justified 
downstream through the party apparatus.173 Relative autonomy from domestic forces 
has allowed the Syrian state to exercise a foreign policy based upon rational 
considerations, rather than class or sectarian interests. 
The Syrian state, lacking comprehensive legitimacy, has remained dependent upon the 
gel of patrimonialism to sustain its longevity. To date, the Syrian state has managed to 
circumvent the overt influence of dominant social forces. The pre-eminence of the 
corporate structures of the state has prevented the political process from being fully 
institutionalised. The state's autonomy has been supported by its extensive patronage 
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networks. The state's vulnerability, one could contend, lies in its dependence upon 
patronage, and its reluctance to empower the political institutions of the state. 
The Armed Forces and the Security Services have constituted the backbone of the 
Ba'th state. They have guaranteed the longevity of the regime, in particular when the 
state was threatened with civil war between 1979 and 1982. The rebellion in Hama 
posed a serious threat to the security of the state. The state's resilience to this challenge 
was underwritten by its monopoly over the means of coercion. The reliance upon the 
Armed Forces and the Security Services illustrated the failure of the state's political 
institutions to pre-empt or contain the grievances of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Balancing the interests within the state, Asad has provided the state with a degree of 
autonomy that has enabled it to make decisions based on rational set of principles. The 
decision to join the US-led coalition against Iraq in 1990 represents one incident, 
where the state's action was founded upon a rational criteria, whilst appearing to 
contradict the common Arab interest The state enjoyed enough autonomy to disregard 
public opinion, and follow a policy determined by national interest. Syria's decision 
was portentous, as it elevated its national interest over the Arab interest, and risked its 
own legitimacy. 
The risk to the domestic legitimacy of the Syrian state, in this case, was subjugated to 
the demands of the international political system. The change in the distribution of 
global power compelled Syria to adjust to the New World Order. Residing above the 
domestic arena, the Syrian state was insulated enough to adjust to the New World 
Order without precipitating domestic unrest, and without having to legitimise its 
decision beforehand. 
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THE REGIONAL BALANCE OF POWER 
Introduction 
Syria's foreign policy has been consistent for the past twenty-five years. 
Comprehensive peace with Israel has been an obtainable and desired goal of the Syrian 
regime since the early 1970s, but the structural determinants within the region, pushed 
the Syrian state to pursue a balance of power before taking a place at the negotiating 
table. 
The consolidation of the state, forged through the policies of Asad, have afforded it the 
opportunity to pursue a rational foreign policy. Syria's foreign policy can be mainly 
accounted for by the realist paradigm of international relations. It is based upon: 
• preserving the security of the state; 
• following the national interest; 
• maximising the available amount of power. 
Syrian foreign policy has been guided by this set of principles; despite its tactical 
flexibility, Syria has remained committed to securing the state and maintaining its 
sphere of influence in the Levant. 
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Commentators such as Pipes' and Lawson2 cast doubt over Syria's consistency in the 
execution of foreign policy. Their analyses, which belong to the domestic politics 
model, attributes Syrian foreign policy to satisfying the demands of its various 
domestic constituencies. Thus, an irrational pattern of behaviour emerges. As a Third 
World state, Syria's domestic constraints impinge upon the state's room for 
manoeuvre. Foreign policy is open to the centrifugal forces inherited from the period 
of colonialism; the state is not unitary, nor is it the principal actor due to the fractious 
and permeable nature of society. 
In the following section, I shall present the arguments coined by the domestic politics 
model and the rational actor model of foreign policy analysis. It is the contention of the 
author that the rational actor model, put forward by the realist paradigm, is the most 
appropriate explanatory model for the Syrian case. 
Domestic Politics Models 
The domestic politics model places its emphasis upon domestic interests in the 
formulation of foreign policy. It stresses the role of classes or interest groups and their 
access to the decision-making process. In this instance, the state is subjected to a loss 
of its autonomy. They refute the primacy of the international political system as the 
major determinant for the actions of a state. Conversely, they focus upon the domestic 
configurations of power. 
Domestic politics models are the dominant form for analysing the foreign policies of 
Third World states. The onus of the domestic politics models is placed upon the 
1 Pipes, D., Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990). 
2 Lawson, F. , Why Syria Goes to War? Thirty Years of Confrontation, (London: Cornell University 
Press, 19%). 
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instability that characterises Third World states.3 Their foreign policy is portrayed as 
irrational by this school of thought.4 
Third World states are considered to lack legitimacy and autonomy from their societies; 
the regimes are notoriously authoritarian and depend upon foreign policy to cohere 
otherwise divisive social and political communities. The utility of an external threat 
provides a locus of attention for the population of a state. According to Goode, foreign 
policy is domestic politics pursued by other means.5 In other words, Goode suggests 
that the continuous presence of an external threat to security is a useful device to 
generate allegiance to unconsolidated states. Regimes exaggerate the significance of 
security threats as a method of diverting attention away from domestic problems. 
Calvert adds another dimension to this analysis when he highlights the intra-elite 
struggles that also characterise poorly consolidated states. He asserts that, where this is 
a prominent feature of Third World states, foreign policy loses any sense of coherence 
as it becomes an instrument in the hands of warring factions. The result is a belligerent 
and largely irrational foreign policy often grounded in anti-imperial rhetoric.6 
Pipes and Lawson apply the domestic politics model in their analysis of Syrian foreign 
policy. Pipes emphasises the sectarian nature of the Syrian regime ('Alawi), and 
contrasts it with the majority (Sunni) interest of the population. He portrays Syrian 
foreign policy as irrational and founded upon two principles that support the 'Alawi-
dominated regime: 
3 Clapham, C , Third World Politics: An Introduction, (London: Croom Helm, 1985), pp. 40-41. 
4 Calvert, P., The Foreign Policy of New States, (Sussex: Wheatsheaf, 1986). 
5 Goode, R., "State Building as a Determinant of Foreign Policy in the New States," in L . Martin 
. (ed.), Neutralism and Non-alignment, (New York: Praeger, 1962). 
6 Calvert, P., The Foreign Policy of New States, (Sussex: Wheatsheaf, 1986). 
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• the perpetuation of the state of war with Israel; 
e the irredentist ambition to recreate Greater Syria.7 
Accordingly, Syrian foreign policy serves the minority interests of the 'Alawis in the 
following way: the state of war with Israel provides a pretext to maintain a strong 
domestic military presence in the cities. Basically, foreign policy acts as a tool to 
legitimise an unpopular regime. Furthermore, the promotion of Greater Syria 
envelopes and hides the sectarian character of the 'Alawi regime.8 
The domestic politics model accounts for a foreign policy that is grounded in praetorian 
politics (mosaic model) or economics (Marxist analysis). The use of the mosaic model 
to explain Syria's foreign policy is valuable as it enables us to correlate the execution 
of foreign policy decisions with domestic policy.9 It is, however, limited in its 
applicability as it is too unidimensional. To say that the Syrian regime is sectarian is 
tautological. The sectarian composition of the regime is self-evident; the mosaic 
approach cannot account for the complex operations of the state. The 'Alawis hold the 
key positions in the security apparatus of the state, but the business community and the 
Ba'th constituency are functional in the decision-making process. 
Lawson works with a model where foreign policy is instrumental to managing class 
cleavages.10 The perpetual threat of war creates an environment which allows the state 
to enjoy a degree of autonomy from domestic social forces. Lawson suggests that 
7 Pipes, D., Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 
175. 
8 Pipes, D., Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 
184-185. 
9 Bill, J . , and R. Springborg, Politics in the Middle East, (New York: HarperCollins, 1994), pp. 98-
105. 
1 0 Lawson, F. , Why Syria Goes to War? Thirty Years of Confrontation, (London: Cornell University 
Press, 1996). 
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Syria goes to war when the dominant ruling coalition is faced with a serious domestic 
threat that pre-eminently comes about through economic crisis." War provides the 
solution to unifying the deep social divisions within the Syrian society and the 
fractures within the dominant ruling coalition. This approach refutes the ability and 
ambitions of the regime to reach a peace agreement with Israel. 
There is an economic variant of the domestic politics model which has been applied to 
the Syrian case.12 Economic crisis is believed to force the regime to sell foreign policy 
decisions for economic rent needed to service patronage networks on which its 
survival depends.13 This is a familiar explanation of Syria's entry into the Gulf War 
coalition and its engagement in the Madrid peace process. In chapters six and seven, I 
intend to show otherwise; Syria's participation in both events was more determined by 
politico-strategic reasons.14 
Although domestic politics models may apply to many Third World states, their 
suitability to the Syrian case is limited. The three most salient features of the Syrian 
case, namely, the durability of the Asad regime, the intensity of the Syrian-Israeli 
conflict, and its consistency in foreign policy refutes the basic assumptions of the 
domestic politics models. The Syrian regime has indubitably used external threats and 
foreign policy performance to legitimise its rule. It is difficult, however, to discount 
" Lawson, F, Why Syria Goes to War? Thirty Years of Confrontation, (London: Cornell University 
Press, 19%), pp. 179-181. 
1 2 Brand, L . , "Economics and Shifting Alliances: Jordan's Relations with Syria and Iraq, 1975-81," 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 26, 1994, pp. 393-413. 
1 3 This is a familiar explanation for Syria's addition to the Gulf War coalition and its entry into the 
Madrid peace process. In chapters six and seven, I intend to show otherwise; Syria's participation in 
both events was determined by politico-strategic reasons. For more details see: Sarkees, M., and S. 
Zunes, "Disenchantment with the 'New World Order': Syria's Relations with the United States," 
InternationalJournal, vol. XLDC, no. 2, April 1994, pp. 361. 
1 4 Sarkees, M., and S. Zunes, "Disenchantment with the New World Order: Syria's Relations with the 
United States," InternationalJournal, vol. XLDC. no. 2, Spring 1994, pp. 361. 
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the threat posed by Israel. Israel's invasion of Lebanon, in 1978 and 1982, presented a 
direct challenge to Syria and its role in the Levant.15 Syria's pursuit of balancing the 
power of Israel is a testament to the real threat it feels from its southern neighbour. 
Internal politics cannot be de-linked from foreign policy, but their explanatory power 
in the Syrian case is far more limited and indirect than domestic politics models 
suggest. The one quantitative study of linkage politics, which was conducted by 
Burrows and Spector, found that there was no direct link between the domestic and 
foreign policy behaviour of Syria.16 Evron intimates that realist (deterrence) analysis is 
most useful for explaining Syria's quest for strategic parity with Israel.17 
The Rational Actor Model 
According to the rational actor model, which belongs to the realist and neo-realist 
paradigms, foreign policy is determined primarily by security.18 Survival in an anarchic 
arena requires all states, over the long run at least, to adopt certain rational behaviour, 
such as power maximisation and balancing strategies. In the realist paradigm, foreign 
policy is substantially dictated by the international system, regardless of ideology and 
internal politics.19 
1 5 Hopwood, D., Syria 1945-1986: Politics and Society, (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988), pp. 60-72. 
1 6 Burrows, R., and B. Spector, T h e Strength and Direction of Relationships between Domestic and 
External Conflict and Cooperation," in J. Wilkenfield (ed.), Conflict Behaviour and Linkage 
Politics, (New York: David McKay, 1973), pp. 294-321. 
1 7 Evron, Y . , War and Intervention in Lebanon: The Syrian-Israeli Deterrence Dialogue, (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University, 1987). 
1 8 Allison, G. , Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, (Boston: UttleBrown, 
1971), pp. 4-5. 
1 9 Waltz, K., Theory of International Relations, (Reading MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979). 
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The rational actor model explains the behaviour of states according to international 
events and by recounting the aims and calculations of states.20 The value of this 
method, according to Morgenthau, is that: 
it provides for rational discipline in action and creates astounding 
continuity in foreign policy ... (which) appears as an intelligible, 
rational continuum ... regardless of the different motives, preferences, 
and intellectual and moral qualities of successive statesmen.21 
Cross national studies have tended to support the realist case intimating that inter-state 
conflict is more closely associated with variations in international circumstances than 
domestic affairs. No strong consistent association was found between foreign policy 
and internal factors, such as authoritarian regimes and ethnic heterogeneity.22 Where 
external threats are high, as in the Middle East, the realist paradigm is deemed 
particularly apposite.23 
One proposition of the realist model is that adaptation to the external arena is best 
achieved in a strong state where the foreign policy machine is a unified autonomous 
rational actor. In this case, the foreign policy machine is able to put policy in the 
service of an historically or geo-politically shaped national interest. The state is 
sufficiently autonomous to pursue foreign policy goals based on rational criteria. The 
state is also unitary and able to execute a coherent policy without accounting for the 
2 0 Allison, G. , Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, (Boston: LittleBrown, 
1971), pp. 10. 
2 1 Morgenthau, H. , Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, (New York: Knopf, 
1968), pp. 5. 
2 2 McGowan, P., and H. Shapiro, The Comparative Study of Foreign Policy: A Survey of Scientific 
Findings, (London: Sage, 1973), pp. 75-124. 
2 3 Yaniv, A., "Alliance Politics in the Middle East," in A. Braun (ed.). The Middle East in Global 
Strategy, (London: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 133-152. 
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intra-state interests of dominant social actors or groups. Seale and Hinnebusch apply 
this analysis to Syria.24 
The realist paradigm, with its focus on systemic variables, takes a leader's ability to 
mobilise domestic resources for external objectives as non-problematic. This is where 
the realist paradigm is weak in its analysis. Without an analysis of state-society 
relations, the realist paradigm invites criticism, especially when applied to the Third 
World. Protagonists of the domestic politics models, are dismissive of realism; they 
discount the possibility that Third World states can act according to a set of rational 
considerations because they often lack: 
• legitimacy; 
• strong state institutions; 
• a national agenda.25 
It is the contention of the author that Syria's foreign policy has been tempered by the 
international political system and the peculiarities of the regional state sub-system of 
the Middle East. The Syrian state, as has been illustrated in chapter three, is 
particularly vulnerable due to its recent history, demography, and geopolitical position. 
Located on one of the major trading routes between the Occident and the Orient, 
Syria's fortunes have been ultimately tied to the political machinations of the region. 
Syria's foreign relations have traditionally been dependent upon external factors. 
Consequently, Syria has been a pawn amongst the regional hegemons, often 
2 4 See Hinnebusch, R., "Does Syria Goes Want Peace? Syrian Policy in the Syrian-Israeli Peace 
Negotiations," Journal ofPalestine Studies, vol. X X V I , no. 1, Autumn, 1996, pp. 44-46. 
2 5 David, S., "Explaining Third World Alignment," World Politics, vol. 43, no. 2, January 1991, pp. 
235-237. 
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constituting a sphere of influence for regional actors, such as Iraq and Egypt.26 The 
struggle for Syria intensified after independence. Syria became a prize in the regional 
contest between the two tributary states Egypt and Iraq, which competed for influence 
in the fractious state of Syria. 
Belonging to the Arab nation, and dissected from its regional base, Syria's own 
political identity was unclear. The pan-Arab appeal of Arab nationalism, and the pan-
Islamic call of Islam contradicted the notion of Syrian state-hood. Cross-state loyalties 
undermined the sovereign base of the new Syrian state, and allowed its centrifugal 
forces to disrupt a cohesive central polity. The state was porous to the covert 
interventions of the region's main power centres. Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq all 
played instrumental roles in subverting the independence of Syria, whilst promoting 
their own political agendas.27 
On the international level, Syria became a cornerstone in the zero-sum game between 
the Soviet Union and the US. 2 8 The US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was also 
reputed to have undertaken covert operations in order to dissuade local actors from 
cultivating ties with the Soviet Union.2 9 As a small, ethnically divided and vulnerable 
state, Syria could not emerge from its passivity without significant internal changes. 
2 6 Seale, P., The Struggle for Syria: A Study ofPost-War Arab Politics, 1945-1958, (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1965), pp. 46. 
2 7 For more details of this protracted struggle see Seale, P., The Struggle for Syria: A Study of Post-
war Arab Politics, 1945-1958, (London: Oxford University Press, 1965). 
2 8 Saunders, B., The United States and Arab Nationalism: The Syrian Case, 1953-1960, (London: 
Praeger, 1996), pp. 15. 
2 9 Rathmell, A., Secret War in the Middle East: The Covert Struggle for Syria, 1949-1961, (London: 
I.B. Tauris, 1995), pp. 36-37. 
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The new state of Syria, struggling to construct its own identity, was beset with 
regional and international actors intervening to assert their hegemony.30 
The creation of Israel has been considered, by Syrian regimes, to be an extension of 
imperial rule.31 In other words, Israel represented a combined regional and international 
threat to the indigenous peoples of the region. Israel's occupation of Palestinian land, 
orchestrated through the channels of the Great Powers, engendered a permanent 
agenda for war. The struggle between Syria and Israel set a precedent that determined 
the orientation of Syrian foreign policy. Syria's foreign policy has been based on 
security, national interest, and power maximisation since 1970. The security of the 
state has been a preoccupation of the political elite; the occupation of the Golan Heights 
has served as a constant reminder of the threat posed by Israel.32 
Asad's rise to power in 1970 marked a distinctive change in Syria's role in the region. 
The centralisation of the decision-making process, the institutionalisation of the 
political process, and the suppression of inter-state activists enabled the regime to 
consolidate its domestic position. Through this process of state-building, infused with 
an acute sense of power politics, Asad started to translate Syria's inherent vulnerability 
into a source of power. This was achieved through a policy of alliance-building, and 
breaking, with the region's hegemonic powers.33 
3 0 See Rathmell, A., Secret War in the Middle East: The Covert Struggle for Syria 1949-1961, 
(London: I.B. Tauris, 1995), chapters 3,4, and 5. 
3 1 Drysdale, A., and R. Hinnebusch, Syria andthe Middle East Peace Process, (New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations, 1991), pp. 54. 
3 2 Ma'oz, M., Syria and Israel: From War to Peace-making, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 104. 
3 3 Syria's detente with Iraq, after Egypt's defection, was short lived due to the rivalry between the two 
states. Motivated by geopolitics and the need to balance Iraq's power, Syria entered into an alliance 
with Iran. 
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Instead of remaining the pawn, Syria began to exploit the presence of Israel in the 
region, and the presence of other revolutionary forces within the Arab world, in order 
to extract political, military, and economic assistance from Egypt, the Gulf Arab states, 
and the Soviet Union. Syria has since then attempted to free itself from the constraints 
imposed by the superpowers, or other regional actors, in order to pursue an 
independent foreign policy. 
Syria's Foreign Policy 
Syria's foreign policy has been driven by its recent historical experience. The 
amputation of Lebanon, Palestine, and Jordan from historical Syria, left the Syrian 
regimes of the post-independence period, with an irredentist vision of recreating 
Greater Syria as a constituent of the wider Arab nation. Thus, Syria's foreign policy 
has been caste and justified by Arab nationalism since independence. 
Pan-Arabism as a concept, has ceased to be the foremost determinant of Syria's 
foreign policy. Its foreign policy is now shaped primarily by assessments of how best 
to defend and enhance the power and prestige of Syria within the regional state 
system.34 Seale labelled Syria's foreign policy as the Levant Security Doctrine, and it 
incorporated the following: 
• The security of the Arab East is indivisible, and any defection from the Arab 
front against Israel would undermine the chance for peace. 
• Peace in the region is only possible through unity. Separate agreements between 
Arab states and Israel would weaken the common front and result in settlements 
that hurt the Arab side. 
3 4 Drysdale, A., and R. Hinnebusch, Syria and the Middle East Peace Process, (New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations, 1991), pp. 57. 
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• Syria and Israel are engaged in an on-going competition for hegemony over the 
western buffer zones. 
• Syria must fight any policy that, intentionally or not, impinges upon its front-line 
defences.35 
Seale's analysis is based upon Syria's desire to provide the state with security from 
external threats. There are numerous threats to Syrian security owing to its geopolitical 
location. They can be found on Syria's northern, southern, eastern, and western flank. 
Israel represents the most significant and dynamic threat to Syria. Thereupon, it has 
been the focus of Syrian foreign policy since 1948. Israel's separate peace deals with 
Egypt, the PLO, and Jordan have increased the extent of Syria's insecurity.36 Iraq's 
contention for the leadership of the Arab world has posed a dynamic threat to Syria's 
security, and ensured that inter-Arab rivalry has focused upon the Syrian-Iraqi 
relationship.37 
In order to balance the threats imposed by Iraq and Israel, the Levant Security Doctrine 
set out to incorporate the potential of the Lebanese, Jordanians, and the Palestinians. In 
an effort to extract Syria from the struggle among the regional powers, Asad sought to 
develop a base from which to challenge the hegemonic pretensions of its neighbours. 
This would enable Syria to maximise its power projection. 
The envelopment of the Levant states' foreign policies into a unified polity could have 
provided a counter-balance to the power projections of Iraq, and Israel. Asad's 
Brand, L . , "Asad's Syria and the PLO: Coincidence or Conflict of Interests?," Journal of South 
Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, vol. XIV, no. 2, Winter 1990, pp. 23-24. 
3 6 Ma'oz, M., Syria and Israel: From War to Peace-making, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 273. 
3 7 For a detailed account of the rivalry between Syria and Iraq see: Kienle, E . , Ba'th v Ba'th: The 
Conflict between Syria and Iraq 1968-1989, (London: LB. Tauris, 1990). 
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objective, however, was not the territorial annexation of Syria's neighbours, but their 
incorporation into its sphere of influence.38 The tangible objectives of Syria's foreign 
policy can be translated into: 
© recovering the territories lost in the 1967 War, which included Gaza, the West 
Bank, the Golan Heights, and the Sinai; 
e the restoration of Palestinian rights. 
The signing of the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt, and the Oslo 
Accords between Israel and the PLO curtailed Syria's ambitions. 
Syria's goals were contained in UN Resolution 242 which had constituted a basis for 
comprehensive peace talks prior to the Oslo Accords of 1993.39 Dispensing with the 
rhetoric of his predecessors, Asad implicitly accepted UN Resolution 242 when he 
agreed to Resolution 338, on 15 October 1973, which called for a cease-fire between 
Syria and Israel and the implementation of Resolution 242.40 
Seale and Hinnebusch assert that Syria's foreign policy has been consistent since 
1972, and has been founded upon a set of rational principles. Asad relegated the role 
of ideology in the decision-making process, and formulated foreign policy according to 
Syria's power potential. Since coming to power, Asad has employed various 
strategies, and has effected numerous culpable tactical moves that have alienated large 
sections of the Syrian population. Syria's foreign policy has, however, remained 
anchored to the Levant Doctrine, but the transmuting international and regional 
Drysdale, A., and R. Hinnebusch, Syria and the Middle East Peace Process, (New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations, 1991), pp. 60. 
3 9 For more details and discussion of UN Resolution 242, Madrid Peace Conference, and the Oslo 
Accords see chapter seven. 
4 0 Lorenz, J . , Egypt and the Arabs: Foreign Policy and the Search for National Identity, (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1990), pp. 49. 
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configurations of power have pushed Syria towards unpopular tactics and new 
strategies.41 
The balance of power has determined the strategies employed by the Syrian state in its 
competition with Israel. These strategies have taken three distinct forms since 1970: 
• the Egyptian axis: 1970-1978; 
• strategic parity: 1979-1988; 
• strategic deterrence: 1989-1996. 
The following section will explore the content of Syria's strategies, and its pursuit of 
foreign policy goals. 
The Egyptian axis: 1970-1978 
As soon as Asad seized power in Damascus, he started to court the financial and 
political support of the conservative Gulf monarchies whilst reinforcing the symbiotic 
military relationship with the Soviet Union.42 Although Asad was not an ideologue, he 
understood the significance that the Soviet Union could lend the Arabs in terms of 
military aid and strategic depth.43 
The advent of the 1967 war appeared to signify that the Arab effort to eradicate Israel 
retreated into the annals of history. A new sense of realism emerged amongst the front-
line Arab states. Between 1970 and 1978, Syria's military doctrine was cast within the 
rubric of Arab military and economic co-ordination. 
4 1 Ma'oz, M., Syria and Israel: From War to Peace-making, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 187. 
4 2 Hinnebusch, R., Peasant and Bureaucracy in Ba'thist Syria: The Political Economy of Rural 
Development, (London: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 24. 
4 3 Karsh, R, The Soviet Union and Syria: The Asad Years, (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 5-8. 
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The Middle Eastern equation, according to Asad and Sadat, required Syria and Egypt 
to co-ordinate their military manoeuvres, under the auspices of the Soviet Union, in 
order to balance the power of the Israeli military. Achieving a balance of power 
determined Syria's and Egypt's potential to: 
• strike Israel; 
• reclaim the territories lost in 1967; 
• recover diplomatic prestige.44 
The Syrian-Egyptian axis operating with the support of the Soviet Union appeared to 
offer a realist strategy to recover the lost lands of 1967 war and deliver a political 
advantage. The two-front strategy received economic support from the Gulf Arab 
states. This represented a new era in the Middle East based on the balance of power. 
Developing the two front strategy entailed a commitment from the Soviet Union to re-
arm and train the Syrian and Egyptian military. By June 1973, according to Ramet's 
source, Syria had acquired 300 fighter aircraft, which meant an additional 200 to the 
stockpile of the 1967 War. Syrian military expenditures per capita increased quite 
substantially from $115 in 1972 to $148 in 1973, and $151 in 1974.45 The armed 
forces also started to grow in strength throughout this period. The numerical strength 
of the armed forces per 1,000 people increased from 17.2 in 1972, to 18.1 in 1974.46 
The consolidation of the Soviet-Syrian ties, and the improvement in the quality and 
quantity of the military hardware transferred, were not sufficient, however, to sustain a 
4 4 Lorenz, J . , Egypt and the Arabs: Foreign Policy and the Search for National Identity, ((Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1990), pp. 46. 
4 5 These figures are calculated at constant 1981 dollars. 
4 6 Ramet, P., The Soviet-Syrian Relationship Since 1955: A Troubled Alliance, (Boulder Westview 
Press, 1990), pp. 95-6. 
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prolonged offensive against Israel. Although the Soviets re-supplied the Syrians and 
the Egyptians during the October War, the disjointed approach to the war caused Syria 
and Egypt to concede their early military and territorial advantages.*7 After 72 hours, 
Israel was able to mobilise its reserves and concentrate upon its northern border. The 
initial gains were lost as Israel pushed Syria back towards Damascus, and the war was 
effectively lost.48 
The different objectives of Asad and Sadat were considered to be largely responsible 
for the failings of the Syrian-Egyptian axis. Seale suggests: 
Asad went to war because he believed there could be no satisfactory 
negotiation with Israel until the Arabs had snatched back some of their 
lost land. Peace-making, he believed, could be a product of war, but 
not a substitute for it. Sadat went to war because the peace diplomacy 
he was already conducting, covertly as well as overtly, had faltered. He 
thought a shock would revive it.*9 
Egypt's limited military strategy, dubbed High Minarets, was ultimately tied to Sadat's 
political ambitions. The tactical delay employed after seizing control of the Suez Canal, 
during the first phases of the war, allowed Israel sufficient space and time to re-direct 
its aggression towards the more threatening Syrian advances.50 The initial gains of the 
October War were lost as Egypt pursued a cease-fire with Israel, through the secret 
diplomatic offices of Kissinger.5' Apparently, Sadat was more willing and ready to 
4 7 Karsh, E . , The Soviet Union and Syria: The Asad Years, (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 12-13, and 
Khalidi, A., and H. Agha, The Syrian Doctrine of Strategic Parity," in J. Kipper, and H. Saunders 
(eds.). The Middle East in Global Perspective, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 196. 
4 8 "The October War and Its Aftermath," Middle East Economic Digest Annual Review 1973, vol. 17, 
no. 52, 28 December 1973, pp. 1498. 
4 9 Seale, P., Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East, (London: LB. Tauris, 1988), pp. 195. 
5 0 Seale, P., Asadof Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East (London: LB. Tauris, 1988), pp. 198. 
5 1 Seale, P., Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East, (London: LB. Tauris, 1988), pp. 208. 
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accept the imposition of a cease-fire than Asad, but the military failure of the two-
pronged attack led to the US-brokered Disengagement Agreements of 1974.52 
The climax to the division of Syrian and Egyptian objectives culminated in Sadat's visit 
to Jerusalem in 1977, and the signing of the Camp David Accords in 1979. This 
signified the end of the Syrian-Egyptian alliance. Egypt was effectively removed from 
the Arab-Israeli conflict through its peace treaty with Israel, thus forcing Syria to adopt 
a new strategy.53 
Strategic parity: 1979-1989 
The regional environment of the Middle East during 1979, which witnessed: the 
signing of the Camp David Accords, the Iranian revolution, and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, impinged upon Syria's room for strategic planning and tactical 
manoeuvring. 
The absence of Egypt from the theatre of war forced Syria to seek alliances elsewhere. 
The temporary rapprochement between Syria and Iraq, through the formation of the 
Front for Steadfastness provided Syria with strategic depth. Nevertheless, its 
effectiveness was limited. The traditional competition for regional hegemony between 
these tributary states, expressed in the balance of power, determined the transitory 
nature of their alliance.54 Syria's support of Iran in the Iran-Iraq War of 1980 
demonstrated the intense rivalry between Syria and Iraq, which emanated from two 
sources: 
Israelyan, V., T h e October 1973 War: Kissinger in Moscow," Middle East Journal, vol. 49, no. 2, 
Spring 1995, pp. 262. 
5 3 Agha, H., and A. Khali di. Syriaand Iran: Rivalry andCooperation, (London: Pinter, 1995), pp. 45. 
^ Kienle, E . , Ba'th v Ba'th: The Conflict between Syria and Iraq, 1968-1989, (London: L B . Tauris, 
1990), pp. 149-151. 
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(i) the balance of power; 
(ii) Syria's quest for regional leadership. 
Syria's support of Iran during the Iran-Iraq War offered a classic example of the 
balance of power in operation. Syria's interests were enhanced through its alliance 
with Iran. 5 5 The perpetuation of the conflict enabled Syria to pursue its goal of regional 
leadership through its offices in Lebanon, and over Palestinian activities through Saiqa 
and Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-GC).56 There 
were a number of other factors that reinforced Syria's decision to oppose Iraq in its 
conflict with Iran, such as Syria and Iraq's claim to Ba'th party authenticity, and the 
personal animosity between presidents Asad and Hussein.57 
Syria's policy towards Iraq, its endorsement of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 
and its continuing intervention in Lebanon drew it into a period of regional isolation.58 
This set of conditions produced an environment which led to the development of the 
Syrian doctrine of strategic parity.5' 
Syria's search for strategic parity was initiated by the conclusion of the Camp David 
Accords and the deflection of regional attention towards the Iran-Iraq war, which 
implied that the balance of power between the Arabs and Israel worked in favour of 
' Goodarzi, J . , T h e Syrian-Iranian Axis: An Enduring Entente?," Middle East International, no. 522, 
29 November 1996, pp. 19, and Ehteshami, A., and R. Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran: Middle Power 
in a Penetrated Regional System, (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 112-115. 
' Interview with. Press Secretary of the DFLP, Maher Hamdi, 10 October 1995. 
Saddam Hussein's accusation that the High Command of Syria had played an instrumental role in an 
attempted coup against him exacerbated the personal rivalry between the two leaders. 
' Rabinovich, I. , T h e Foreign Policy of Syria: Goals, Capabilities, Constraints and Options," in C , 
Tripp (ed.). Regional Security in the Middle East, (New York, St. Martin's Press, 1984), pp. 40-41. 
' Khalidi, A., and H. Agha, T h e Syrian Doctrine of Strategic Parity," in J. Kipper, and H. Saunders 
(eds.), The Middle East in Global Perspective, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 186. 
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Israel. Strategic parity was a doctrine that implied that Syria would reduce the military, 
societal, and political imbalance between Israel and itself. In other words, strategic 
parity signalled an expansion of Syrian power.60 
Strategic parity was designed to provide Syria with the capability of building a credible 
deterrent to Israel. The deterrent capability rested upon two interrelated notions: 
• Syria could not enter into a full-scale war with Israel, but by expanding its 
delivery systems (SS-21s), coupled with the potential of carrying chemical 
warheads, Syria could inflict devastating damage on an Israeli society acutely 
sensitive to civilian targets.61 
• In order to participate in an international peace conference, and to negotiate from 
a position of strength, Syria was required to compensate for the loss of its 
regional allies by developing its armed forces.62 
Only through developing its military capabilities could Syria enter the peace process in 
pursuit of a durable and honourable peace. The achievement of a balance of power 
alone, Hinnebusch suggests, would not be a sufficient reason to initiate an offensive: 
"Decisions to go to war are rarely based only on a calculus of the balance of power, 
but are also shaped by frustrations".63 
Freedman, R., T h e Soviet Union and Syria: A Case study of Soviet Policy," in M. Efrat, and J. 
Bercovitch (eds.), Superpowers and Client States in the Middle East: The Imbalance of Influence, 
(London: Roudedge, 1991). pp. 171. 
6 1 Sayigh, Y . , 'The Middle East Strategic Balance: Capabilities for Waging War," Middle East 
International, no. 378, 22 June 1990, pp. 15-16. 
6 2 Khalidi, A., and H. Agha, "The Syrian Doctrine of Strategic Parity," in J. Kipper, and H. Saunders 
(eds.). The Middle East in Global Perspective, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 189. 
6 3 Drysdale, A., and R. Hinnebusch, Syria and the Middle East Peace Process, (New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations, 1991), pp. 141. 
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Strategic parity represented a radical departure from previous functional military co-
operation structures, as it implied that Syria would seek to achieve a balance of power 
with Israel.64 The concept, itself was far reaching as it aimed at equating Syria with 
Israel, in military and diplomatic terms.65 
Syria's military expansion 
The doctrine of strategic parity prescribed that the Syrian forces required upgrading in 
both qualitative and quantitative terms. The central tenet of the doctrine focused on the 
inadequacy of the Syrian military.6 6 Syria's technological home was situated in the 
latter cycles of the technological revolution, and in order to move closer to the cutting 
edge (enjoyed by Israel), it was required to formalise its relations with the Soviet 
Union. 6 7 
Mutual Soviet and Syrian vulnerability propelled the two states towards a more intense 
patron-client relationship, enveloped in the terms of the Treaty of Friendship and Co-
operation in 1980.68 The Soviet's loss of Egypt as their major client in the region 
served to elevate Syria's importance; this resulted in a new arms policy attempting to 
secure Syria's allegiance.69 Soviet-Syrian relations, from the Syrian perspective, were 
instrumental to establishing its quest for strategic parity. Syria needed to equip itself in 
6 4 Drysdale, A., and R. Hinnebusch, Syria and the Middle East Peace Process, (New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations, 1991), pp. 135. 
6 5 Drysdale, A., and R. Hinnebusch, Syria and the Middle East Peace Process, (New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations, 1991), pp. 141. 
6 6 Ehteshami, A., "Defence and Security Policies of Syria in a Changing Regional Environment," 
International Relations, vol. XIII , no. 1, April 19%, pp. 53-54. 
6 7 Drysdale, A., and R. Hinnebusch, Syria and the Middle East Peace Process, (New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations, 1991), pp. 135-136. 
6 8 Ramet, P., The Soviet-Syrian Relationship Since 1955: A Troubled Alliance, (Boulder Westview 
Press, 1990), pp. 263-267. 
6 9 Karsh, E . , The Soviet Union and Syria: The Asad Years, (London: Routledge. 1988), pp. 52-53. 
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order to compensate for the absence of Egypt, and to balance the military power of 
Israel. 
Syria's military experienced a period of intense and rapid expansion between 1982 and 
1989. These quantitative increases are detailed below: 
• an 80% increase in the regular armed forces from 240,000 to 400,000 
• a 50% increase in the armoured and mechanised divisions from 6 to 9 
• a 35% increase in the number of MBTs from 3,200 to 4,200 
• a 200% increase in the number of tactical ballistic missile launchers from 33-100 
• a 50% increase in the number of surface-to-air batteries from 100 to 150 
• a 45% increase in the number of combat aircraft from 440 to 650 
• a 150% increase in the number of attack helicopters from 40 to 100 
• a 40% increase in the number of missile attack craft from 20 to 28 
• an absolute increase in the number of submarines from 0 to 3.70 
If one examines the quantitative statistics of Figure 5.1, it is possible to identify the 
extraordinary expansion of Syria's armed forces during the 1980s. 
7 0 Khalidi, A., and H. Agha, "The Syrian Doctrine of Strategic Parity," in J. Kipper, and H. Saunders 
(eds.). The Middle East in Global Perspective, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 192. 
ri
a 
ae
l 
Is
r 
C • I 
K 
00 
ON 
00 
i 
1 
a; 
oo 
0\ 
00 
CO 
00 
ON 
P 
_ .U 
as 
6(J 
oc 
=0 
.a 
I 
o 
00 
4 
CN 
1 
| 
THE REGIONAL BALANCE OF POWER 264 
Syria's military power also increased from a qualitative perspective between 1982 and 
1989. The Soviets' commitment to Syrian ambitions, linked to Soviet vulnerability in 
the region, ensured that higher quality hardware was exchanged on soft-terms.71 The 
following weapons systems entered the Syrian inventory after 1982: 
• SS-21 tactical ballistic missiles 
• SAM-5, SAM-11, SAM-13, and SAM-14 
• T-80, T-72M, T-74 MBTs 
• BM-27 220-millimetre multiple rocket launchers 
• MiG-29 counterair fighters and MiG-23MF/Flogger-G 
• AA-7 Acrid and AA-8 Aphid air-to-air missiles 
• new tactical C3I and electronic warfare systems, including DR-30 and UR-1, 
remotely piloted drones (RPVs), and Mi-17 Elint helicopters 
• chemical warfare delivery systems.72 
Looking at Figures 5.2 and 5.3, one could see that the balance of the armed forces was 
in favour of Syria in 1989. 
7 1 Cordesman, A., "United States Power-projection Capabilities in the Gulf and South-West Asia: 
Changing Forces for a Changing World," in C. Davies (ed.). Global Interests in the Arab Gulf, 
(Exeter University of Exeter Press, 1992), pp. 249. 
7 2 Khalidi, A., and H. Agha, T h e Syrian Doctrine of Strategic Parity," in J. Kipper, and H. Saunders 
(eds.), The Middle East in Global Perspective, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 193. 
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The expansion of the armed forces had improved radically between 1982 and 1989; the 
armed forces increased from 250,000 in 1982 to 404,000 in 1989.73 The change in 
ratio from reserve to regular forces indicated a more responsive action force. It was 
estimated that Israeli mobilisation would take at least 24-72 hours,74 thus offering Syria 
the opportunity to seize the Golan without conceding defeat75 
Syria started to close the quantitative gap with its combat aircraft between 1982 and 
1989. Nevertheless, Syrian air power, remained subordinate to Israeli air power as the 
pace of technological advancement accentuated Israel's superiority. During the period 
in question, Syria possessed 65 high quality combat aircraft from its airforce of 650 
whilst Israel maintained 200 high quality aircraft in its airforce.76 
Israel's alliance with the US guaranteed its superiority in: 
• air-to-air and air-to-ground operations; 
• modern command, control, and communication systems; 
• combat aircraft.77 
Syria did manage to improve its air defences through an increase in SAM batteries, 
radar, electronic jammers, and an advanced command and control system, thereby, 
7 3 Ehteshami, A., "Defence and Security Policies of Syria in a Changing Regional Environment," 
International Relations, vol. XIII , no. 1, April 19%, pp. 54. 
7 4 Khalidi, A., and H. Agha, "The Syrian Doctrine of Strategic Parity," in J. Kipper, and H. Saunders 
(eds.),The Middle East in Global Perspective, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 193. 
7 5 Drysdale, A., and R. Hinnebusch, Syria and the Middle East Peace Process, (New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations, 1991), pp. 140. 
7 6 Ehteshami, A., "Defence and Security Policies of Syria in a Changing Regional Environment," 
International Relations, vol. XIII , no. 1, April 19%, pp. 54. 
7 7 Khalidi, A., and H. Agha, "The Syrian Doctrine of Strategic Parity," in J. Kipper, and H. Saunders 
(eds.). The Middle East in Global Perspective, (Boulder Westview Press, 1991), pp. 195. 
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creating an air defence system deployed by the Soviets.78 Israeli and US technology 
rapidly outmanoeuvred these initiatives with the development of the Arrow missile and 
the tested Patriot anti-missile system.79 
The technological gap between Syria and Israel ensured that Israel continued to enjoy 
the military advantage. Wherever the gap in technology seemed to recede, the next 
cycle extended Israel's disproportionate advantage. For example, the delivery of MiG-
29s to Syria was met with the arrival of the Agile Falcon, the advanced tactical fighter 
(ATF), in Israel.80 
Evidently, Syria's dependence on the Soviet Union was crucial to strategic parity. 
Syria could not have acquired its sizeable arsenal without the assistance of the Soviet 
Union. Although Syria sought to diversify its military suppliers, it was severely 
restricted due to the European and US ban on military exports.81 Syria's principal 
suppliers remained the Soviet Union (90%), Eastern Europe, China, and North 
Korea.82 
Patron-client relations 
Israel's advantage over Syria was not confined to technology; there was a discernible 
difference between the status of the US-Israeli alliance and the Soviet-Syrian 
7 8 Drysdale, A., and R Hinnebusch, Syria and the Middle East Peace Process, (New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations, 1991), pp. 137. 
7 9 Khalidi, A., and H. Agha, The Syrian Doctrine of Strategic Parity," in J. Kipper, and H. Saunders 
(eds.). The Middle East in Global Perspective, (Boulder. Westview Press, 1991), pp. 197. 
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relationship. The US-Israeli and the Soviet-Syrian patron-client relationships were 
formulated according to two distinct sets of principles. 
The US and Israel 
The US-Israeli alliance has been built on more sustainable foundations than the Soviet-
Syrian relationship. Both states are cemented through the relationship between the 
Jewish lobby and the US administrative system. Although it seems rather crude, there 
is sufficient evidence to suggest that the US-Israeli relationship is guided by the 
aspirations of the multifarious Jewish associations in the US.8 3 The influence of the 
Jewish lobby is well-documented in both domestic policy and foreign policy 
articulation.84 This instrumental presence of Israel supporters in the US operates in 
complete contrast to the avenues open to the Syrians in the Soviet Union. 
The durability of the US-Israeli alliance can be periodically displayed with the 
exchange of the US administration or ruling coalition in Israel. In each case, the 
alliance remains unchallenged as the fundamentals of the relationship are constant. 
There may be a teething-period, as each new team settles into position, but the core of 
the allegiance is protected. For instance, Bush's resistance to provide the $10 billion 
loan guarantees, in 1991, owing to the expansion of settlements in the West Bank, 
marked a period of troubled-relations between the US and Israel. Bush's reluctance, 
Chomsky, N., The Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel & the Palestinians, (Boston: South 
End Press), pp. 13-17. 
8 4 Dallal, S., "The Zionist Bureaucracy in the US Government," Middle East International, no. 381, 3 
August 1990, pp. 16-17. Due to the limitation of space, it is not possible to develop this idea here, 
but the following readings are recommended by the author: Rubenburg, C , Israel and the American 
National Interest, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986), Tillman, S., The United States in the 
Middle East, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), Kerr, M., America's Middle East 
Policy: Kissinger Carter and the Future, (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1980), and Curtiss, 
R., Stealth PACs: How the Israeli-American Lobby Took Control of US Middle East Policy, 
(Washington: American Educational Trust, 1990). 
THE REGIONAL BALANCE OF POWER 270 
though, failed to prevent the expansion of settlements taking place upon Israeli receipt 
of the loan guarantees.85 
The Soviet Union and Syria 
In the zero-sum game of the Cold War, the Soviet Union became increasingly 
marginalised in the Middle East. The conservative and monarchical states of the region 
resisted the ideological orientations of Soviet Communism as they were deemed more 
pernicious than the liberal ideologies of the West. Realising this, the US adopted a 
policy that successfully incorporated the inimical interests of the conservative oil-rich 
Arab states, Israel, Turkey, Iran (before 1979), and Egypt (after 1973).86 
The loss of Egypt to the US, as a client state in 1972, and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan represented a further diminution of Soviet influence and a concomitant 
increase in US prestige in the Middle East. Although the Iranian revolution, in 1979, 
disengaged Iran from the US sphere of influence, the Soviet Union did not become a 
beneficiary in the zero-sum game. Iran's post-revolutionary foreign policy was 
governed by the neither East nor West policy. 
Soviet access to the states of the Middle Eastern region was limited; Syria and Iraq 
were the two radical/revolutionary states of the Mashreq that turned to the Soviet 
Union, but extracted a high price for their allegiance. The limited Soviet penetration in 
the Middle East state-system provided Syria and Iraq with some autonomy to pursue 
Neff, D., T h e Bruising Battle between Bush and Shamir," Middle East International, no. 404, 13 
September 1991, pp. 3-4. 
Bercovitch, J . , "Superpowers and Client States: Analysing Relations and Patterns of Influence," in 
M. Efrat, and J. Bercovitch (eds.), Superpowers and Client States in the Middle East: The Imbalance 
of Influence, (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 22-23. 
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their regional goals, even to the detriment of Soviet interests.87 Bercovitch has labelled 
this style of patron-client relationship as interdependent.™ 
In the zero-sum game, Syria formed part of the Soviet Union's strategic chess plan. 
The Soviets lent the Syrians military, political, and diplomatic support for their 
regional designs. As part of the reciprocal bargain, Syria allowed the Soviet Union to 
use its ports at Latakia and Tartous, giving it naval access to the Mediterranean. The 
interdependent relationship was confined to serving the mutual interests of both 
superpower and regional state. This leads one to conclude that the Soviet-Syrian 
relationship was functional and based on its strategic value rather than a cultural, 
religious, or ideological basis.89 
The Soviet-Syrian alliance was not sustainable beyond the strategic value that each 
state lent to the other. This became evident when new thinking was introduced into 
Soviet foreign policy, which challenged the very foundations of the relationship, for it 
disengaged their mutual interests. New thinking dictated a change in the strategic 
dimension of Soviet international relations, and a focus upon the ailing Soviet 
economy.90 
8 7 Syria's intervention in Lebanon compromised Soviet directives. For more details of this episode see: 
Golan, G., The Soviet Union and the Palestine Liberation Organisation: An Uneasy Alliance, (New 
York: Praeger, 1980), pp. 187. Furthermore Syria's support of the Abu Musa rebellion against 
Fatah contravened Soviet interests as its two clients were engaged in military confrontation in 1983. 
See: Cobban, H., The Superpowers and the Syrian-Israeli Conflict: Beyond Crisis Management?, 
(London: Praeger, 1991), pp. 234. 
8 8 Bercovitch, J . , "Introduction,'' in M. Efrat, and J. Bercovitch (eds.). Superpowers and Client States 
in the Middle East: The Imbalance of Influence, (London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 12. 
8 9 Yorke, V., Domestic Politics and Regional Security: Jordan, Syria and Israel. The End of an Era?, 
(Aldershot: Gower, 1988), pp. 142-143. 
9 0 Gorbachev, M., Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World, (London: Fontana 
Press, 1987). 
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New thinking 
The Soviet Union, through the Treaty of Friendship and Co-operation in 1980, 
pledged its support for Syria's pursuit of strategic parity. Its relationship with the 
Soviet Union enabled Syria to adopt its rejectionist stance throughout the 1980s. 
During the years of its association with the Soviet Union, Syria successfully avoided 
becoming a satellite of the Soviet Union; in particular, this strategic alliance gave Syria 
a considerable degree of autonomy of action whilst providing it with a cushion of 
strategic depth.91 The arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 was to radically alter the 
autonomy enjoyed by Syria. 
The substance of Soviet-Syrian relations started to disengage after Gorbachev had 
come to power in 1985. Soviet foreign minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, spelt out the 
new concerns of Soviet foreign policy: "The new thinking logically led us to reject 
antagonism as the basis for foreign policy, to discard ideological cliches, and to de-
ideologise international relations."92 
Gorbachev's introduction of new thinking in Soviet foreign policy changed the nature 
of international politics. Global issues, such as nuclear arms reduction, the eradication 
of famine, and the inevitable destruction of the global environment started to take 
precedence over the bipolar competition between the Soviet Union and the US.9 3 
With the shift of emphasis upon global co-operation, the radical states of the Middle 
East had to acclimatise to a new international environment. The Arab-Israeli conflict 
required re-appraising according to the new tenets of Soviet foreign policy. In an after 
9 1 Karsh, E . , The Soviet Union and Syria: The Asad Years, (London: Roudedge, 1988), pp. 46-47. 
9 2 Shevardnadze, E . , The Future Belongs to Freedom, (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1991), pp. 102. 
9 3 Gorbachev, M.. Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World, (London: Fontana 
Press, 1987), pp. 102. 
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dinner speech, Shevardnadze reflected: "The climate, both world-wide and in the 
Middle East have changed significantly. The antagonism between the Soviet Union and 
the US in that region has ended. This alone is a factor that affects all of the elements of 
the Middle East equation".94 
The immediate impact of new thinking upon Syrian foreign policy was severe. Until 
the advent of new thinking, the relationship between the Soviet Union and Syria had 
existed on mutual dependence and insecurity. Nevertheless, the fabric of the 
relationship had been sustained due to their mutual isolation. New thinking 
undermined the flexibility of the partnership and removed Syria's margin of 
manoeuvre. 
Although the Soviets pledged their continued support of Syrian interests, Gorbachev 
seized the political opportunity and initiated a process of redefining relations. The first 
outcome was the rejection of strategic parity. This signified the end of their intimate 
military relationship and Syria's need to re-assess its regional strategy. 
During the bipolar period of modern history, Syria had been successful in extracting 
military advantages from the Soviet Union, based on the Soviet's desire to gain a 
stronghold in the region. New thinking liberated the Soviet Union from this necessity, 
and granted it more freedom to redefine its role in the Middle East. 
Gorbachev's address in Syria during 1987 provided an example where the fragility of 
the Soviet-Syrian bond was under threat. He passed comment on the Soviet-Israeli 
situation: The absence of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Israel 
9 4 Shevardnadze, E . , The Future Belongs to Freedom^ (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1991), pp. 108. 
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cannot be considered normal".95 During the meeting of Asad and Gorbachev, in April 
1987, the Soviet leader stressed the inappropriateness of the military option and placed 
emphasis upon reaching a political solution.96 Asad remained resolute and mocked 
Gorbachev's naivete: 
Force in today's world, just as in the past, is what determines rights. 
Everyone speaks about rights and international norms, charters, and 
resolutions. However, you find that every international event is 
eventually settled by force.'11 
As part of the new thinking, Gorbachev rejected the military solution in resolving 
international conflicts; he paid particular attention to the Arab-Israeli conflict and the 
role played by the peace process. The option of strategic parity, a policy that had 
gained momentum after the Camp David Accords, was abruptly abandoned by the 
Soviets. 
The economic crisis of the Soviet Union forced Syria to abandon strategic parity. This 
was reflected in a change in the pattern of Syrian arms purchases; as Rathmell says: 
"This drive for strategic parity was undermined by the sclerotic performance of the 
Syrian economy and the changes in the Soviet Union which ended Moscow's 
willingness to supply hardware on easy payment terms".98 The Soviet demand for 
payment in hard currency altered the flexibility within the relationship. 
Hannah, J . , At Arms Length: Soviet-Syrian Relations in the Gorbachev Era, (Washington: 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1989), pp. 21. 
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July 1994, pp. 16-17. 
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The bipolar era was passing, a New World Order was forming and Asad had to seek a 
new strategy or co-sponsor to achieve his regional ambitions. The disjunctive between 
theory and application in Soviet foreign policy granted Asad a period of grace. The 
impact of new thinking was incremental during its early stages, and the Syrians 
continued to benefit from the contradiction in theory and application." 
After 1985, the trend in arms transfer dropped; it is important, though, not to 
exaggerate the deterioration in military relations between Syria and the Soviet Union. 
In spite of the fact that the Soviet Union was embarking upon its new philosophy, 
residues of the former period were still in existence. The geographic and strategic 
factor of the Soviet-Syrian relationship could not be unconditionally discounted. The 
Soviet Union continued to share its southern borders with the Middle East, and it still 
required strategic allies. There were occasions when new thinking was relegated to the 
immediate interests of Soviet security.100 
The rejection of the military option and the Soviet recognition of the state of Israel 
signified that Syria's pursuit of strategic parity was over.101 Syria retreated from its 
search for strategy parity when Asad restored diplomatic relations with Egypt in 
December 1989.102 The functional capacity of the Soviet-Syrian relationship came to its 
conclusion with the break-up of the Soviet Union in August 1991.'03 The structural 
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Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1989), pp. 52. 
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1 0 3 Shad, T., S. Boucher, and J. Gray Reddish, "Syrian Foreign Policy in the Post-Soviet Era," Arab 
Studies Quarterly, vol. 17, no. 1&2, Winter/Spring 1995, pp. 77. 
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changes in the relationship were responsible for engendering Syria's search for a new 
strategy.104 
Strategic deterrence: 1989-1996 
The transition in superpower relations, following the withdrawal of the Soviet support, 
and the fluidity in the regional configurations of power, after 1988, encouraged Syria 
to pursue a more inclusive regional strategy. This took two forms: 
• engaging in a more constructive dialogue with the US, carried out through 
Syrian-US complicity in Lebanon;105 
• getting involved in a more rigorous realignment with the Gulf Arab states and 
Egypt.106 
Iraq's respite from the Iran-Iraq War, in 1988, allowed Saddam Hussein to reclaim the 
central role in the Arab-Israeli conflict; this move set a deliberate challenge to Syria's 
regional and Levantine role. Asad needed an opportunity to maintain Syria's hegemony 
in Lebanon, and claim to Arab nationalism. 
The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, on 2 August 1990, was fortuitous for Asad. It provided 
Syria with the opportunity to secure its regional position in the post-Cold War era. 
Although Asad's decision to join the US-led coalition appeared to contradict Syria's 
Arab nationalist credentials, the windfall from its support served two purposes, 
namely: 
• to elevate Syria's role in the post-war Arab and global orders; 
1 0 4 Sadowski, Y . , Scuds or Butter?: The Political Economy of Arms Control in the Middle East, 
OWashington: Brookings Institute, 1993), pp. 37. 
1 0 5 Muir, J . , "Why Asad Turned to Cairo?," Middle East International, no. 366, 5 January 1990, pp. 3. 
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• to obtain $700 million in credits from the Europeans and the Japanese, and over 
$2 billion in pledges from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.107 
Syria accrued a major benefit from its participation in the US-led coalition, as it 
allowed it to diversify its military suppliers and to purchase more sophisticated 
weaponry. The build-up of Syria's military hardware was financed with the hard 
currency earned from the liberation of Kuwait. With the financial rewards, Syria was 
able to conclude deals with Russia, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia. In 1991-92, Syria 
procured 400 T-72M mbts and 300 self-propelled artillery pieces from these deals.108 In 
1993, it was believed that Syria had placed an order with Russia for 68 MiG-29 
combat aircraft, 24 Su-24 bombers with the inclusion of SA-11 Gadfly missile 
batteries. Syria managed to diversify its military source and obtained the North Korean 
Scud-C and the Chinese solid-fuel M-9 missile.1 0 5 Ironically, it led some 
commentators, namely Shahak and Lucas to admit that "the Syrian army is much better 
equipped than its was when Syria depended on Soviet supplies".110 
Sadowski, however, disputed some of the above claims when he wrote: 
By late 1992, however, the expected rearmament of Syria had not 
materialised. Moscow signed no new arms agreement. In 1992 the 
Czechs announced that they would complete a standing contract for the 
delivery of T-72 tanks to Damascus but would not make any future 
sales. The North Korean ship suspected of carrying missiles returned to 
port without docking in Syria, and in February 1992 a second freighter 
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supposedly carrying Scuds for Damascus failed to reach the 
Mediterranean, although it did make port in Iran.111 
Sadowski assigned Syria's failure to purchase these items to US pressure on China 
and North Korea. Syria's failure to conclude a deal to buy military hardware from 
South Africa in January 1997 illustrates the extensive influence of the US and the 
limitations Syria faces.112 
Although it was a casualty of the change in the global and the regional balance of 
power, Syria managed to pursue an alternative path to achieving a balance with Israel. 
The new strategy for Syria, engaging the US, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the other Gulf 
Arab states in a new balance of power formula, enabled it to develop a military doctrine 
based on a strategic deterrent. Syria's new military doctrine can be identified as "the 
capability to deter (a regional enemy) through power projection and through suitable 
alliances with one or more regional players"."3 
Syria's goal of providing a strategic deterrent, whilst participating in the peace process, 
has been achieved through the possession of ballistic missiles coupled with chemical 
and biological warheads. But as Sayigh says: "not only does Israel possess chemical 
weapons, but it is also the only Middle Eastern country to have developed nuclear 
warheads for its Jericho missiles.""4 Therefore, power projection of Syria can only be 
conceived in defensive terms. 
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Syria's intervention in Lebanon 
Syria's foreign policy has been determined by the regional balance of power. Its 
pursuit of strategic parity in the 1980s was a quest for achieving such a balance with 
Israel. The conclusion of the Camp David Accords relegated Syria's regional 
importance and circumvented its centrality to the peace process. The signing of a 
separate peace deal threatened the very notion of Arab unity or at the very least Arab 
co-operation and, therefore, Syrian security. Egypt's departure, motivated by national 
interest, was in danger of establishing a precedent amongst the Arab states. In the 
aftermath, Syria tried to mould the policies of the Arab states to accommodate the 
Levant Security Doctrine. 
The rational actor model helps to explain the strategy of Syria during its tumultuous 
engagement in the Lebanese civil war. Preservation of Syria's security and the 
maximisation of its power through extending its hegemony accords with the realist 
paradigm and most accurately accounts for Syria's actions in Lebanon. Syria entered 
Lebanon, and broke numerous alliances often trading its traditional allies for less 
ideologically disposed clients, but each instance can be attributed to the broader goal of 
Syrian security, and Asad's determination to prevent separate Israeli peace deals from 
disrupting the prospect for comprehensive peace. At the very early stages of the war, 
Syria was still smarting from Egypt's defection, and tried to construct an Eastern Bloc. 
Syria cultivated the interests of the Eastern bloc states which comprised Jordan, 
Lebanon, and the PLO. It was designed to counter the effect of the Camp David 
Accords, by ruling out the possibility of another separate peace agreement. Syria's 
attempt to create a cohesive bloc also served its security interests, which had become 
paramount to Syrian foreign policy. At the focal point of the Eastern bloc and Syria's 
security concerns was Lebanon. 
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Lebanon has been central to Syria's foreign policy since the outbreak of the Lebanese 
civil war in 1975, and has remained a cornerstone of Syria's Levant Doctrine. During 
the civil war, Lebanon became an intense battleground for the region's interests; it 
resembled a microcosm of the Middle East's numerous political contests. The Arab-
Israeli conflict, the inter-Arab competition, the export of the Iranian revolution, and the 
superpower zero-sum game all found an expression in Lebanon. Syria has played a 
pivotal role in each of these conflicts, illustrating its centrality to the political 
machinations of the Levant. 
Syria's interests have been irrevocably intertwined with the fortunes of Lebanon and 
have manifested themselves in a variety of forms. Syria's historical claim as the parent 
state of the Levant, its role in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and its contentious relationship 
with Iran have all served to embroil Syria in the struggle for Lebanon."5 Syria's role in 
Lebanese affairs can be accounted for by two factors: 
• history; 
• security. 
History 
As the cornerstone of the Levant, Syria has historically played a role in the political 
organisation and administration of the region. Under the rule of the Ottomans, Aleppo, 
and Jerusalem were local administrative centres that deferred to Damascus. Syria was 
the dominant Arab actor in Bilad al-Sham, and drew its allegiance from the indigenous 
Arab population. The assault of the Arab armies on Damascus in 1918, and their effort 
to liberate it from Turkey, remains a testament to the parental status of Damascus."6 
1 1 5 Hinnebusch, R., "Syrian Policy in Lebanon and the Palestinians," Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 8, 
no. 1, Winter 1986, pp. 3. 
1 1 6 Lawrence, T., Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph, (London: Cape, 1990), pp. 515. 
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The secret agreement between Sykes-Picot in 1916, and the post-war San Remo 
Conference of 1920, however, undermined Syria as a regional centre of power. The 
dismemberment of Bilad al-Sham, referred to in chapter three, has left an indelible 
imprint on the domestic and foreign policies of Syria The creation of the modern states 
of Lebanon, Syria, Palestine, Iraq and Transjordan, after the First World War, led to 
the diminution of Syria's power at the centre of the region. 
This period in history, from 1920 up till now, fostered a revisionist agenda for the 
restoration of Bilad al-Sham by the more radical nationalists belonging to the Ba'th 
party and the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP)."7 The ideology and the 
ambitions of the Ba'th party and the SSNP, however, were incompatible. Whereas the 
Ba'thists believed that the recreation of Bilad al-Sham was a staging post to achieving 
comprehensive Arab unity, the SSNP were less ambitious with their intentions to re-
build Greater Syria."8 
Modem Lebanon was carved from Syria. Both states share a cultural, linguistic, and 
political heritage. The extraction of Lebanon from Syria has left a psychological scar 
on the Syrian political landscape. Lebanon was part of the jigsaw puzzle, and 
according to Arab nationalists, when adhered to Bilad al-Sham, it would have 
guaranteed Lebanon's Arab character and restored Syria's regional prominence. 
Hence, Syrian politicians have viewed Lebanon with a covetous eye over the years. 
With this common history, it could be fanciful to reunite these two independent states 
under the dominant supervision of Syria; indeed, it has been suggested that Syria's 
1 1 7 Yamak, L . , The Syrian Social National Party: An Ideological Analysis, (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1966), pp. 76-88. 
1 1 8 Pipes, D., Greater Syria: The History of an Ambition, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 
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ambitions, under 'Alawi rule, have included the annexation of Lebanon."9 The 
complex realities that characterise the Lebanese political system, infused with the 
existence of seventeen competing confessions within the one state, however, belies the 
prospect for unity or the possibility of annexation. In addition, the global and regional 
powers would prevent such a move. One only has to observe Syria's dependence upon 
the green light from the US to intervene in Lebanon during the civil war to realise the 
limitations placed on Syria by these powers.120 
Asad's foreign policy has been partially motivated by the historical connection between 
Syria and Lebanon. He has frequently stressed the historic indivisibility of the two 
countries. He once commented: "the Syrians and Lebanese are one people. What binds 
us is stronger than any treaty. Syria is concerned with defending Lebanon and 
Lebanon is concerned with defending Syria, whether this is written on paper or not."121 
The notion of defence appears to have taken priority in defining their relationship. 
Security 
The issue of security, has been the most dynamic aspect of the relationship between 
Syria and Lebanon. As implied earlier, security has been a priority of Syrian foreign 
policy since 1970. The security of the state has dominated the formulation and 
implementation of foreign policy. Immersed in a regional contest with Israel, that owes 
its roots to the imperial policy of the British, Syria's main preoccupation has been 
securing its borders. 
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The rise of Asad to power, in 1970, and the advent of the Lebanese civil war in 1975, 
have joined the two states in a complex symbiotic relationship. The introduction of 
realism into Syrian foreign policy in 1970 has placed the Syrian-Lebanese relationship 
into a context of power politics, where Lebanon has been used to serve the security 
interests of Syria.122 As part of the equation, Syria has provided stability, through the 
use of force, for the weak state. One should not be under the impression that this status 
quo has been arrived at through a mutual process. 
Moreover, the political, confessional, cultural, and demographic contortions of the 
Lebanese civil war challenged the fabric of the Syrian-Lebanese relationship.123 Asad 
colluded with all of the main Lebanese actors of the war, and subsequently dissolved 
his allegiance with each one. The Syrian president has been consistent in trying to 
forge a durable alliance to protect Syria's security, but the efficacy of each client has 
waxed and waned according to local conditions, and the intervention of the US and 
other regional actors. 
The weak state within Lebanon, accompanied by the convulsive nature of its 
multifarious confessions, was acutely sensitive to any demographic change. The 
political balance of the confessions was institutionalised in the National Charter of 
1943. This form of co-associational democracy was not designed to accommodate the 
demographic change that was taking place in Lebanon. The political structure was 
1 2 2 Nasrallah, F. , "Syria after Ta'if: Lebanon and the Lebanese in Syrian Politics," in E . Kienle (ed.). 
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1 2 3 Nasrallah, F. , "Syria after Ta'if: Lebanon and the Lebanese in Syrian Politics," in E . Kienle (ed.). 
Contemporary Syria: Liberalization between Cold War and Cold Peace, (London: British Academic 
Press, 1994), pp. 134-135. 
THE REGIONAL BALANCE OF POWER 284 
particularly susceptible to the influx of the Palestinian resistance movement after Black 
September in 1970.124 
Amidst these fluctuations in the composition of the population, Syria sought to balance 
the interests of each party in order to extend its hegemony over Lebanon. The stability 
of Lebanon was paramount to Syrian security. To provide security, Syria found it 
necessary to ensure that: 
• the confessional balance, that governed the state, was maintained; 
• the Palestinians did not radicalise Lebanon and invite an Israeli invasion; 
• the Christian community did not create an alliance with the Israelis; 
• Lebanon did not disintegrate into numerous state-lets, inviting Israel and Iraq to 
foster client states adjacent to Syria's borders.125 
The history and the structure of the political system in Lebanon made it a tinder box 
that was waiting to be lit. The influx of the Palestinians after 1970 became the match 
that ignited the Lebanese civil war, and enflamed the hostilities between the different 
communities. The Palestinians tipped the balance of forces between the Christians and 
Muslims, fuelling the emergent animosity. Syria was unable to preserve the status quo, 
and chose to adopt an interventionist policy. Far preferable for Syria to a radicalised 
Lebanon was a situation in which it could play the role of balancer between two rival 
alliances, Christian rightist forces, and the Palestinian and Muslim leftist forces. 
Hence, Syria would be able to exercise hegemony in Lebanon.126 
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With its weak state structure, amorphous demography, and contiguous borders with 
Syria and Israel, Lebanon became the apogee of Syria's security concerns. In their 
perennial conflict with Israel, Syrian decision-makers have tended to consider the 
mountains of southern Lebanon as natural defensive frontiers that could be utilised to 
stop, or at least crucially delay, an Israeli middle thrust should a war suddenly occur.127 
Israel's military advance into Syria could take two possible routes: 
• through the Golan Heights; 
• and/or through Lebanon's Beqa' valley. 
The pincer movement would encircle the Syrian capital, thus threatening the very 
essence of the Syrian state. The security threat has been unquestionably the dominant 
ingredient in Syria's foreign policy calculations.128 Consequently, Lebanon's security 
became concomitant to Syria's security. 
For Syria, the Lebanese civil war offered a mixture of opportunities and risks.129 The 
opportunity for Syria was the chance to extend its hegemony over Lebanon, and to 
secure its eastern borders. Lebanon would fall under Syria's sphere of influence 
enhancing its power in the regional contest with Israel. Lebanon, as the microcosm of 
the region, also offered Syria the opportunity to contain the PLO, the Leftist National 
Movement (LNM), the growing disaffected Shi'a population in the south, and the 
Lebanese Forces (LF). 1 3 0 
Dawisha, A., Syria and the Lebanese Crisis, (London: Macmillan, 1980), pp. 58. 
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The risks, however, far outweighed the advantages to be gained. The schizophrenic 
nature of Lebanon's foreign policy, and its split allegiance between the West and the 
Arab World, polarised the Lebanese arena. Successfully balancing the forces amongst 
Lebanon's confessions was destined to be a tempestuous affair, as the Muslims looked 
towards the Arab fold for support, and the Christians looked favourably towards the 
Israelis.131 
The Civil War 
At the outset of the civil war, Israel issued the Syrians a warning not to intervene 
beyond the red-line agreement. Asad remained committed to this warning, as it would 
have been untimely to enter a conflict with Israel.132 The balance of power was firmly 
in favour of the Israelis. 
During the course of the Lebanese civil war, Syria was at times pitted against the 
Palestinian-Leftist alliance and then the Christian-Rightist forces. It was engaged in an 
indirect conflict with Israel and the US at different stages of the war. It entered a 
quagmire, which left it regionally isolated and increasingly dependent upon the support 
of its patron, the Soviet Union. 
Syria entrenched its position in Lebanon as a matter of necessity in terms of securing 
the Beqa' valley against Israeli incursion, and preserving its regional and international 
prestige. I do not wish to recount the proclivities of the Lebanese civil war, there is not 
sufficient space here, and any brief account would prove to be a repetition of existing 
Ma'oz, M., Syria and Israel: From War to Peace-making, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 
163-171. 
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THE REGIONAL BALANCE OF POWER 287 
materials.133 The most relevant point to this thesis is the motivation behind Syria's 
intervention policy in Lebanon, and the flexibility with which it was pursued. 
Syria's intervention was fraught and tortuous; it appeared, on first inspection, to be 
governed by irrational impulses. Syria's first military engagement in Lebanon was 
conducted according to the red line agreement brokered by the US, satisfying both 
Israeli and US interests.134 Syria unleashed its forces against the Palestinian-Leftist 
alliance, on 31 May 1976, in order break their emerging dominance in the politico-
military balance against the Christian alliance.135 
This action was difficult to justify to its domestic constituency, particularly as Arab 
nationalism was the state's main source of legitimacy, and the Palestinians remained 
symbolic of the Arab cause. Syria's pro-Christian tendency in Lebanon also enflamed 
the Sunni population in Syria, and the regime was accused of pursuing a sectarian 
policy; the prospect of an 'Alawi-Christian alliance tainted the regime's Arab 
credentials.136 
The intervention in Lebanon produced a number of political dividends in the earlier 
stages of the civil war. During the Riyadh Conference of October 1976, Syria received 
another green light to continue its policy in Lebanon; furthermore, it received a 
financial endorsement from the Arab League to pursue its balanced policy. The creation 
One can find an excellent account of the Lebanese civil war in Fisk, R., Pity the Nation: Lebanon 
at War, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). Adeed Dawisha's Syria and the Lebanese Crisis, 
(London: Macmillan, 1980) provides an in-depth analysis of Syria's decision to intervene in 
Lebanon in 1976. 
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of the 30,000 strong Arab peace-keeping force was predominantly composed of Syrian 
soldiers, and financed by the Gulf Arab sheikhdoms.137 
A change in the political orientation of the regime took place after the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon in 1978. A switch in policy was activated by Syria's growing impatience with 
the delaying tactics of the Christian Maronite rightists and their attempts to thwart any 
political solutions offered or imposed by Syria. Syrian bombardments in July 1978 of 
East Beirut, where 350 civilians were killed, was an indication of a more aggressive 
and intrusive policy in Lebanon.138 
The number of troops in Lebanon rose from the regular level of 28,000, approved by 
the Arab League, to 40,000-50,000 indicating Syria's broader strategy for containing 
the conflict. 1 3 9 Naturally, US and Israeli interests were at stake through Syria's 
pervasive intervention in Lebanon. As Syria began to lose international support for its 
Lebanon policy, Israel colluded with the Lebanese rightists to cement their interests in 
Lebanon.140 
Although the Maronites could not hope to re-establish their supremacy in the whole of 
Lebanon, some of them seemed determined to fall back upon the notion of a smaller 
Christian Lebanon.141 Thus, the Maronites overtly aligned with Israel, thereby forming 
a stubborn obstacle to the reconstruction of a united Lebanon whilst posing a serious 
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threat to Syrian security. By this stage, Israel, assuming the role of protector of the 
Christians, had, as much as Syria, become the arbiter of Lebanon.142 Syria's incubus 
looked like tipping the balance of power, in Lebanon, back in its favour. 
Consequently, Syria was compelled to return to its traditional allies, and to offer them 
limited protection against the imperial policies of Israel. 
Syria's intervention in Lebanon enabled the Syrian regime to exercise some control 
over the Palestinian resistance movement. The Palestinians became a useful pawn in 
the game of international diplomacy; the Syrians, through their increasing military role 
in Lebanon, could enhance or constrain the activities of the Palestinians. The 
imposition of a cease-fire on 22 January 1976 acted as a restraining order on the 
Palestinian resistance fighters, and Asad encouraged the Palestinians to conform with 
an iron fist. 1 4 3 
The Palestinians 
The Palestinians were problematic for the Syrians. Their cause was the main source of 
legitimacy for the Syrian regime. They were strategic allies in the struggle with Israel, 
but they were also a formidable force that threatened the security of Syria through their 
presence and opportunistic operations in Lebanon. To serve the Syrian interests, and 
what Asad considered to be the broader Arab interest, the Palestinians needed to be 
ordered and disciplined according to Syria's criteria. 
Asad's strategy to meld a common Arab position was not shared by 'Arafat and his 
followers. Their different visions of how to liberate Palestine, and their conflictual 
national interests, prevented the pro-Fatah groups of the PLO and the Syrians from 
Hinnebusch, R., "Syrian Policy in Lebanon and the Palestinians," Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 8, 
no. 1, Winter 1986, pp. 9. 
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maintaining a consistent unified policy. Asad wished to discipline the resistance 
fighters of the PLO, and incorporate them into a projected balance of power formula. 
Such a formula would enhance Syria's security by restraining the Palestinian's 
impetuous modes of resistance. Asad's Levant Security Doctrine incorporated the 
Palestinian movement as an integral element of Syria's regional strategy. For 'Arafat, 
the solution to the Palestinian question belonged exclusively to the Palestinians.144 
After the Palestinian resistance movement had been expelled from Jordan in 1970, it 
re-assembled in Lebanon. Its activities were initially governed by the terms of the 
Cairo Accords of 1969, in an attempt to avoid alienating its host country.145 The 
activities of the PLO under the leadership of Yasser 'Arafat, were not constrained by 
the Cairo Accords for long. The fomentation of a state within a state was starting to 
take place as the PLO infrastructure was transferred from Jordan to Lebanon. Not only 
did the PLO's military operations invite Israeli retaliation, but it also created a distinct 
imbalance in the composition of Lebanon's confessional mixture.146 
In Lebanon, the PLO, as an umbrella organisation, was unable to conceal the tensions 
amongst its factions. Al l factions were united in their aim to liberate Palestine and/or 
the occupied territories, but there was a significant disagreement on how to liberate 
their homeland. The main contenders of the time were: 
• Fatah, led by Yasser 'Arafat; 
• the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), led by George Habash; 
• the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP), led by 
Nayif Hawatmeh; 
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• the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine - General Command (PFLP-
GC), led by Ahmed Jibril; 
• finally, Saiqa and the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA) owed their loyalty to the 
Syrian Ba'th party. 
'Arafat's Fatah was the most dominant faction in the PLO, and was often able to 
persuade its partners, the PFLP and PDFLP, to support its motions in the Palestine 
National Council (PNC). Fatah was the least ideologically opposed faction to the 
existence of the state of Israel. It was more willing to negotiate a final agreement with 
the Israelis based on a two state solution.147 Saiqa and the PLA's motivations were less 
obvious than those of Fatah as they were guided by Syrian national interests.148 
One can perceive from the factional structure of the PLO that it has been accessible to 
external forces. This has helped to produce a disparate organisation which has often 
lacked a co-ordinated policy. Consequently, the lack of consensus has invoked a series 
of internecine struggles amongst its factions occasionally fuelled by external powers. 
This was the case in Lebanon when the PLO temporarily disintegrated into its 
constituent parts.149 
In May 1983, due to 'Arafat's decision to explore the possibilities of the Reagan Plan, 
a deep division within the ranks of Fatah occurred. The Abu Musa group, a rejectionist 
component within Fatah, rejected the adoption of the provisional political programme 
of 1974, where reconciliation, recognition, and negotiation were welcomed. 'Arafat's 
Brand, L . , "Asad's Syria and the PLO: Coincidence or Conflict of Interests?," Journal of South 
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autocratic rule also caused consternation amongst his followers. The decision to 
engage in the Reagan Plan, despite the outcome of the PLO Central Committee's 
rejection of the Plan, exemplified the multidirectional forces within the PLO. 1 5 0 
Asad lent military support to the anti-'Arafat groups and helped to oust the 'Arafat 
loyalists from the Beqa1 valley towards Tripoli. 1 5 1 In November 1983, the Syrian 
backed insurrection against 'Arafat began. Numerous battles took place in the refugee 
camps of Nahr al-Bared and Badawi camp, where Abu Jihad took command of the 
loyalist soldiers. Open rebellion against 'Arafat was backed by PFLP and PDFLP, as 
well as its main protagonists Abu Musa, PFLP-GC and Saiqa.152 The internecine 
struggle among the Palestinians added another surreal dimension to the Lebanese civil 
war; Asad waited to re-order the emasculated Palestinian resistance movement under 
the auspices of the Damascus regime. 
The PLO, Asad declared, no longer spoke for the Palestinian cause; 
henceforth, Syria would lead the struggle. Nevertheless, Asad was not 
prepared to support the resumption of armed struggle by Palestinian 
radicals, which might have made their strategy a credible alternative to 
'Arafat's diplomacy.153 
Asad's policies, however, proved to be short sighted as his intervention in the 
fratricidal fight raised Palestinian consciousness, and provided a reinvigorated mandate 
for 'Arafat and his loyalists. The PDFLP and PFLP returned to the moderate PLO fold 
and turned against Syria. Two days after leaving Tripoli, 'Arafat scored a diplomatic 
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victory against his Syrian adversary by meeting Mubarak, the President of Egypt. It 
was the first meeting between the Palestinian leader and an Egyptian president since the 
signing of the Camp David Accords; it was designed to circumvent Syria's role in the 
Middle East peace process.154 
Syria claimed a kind of protectorate over the PLO; but in 1982; it failed to fu l f i l the 
responsibilities incumbent on this self-assumed role, as the Palestinian resistance 
movement was expelled from Lebanon.155 While the immediate object of Israel's 
invasion of Lebanon was to uproot the PLO from the Lebanese arena, its grander 
objective was to humble Syria militarily, and dislodge Lebanon from Syria's sphere of 
influence.156 The Lebanon-Israel agreement made some headway in diminishing Syria's 
influence in Lebanon. 
The Lebanese-Israeli Agreement 
Israel's invasion of Lebanon in 1982 was comprehensive as it consumed the small 
Levantine state and its capital within days. The Syrians suffered a humiliating defeat as 
their airforce was no match for the Israeli Air Force, and the Israelis destroyed Syria's 
air defence systems. Iran's offer of active support contrasted sharply with the virtual 
immobility of the rest of the Arab World and the Soviet Union.1 5 7 
Due to the imbalance of power between Syria and Israel, Syria was unable to confront 
the Israelis directly, and so began a game of spoils. As Syrian influence waned, its 
forces entrenched themselves in and around the Beqa1 valley. Syria and Iran fuelled the 
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activities of their proxies, Amal and the new resilient force that became Hizbollah; they 
began a campaign of liberation based upon martyrdom and hostage-taking.158 
In the wake of the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Israel installed a regime friendly 
to their cause. Bashir Gemayel, the leader of the Phalange, was the ideal candidate for 
the presidency, but his assassination forced the Israelis to deal with his brother, Amin 
Gemayel.159 
The Lebanese-Israeli Accord, which constituted a separate peace treaty, was signed by 
Amin Gemayel. The terms of the treaty opened Lebanon to an exchange of diplomats, 
military influence, and goods with Israel. Israel would maintain the right to extend and 
legitimise the role of Haddad's army in the south. The Arab character of Lebanon was 
to be effaced with Israel providing the initiative for foreign policy, which stipulated the 
withdrawal of all Arab forces from Lebanese soil. As part of the agreement, Israel's 
withdrawal from Lebanese territory was made contingent upon the evacuation of 
Syrian forces.160 
Syria was confronted by a triumphant Israel: Egypt had signed the Camp David 
Accords; an Israeli-friendly regime had been installed in Lebanon; Jordan and Saudi 
Arabia were accommodating to the Reagan Plan; and Iraq was engaged in a war 
deflecting its attention away from the Arab-Israeli conflict. Syria's regional position 
was weakened and capitulation appeared to be a prospect. 
Ehteshami, A., and R. Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran: Middle Power in a Penetrated Regional System, 
(London: Roudedge, 1997), pp. 127-129. 
Fisk, R., Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 353. 
Drysdale, A., and R. Hinnebusch, Syria and the Middle East Peace Process, (New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations, 1991), pp. 126. 
THE REGIONAL BALANCE OF POWER 295 
Syria naturally rejected the Lebanese-Israeli Treaty and strove to disrupt it. To counter 
the terms of the treaty, Asad set about constructing a rejectionist front from the 
alienated parties within Lebanon. A coalition of forces was established around the 
resentments caused by the exclusive deal between the Maronites and Israel. The 
National Salvation Front (NSF)was formed after the promulgation of the treaty on 17 
May 1983. A coalition of Lebanese Shi'a, Druze, and Palestinian forces joined under 
the leadership of Syria with the intent of destroying the imposition of the Lebanon-
Israel Accord.161 
An intense period of resistance commenced with the US and the Israeli military 
experiencing high fatalities from suicide bombers. US support of the Israel-Lebanon 
Accord was punished, on 23 October 1983, when 236 US marines died in a suicide 
bombing mission. Although Syria was not directly implicated in the attack, its alliance 
with the pro-Iranian Shi'a group Amal did not go unnoticed. The Syrian-Iranian 
connection, perpetuated through the role of Hizbollah and Amal, fomented an 
alternative bargaining chip for Syria.162 
The US did not leave the Lebanese problem without amassing its forces off the 
Lebanese coast, which consisted of three aircraft carriers, forty ships, three hundred 
aircraft, and 2,000 marines.163 The subsequent withdrawal of the US marines, and the 
partial withdrawal of the Israeli forces created a vacuum which the Druze and Muslim 
militias filled. They defeated the isolated Phalangists in the Shouf mountains and West 
Beirut.164 
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The strained Gemayel government could no longer withstand the unified resistance to 
the Lebanese-Israeli Accord, and so annulled it in February 1984.165 Through a policy 
of coalition building, military entrenchment, and an extension of Soviet-Syrian ties, 
Asad successfully unravelled the agreement brokered by the US between Israel and 
Lebanon.166 
The Ta'if Agreement 
Syria prevented another Arab state from concluding a durable peace treaty with Israel. 
From this perspective, the Levant Security Doctrine was successful. Throughout the 
duration of the late 1980s, Syria was able to extend its military presence in Lebanon, 
as the casualties sustained by the Israelis, inflicted by the martyrs of Hizbollah, forced 
the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) to retreat to their self-imposed security in south 
Lebanon. Syria's hegemony in Lebanon was garnered in the terms of the Ta'if 
Agreement, which eventually delivered Lebanon from the civil war in September 1989. 
According to the Ta'if Agreement, an agreement underwritten by Saudi Arabia, 
Algeria, and Morocco, the special nature of the Lebanese-Syrian relationship 
recognised that future co-ordination and co-operation between the two states would be 
determined by bilateral agreements in all domains. These domains were to include 
foreign policy, security and military affairs, economic relations, educational affairs and 
information.167 Indeed, Syrian-Lebanese security co-ordination was formalised in a 
mutual Defence Pact in 1991. This pact made provision for the continued deployment 
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of Syrian troops in Lebanon. They were held accountable to the Syrian state, but 
enjoyed a large degree of autonomy from the Lebanese authorities.168 
Although the Israelis have maintained their military presence in southern Lebanon, and 
still influence the policies of their Christian proxy, the South Lebanese Army, Syria 
has managed to extend its sphere of influence throughout the remainder of Lebanon. Its 
hegemony is enshrined in the Ta'if Agreement despite the commitment to troop 
redeployment contained in chapter four of the agreement. With some irony, Syria's 
domination over Lebanese affairs was facilitated by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Syria 
received yet another green light from the US to crush the 'Aoun rebellion in reward for 
its participation in the Gulf war coalition.169 
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Conclusion 
In chapter five, I have attempted to illustrate that the international political system has 
been the ascendant variable in determining Syria's foreign policy. Its foreign policy 
has been consistent since Asad came to power in 1970 and prescribed a dose of realism 
into the decision-making process. 
If one examines Syria's decision-making process, one can identify a consistency in its 
objectives which derive from national security and the national interest. A tribute to its 
consistency can be found in the three strategies that have been utilised by the state, 
since 1970, which engaged Israel in the regional contest for hegemony. 
Prior to 1979, Syria participated in the two-front strategy with Egypt. This was 
designed to empower the diplomatic position of the Arab states in their post-war 
negotiations with the Israelis. The strategy was based on achieving the balance of 
power between Egypt and Syria, on one hand, and Israel on the other. The conclusion 
of the Camp David Accords in 1979 pushed Syria towards a new strategy. 
The doctrine of strategic parity encouraged Syria to pursue a bilateral balance of power 
with Israel. 1 7 0 The source of Syria's power, however, was not indigenous as it was 
dependent upon the strategic support of the Soviet Union. The transformation of 
Soviet foreign policy from 1985 onwards, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 
1991, left Syria without a patron. 
The transition in global affairs at the end of the 1980s, rendered Syria's search for 
strategic parity redundant, and increased its regional and international vulnerability. 
In seeking a balance of power with Israel, Syria and Israel fitted Morgenthau's pattern of direct 
opposition. See Figure 1.2 on page 38. 
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Nevertheless, Syria remained constant in its objectives, and endeavoured to find a new 
strategy. In order to understand the determinants of Syria's foreign policy, I have 
referred to two explanatory models of analysis. 
The rational actor and the domestic politics models offer us two possible alternatives 
for explaining state behaviour. The rational actor model, noted by Allison, is a useful 
model for examining the decision-making process within states. It enables us to 
examine the structural determinants that affect a state's decision-making process, but it 
is unable to account for the behaviour of Third World states. Belonging to the 
paradigm of realism, the rational actor model bases its assumptions upon the unitary 
character of states. Many states of the Third World, however, have yet to consolidate 
their status, and are open to the protracted domestic struggle for power. 
The domestic politics model may be more suitable for analysing the behaviour of Third 
World states. Instead of attributing state behaviour to the international political system, 
it ascribes the formulation of foreign policy to the interplay of domestic forces. In this 
case, foreign policy becomes an outward expression of domestic politics. The inability 
of many Third World states to achieve a unitary status, and to resist the continual 
intervention of the military gives this model of inquiry credence. However, this 
particular model is not apposite to the Syrian case, where the state has managed to 
elevate itself above the dominant social forces in society. Omnibalancing, with its 
emphasis on the link between the international political system and domestic politics, 
appears to be the most applicable explanation for Syrian foreign policy. 
The international political system has been the primary determinant in the formulation 
of Syrian foreign policy. The anarchy of the international political system has 
compelled the Syrian state to protect its national security, especially in the hostile 
environment of the Middle Eastern state-system. Syria's foreign policy, motivated by 
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the national interest and national security, has manifested itself in the struggle for 
regional hegemony with Israel. 
One area where Syria and Israel's regional contest has taken place has been Lebanon. 
Both states have competed to incorporate Lebanon into their spheres of influence. 1 7 1 
For Syria, Lebanon's strategic value is paramount, and its shared history symbolises 
the destiny of both states. Syria's tenacity in Lebanon, notwithstanding Israel's 
invasions and US intervention, demonstrated its value to Syria. In the regional balance 
of power, Lebanon constituted a critical piece in Syria's game plan. 
The balance of power has determined Syria's pursuit of regional hegemony. Syria has 
tried to achieve this balance employing the different strategies described above. The 
end of the bipolar era dictated a search for a new strategy. In the ensuing 
reconfiguration of global power, Syria tried to anchor a new strategy to the epicentre of 
the New World Order. In other words, Syria's adjustment to the New World Order 
presaged a propitious move towards the US. 
The case of Syria and Israel's attempts to extend their hegemony over Lebanon is an illustration of 
Morgenthau's patterns of competition in attaining a balance of power (see Figure 1.3 on page 39). 
The Ta'if Agreement signifies another model of Morgenthau's patterns of competition, where Syria 
manages to assert its hegemony over Lebanon (see Figure 1.5 on page 41). It was able to do so due 
to contingencies with the New World Order. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
SYRIA AND THE GULF WAR: 
ADJUSTING TO THE NEW WORLD ORDER 
Introduction 
Chapter six will provide an illustration of how Syria has adjusted to the New World 
Order. The New World Order represented a change in the configuration of global 
power, and precipitated a new international climate. It marked the end of the Cold 
War, and the emergence of a global order based on the succession of global 
capitalism underpinned by force.1 
Despite the tribute paid to the morality of global capitalism, the nature of the New 
World Order did not alter beyond recognition. Force, secured by the unipolar power 
remained the defining feature of international relations. Irrespective of its multipolar 
features, global capitalism could only be guaranteed through the military force of the 
US and its allies.1 
' Chomsky, N., WorldOrders. OldandNew, (London: Pluto Press, 1994), pp. 70-71. 
1 Chomsky, N., World Orders, OldandNew, (London: Pluto Press, 1994), pp. 25. 
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The ascent of US political power, within the new climate, challenged the status of the 
former client states of the Soviet Union. The future of those states, such as Libya, 
Cuba, Iraq, and Syria, started to look uncertain. Nevertheless, Syria has managed to 
adjust to the New World Order. The combination of the state's relative autonomy 
from domestic forces, and its unique geopolitical position has allowed Syria to adjust 
without substantial difficulty. By omnibalancing the domestic and international 
interests of the state, Syria has altered its regional strategy.3 
Omnibalancing has rewarded the state with a considerable degree of autonomy. In 
turn, this autonomy has enabled the state to pursue a rational foreign policy, 
determined primarily by systemic factors, whilst domestic constraints have assumed 
a subordinate role. The security of the Syrian state, and the national interest were 
essentially responsible for shaping Syria's decision to join the US-led coalition forces 
in the second Gulf War. 
The second Gulf War provides us with a paradigm case to understand the nature of 
the New World Order, and Syria's relationship to its central powers. Remaining 
within the shadows of the old order, Syria needed an opportunity to display its 
commitment to change. The second Gulf War provided Syria with the ideal chance to 
demonstrate its strategic move, and its strategy for adjusting to the New World 
Order. Syria made a strategic decision in realigning its policy towards the US. 
The consequent liberation of Kuwait and the qualified-destruction of Iraq allowed the 
New World Order to reveal its teeth. As the leading force in the New World Order, 
the US mobilised a coalition of states to repel Iraq's invasion. The action of the 
1 S. David provides an in-depth account of omnibalancing in his article "Explaining Third World 
Alignment," World Politics, vol. 43, no. 2, January 1991, pp. 233-256. 
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coalition set a precedent to future challenges to the inviolability of the state-system, 
and those middle powers that sought to test the durability of the hegemonic power.4 
The Golf War 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, on 2 August 1990, set a two-fold challenge to the US-led 
New World Order. Firstly, due to the oil-dependent economic structure of the global 
economy, and the strategic relevance of the Arab Gulf to that global economy, this 
invasion represented a threat to the global economic order.' Secondly, one of the 
founding principles of international relations enshrined in the UN Charter of 1945, 
the inviolability of state borders, was threatened by Iraq's dramatic action in the Gulf. 
The invasion of Kuwait challenged the very essence of the international norms 
contained within the UN Charter.' 
The US-led coalition launched the second Gulf War on 17 January 1991.7 US 
impatience circumvented the success of the economic sanctions and the enforced 
embargo,8 favoured by Russia and the European Union, against Iraq.' The US-led 
4 Barhoum, K. , "The Gulf Crisis and a New World Order," Middle East International, no. 391, 11 
January 1991, pp. 21. 
J Kubursi, A., and S. Mansur, "Oil and the Gulf War: An 'American Century' or a 'New World Order'," 
Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 15, no. 4, Fall 1993, pp. 15. 
6 
Kienle, E . , "Syria, the Kuwait War, and the New World Order," in T. Ismael, and J. Ismael (eds.), 
The Gulf War and the New World Order: International Relations of the Middle East, (Gainsville: 
University Press of Florida, 1994), pp. 384. 
7 Freedman, L . , and E . Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World 
Order, (London: Faber & Faber, 1993), pp. 299. 
8 Freedman, L . , and E . Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World 
Order, (London: Faber & Faber, 1993), pp. 91. 
9 
Buettner. F. , and M. Landgraf, The European Community's Middle Eastern Policy: The New Order 
of Europe and the Gulf Crisis," in T. Ismael, and J. Ismael (eds.). The Gulf War and the New World 
Order: International Relations of the Middle East, (Gainsville: University Press of Florida, 1994), 
pp. 81, and Swann, R., "Europe's Abortive Bridge-building," Middle East International, no. 391,11 
January 1991, pp. 5-7. 
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offensive, under the banner of the UN, supported by Western powers, Saudi Arabia, 
Egypt, Turkey, and Syria, showed the role of force in establishing the co-ordinates of 
the New World Order.10 The coalition forces sought to reverse Iraq's invasion of 
Kuwait. 
Each coalition partner was motivated by differing needs. The international 
justification rested on the premise that Iraq had challenged the terms of the 
international state-system. For many of its critics, the US-led response was indicative 
of the relationship between the predominant economic system and the succession of 
US national interest." The dependency of the global economy upon a cheap and 
regular flow of oil was sufficient to unite the US with its economic partners in its 
confrontation with Iraq. The participation of the Western powers can be attributed to 
their defence of the international political system and the stability of the capitalist 
economic order." 
Saudi Arabia's role is self-explanatory. The cause of Saudi insecurity, a feature of 
domestic politics, emanated from Iraq's immediate threat to the Saudi state.13 This 
created a dependency on external powers. The Arab League failed to accommodate 
Saudi security needs whilst the US filled all avenues of doubt. 
Hill, E , T h e New World Order and the Gulf War: Rhetoric, Policy, and Politics in the United 
States," in T. Ismael, and J. Ismael (eds.), The Gulf War and the New World Order: International 
Relations of the Middle East, (Gainsville: University Press of Florida, 1994), pp. 197. 
" Chomsky, N., World Orders, OldandNew, (London: Pluto Press, 1994), pp. 23-25 
" Freedman, L . , and E Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World 
Order, (London: Faber & Faber, 1993), pp. xxix. 
U Abir, M., Saudi Arabia: Government, Society, and the Gulf Crisis, (London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 
174. 
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Considering its economic ties to the US, and its need to re-integrate itself into the 
14 
regional political and economic system, Egypt took part in this coalition. Egypt's 
rehabilitation into the Arab fold had been completed with the restoration of relations 
with Syria in 1989, and the Gulf War provided it with the chance to adopt a central 
role in the post-war era.'5 
As a member of NATO, Turkey's participation fulfilled the needs of its Western 
partners. Its inclusion in the Gulf War coalition allowed the secular leaders of the 
state to reaffirm their commitment to the West amidst the growing sense of West 
versus East schizophrenia embracing the country. Furthermore, the change in the 
world order presented a possible threat to Turkey's utility to the US and Europe; 
therefore, Turkey sought to assert its regional and international importance. 
The response of Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey, to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait is 
understandable as they were allied to the US and Europe prior to the advent of the 
New World Order and the second Gulf War. Syria's participation, however, appears 
to have been at odds with its professed ideological and nationalist perspective. The 
Syrian decision to join the Gulf War alliance appeared to contradict both its domestic 
and international agendas. 
Syria's Entry into the Gulf War Coalition 
The Gulf War proved to be a portentous moment for Syria, as it enabled the Syrian 
regime to realign its global allegiance towards the US. Its global vulnerability was 
1 4 Rodenbeck, M., "Quiet Unease," Middle East International, no. 393,8 February 1991, pp. 15. 
" Egypt's central role in the post-war peace process helped to elevate its regional status. Its function as 
an intermediary between Syria, the PLO, and Israel has guaranteed it a role in the US-dominated 
regional order. 
SYRIA ASD THE GULF WAR: ADJUSTING TO THE NEW WORLD ORDER 307 
rapidly increasing as the influence of the Soviet Union receded, and the vacuum was 
filled by the US. At a regional level, on one hand, Iraq was punishing Syria's 
presence in Lebanon, by supporting Aoun's war of liberation.16 On the other hand, the 
PLO had recognised the right of Israel to exist, thus jeopardising Syria's co-
ordinating role in promoting comprehensive peace." 
Although Syria's entry into the Gulf War coalition appeared to contradict its Arab 
nationalist agenda, its participation can be accounted for by the following factors: 
(i) the New World Order; 
(ii) the peace process; 
(iii) the post-war regional order; 
(iv) Iraq's challenge to Syria's hegemony; 
(v) European sanctions; 
(vi) Syria's economic prospects. 
The New World Order 
The introduction of new thinking into Soviet foreign policy radically altered the co-
ordinates of international relations. The bipolar division of the world, that had 
provided some middle powers, such as Syria, with the opportunity to exploit the 
vulnerabilities of their patron-states, fell away almost overnight." 
Syria's strategy had been devised after the Camp David Accords. Its tactics were 
based on co-ordinating the policies of the Eastern bloc states, and were to designed to 
1 6 Jansen, G. , T h e Ousting of Aoun," Middle East International, no. 386,26 October 1990, pp. 8-10. 
" Ma'oz, M., Syria and Israel: From War to Peace-making, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 206. 
18 
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spoil any separate peace initiatives fostered by the US or Israel. The establishment of 
the Steadfastness Front in 1979 in the face of the Camp David Accords indicated the 
beginning of the rejectionist period. Although the fortunes of the Steadfastness Front 
were more determined by inter-Arab struggles, rather than united action, Syria's 
obstructionist role prevented any further progress in the Middle East peace process." 
Syria's role in Lebanon was characteristic of its policy of tactical rejectionism. Its 
long-term resistance to Israeli and international intervention in Lebanon, its active 
role in the intra-fratricidal Palestinian struggle, and its alleged involvement in 
international terrorism were all symptomatic of Egypt's conclusion of a separate 
peace.w Syria's rejectionist policy was endorsed by the Soviet Union as the Camp 
David Accords had denied the Soviet Union critical access to the region. 
The arrival of President Andropov in 1983, provided Syria with the necessary 
military umbrella to engage in further obstructionist policies whilst attempting to 
achieve a balance of power with Israel.11 Syria's quest for strategic parity, according 
to the Syrian regime, was the only viable option for attaining a sufficient bargaining 
position to enter a more equitable peace process.11 The introduction of perestroika in 
1985 and its consequences ended Syria's post-Camp David strategy. Syria's 
rapprochement with Egypt in 1989 signalled the end of tactical rejectionism, and the 
acceptance of US global hegemony. In response to the changes that had taken place 
19 
Ehteshami, A., "Defence and Security Policies of Syria in a Changing Regional Environment," 
International Relations, vol. XIII , no. 1, April 1996, pp. 51. 
20 
Yorke, V., Domestic Politics and Regional Security: Jordan, Syria and Israel, The End of an Era?, 
(Aldershot: Gower, 1988), pp. 305-307. 
1 1 Karsh, E , The Soviet Union and Syria: The Asad Years, (London: Routledge, 1988), pp. 79. 
1 1 Khalidi, A., and H. Agha, "The Syrian Doctrine of Strategic Parity," in J. Kipper, and H. Saunders 
(eds.), The Middle East in Global Perspective, (Boulder: Westview Press. 1991), pp. 189-191. 
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in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, Syria was forced to abandon its search for 
strategic parity. 
The revolutions that swept throughout Eastern Europe during the latter stages of the 
1980s served to remind the Syrian regime of its own dispensability. As the political 
leaders and political establishments of East Germany, Romania, and Czechoslovakia 
were swept aside, the realities of the global environment emerged.25 Syria's fate 
appeared to be precarious and dependent upon the vagaries of US foreign policy. 
The dissolution of the Soviet-Syrian partnership exposed Syria's regional and 
international vulnerability; and until the advent of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, Syria's 
future looked uncertain. The punishment of Libya in 1986 for its alleged involvement 
in international terrorism looked like a possible course of punishment for Syria. 
The decline of Soviet support forced Syria to re-examine its options. Syria's options 
were limited as the US prepared to punish Iraq for its aggression and challenge to the 
New World Order. Syria's motives for participating in the US-led coalition, therefore, 
can be partially explained by recognising its necessity to re-align its global position. 
The reconfiguration of global power compelled Syria to re-consider its regional 
strategy. Seeking regional hegemony was not abandoned; however, a new strategy 
was sought to achieve its ambitions. Syria's participation in the liberation of Kuwait 
enabled it to gain enough diplomatic and political capital to be propelled towards the 
centre of a proposed international peace process." 
Hinnebusch, R., "State and Civil Society in Syria," Middle East Journal, vol. 47, no. 2, Spring 1993, 
pp. 243. 
24 
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Syria and the Peace Process 
One of Syria's principal benefits from joining the US-led offensive was the 
convening of an international conference based upon UN Resolution 242.25 The US 
administration promised Syria the prospect of a peace process in exchange for 
lending the coalition legitimacy. Syria was rewarded for providing invaluable cover 
with an acknowledgement of its indispensability to a peaceful solution to the Arab-
Israeli conflict. 
As a radical state, Syria lent the US-led offensive a degree of legitimacy, otherwise 
absent from the alliance. The value of Syria's contribution to the US-led alliance was 
crucial in restraining the development of a counter-alliance amongst the remaining 
radical Arab states. The Syrian admission to the Gulf War coalition provided a 
pretext for the US to act without necessarily invoking Arab nationalist sentiments. 
Moreover, Asad denounced Saddam Hussein's attacks on Israel, "Nobody can drag 
Syria into an imposed war ... as Saddam is trying to do with his theatrical missiles 
fired at Israel. Not content with dragging Iraq into the furnace, its regime is trying to 
embroil the whole Arab world"." 
Syria's inclusion enabled Asad to adjust, in an expedient fashion, to the changing 
demands of the New World Order. The days of tactical rejectionism were assigned to 
the 1980s as Syria gravitated towards the only viable and available option to pursue 
its regional ambitions. Syria managed to transform a potential strategic problem into 
a distinct advantage; the price of Syria's cover in the liberation of Kuwait yielded the 
Madrid Peace Conference, a long-term choice for Asad. A peace process would not 
1 5 Cordahi, C , "Sticking to Its Principles," Middle East International, no. 398,19 April 1991, pp. 16. 
* Muir, J . , "The PLO, Syria, and Iran," Middle East International, no. 392, 25 January 1991, pp. 9, 
and BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/0984, A/7,31 January 1991. 
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only provide a pretext to settle the Golan issue, but also allow Syria to jostle for pre-
eminence in the post-war regional order. 
Post-war regional order 
During the years of tactical rejectionism, Syria had isolated itself from the 
mainstream Arab states. Its support of Iran during the eight year Gulf War translated 
into its exclusion from both the economic and security orders of the region.21 The 
formation of the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC), with Iraq as the centre of gravity, 
served as a threat to Syria's claim for the leadership of the Arab nation." The 
conclusion of the Gulf War in 1988 enabled Iraq to divert its attention towards its 
western borders and the balance of power in the Levant. Syria's hegemony in 
Lebanon was diminishing due to Iraq's growing influence through the sponsorship of 
General Aoun.2 9 
Syria's entry into the second Gulf War elevated its status in the region. It extracted 
itself from its regional isolation whilst improving its credibility with the Gulf Arab 
states. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) had failed to identify Iraq as the major 
threat to the Gulf States whereas Syria had maintained that Iran did not constitute the 
principal threat in the Gulf.30 Iraq's invasion of Kuwait vindicated Syria's support of 
Iran and earned it considerable diplomatic credit. The war provided Syria with an 
opportunity to demonstrate its utility to the Gulf Arab states. 
3 7 Agha, H., and A. Khalidi, Syria and Iran: Rivalry and Cooperation, (London: Pinter, 1995), pp. 26. 
28 
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The reward for Syria was the pronouncement of the Damascus Declaration, where 
the GCC states plus Egyptian and Syrian armed forces formed the new formula for 
guaranteeing Arab Gulf security.3' Syria's participation guaranteed it a key role in the 
post-war order with the benefits of Gulf financial aid and Gulf-US diplomatic credit. 
After existing outside the regional framework throughout the 1980s, Syria was able 
to re-integrate into the regional mainstream gaining the confidence and support of the 
US-friendly regimes, in the form of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Egypt.5' Syria's quest 
to remain at the core of Arab politics was fulfilled in the Damascus Declaration, and 
the universal acknowledgement of Syria's strategic interest in Lebanon.33 
Syria's participation was also accredited in Lebanon; the US gave the Syrians the 
green light to extend their hegemony and remove Iraq's Lebanese client, General 
Aoun, as the last bastion to Syrian hegemony (excluding Israeli occupied south)." 
Iraq's challenge to Syria's hegemony 
The signing of the Iran-Iraq Peace Accord in 1988 left Iraq with a highly militarised 
society and a powerful political opponent for Syria. In the regional balance of power, 
Syria was outweighed in terms of population, natural resources, economy, and the 
militarisation of society. Iraq's termination of the war with Iran enabled it to re-enter 
the contest for regional influence. Although it was not in Syria's, or the broader Arab, 
The Damascus Declaration, however, has essentially remained as a paper agreement The US and 
Britain have continued to provide Gulf security despite the unpopularity of an imperial presence in 
the region. 
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interest to see Iraq destroyed, it was an advantage to witness the diminution of the 
threat posed by Iraq." 
European sanctions 
After witnessing the collapse of the East European states and the re-orientation of 
Soviet foreign policy, Syria was required to diversify its network of international 
support i f it wished to diminish its new state of vulnerability. On 24 October 1986, 
the UK had suspended its diplomatic relations with Syria due to the Syrian 
involvement in the plot to place a bomb on an El Al flight to Tel Aviv departing from 
Heathrow Airport, on 17 April 1986.36 In addition, the European Community imposed 
economic sanctions on Syria on 10 November 1986. It seemed almost certain that the 
Syrians were involved in the plot to blow up the Israeli airliner, but the question that 
evaded answers was how closely the president was involved." 
Syria's rehabilitation into European favour was achieved after its decision to join the 
US-led coalition forces. One dividend for participating in the second Gulf War was 
the restoration of diplomatic relations with the UK, and the lift ing of economic 
sanctions by the European Community.38 However, Syria was angered at an EC vote, 
on 22 October 1990, taken after an exertion of British pressure, to maintain a ban on 
arms sales to Syria and to limit the number of Syrian diplomats and officials in 
Europe." 
3 5 Drysdale, A., and R. Hinnebuscb, Syria and the Middle East Peace Process, (New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations, 1991), pp. 91, and Nasrallah, F . , "Syria's Post-war Gains and Liabilities," Middle 
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Despite sending 15,000 troops to Saudi Arabia as part of its contribution to the Gulf 
War, Syria was still considered, by the US, a sponsor of state-terrorism.* Whilst 
acknowledging the political and diplomatic significance of Syria in justifying the 
allied liberation of Kuwait, the US did not recognise Syria's participation as 
sufficient to warrant its removal from its State Terrorist list. This dichotomy still 
separates the approaches of the European Union and the US in their diplomatic 
relations with Syria. Their differences in approach, however, did not impinge upon 
the economic benefits accrued by Syria's from the lifting of economic sanctions or 
the windfall from the Gulf Arab states. 
Syria's economic prospects 
The second Gulf War provided Syria with an opportunity to compensate for the loss 
of the economic support of the Soviet Union, through the promotion of the Syrian-
Egyptian-GCC security order. Syria and Egypt were both financial beneficiaries of 
the second Gulf War, and were rewarded for their allegiance to the Gulf Arab states. 
Their rewards, though, were disproportionate in favour of the Egyptians, which 
prompted Syria to temporarily review its options and suspend the deployment of its 
troops in Saudia Arabia/' 
Syria received $2 billion for its role in the liberation of Kuwait only from the 
governments of the Gulf Arab states. This capital was mainly used to upgrade the 
Syrian military."0 The Egyptians, on the other hand, were granted a debt write-off of 
40 
Kienle, E . , "Syria, the Kuwait War, and the New World Order," in T. Ismael, and J . Ismael (eds.), 
The Gulf War and the New World Order: International Relations of the Middle East, (Gainsville: 
University Press of Florida, 1994), pp. 384. 
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$14.4 billion by the US."0 The disparities in the distribution of financial rewards 
reflected the differences in the relationships of the two states with the US. 
The signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979, underpinned by economic 
benefits, marked the new Egyptian strategy for the recovering the Sinai peninsula. 
Egypt rejected the Soviet Union and competed with the Israelis for US influence.44 
This strategy had been successful in disengaging Egypt from the territorial conflict 
with Israel.45 Moreover, it had resulted in the return of the Sinai, and the cultivation 
of US support. However, it had produced an economic dependency upon the US.46 
Syria's strategy during the Cold War had rested upon Soviet support. The radical 
change in the world order removed the main pillar of Syria's foreign policy strategy. 
Syria's options were clearly limited in a US dominated world order. Saddam 
Hussein's dramatic move granted Syria an unexpected opportunity to work closer 
with the US.47 Joining the US-led Gulf War coalition afforded Syria the chance to 
adjust to the new international climate, and pursue policies still in line with its 
regional objectives, but less inimical to US interests in the Middle Eastern region. 
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Although the decision to re-align its foreign policy and join the Gulf War coalition 
could be considered successful for the Syrian regime, it was a difficult task justifying 
this change in policy to the Syrian population. The Arab credentials of the regime, a 
major source of legitimacy, were under threat by the decision to lend support to the 
US in a war against an Arab brother. At the time of decision-making, therefore, a 
number of obstacles emerged that may have persuaded the political elite to adopt a 
pro-Iraqi position. 
The Golf War: Obstacles to Syrian Participation 
The above explanation for Syria's joining the Gulf War coalition was examined in the 
light of international conditions, but did not reflect the domestic constraints placed 
upon Syria. The following section will illustrate how Asad, although reliant upon the 
regime barons and sensitive to public perceptions of the regime's Arab credentials, 
was able to pursue a policy that appeared to be inimical to domestic and regional 
interests. There were few domestic constraints upon the regime as regards 
influencing its options in joining the Gulf War coalition. The two potential sources of 
resistance could have emerged from public discontent and from the entrenched 
positions of the regime barons* Before discussing these factors, we should address 
the issue of legitimacy to be able to understand the impact of public opinion and the 
regime barons upon the state's foreign policy. 
Legitimacy 
Within the Arab World, the concept of legitimacy has undergone an evolutionary 
transformation over the last twenty-five years. Arab nationalism seems to have lost 
its appeal to the Arab population, whilst the promise of economic security may have 
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gained in credence. Arab nationalism, therefore, may be losing its significance as a 
legitimising tool. The provision of economic security may provide legitimacy to a 
more compliant public* 
The Syrian case, however, is still unique within the Arab World. Regime legitimacy 
in Syria is not a quantifiable commodity, and it is not really possible to gauge due to 
the secret nature of the regime and society. It has been traditionally measured by the 
Arab credentials of the state. Arab nationalism is believed to be one of the keys to 
understanding state-society relations in Syria." As the military threat from Israel is 
still of paramount interest to the Syrian regime and the Syrian population, the 
hegemonic challenge of Israel to Syria's regional interests dominates its perception of 
international politics. 
Arab nationalism remains a critical juncture around which the Syrian population can 
unite behind the regime. The foreign policy gains of the regime, namely, in the 
regional contest with Israel have been popular and won support. The return of the 
Golan, the liberation of the Arab territories, and the restoration of Palestinian rights 
have remained the central tenets of Asad's foreign policy. These goals continue to 
legitimise foreign policy decisions, and have not changed since Asad's seizure of 
power in 1970. In short, regime legitimacy has been synonymous with Arab 
nationalism. 
Legitimacy, however, has not been a priority in the means to achieving these goals. 
The tactics of the Syrian regime have often seemed to be at odds with the Arab 
dimension in the Arab-Israeli dispute. As mentioned previously, Syria's intervention 
* Interview with a Damascene businessman, 29 September 1995. 
5 0 Seale, P.,Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988), pp. 174. 
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in Lebanon, its support of Iran in the Iran-Iraq War, its promotion of the anti-Arafat 
struggle in Lebanon, and its support of Amal in the Camp Wars of 1985, have been 
deeply unpopular and have been considered to be detrimental to the Arab cause. 
Islam is an alternative form of acquiring legitimacy. However, the Syrian regime 
does not possess sufficient Islamic credentials despite the public displays of 
religiosity by the president" The violent suppression of the Islamic uprising in Hama 
in 1982 has stripped the regime of all pretensions of Islamic legitimacy.n 
Although the regime of Asad is essentially unpopular, it has survived for twenty 
seven years. The regime of President Asad owes its longevity to a number of factors 
which can be summarised as: 
• the Ba'th party; 
• the Armed Forces; 
• the Security Services; 
• the maintenance of legitimacy. 
Each factor is independent of public opinion except for the factor of legitimacy.5 
Public opinion 
As illustrated in chapter four, political participation is limited in Syria. The public do 
not have effective access to a system of redress to challenge unpopular policy 
decisions. Despite the presence of an institutionalised political process, the structures 
in place serve more as a facade than a system of representation. Public unrest has not 
3 1 Interview with the First Secretary of the British Embassy, Damascus, 22 September 1995. 
5 2 Batatu, H., "Syria's Muslim Brethren," MERIP, no. 110, November/December 1982, pp. 19-20. 
3 Hinnebusch, R., Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba'thist Syria: Army, Party, and 
Peasant, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), pp. 156. 
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emerged, in any significant way, since the destruction of Hama in 1982. In this 
instance, the regime was dependent upon the support of its security services and 
Rifat Asad's Defence Companies.* 
It was, however, important to address public opinion before taking part in the Gulf 
War coalition, to legitimise the logic of the decision. Asad found it necessary to 
defend his decision in a major speech on 12 September 1990." Intervention was 
justified in the following ways: 
• to constrain the imperial powers and assure their rapid departure after the 
completion of the task; 
• the restoration of international laws and norms would place pressure on the 
Western governments to implement UN Resolutions 242,338, and 425; 
• to ensure that an international peace process would commence after the 
liberation of Kuwait. 
In spite of this, the public were still discontented with the decision. Public opinion 
during the Gulf War was expressed in covert ways, such as the posting of seditious 
materials, and there were some demonstrations in eastern Syria, but very few Syrians 
were willing to challenge the regime." 
Syria's partnership in the alliance to liberate Kuwait, an oil-rich Gulf state, against 
Iraq, a fellow Ba'thist state, appeared to be contradictory to popular expression. 
Siding with the imperial power of the US, the long-term ally of Israel seemed to 
"Salah ed-Din al Bitar's Last Interview: The Major Deviation of the Ba'th Is Having Renounced 
Democracy," MERIP, no. 110, November/December 1982, pp. 23. 
" Jansen, G., "Unpopular U-turn," Middle East International, no. 384,28 September 1990, pp. 11-12. 
* Jansen, G., "Unpopular U-turn," Middle East International, no. 384,28 September 1990, pp. 11-12. 
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negate the principles of Arab nationalism. Certainly, the decision to fight with the 
Western alliance was not determined by public sympathies with Arab nationalism. 
Arab nationalism and the liberation of the occupied territories remained at the centre 
of Asad's strategic thinking, yet abstaining from the liberation of Kuwait would have 
harmed Syrian interests, and intervention on the side of Iraq could have been 
suicidal. 
The reconciliation between policy decisions and public opinion has never been 
critical to the state, as the regime exists largely above the influence of political 
interest groups. The only group that exerts real influence upon the regime can be 
identified as the regime barons. They are not, however, a group as such; they are 
carefully recruited, cultivated, and removed according to the strength of the 
president.37 
The Regime Barons 
Although President Asad appears to be the major decision-maker in Syria, this 
perception is, of course, inaccurate. There is a political elite that enjoins the president 
and represents the interests of: 
• the Ba'th party; 
• the Armed Forces; 
• the Security Services. 
The political elite have been identified as: Vice President 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam, 
Chief of Staff Hikmat al-Shihabi, and intelligence boss 'Ali Duba. The jamd'a around 
5 7 Hinnebusch, R., "Syria: The Politics of Peace and Regime Survival," Middle East Policy, vol. iii, no. 
4, April 1995, pp. 76. 
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this core has been crucial to regime autonomy and stability. There is little evidence 
that Asad encountered much resistance from the political elite, as the decision was 
considered to be consensual.* Although the decision appeared to be difficult to 
justify to the ideological army of Syria and the Ba'th party, Asad demonstrated the 
utility of his decision after the devastating defeat of Iraq. 
Without the constraint of appeasing interests within the state, the Syrian elite were 
able to conduct and implement a policy that seemed antithetical to the traditional 
policies of the state. The nature of the decision-making process, and the method of 
implementation did not deviate from previous patterns. Foreign policy remains the 
exclusive domain of the president and his coterie. High politics is still the dominant 
theme in Syrian foreign policy; it exists beyond the reach of any institutional 
framework or the vagaries of public opinion. 
The relative autonomy from domestic constraint, enjoyed by the state, empowered 
the decision-makers to pursue a policy that appeared to be inimical to Arab interests, 
and a betrayal of its traditional foreign policy. Through a careful balancing of 
domestic and international pressures, however, the state was able to follow a rational 
policy founded upon national security and national interest. National security and 
national interest owe their origins to the primacy of systemic factors in the 
formulation of foreign policy. 
Hinnebusch, R., "Syria: The Politics of Peace and Regime Survival," Middle East Policy, vol. iii, no. 
4, April 1995, pp. 77. 
" Hinnebusch, R., "Syria: The Politics of Peace and Regime Survival," Middle East Policy, vol. iii, no. 
4, April 1995, pp. 76-77. 
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The Primacy of Systemic Factors 
Free from the impositions of constituent demands, Syria's decision to join the 
coalition was based upon a rational set of considerations focused on realpolitik. The 
foreign policy goals of the regime did not significantly change, but the strategy to 
achieve them was adapted according to the new international environment. 
The rational actor model appears to offer the most appropriate analysis for Syria's 
decision to engage in the second Gulf War on the side of the US and its allies. The 
model's emphasis on national security and the national interest fit accordingly to the 
Syrian case. The systemic factors compelled Syria to conform to a rational decision-
making process. Evidently, the domestic politics models fail to provide a convincing 
explanation of Syria's decision, with their focus upon the domestic arena. Despite 
widespread domestic opposition to Syria's intervention in the second Gulf War, the 
state employed a policy that contravened the public mood and the interests of other 
influential parties. 
Understanding that force was still the ultimate source of power, Asad realised that 
Syria needed to adapt its strategy in order to capitalise upon the changing 
circumstances and fortunes of international relations. Asad said about the pre-
eminence of force in international relations: "Force in today's world, just as in the 
past, is what determines rights. Everyone speaks about rights and international 
norms, charters, and resolutions. However, you find that every international event is 
settled by force."60 
Hannah, J . , At Arms Length: Soviet-Syrian Relations in the Gorbachev Era, (Washington: 
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1989), pp. 21. 
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Despite the talk of a New World Order based on a new morality, that order was still 
defined by might over right. The dominant feature of the military in international 
relations had not radically altered. The significance of the New World Order lay in 
the reconfiguration of power, which emanated in a military unipolarity, and an 
economic multipolarity. As a pragmatist and a realist, Asad responded to the 
challenge of the New World Order. He perceived a New World Order emerging and 
wanted to influence it rather than be its victim. The Gulf War promised to be a 
watershed event in the birth of that order, and Syria's policy in the conflict would 
determine its status in the new order. 
The calculated gamble, taken by the Syrian regime, vindicated its policy decision to 
join the US and its allies in the liberation of Kuwait. The Syrian public opinion 
reluctantly accepted the sagacity of Asad's decision, in the post-war period. It was 
acknowledged that Syria was spared the ordeal of being the next victim of the New 
World Order, and had in the mean time elevated its status in the regional hierarchy. 
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Conclusion 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait afforded the US-led coalition with the occasion to 
challenge the actions of an aggressor state (Iraq) in order to guarantee the territorial 
integrity of a victimised state (Kuwait). The reaction of the US-led coalition 
represented the nature of the New World Order and it served to remind the world's 
states that international law would be upheld by the world's hegemonic powers.61 
This perception of the New World Order is based upon international law and falls 
into the pluralist paradigm of international relations theory. The globalist perspective 
works from the assumption that the liberation of Kuwait was motivated by the need 
to guarantee access to cheap oil for the global economy. The action of the coalition, 
therefore, served the interests of the leaders of the global capitalist economy. Realists 
have, however, alluded to the primacy of self interest of the members of the US-led 
offensive. 
For realists the New World Order did not entail a break from the past. Nevertheless, 
it signified the next stage of world history based upon a redistribution of power. 
National interests remained the paramount feature of the New World Order. Realists 
have asserted that the liberation of Kuwait served the national interests of both the 
international and regional players.62 
International actors 
The destruction of an emerging middle power in the Middle East state sub-system 
demonstrated the nature of the New World Order. The successor to the bipolar order, 
4 1 Chomsky, N., World Orders, Old and New, (London: Pluto Press, 1994), pp. 9. 
a Krauthammer, C , "The Unipolar Moment," Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, no. 1, Winter 1991, pp. 24. 
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either the unipolar or multipolar order, was to be reinforced by international coercion 
whilst conciliation and co-operation were subordinate features of the New World 
Order.0 In other words, the response of the US-led coalition did not connote the 
ascendancy of liberal values, but the omnipresence of force in international 
relations.44 The response of the coalition served two purposes. 
Firstly, it illustrated the inflexible nature of the centre powers demonstrating their 
political and military hegemony over the world's regions. The action of the coalition 
set a precedent to regional middle powers. It illustrated the intolerance of the centre 
powers to anti-systemic forces and their readiness to meter out punishment to 
regional threats. As a radical force in the region, Iraq threatened to disrupt the status 
quo that served the interests of the US." 
Secondly, it represented the collective national interests of its international members. 
Access to cheap oil was deemed essential to maintaining their high-tech economies 
and for the general servicing of the global economy. Adjacent to the copious oil 
fields of the GCC, Iraq's invasion posed a challenge to the continuous flow of cheap 
oil. As the currency of the global economy, oil is fundamental to the interdependent 
interests of the world's economic centres. The liberation of Kuwait, therefore, served 
the economic and political agenda of the international actors in the US-led 
offensive." 
Kuroda, Y . , "Bush's New World Order A Structural Analysis of Instability and Conflict in the 
Gulf," in T. Ismael, and J. Ismael (eds.). The Gulf War and the New World Order: International 
Relations of the Middle East, (Gainsville: University Press of Florida, 1994), pp. 56. 
** Chomsky, N., WorldOrders, OldandNew, (London: Pluto Press, 1994), pp. 25. 
" Freedman, L . . and E Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World 
Order, (London: Faber & Faber, 1993), pp. xxi-xxx, and Chomsky, N., World Orders, Old and New, 
(London: Pluto Press, 1994), pp. 9-10. 
6 6 Chomsky, N., World Orders. Old and New, (London: Pluto Press, 1994), pp. 8-25. 
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Regional actors 
The liberation of Kuwait served the interests of the regional actors who took part in 
the US-led coalition. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria were the main Arab 
beneficiaries; their participation elevated their international and regional status. Saudi 
Arabia's acute security dilemma, incurred by Iraq's ominous presence, obliged it to 
seek international protection. As a regional power, Iraq's emergence from the Iran-
Iraq War constituted a threat to the hegemonic interests of Egypt and Syria. Egypt's 
dependence upon US economic aid was partially accountable for its entry into the 
coalition. Syria's gravitation towards the US-centred world order was a reflection of 
its new strategy in foreign policy. The roles of Egypt and Syria were essentially 
motivated by the prominence of their national interests. Turkey's participation in the 
coalition forces and Israel's abstinence from attacking Iraq, despite Iraq's Scud 
missile provocation, ensured that both parties received considerable economic and 
diplomatic credits.*7 
From this brief observation, it is possible to suggest that Syria's decision to join the 
Gulf War coalition was calculated according to a set of rational decisions. The 
hypothesis of this chapter asserts that the primary motivation behind Syria's role in 
the Gulf War coalition was the necessity to realign its global position. This was not a 
decision taken lightly, but owed its origins to the vulnerability of Syria vis-a-vis 
Israel and the remaining superpower, the US. 
There was little choice but to accept the dominant role played by the US in the world 
order. Unipolarity was the defining feature of international relations, and the prospect 
of a multipolar system emerging looked increasingly remote. Syria faced two 
BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/0984, A/21,31 January 1991, and Freedman, L . , and E 
Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order, (London: Faber 
&Faber, 1993), pp. 203. 
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choices: either to pursue a US-led solution, or to risk falling into isolation. Ironically, 
Syria was forced to adopt a strategy employed by the Egyptian government in the 
late 1970s, but the terms of reference, however, were very different. 
The reduction in Iraq's military capacity and the elimination of its political threat to 
Syrian hegemony in the region, and especially in Lebanon, were benefits enjoyed by 
Syria, but they did not constitute a major factor in the decision-making process. 
Moreover, the destruction of Iraq weakened the Arab balance of power with Israel, 
and it exposed the region to more external forces. The lift ing of sanctions was 
incidental to the decision, especially as the US failed to remove Syria from its list of 
terrorist states. The economic dividends accrued after the war were also negligible in 
making the decision. 
Adjusting to the New World Order was an essential part of Syria's foreign policy in 
the post-Cold War era. US-Syrian relations had reached an all time low during the 
1980s, due to: 
• the bombing of the US marine base in 1983; 
• the episode of hostage taking; 
• Syria's alleged role in international terrorism. a 
Libya paid for its activities in 1986,*' Iraq was being prepared as the next victim in 
the Middle East, and Syria may have been in line for the following round of 
retributive action. The second Gulf War presented Syria with the moment to evade 
this course of action. 
Agha, H., and A. Khalidi, Syria and Iran: Rivalry and Cooperation, (London: Pinter, 1995), pp. 20-
25. 
Chomsky, N., World Orders, Old and New, (London: Pluto Press, 1994), pp. 23. 
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The New World Order represented a direct threat to Syria and its regime. The 
objectives of Syrian foreign policy were moving beyond the realms of realism; Asad, 
motivated by power-politics sought the first opportunity to realign Syria to the more 
advantageous side of the New World Order. Syria's inclusion in the US-led coalition 
enabled it to adjust to the environment of the New World Order. 
In order to occupy a place in the post-war regional order and to achieve its regional 
ambitions, Syria joined the US-led coalition. This move may have appeared to have 
contradicted Syria's foreign policy goals of the 1970s and 1980s. But the promise of 
a revival of an international peace conference illustrated Syria's motive for allying 
itself to the conservative Gulf Arab states and their international guardians. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
SYRIA AND THE PEACE PROCESS 
Introduction 
One result of the liberation of Kuwait was the convening of an international peace 
conference for the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The US maintained and 
pursued its commitment to the peace process despite the reluctant overtures of 
Shamir's government.1 Syria's adjustment to the New World Order, represented in its 
decision to join the Gulf War coalition, was rewarded by the prospect of the peace 
process. 
Syria's participation in the US-led peace process, arose from the change in the 
configuration of global power, as Asad noted: "If the New World Order is actually to 
be global, then it must adhere to legitimacy and we, along with others, must be part of 
it. We cannot support an order that is biased against us and that attacks the victim."1 
1 Cohen, S., "The Geopolitics of a Golan Heights Agreement," Focus, vol. 42, 1 June 1992, pp. 15. 
1 BBC Summary ofWorld Broadcasts, ME/1351, A/9, 9 April 1992. 
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The debate about Syria's commitment to peace re-emerged as the peace process began. 
Syria watchers, such as Pipes3 and Kirkpatrick4 cast serious doubt over Syria's 
intentions towards Israel, whilst Hinnebusch,5 Seale, and Kienle4 believed that peace 
was a strategic option for Syria. 
In chapter seven, I intend to show how Syria's engagement in the peace process is 
consistent with Asad's foreign policy. Its entry into the Madrid peace process was 
determined by the advent of the New World Order. Prior to this shift in the global 
configuration of power, the prospect of a solution based upon a comprehensive 
formula remained elusive. Syria's exclusion from the separate peace tracks, which had 
included Egypt and Lebanon, had encouraged Syria to develop tactical rejectionism. 
The New World Order produced a climate conducive to a more comprehensive peace 
formula. Hence, Syria's path of rejectionism was discarded as peace became a strategic 
option for Syria.7 
Syria's foreign policy has been consistent since 1974. It has been motivated by the 
quest for a comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict based upon UN 
Resolutions 242 and 338.' More recently, however, the terms of a peace settlement for 
Syria have become more fluid. Since Jordan and the PLO have signed separate peace 
5 Pipes, D., "Syria's People May Not Want Peace," Jewish Exponent, 25 November 1994, pp. 1-3. 
4 Kirkpatrick, J . , "We Shouldn't Risk US Dollars on Unreliable Arafat and Assad," Human Events, 
vol. 51, 28 July 1995, pp. 10. 
5 Drysdale, A., and R. Hinnebusch, Syria and the Middle East Peace Process, (New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations, 1991), pp. 201-207. 
4 Kienle, E . , "Syria, the Kuwait War, and the New World Order," in T. Ismael, and J. Ismael (eds.), 
The Gulf War and the New World Order: International Relations of the Middle East, (Gainsville: 
University Press of Florida, 1994), pp. 390. 
7 Richards, C , "Assad Adds His Weight to Middle East Peace Talks," The Independent, Monday 17 
January 1994, pp. 1. 
8 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/1402, A/1, 9 June 1992. 
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deals, Syria has been left at liberty to settle the issue of the Golan without reference to 
the Palestinian Question, which has been the central feature of the Arab-Israeli conflict 
since its inception. 
The Palestinian Question has been central to the legitimacy of the Syrian state. The 
regime's Arab credentials, obtained from its vociferous defence of the Arab territories, 
have served to justify foreign policy and unpopular domestic policies. Deviation from 
the Palestinian agenda, therefore, could be deemed to be betraying pan-Arabism, 
thereby risking regime legitimacy. 
I contend that this idea has fallen into the shadows of history. The Syrian population 
has carried the burden of Palestine for the last f i f ty years; furthermore, it attributes the 
absence of democracy within Syrian society to the omnipresent threat of the Israelis.' 
Peace with Israel, irrespective of the Palestinians, would liberate Syria from its 
security dilemma and decompress the domestic political system. From this perspective, 
it is more likely, that the Syrian population perceives the separate PLO-Israeli deal as 
an opportunity to pursue state or domestic interests over Arab interests.10 
Traditionally, Syria has been depicted as an enemy of peace. In this chapter, I intend to 
refute this assumption and show that peace has been a realistic option for Syria since 
Asad took power. Peace has been conceived in terms of a comprehensive option, thus 
universally satisfying Arab needs and ambitions. Before presenting this hypothesis, I 
intend to analyse the major events that characterised Syrian foreign policy throughout 
the 1970s and 1980s. The main focus of this chapter is to present an understanding of 
Syria's role in the current peace process. 
' Interview with Syrian businessman, 25 June 1994. 
1 0 This assumption in based a number of interviews undertaken in Syria during October 1995. 
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Syria and the Peace Process 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the succession of the US, as the architect of the 
New World Order, swept away the status quo and precipitated a change in the Middle 
Eastern regional order. The invasion of Kuwait provided the optimum moment for 
collating the interests of the US' allies in the region, and for incorporating Syria into 
the formula. 
With these trends reinforced by the crumbling of East European 
regimes and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the radical regimes 
in the Middle East concluded that they had been left to the mercy of the 
only remaining superpower, the United States, and its lackeys, of 
which Israel was first and foremost.1' 
The changes in the world order presented a window of opportunity for Israel and the 
Arab states to find a resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict The structural determinants, 
namely, the emergence of the US as the world's superpower, coupled with a 
weakened Arab World created a context in which the US could impose a peace upon 
the region. The Madrid Peace Conference, which commenced in October 1991, 
initiated an irreversible process in which Jordan with a Palestinian delegation, 
Lebanon, and Syria participated in bilateral talks. 
At this stage of the negotiations, Syria was the linchpin of the Arab camp; it persuaded 
the other Arab parties to conform to a united policy. Realising that a separate peace 
weakened the Arab position after Egypt had accepted the terms of Camp David, Syria 
sought to co-ordinate the policies of the Arab parties. Before attending the Madrid 
peace conference on 31 October 1991, Syria convened a co-ordinating session in 
1 1 Karsh, E . , "Peace in the Middle East," The Oxford International Review, vol. 5, no. 1, Winter 
1993, pp. 39. 
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Damascus, on 23 October 1991.12 This was one opportunity to confront Israeli 
ascendancy through a unified position. 
This chapter has been divided into two main sections: the history of the peace process, 
and the state of the current peace process. The first section wil l summarise Syria's 
conceptualisation of peace in the 1970s and 1980s. The second section will examine 
Syria's role in the peace process with reference to the changes within the New World 
Order. 
History of the Peace Process 
The map of the contemporary Middle East, which was essentially drawn up after the 
First World War, set the structural precedents for the region's future. The 
dismemberment of Greater Syria into individual states administered by the mandatory 
powers sought to disfigure the political and geographical orientation of the region. The 
deliberations of the Sykes-Picot agreement and the issue of the Balfour Declaration in 
1917, accompanied by the subsequent creation of Israel, generated structural fault lines 
that dragged the region irrevocably towards war." 
The Arab states of the region did not accept the existence of the state of Israel. It was 
believed to be a revocable state without indigenous roots. It owed its existence and 
allegiance to the Western powers.14 Hence, the objective of the regional powers, has 
been to eliminate the state of Israel in their pursuit of regional influence. Israel 
provided an nexus for the newly formed Arab states to unite behind a single cause and 
1 2 Butt, G. , "Asad the Coordinator,'' Middle East International, no. 411, 25 October 1991, pp. 7. 
1 1 Karsh, E . , "Peace in the Middle East," The Oxford International Review, vol. 5, no. 1, Winter Issue 
1993, pp. 37. 
M Galvani, J . , P. Johnson, and R. Theberge, "The October War: Egypt, Syria, Israel," MERIP, no. 
22, November 1973, pp. 15. 
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to search for their own trans-state schemes. The Iraqi and Transjordanian schemes to 
recreate the Fertile Crescent and Greater Syria provided examples where the trans-state 
objectives of the newly independent states dominated the region's politics." One 
political manifestation of the Arab nationalist movement was the rising Ba'th party. 
The Ba*th party and Israel 
The Ba'th party, founded in 1940, represented a more aggressive and visionary form 
of Arab nationalism. Its appeal as a revolutionary movement far exceeded the 
chivalrous objectives of the early leaders of Arab nationalism, whose acceptance of the 
Arab state-system and their acquiescence to the creation of Israel was habitually 
denounced.14 
As an ideology, Ba'thism called for the renaissance of Arabism, a regeneration of the 
great Arab empires, and the eradication of all occupying powers. The state of Israel 
was located at the centre of Ba'thi philosophy, and served to unify the objectives of 
Ba'thism.17 The anti-Israeli rhetoric of the Ba'th regime after 1963 had called for the 
destruction of Israel, and the breakdown of the Arab state sub-system. According to 
these principles, in conjunction with the expansionist tendencies of the Israeli state, 
conflict between Syria and Israel was an inevitable feature of the contemporary Middle 
East." 
1 5 Petran, T., Syria, (New York: Praeger, 1972), pp. 97-105. 
" Ma'oz, M., T h e Emergence of Modern Syria," in M. Ma'oz, and A. Yaniv (eds.), Syria under 
Assad: Domestic Constraints and Regional Risks, (London: Croom Helm, 1986), pp. 21. 
1 7 Petran, T., Syria, (New York: Praeger, 1972), pp. 89-92. 
1 8 Ma'oz, M., Syria and Israel: From War to Peace-making, (Oxford: Clarendon Press Press, 1995), 
pp. 82-84. 
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Syria and Israel 
Syria has long been regarded, by the West, as an ardent opponent of peace. This 
understanding has been based upon the military confrontations and vocal antipathy 
shared between Syria and Israel. The creation of Israel has been the source of Syria's 
enmity; its creation marked the demise of the Greater Syrian region as a single political 
and cultural unit Viewed as an imperial and alien state, Israel symbolised the failure of 
evolutionary Arab nationalism to resist the imposition of another successive period of 
occupation." 
Although the creation of Israel affected the Arab World, due to its geographic 
proximity, its most immediate impact was felt in the Levant. It set a challenge to Syrian 
influence in Lebanon, Jordan, and Palestine, and at the same time undermined the 
legitimacy of the Syrian state. As a result of this, Syria's domestic politics after 1948, 
had been necessarily determined by the existence of Israel. The pre-occupation of 
Syrian foreign policy was committed to the challenge that Israel had set before it. The 
Syrian leadership has owed its credentials to the success of its Arab nationalist agenda, 
and its opposition to Israeli statehood.10 
As previously mentioned, the 1967 War was a defining moment in contemporary 
Middle Eastern history. It signalled the permanence of Israel's presence in the region. 
The combined Arab effort to destroy Israel had failed. The structural faults remained, 
but Israel's existence was an unavoidable truth. 
" Ben-Meir, A., T h e Israeli-Syrian Battle for Equitable Peace," Middle East Policy, vol. iii, no. 1, 
January 1994, pp. 74. 
" For more details of the theoretical approach consult: Lawson, F. , Why Syria Goes To War: Thirty 
Years of Confrontation, (London: Cornell University Press, 19%). 
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The details of the struggle between Syria and Israel, during the period 1948-70, are not 
strictly relevant here, as we are mainly concerned with the Asad years. But it is 
important to understand that the struggle owed its roots to the structural factors that 
shaped the Middle Eastern region after the First and Second World Wars.21 With a 
change of leadership in Egypt and Syria, in 1970, the next phase of the regional 
conflict moved away from the destruction of Israel and focused on the liberation of the 
territories occupied in 1967.22 
Asad and Sadat: A new direction 
Asad's rise to power was accompanied by a brand of realism that recognised the 
longevity of Israel's existence. At the time, neither Egypt nor Syria recognised the state 
of Israel, but their changing behavioural patterns acknowledged the contemporary 
realities. The ambitions of Syrian and Egyptian foreign policy, as displayed in the 
October War, were confined to liberating the territories occupied during the 1967 
war.23 
The October War 
The June War of 1967 contributed to a fundamental change in the military arena in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. Asad had gained invaluable experience during the Six Day War 
and understood the limitations of Syria's military capabilities. Success had to be 
determined in the air, and the Israeli air force enjoyed the supremacy of the US military 
2 1 For more details of the early Syrian-Israeli struggle see the following: Ma'oz, M., Syria and Israel: 
From War to Peace-making, (Oxford: Clarendon Press Press, 1995), Petran, T., Syria, (New York: 
Praeger, 1972), Seale, P., The Struggle for Syria: A Study ofPost-War Arab politics 1945-1958, 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1965), and Rathmell, A., Secret War in the Middle East: The 
Covert Struggle for Syria, 1949-1961, (London: Tauris, 1995). 
2 2 Karsh, E . , "Peace in the Middle East," The Oxford International Review, vol. 5, no. 1, Winter 
1993. pp. 37. 
2 3 Ma'oz, M., Syria and Israel: From War to Peace-making, (Oxford: Clarendon Press Press, 1995), 
pp. 120-130. 
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edge.24 This reality played a significant part in shaping the military co-ordination of 
Egypt and Syria in the October War. 
Unity between Egypt and Syria in waging the war in 1973 formed the two-front 
strategy to liberate the occupied territories. Committed to the principle and utility of 
unity, Asad was aware that the Arabs were weak and ineffectual when divided against 
the rapidly consolidating state of Israel. The war of 1973 was a war to liberate the Arab 
territories, and to award the front-line Arab states with the diplomatic advantage in 
post-war negotiations. In short, the October War was a war for peace. 
The war provided a moral and psychological victory for the Arab states. The notion of 
Israeli supremacy had been severely challenged, and the Arab states had seized the 
diplomatic advantage." The war initiated a process that produced a watershed in the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. However, the unity between Syria and Egypt, already fractured 
through a break down in military co-ordination," dissipated as Egypt pursued a 
separate peace deal with Israel." 
The October War of 1973 illustrated the precedence of Egypt's national-state interest 
over Arab interest. The political and cultural homogeneity of Egypt allowed for the 
creation of a more particular foreign policy," whereas Syria's national interests were 
2 4 Sealc, P., Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988), pp. 140. 
2 5 The use of the oil weapon by the Gulf Arab states provided economic, political, and diplomatic 
leverage for the Arab states. 
2 5 Seale, P., Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988), pp. 194-
201. 
2 7 Lorenz, J . , Egypt and the Arabs: Foreign Policy and the Search for National Identity, (Oxford: 
Westview Press, 1990), pp. 51. 
2 8 For more details of Egyptian and Syria identity see: Kienle, E . , "Arab Unity Schemes Revisited: 
Interest, Identity, and Policy in Syria and Egypt," International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 
27, no. 1, February 1995, pp. 53-71. 
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intricately tied to the broader Arab agenda." The first and second disengagement 
agreements between Israel and Egypt led to the signing of the Camp David Accords. 
The conclusion of the Camp David Accords, in the form of a peace treaty, rejected 
Syria's aim of achieving comprehensive peace.30 
Arab unity had preoccupied the Syrian and Egyptian leadership since the 1950s." Their 
foreign policies had been determined by the projection of regional competition with 
Israel. In 1973, Sadat's ambitions appear to have deviated from the Arab fold towards 
satisfying Egypt's national interest. Egypt's domestic problems took priority over its 
foreign policy commitments; Sadat entered into US-brokered talks. The US induced 
Egypt to enter into a peace agreement with Israel through financial assistance and the 
promise of annual aid." Due to the primacy of the economic crisis, the role of the 
economy became the distinguishing feature of Egyptian foreign policy in the late 
1970s.31 
Egypt's exit from the Syrian-Egyptian formula had significantly weakened Syria's 
negotiating position with Israel. Despite its isolation, Syria's commitment to 
comprehensive peace remained steadfast. For Asad, it was necessary for Syria and 
Egypt to co-ordinate their activities in order to achieve a real peace - a peace that 
" Galvani, J . , P. Johnson, and R. Theberge, T h e October War: Egypt, Syria, Israel," MERIP, no. 
22, November 1973, pp. 10. 
3 0 Hopwood, D., Egypt: Politics and Society 1945-90, (London: HarperCollins, 1991), pp. 110. 
3 1 Kienle, E . , "Arab Unity Schemes Revisited: Interest, Identity, and Policy in Syria and Egypt," 
International Journal of Middle East Studies, vol. 27, no. 1, February 1995, pp. 54-56. 
3 2 Dessouki, A., T h e Primacy of Economics: The Foreign Policy of Egypt," in B. Korany, and A. 
Dessouki (eds.), The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Change, (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1991), pp. 175. 
3 3 Dessouki, A., T h e Primacy of Economics: The Foreign Policy of Egypt," in A. Dessouki, and B. 
Korany (eds.), The Foreign Policies of Arab States: The Challenge of Change, (Boulder: Westview 
Press, 1991), pp. 156, and Burrell, R., and A. Kelider, The Washington Papers: Egypt the 
Dilemmas of a Nation -1970-1977, vol. v, no. 48, (London: Sage. 1977), pp. 61. 
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satisfied all parties involved. Syria remained consistent in its objectives, and demanded 
a total withdrawal from the occupied territories in return for peace; contained within 
this language was a tacit recognition of Israel's existence. In 1974, Asad remarked in 
an interview: 
For our part we look upon peace in its true sense ... a peace without 
occupation, without destitute peoples, and without citizens whose 
homeland is denied them ... Anyone who imagines that the peace 
process can be a piecemeal is mistaken ...We may now say as we have 
always said - that peace should be based on complete withdrawal from 
the lands occupied in 1967 and on the full restoration of the rights of 
the Palestinian people.34 
During the early stages of the second disengagement talks, Syria had been willing to 
attend an international conference if it was based upon the land for peace formula 
contained within the UN Resolutions 242 and 338. These conditions were not 
acceptable to Israel or the US. For Israel, any conference taking place under 
international aegis, particularly one based upon UN Resolutions, could carry binding 
obligations that were unacceptable to the Israeli state." 
On the other hand, for the US, an international conference would have incorporated the 
Soviet Union, which would have elevated the status of the latter in the peace process, 
and in particular, the Middle East. The US acquisition of Egypt, as a client state from 
the Soviet Union, had already won it a major advancement in the zero-sum game; an 
international conference held the possibility of awarding the Soviet Union an 
undeserved extension of its sphere of influence." Syria's effective exclusion from the 
3 4 Seale, P., Asad ofSyria: The Struggle for the Middle East, (London: I.B. Tauris, 1988), pp. 256. 
3 5 Ehteshami, A., and R. Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System, 
(London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 158. 
3 4 Burrell, R., and A. Kelider, The Washington Papers: Egypt the Dilemmas of a Nation - 1970-1977, 
vol. v, no. 48, (London: Sage, 1977), pp. 65. 
SYRIA AND THE PEACE PROCESS 341 
Geneva conference in 1977, then, was based on the procedural arrangements favoured 
by the US and Israel.37 
During the period 1974-78, it appears that Syria was prepared to enter a peace process 
based upon the principles of UN Resolutions 242 and 338. Syria's options, however, 
were limited. As a consequence of the separate Egyptian peace, Syria became the only 
belligerent front-line state, and found itself in a vulnerable position. It had the capacity 
to join a US sponsored peace process, yet it demanded a comprehensive solution to the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. The US insistence on separate peace deals served to exclude 
Syria from any peace process. Peace could not be achieved in isolation, it was no 
longer an option. Rejectionism became the key to Syrian policy, and the pursuit of 
strategic parity became the strategy of its foreign policy.38 
1980s: Tactical rejectionism" 
Strategically, Syria signed its future according to the vagaries of Soviet fortune; the 
avenues for peace looked bleaker as Syria embraced tactical rejectionism,40 and Israel's 
expansionist tendencies were reinforced by an ideologically driven US 
administration.41 The polarisation of US-Soviet relations after the signing of the Camp 
David Accords, and the election of President Reagan were reflected in the escalating 
animosity between the Israelis and the Syrians. 
3 7 Zisser, R, "Asad of Syria - the Leader and the ]mage,"'Orient, vol. 35, no. 2, June 1994, pp. 256. 
3* Khalidi, A., and H. Agha, "The Syrian Doctrine of Strategic Parity," in J. Kipper, and H. Saunders 
(eds.). The Middle East in Global Perspective, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 186-218. 
3 9 This term has been borrowed from: Drysdale, A., and R. Hinnebusch, Syria and the Middle East 
PeaceProcess, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1991), pp. 129. 
4 0 Drysdale, A., and R. Hinnebusch, Syria and the Middle East Peace Process, (New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations, 1991), pp. 129. 
4 1 Syria - Country Profile, Economist Intelligence Unit, no. 2, May 1981, pp. 25. 
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Syria's tactics changed after the withdrawal of Egypt from the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
From a position of isolation, Syria attempted to stabilise the inequality in the balance of 
power between itself and Israel. The pursuit of strategic parity depended upon the 
strategic support of the Soviet Union, and Soviet compliance to Syrian objectives.42 
The structural determinants of the region and the international environment edged Syria 
to embrace tactical rejectionism and a Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union in 
1980. The necessity was guided by structural forces, but the decisions were forged 
from a limited number of pragmatic options available to the Syrian elite.43 
Syria's era of rejectionism commenced with the rejection of the Fahd Plan in 1981, on 
the pretext that it represented another partial peace settlement.44 Syria actively sought to 
derail all possible peace initiatives, in the 1980s, which attempted to conclude a peace 
settlement without Syria. The old adage that the Middle East cannot go to war without 
Egypt, or create peace without Syria gained credence throughout the 1980s. 
Syria used all available means to prevent the PLO and Jordan from reaching an 
understanding in their conflicts with Israel. Assassinations, military manoeuvres along 
the Jordanian border, and encouragement of the rebellion amongst the PLO factions 
4 1 Freedman, R., T h e Soviet Union and Syria: A Case Study of Soviet Policy," in M. Efrat, and J. 
Bercovitch (eds.). Superpowers and Client States in the Middle East: The Imbalance of Influence, 
(London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 164. 
4 5 Freedman, R., T h e Soviet Union and Syria: A Case Study of Soviet Policy," in M. Efrat, and J. 
Beicovitch (eds.). Superpowers and Client States in the Middle East: The Imbalance of Influence, 
(London: Routledge, 1991), pp. 164. 
4 4 Karsh, E . , "Peace in the Middle East," The Oxford International Review, vol. 5, no. 1, Winter 
1993, pp. 38. 
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and suicide bombings in Lebanon were devices employed by the Syrian regime to 
destroy all conciliatory attempts towards Israel.45 
Syria's decade of rejectionism ended in 1989, when it restored relations with Egypt 
and attempted to re-integrate into the emerging global order. As previously mentioned, 
the transformation of Soviet foreign policy forced Syria to moderate the terms of its 
international relations, and to engage in the New World Order. 
Despite Syria's decade of tactical rejectionism, during the 1980s, Asad had continually 
indicated his willingness to enter into a peace process committed to achieving 
comprehensive peace. The pursuit of comprehensive peace had remained Syria's goal 
despite the tactical manoeuvres employed to destroy separate peacelnitiatives. 
The Current Peace Process 
The peace process has undergone a number of transformations since its inception in 
Madrid, in October 1991. There have been two presidential elections in the US and 
two elections in Israel. Shamir's reluctance to attend the Madrid Conference appeared 
to have produced a stalemate during the talks. The election of the Rabin-Peres team, in 
June 1992, produced an era of optimism, as both men had discussed the concept of 
land for peace and territorial compromise. The election of President Clinton, in 
November 1992, and his assumption of office, in January 1993, was greeted with 
uncertainty by the Arab World, as the Bush administration had been less pro-Israeli 
than previous US administrations.4' Notably, there were no leadership changes within 
the Arab World during this period. 
4 5 Ironically, Begin's government snared Syria's disdain for PLO and Jordanian initiatives, especially 
those that included references to territorial compromise. See: Drysdale, A., and R. Hinnebusch, Syria 
and the Middle East Peace Process, (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1991), pp. 131. 
4 4 Seelye, T., "Syria and the Peace Process," Middle East Policy, vol. ii, no. 2, 1993, pp. 104-109. 
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The Clinton administration and the Rabin government co-operated closely through the 
offices of the US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher. The US endorsement of 
Israeli policies within the region has led some observers to charge the Clinton team to 
have lost sight of objectivity.''7 The Syrians denounced the Clinton administration after 
it had used its veto to prevent the condemnation further Israeli annexation of East 
Jerusalem.48 
The assassination of Rabin in November 1995 caused the international community to 
reflect upon the role played by the Israeli leader, and the momentum of the peace 
process itself. The peace process, created by the structural forces of the post-Gulf War 
order, had survived the numerous changes of administrations and governments. The 
prospect of Netanyahu as an Israeli prime minister, however, appeared to challenge the 
fabric of the peace process.4' 
The prospect of reaching a comprehensive peace settlement has been the ambition of 
the Syrians since 1974, but the loss of the PLO and Jordan as negotiating allies has left 
Syria diplomatically isolated once again. Syria's isolation is unlike that of the 1980s, 
as it has not retracted its commitment to peace despite the obstacles placed in the path 
of progress. Syria's participation in the US sponsored peace process has remained 
resolute, although its demands have incrementally decreased according to necessity.50 
4 7 Kagian, J . , "More of the Same at the UN." Middle East International, no. 544, 21 February 1997, 
pp. 6. 
4 8 User, G., "Land Confiscation in Arab Jerusalem," Middle East International, no. 500, 12 May 1995, 
pp. 3-4, Kidron, P., "Rabin Caves In On Land Confiscations," Middle East International, no. 501, 
26 May 1995, pp. 3, and Neff, D., T h e 30th Veto to Shield Israel," Middle East International, no. 
501, 26 May 1995, pp. 5-6. 
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58-69, and Usher, G., "Picture of War," Middle East International, no. 535, 4 October 1996, pp. 3-
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The twists and turns of the peace process 
The peace process has taken a number of different routes since it began in October 
1991. Each event in the region has had an impact on the rate and nature of 
negotiations. The US has, wherever possible, tried to apply pressure on the 
participating parties to maintain the momentum. The process has, however, been beset 
with problems starting with Israeli reluctance to attend the Madrid Conference, to the 
re-writing of the Oslo Accords in order to accommodate the demands of Netanyahu 
and the Hebron settlers. 
In this section, I intend to examine Syria's role in the current peace process. Since the 
commencement of the Madrid Conference, the PLO and Jordan have followed Egypt's 
example and have signed separate peace treaties. There have been many developments 
in the path of peace since October 1991, but neither Syria nor Lebanon have concluded 
peace treaties with Israel. Syria's function in the peace process cannot, of course, be 
studied in isolation as all the components of the peace process are ultimately 
interconnected. 
In attempting to examine the peace process, I shall use the following events as 
signposts to this study: 
• the Madrid Peace Conference; 
• the multilateral talks; 
• the election of Rabin; 
• the expulsion of 415 Palestinians; 
• Operation Accountability; 
• the Oslo Accords; 
• the Hebron massacre; 
• the Jordanian peace deal; 
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• the Wye Plantation talks 
• Operation Grapes of Wrath; 
These events seem to present themselves as natural obstacles or catalysts to the 
process. 
The Madrid Peace Conference 
The Madrid Peace Conference presented the states of the Middle East with an 
opportunity to reach a peaceful settlement to their historic conflict. The international 
environment and the ensuing political conditions were ripe for a settlement. The US 
was in a position to exert its international and regional influence. 
In the New World Order, the US could pursue its interests, in the Middle East, without 
the explicit cover of the UN. Thereupon, the formula for the peace process was not 
conducted under the aegis of the UN. The UN was reduced to observer status, and the 
Soviet Union/Russia played a nominal role in the negotiations.51 The regional 
conditions have also provided the US with enough leverage to persuade the main 
adversaries of the conflict to attend the conference. The regional players were all 
weakened after the demise of the Soviet Union and the invasion of Kuwait. 
The PLO's decision to support Saddam Hussein proved to be disastrous in terms of 
international legitimacy and finance. Irrespective of the international support it had 
gained throughout the intifada, the PLO lost its credibility through its support of Iraq.5 1 
'Arafat's unequivocal backing of Saddam Hussein provided the US with the pretext to 
5 1 Diab, M., "Have Syria and Israel Opted for Peace?," Middle East Policy, vol. iii, no. 2, 1994, pp. 
83. 
5 2 Karsh, E . , "Peace in the Middle East," The Oxford International Review, vol. 5, no. 1, Winter 
1993, pp. 39. 
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exclude the PLO from direct representation at the Madrid Peace Conference. This gave 
the US administration sufficient flexibility to persuade the Israelis to attend." 
The Jordanian decision to abstain from pledging support for either side in the conflict 
left it vulnerable to regional and international pressures. Through this process, Jordan 
had alienated itself from the US and the Gulf Arab states. As a long term supporter of 
Jordan, the US felt betrayed by King Hussein's option, and was intent to punish 
Jordan. Jordan's acquiescence to attend the Madrid Peace Conference was indicative of 
its weakness; its conciliatory role towards the US also illustrated its desire for 
international rehabilitation.54 
Due to Syria's participation in the liberation of Kuwait, Asad managed to accumulate 
sufficient diplomatic capital to occupy a prime position in the peace process.55 For 
Syria, the invitation to attend the conference was a recognition of its centrality to the 
peace process. After years of patience and tactical manoeuvring, Asad had achieved his 
goal of engaging in an international conference whose foundation was built upon UN 
Resolutions 242, 338 and 425." In an interview with the newspaper Al-Akhbar, Asad 
noted his appreciation of the way the regional and international attitudes had changed: 
"... the opportunities for peace have become better than at any other time before 
5 3 Neff, D., "Settlements and Guarantees: The US Threatens Linkage," Middle East International, no. 
409, 27 September 1991, pp. 3-4, Kidron, P., "Consternation in Israel," Middle East International, 
no. 409, 27 September 1991, pp. 4-5, and Kidron, P., "Sullen Acceptance," Middle East 
International, no. 411, 25 October 1991, pp. 9-10. 
5 4 Hawatmeh, G., "Still in Two Minds," Middle East International, no. 409, 27 September 1991, pp. 
8 and Islam, S., "Hussein's Plea for Jordan," Middle East International, no. 409, 27 September 
1991, pp. 9. 
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(London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 158. 
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because of the current international climate and also because of the development and 
increase in the number of those desiring peace even inside Israel itself."57 
Unlike Jordan and the PLO, Syria's regional position improved during the tactical re-
orientation of the second Gulf War.58 However, this did not negate its vulnerability to 
the regional hegemony of Israel, or the international hegemony of the US. 5' Syria's 
attendance of the Madrid Conference, under less than ideal conditions, was a 
consequence of the change in the world order; and Syria's participation signified its 
adjustment to the New World Order." 
Syrians participation in the conference 
Secretary of State Baker travelled to Damascus in July 1991 in order to secure the 
Syrian seal of approval for the conference proposal. Syria was the first state to accept 
Baker's proposals to attend the Madrid session.41 After Syria's acceptance, of the 
conference proposal, the rest of the Arab states followed suit and agreed to attend." 
For Syria, its diplomatic capital was at its maximum level; the second Gulf War had 
helped to ingratiate the regime with the US administration, and the diplomatic weight 
of Egypt and Saudi Arabia helped it to counter-balance the strategic alliance between 
Israel and the US. Israel had the upper hand in the balance of power; Syria's pursuit of 
5 7 Butter, D., "Asad Treads Cautiously," Middle East Economic Digest, vol. 37, no. 40, 8 October 
1993. pp. 3. 
5 8 Freedman, L . , "Syrian Initiative Increases Regional Risks for Assad," The Times, Monday 17 
January 1994, pp. 10. 
5 9 Ehteshami, A., and R. Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System, 
(London: Roudedge, 1997), pp. 157. 
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strategic parity was over. Henceforward, Syria sought a new strategy based upon the 
Egyptian experience. 
In order to combat US pressure, Syria conducted a co-ordinating session in Damascus 
on 23 October 1991." Asad attempted to dissuade the other Arab parties from attending 
the multilateral round of talks. Multilateral talks, Asad argued, would form the first 
stage of normalisation prior to Israeli commitment to peace." According to the Syrian 
stance, the Arab delegations could only resist US diplomatic pressure from a united 
platform. Asad had paid the price for Egypt's separate peace treaty in 1979; another 
separate peace deal would leave Syria isolated and regionally weakened. 
For five decades, the public in the Arab World had been fed anti-Israeli propaganda. 
With its legitimacy resting on its Arab credentials, therefore, Syria's agreement to 
participate in the peace process required public justification. The Syrian public had to 
be prepared for the language of peace. Such a move demanded an incremental 
introduction of new notions, such as honourable peace, and the peace of the brave. 
Nevertheless, it was crucial for Syria to appear tenacious and courageous in 
negotiating with the Israelis. The opening ceremony of the Madrid Peace Conference 
illustrated this point; the politics of diplomatic language and personal affectations relied 
upon the rhetoric of distrust and animosity to fulf i l Syrian perceptions." 
Before the Madrid Conference started, Syrian Foreign Minister, Shar'a, had 
announced his refusal to shake the hand of the Israeli delegate, he said: 
" BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/1213, A/2,26 October 1991. 
" Hinnebusch, R., "Does Syria Want Peace? Syrian Policy in the Syrian-Israeli Peace Negotiations," 
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This hand that you would like me to shake is very guilty, because it is a 
hand which occupies our land, ignores Palestinian national rights and 
we have been suffering from this occupation, and the Palestinians in the 
occupied territories have been suffering from constant repression.66 
The exchanges between Syrian Foreign Minister Shar'a and Israeli Prime Minister 
Shamir were acrimonious as each delegate accused the other of acts of tyranny and 
terrorism." Although the charges were made, they were most probably created for 
public consumption to satisfy both domestic constituencies. 
During the opening sessions in Madrid, Israeli Prime Minister, Shamir, refused to 
commit Israel to the land for peace formula demanded by the Syrians. The Syrians 
believed that Shamir's intransigence was designed to edge the Syrians out of the peace 
process. The inauguration of a new settlement on the Golan,68 and the Knesset's timely 
approval of a non-binding resolution declaring the Golan non-negotiable were also 
believed to have been measures to frustrate the Syrians." Syrian withdrawal from the 
peace process would have served the international interests of the Israeli state, and 
satisfied the perception of the Israeli public. 
Syria's tolerance of these acts of belligerency demonstrated its regional and 
international vulnerability. The significance of the peace process to Syria's regional 
position was becoming apparent. In the past, Syria had enjoyed enough leverage from 
its partnership with the Soviet Union to remain steadfast with its demands. Without the 
backing of a major patron, Syria's diplomatic position was much more fluid and open 
" Neff, D., T h e Make-or-Break Process Begins in Madrid," Middle East International, no. 411, 25 
October 1991, pp. 3. 
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" Muir, J . , "Syrians Refuse the Bait," Middle East International, no. 413, 22 November 1991, pp. 5-
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to pressure. An exit from the peace process was not a realistic option, but points of 
substance remained unnegotiable.70 
Procedures 
Asad made a number of concessions on the issue of procedure, but the substance of 
the peace process remained the same. He considered the terms of reference as 
balanced; they did not fu l f i l all of Syria's demands, but they reflected the political 
realities of the time. This was deemed to be the optimum moment for reaching an 
agreement satisfactory to all parties involved.71 
At the expense of procedural details, Syria attended the Madrid Conference. Asad had 
been calling for an international conference, since 1974, conducted under the auspices 
of the UN with binding resolutions based on UN Resolution 242, and the principle of 
land for peace formula. Attending the conference required Syria rescinding from this 
position. President Asad received a US letter of assurance stipulating that the Madrid 
Peace Conference, and ensuing peace process, would be based upon UN Resolutions 
242 and 338, but it was not a binding commitment.72 
Although the Madrid Conference was not an international conference, the presence of 
Europe and the UN as observers added to the prestige of the event. Asad commented: 
As for the UN role, it took me some time before I was convinced that 
the group of elements together constituted an adequate UN role - the 
observers and the Resolutions through which the UN exists (in the 
process), and that any agreements would be ratified by the Security 
Council. Also calling the UN an observer just means it has no vote and 
7 0 Yorke, V., "Prospects for Peace: The Syrian Dimension," Middle East International, no. 414, 6 
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this is not a voting conference; an observer takes part in discussions 
and activities.n 
The absence of direct PLO representation was accepted by Asad as he commented: 
"everything will be done in agreement with the Palestinians and nothing will be done in 
isolation from them".14 Asad added in an American television interview, on 18 
September 1991, that Israel wouldn't have peace without settling the Palestinian 
problem: "If we leave any part of the problem unresolved, there will be no stable peace 
in the region ... The Arab problem is basically a single problem, dividing it will not 
help".75 
Palestinian participation 
The Palestinian issue was crucial to Syria's role in the peace process. As part of the 
comprehensive solution, the simultaneous resolution of the Palestinian issue was 
commensurate to the fulfilment of Syrian interests. The liberation of Golan was also 
contingent upon the liberation of all the occupied territories, and the restoration of 
Palestinian rights. The issues were all interdependent, and a separate Syrian peace was 
not part of the agenda. Asad commented: "Had Syria thought of its own interest only 
... it would have achieved a unilateral solution ... But it did not and will not do this. 
The Golan was originally occupied in a battle waged for Palestine."76 
The absence of independent Palestinian participation from previous peace schemes had 
traditionally prevented Syria from engaging in regional or international peace 
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discussions. Syria, in its pursuit to maximise its regional power, needed to incorporate 
the Palestinian issue within its sphere of influence. The inclusion of Palestinian 
interests under the umbrella of Jordan, especially in the form of the 'Arafat-Hussein 
Accord in 1985,77 militated against Syrian hegemony over Mashreq affairs. In terms of 
extending Syrian influence and acquiring legitimacy from its pan-Arab role, the 
Palestinian issue remained central to Syrian foreign policy. 
The demands of the New World Order, however, forced a change in Syria's 
perception of a Palestinian role. The US acceptance of Israel's demand that the PLO 
could not represent the Palestinians was imposed on the peace formula. Due to the 
prevailing international conditions, Syria was unable to resist such an imposition. The 
inclusion of Palestinian delegates in the Jordanian negotiating team signified another 
procedural concession from the Syrians.78 
The structure of the peace process, built upon the concept of bilateral discussions, 
produced sufficient space for the Israelis to pursue separate peace deals. The Syrians 
were bargaining for a final status agreement whilst the Palestinians, under the ambit of 
the Jordanian team, were negotiating for an interim agreement. This in-built 
discrepancy set structural fault lines that the Palestinians and Syrians were unable to 
reconcile.7' 
The first round of talks, which began on 30 October 1991 in Madrid, served as an 
introduction to the peace process. It represented the first stage of the US-led initiative, 
7 7 Brand, L . , "Asad's Syria and the PLO: Coincidence or Conflict of Interests?," Journal of South 
Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, vol. XIV, no. 2, Winter 1990, pp. 23-25. 
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and for the first time brought delegates from Israel, Syria, Jordan, and Lebanon to the 
same negotiating table.80 
The perennial rift between Asad and 'Arafat was bridged as a matter of co-ordinating 
Palestinian and Syrian positions on 19 October 1991.81 Their meeting was a necessary 
part of the reconciliation between the two leaders; their last meeting took place in 1983 
after Syria had encouraged the Abu Musa faction to seize control of Fatah and depose 
'Arafat as its leader. Although the PLO was not officially attending the peace process, 
the Palestinian delegation was co-ordinating with 'Arafat." During his visit to 
Damascus, 'Arafat had pledged his support for Syria's position in the multilateral 
talks." 
The multilateral talks 
Although Syria had made procedural concessions to attend the first round, it had 
refused to commit itself to attending the multilateral round of talks unless Israel 
announced its willingness to return the Golan Heights to Syria. In an interview with 
Syrian Arab Television, Muwaffaq al-Allaf, the head of the Syrian negotiating team, 
pointed out the incongruity of the multilateral talks: "While Israel is occupying the 
Golan Heights, Jerusalem, the West Bank and Gaza and southern Lebanon, it wants to 
sit down for talks with Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the Palestinians to discuss 
economic co-operation, water-sharing, and the environment.""1 
80 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/1218, E/13-E/24, 1 November 1991. 
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The multilateral round of talks were designed to incorporate the GCC states and Egypt 
into a round of regional talks. Syria considered the multilateral talks constituted a 
process towards normalising the relations between the region's states before the advent 
of peace. The prospect of economic co-operation was to dominate the agenda alongside 
the issues of water and security. Syria refused to attend the multilateral talks on the 
basis that regional co-operation could not be discussed before Israel made a 
commitment to the peace.85 
Despite Syria's attempt to discourage the Arab parties from joining the multilateral 
talks, eleven states attended the multilateral talks in Moscow during the second round 
of talks in January 1992.86 The unity Syria deemed necessary for a strong bargaining 
position dissipated as the Jordanians and the Palestinians joined the multilateral talks. 
The process towards normalisation without a firm commitment to the nature of peace 
had started. This division amongst the Arab ranks caused the Syrians great 
consternation, and indicated the fractious nature of the Arab policy. 
Understanding the inequitable pressure placed upon those front-line states attending the 
talks, Syria chose to criticise the US for its lack of persuasion placed upon the Israelis 
to accept a UN role in the talks. The Israelis were able to attend the multilateral talks 
without making concessions to UN participation in the regional discussions, or over its 
principles on the selection of Palestinian candidates for the discussions. Syria 
recognised an emerging scenario where it would be excluded from the peace process. 
Its refusal to participate in the multilateral talks continued, as Asad argued that such 
talks acknowledged Israel's legitimacy without achieving any form of peace." 
8 5 Hinnebusch, R., "Does Syria Want Peace? Syrian Policy in the Syrian-Israeli Peace Negotiations," 
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8 7 Hinnebusch, R., "Does Syria Want Peace? Syrian Policy in the Syrian-Israeli Peace Negotiations," 
Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. XXVI , no. 1, Autumn 1996, pp. 49. 
SYRIA AND THE PEACE PROCESS 356 
Syria refused to attend the Casablanca Conference in November 1994," the first 
regional economic conference to include Israel, on the basis that it legitimised Israel's 
regional role before a comprehensive peace had been established. Farouq Shar'a 
justified Syria's refusal by stating: 
If we are not going to attend the Casablanca Conference, it is because 
we care about regional co-operation and development, and we believe 
that holding such conferences, holding multinational, multilateral talks 
before achieving genuine peace in the region, would not give the results 
these multilateral talks and international conferences would yield after 
being 100% sure that peace is going to be established in the region.*9 
The election of Rabin 
The election of Yitzhak Rabin, as Israeli prime minister in June 1992, was welcomed 
by the Arab delegations in the peace process."1 The Israeli Labour Party had been 
associated with the land for peace formula, and was thought to possess a less 
obstructionist attitude to the peace process. However, it had been a Likud government 
that had concluded peace with Egypt in the 1970s; moreover, Rabin's reputation had 
been built upon his iw/i/adh-crushing personality." 
The election of Rabin was accompanied by widespread speculation about a Syrian-
Israeli deal. It is easy to deny the rumours in retrospect, but diplomatic gossip 
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emanated from a variety of sources." The question of a Syrian-Israeli separate deal ran 
against the Syrian national interest 
Concluding a separate peace deal may have precluded Syria from extending its sphere 
of influence over its Arab neighbours. Such a deal would have isolated Syria from the 
remaining peace process, and divorced its influence over the Palestinian, Jordanian, 
and Lebanese tracks. Syria's role as the hegemonic leader of the Greater Syrian states 
could have been contained in a similar manner to Egyptian hegemony in the Middle 
East. The Syrians believed that inequitable progress could be made in the bilateral 
talks, but Syria's pledge to comprehensive peace meant that a peace treaty could not be 
concluded until all diplomatic tracks were satisfied." 
The sixth round of talks of the Madrid Conference opened, on 24 August 1992, with 
Rabin as prime minister. There was a considerable reduction in pre-talk animosity 
between the Syrian and Israeli sides. Syria's spokeswoman, Bushra Kanafani, told the 
press that the word 'comprehensive' was more acceptable to the Rabin team, but the 
substance of the talks had not significantly altered.'4 Israel's chief negotiator with the 
Syrians, Itamar Rabinovich, also noted a change in atmosphere and a reduction in 
tension between the two sides - the peace talks were then assuming a business-like 
tone." 
9 1 These sources will be discussed later in this chapter. 
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In spite of issuing conflicting and ambivalent references to the Golan Heights, it was 
possible to detect room for manoeuvre within the diplomatic language of the new 
Labour government. This feature had been lacking in the previous rounds of talks.96 A 
major distinction between the Likud government and the Labour government was the 
acceptance, by Rabin's team, of the applicability of UN Resolution 242 to the talks." 
Although there was no agreement on the meaning of Resolution 242, the Golan was 
included in its ambit, which constituted a movement from the Israeli side. 
Both the Israeli and the Syrian negotiating teams had to satisfy their domestic 
constituencies. The Israelis had to placate the settlers in the Golan who were 
predominantly Labour supporters, and who stood to challenge the policies of the 
state." The credibility of the Syrian state rested upon the total unequivocal liberation of 
Golan; Asad has built his reputation upon the attainment of this objective. 
The second half of the sixth round of the bilateral talks was opened with a Syrian 
proposal that offered a peace treaty in return for the total evacuation of the Golan 
Heights." Israel demanded to know the terms of the peace treaty, displaying its desire 
for normalisation which would include: an exchange of embassies and open borders. 
Israel's response disappointed the Syrian negotiating team. These requests were 
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considered to be unreasonable as Israel had not committed itself to the total withdrawal 
from the Golan.100 
In an interview with the Voice of Israel radio, Itamar Rabinovich, the chief negotiator 
of the Israeli negotiating team, reiterated Israel's reluctance to discuss the extent of 
withdrawal from the Golan: 
We neither voiced nor hinted at any willingness to accept the Syrian 
demand for a full withdrawal from the Golan Heights. We came to the 
current round of talks with renewed formulations. These contain 
Israel's clarification that our acceptance of Resolution 242 means that 
the withdrawal element would be included in the context of a peace 
treaty, if and when it is signed, when Israel's demands are met. 
However, Israel accepts Resolution 242 as talking about a withdrawal 
from territories, rather than a withdrawal from the territories.101 
The Israelis refused to follow the Sinai formula for the Golan. In particular, they 
wanted to avoid the cold peace inherited from the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty of 
1979.'" 
The chief Syrian negotiator, Muwaffaq al-Allaf, expressed his frustration with the 
Israeli negotiating team: "They are not talking at all about withdrawal ... we are not 
ready to discuss any further point with Israel unless Israel discusses with us the 
question of total withdrawal from our territory."103 
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The nature of the peace remained uncertain, at this stage of the discussion, as the 
Syrians refused to speculate on the prospect of warm peace. According to Jansen, the 
Syrians had admitted in private that partial withdrawal would be acceptable i f Syrian 
sovereignty was acknowledged over the entire Golan. An international buffer force and 
demilitarised zones would be a prerequisite for this form of agreement. The statements 
were disclosed behind closed doors and only fuelled expectations.'04 
Israel repeated its demand for Syria's acceptance of the principle of a separate peace 
treaty. The idea was not an issue of discussion for the Syrians. Prior to the seventh 
round of talks on 29 October 1992, amidst endless rumours and speculation, 'Arafat 
expressed his concern that Syria and Israel were moving towards a separate peace 
treaty, and hence leaving the Palestinians at the mercy of the Israelis.105 
Asad responded to 'Arafat's apprehensions by reassuring the Palestinian leader that 
Syria was committed to total peace and total withdrawal. Comprehensive peace based 
on the formula of land for peace remained the objective of Syria. As a gesture to 
Rabin, Asad used the term the peace of the brave to illustrate Syria's intention to 
achieve peace. Unity was the way to achieve the peace of the brave. As an 
encouragement, during the seventh round of talks, Rabin conceded that "We will 
negotiate withdrawal in the Golan, but not withdrawal from the Golan."106 
The extent of Syria's pledge to support the Palestinians was indicated in its convening 
of a rejectionist conference in Damascus, in January 1992 ,where ten Palestinian 
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factions criticised the Palestinian delegation for attending the multilateral talks.101 Syrian 
and Palestinian interests were ultimately linked and could not be divorced from each 
other. Asad's accommodation of the rejectionist factions served to strengthen his 
bargaining position with both the Arabs and the Israelis. Proxy groups had long 
formed part of Syria's tactic for extending its influence beyond its limited resource 
base.108 
The expulsion of 415 Palestinians 
The expulsion of 415 Palestinians, from the occupied territories to Lebanon in 
December 1992, stalled the peace talks. The expulsion of 415 alleged Hamas 
supporters was conducted without regard to international law. The accused were 
deported without trial and left to face the hardship of the Lebanese winter in tents and 
temporary shelters. Israel's actions contravened the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the Fourth Geneva Convention to which it was a signatory.10' 
International condemnation came from the UN Security Council, the European Union, 
and the International Committee of the Red Cross. Lebanon's response was to deny 
entry to the deportees, thus exerting pressure on Israel to accept UN Resolution 799, 
which called on Israel to allow the return of the deportees.110 
The expulsion produced many more contradictions to the peace process. The Arab 
states refused to continue the peace talks. Their demands amounted to the return of the 
1 0 7 Butt, G., " Flagging Arab Spirits," Middle East International, no. 418,7 February 1992, pp. 4. 
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415 expelled Palestinians, to the occupied territories, as a condition for resuming the 
negotiations.1" 
In the amidst of the deportee crisis, Bill Clinton assumed the presidency of the US. In 
selecting his team, Clinton appointed Warren Christopher, as Secretary of State, as a 
replacement for Baker. The intervention of Clinton's new administration seemed to 
have added a new impetus to the peace process at a time when the Israeli deportation 
could have derailed i t . " 1 
The new direction of the US team pushed for Syria to return to the negotiating table; 
this venture was also successful in bringing the Palestinians back to the table, as they 
were fearful of being excluded from the process. Syria displayed uncharacteristic 
ambivalence in its attitude towards the plight of the deportees and called for the 
resumption of talks. For Syria, the peace process had developed a momentum of its 
own and isolated incidents, such as the expulsion of the Palestinians, were not 
sufficient to halt the process.1'3 
After meeting Christopher in Damascus, on 21 February 1993, the Syrian Foreign 
Minister, al-Shar'a, said: "the goal of the peace process is broader and more important" 
than the issue of the Palestinian deportees in Lebanon".114 This suggested that the 
process itself was more important than the constituent parts. Syria's stipulation of 
1 1 1 Kagian, J. , "Retreat from 799: Security Council Bends to US Pressure," Middle East International, 
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incorporating all parties, and co-ordinating Arab diplomatic unity appeared to have 
changed track. 
A potential change in Syrian foreign policy presented a direct threat to the Palestinian 
negotiating team. Syria's diplomatic weight could have persuaded the other participants 
to attend the talks despite the Palestinian absence. In the twist and turn of the peace 
process, Syria denied that it was making progress with Israel on the fast track. A l -
Shar'a replied to the rumours in an interview published in the Le Figaro, on 26 
February 1993: "If we wanted a separate peace, we could have done it years ago. I f 
more attention is paid to the Syrian-Israeli negotiations than to the others, that is 
because there can be no peace without Syria.""5 
Rabin and Clinton 
Rabin's first visit to the White House guaranteed continued US support for Israel. 
More importantly, Rabin announced his commitment to peace based upon the 
principles of UN Resolutions 242 and 338. The change in both administrations seemed 
to precipitate a more active role for the US in the peace process. Clinton appointed 
many pro-Israeli candidates to his administration; the US role in the peace process 
then, looked less favourable than under the Bush administration. The Syrian-Israeli 
peace was placed on the fast track by both Rabin and Christopher, whilst the 
Palestinian track received less attention as the issue of the deportees stayed 
paramount.1" 
In an apparent change of US and Israeli policy, the peace process started to assume 
characteristics once displayed by the Egyptian-Israeli peace process. Israel targeted 
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Syria for a separate peace; it believed that peace with its northern neighbour would 
neutralise the Palestinian track.117 Rabin acknowledged that a fundamental change had 
taken place in Syrian-Israeli relations. Asad's commitment to peace was becoming 
more credible, and his posture against the rise of Islamic militancy made the prospect 
of peace with Syria even more attractive. 
Syria's insistence that the Palestinians attend the ninth round of talks, before the 
fulfilment of UN Resolution 799, demonstrated the intensity of its commitment to the 
peace process.118 The Americans and the Syrians encouraged the Palestinians to take 
part in the talks. The structural determinants seemed to push the Palestinian delegation 
towards peace although the deportees felt betrayed, and the supporters of Hamas in the 
territories deplored the official Palestinian position. 
Operation Accountability 
Operation Accountability was the codename for Israel's response to Hizbollah activities 
in south Lebanon. Retaliation for the Katyushas, fired into northern Israel by 
Hizbollah, was severe.119 It took the form of collective punishment, and was inflicted 
on the civilians living in the south Lebanon region. The response was characteristic of 
Israeli reprisals. It was estimated that, in the Israeli bombing raids, at least 130 people 
were killed, 450 were wounded, and 400,000 fled their homes.1" 
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Israel's objective was to eliminate the Hizbollah threat, and to challenge the cohesion 
of the Lebanese state. Israel sought to exploit the divisions within the Lebanese state 
by challenging its sovereignty over south Lebanon. The Lebanese government, 
however, was resolute in its response to Israel as it permitted Hizbollah to continue its 
resistance to the Israeli occupation of south Lebanon.m 
The south Lebanese border provides Syria and Israel with an arena for confrontation 
whereas the Syrian-Israeli border along the Golan Heights is governed by the 
disengagement agreements of 1974.'" As an instrument of Syrian political pressure, 
Hizbollah has acted as a bargaining chip in Syria's negotiations with Israel.1" 
If a peace agreement is reached between Syria and Israel, Hizbollah may lose its utility 
to Syria. Realising this, it has started to integrate itself into the constitutional politics of 
Lebanon's economic and political reconstruction. Until such an agreement is signed, 
Hizbollah, will remain one of the Syrian regime's bargaining chips in regional politics 
and in the peace process. 
Hizbollah, as a revolutionary organisation, has proved to be very useful to Syria's 
regional goals. Syria has been effective in persuading Hizbollah to act according to its 
interests, through the regulation of arms control. Syria's special relationship with 
Hizbollah, orchestrated through the offices of Iran, has enabled it to influence the 
group's behaviour.114 As a proxy of Syria and Iran, Hizbollah exerts timely pressure 
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on Israel; its revolutionary philosophy, emboldened by resistance, acts as continuous 
irritant to the Israelis.1" 
Although stretching Iranian support, Asad had sufficient leverage over Hizbollah to 
assist US mediation between Israel and Hizbollah. Despite the death of Syrian soldiers 
from Israel's reprisal raids, Asad exercised restraint, and exerted pressure on 
Hizbollah to suspend their attacks on northern Israel. Syrian intervention produced a 
climate in which a cease-fire agreement was reached through the offices of the US. 1" 
Syrian diplomatic intervention achieved three advantages: 
(i) it quelled the intensity of the conflict; 
(ii) it helped to produce an understanding between Hizbollah and Israel; 
(iii) it allowed Asad to cultivate diplomatic credit with the US. 1 1 7 
Syrian mediation was rewarded by a more constructive US role, albeit temporary, 
which brought about a change in the content of the Syrian-Israeli dialogue. Syria's 
constraining role in south Lebanon had indicated its readiness to control Hizbollah; 
moreover, it gained the Syrian state credit from both the US administration and the 
Israeli government. 
The prospect for progress on the Syrian-Israeli peace track was beginning to improve. 
Syrian and Israeli intransigence was incrementally and symmetrically receding, whilst 
both sides jostled for their diplomatic advantage. The continuing ambivalence in their 
public statements was most probably aimed at satisfying their respective public 
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opinion. These contradictions between public statements and the steps taken on the 
peace track countenanced public criticism as the two sides drew closer to each other. 
In abstract terms, not openly admitted between the two sides, the concepts of 
normalisation and withdrawal had been used simultaneously. Neither side was willing 
to concede the extent of normalisation or withdrawal, but a formula for promoting 
Syrian-Israeli peace was in the making. 
Meanwhile, Syria was careful not to contradict its pledge to achieving comprehensive 
peace and stated that any such agreement would not be signed or implemented until the 
Palestinian, Jordanian, and Lebanese tracks had reached their natural conclusions.1" 
However, the announcement of the Oslo Accords and the Declaration of Principles, 
conceived in private talks between the PLO and Israel under Norwegian guidance, in 
August 1993, abruptly halted progress on the Syrian-Israeli track.1" 
The Oslo Accords 
The announcement that the PLO had reached a secret agreement with the Israelis 
stunned the Arab World. The world media greeted the news with applause and praised 
Rabin and 'Arafat for their courage in striking such a deal. The Syrian president 
remained mute. 
The Gaza-Jericho First Plan came against the backdrop of a dissatisfied Palestinian 
delegation, who were increasingly losing faith in the leadership of the PLO. 
Furthermore, the PLO's decision to support Saddam Hussein during the second Gulf 
War had been financially disastrous. Wracked with acute leadership and financial 
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1 2 9 Seale, P., "Asad's Regional Strategy and the Challenge from Netanyahu," Journal of Palestine 
Studies, vol. X X V I , no. 1, Autumn 19%, pp. 34-35. 
SYRIA AND THE PEACE PROCESS 368 
crises, the PLO was losing its authority and legitimacy amongst its members and 
constituency.130 
The Oslo Accords transformed 'Arafat's precarious position as leader of the Palestinian 
struggle for statehood into a victor and popular leader again. The contents of the deal, 
although lacking in numerous areas, were perceived to be the first step towards 
achieving statehood. 'Arafat's constituency within the occupied territories initially 
pledged their support for the Accords. The PLO, particularly 'Arafat's Fatah, had re-
gained its legitimacy amongst the West Bank and Gazan population.131 
Prior to the signing of the Accords, the PLO and Israel agreed to formally recognise 
each other. The Gaza-Jericho First Plan granted the Palestinians self-rule in the 
occupied territories at the beginning of a five year interim period. At the beginning of 
the third year, the issue of Jerusalem, the status of Israeli settlements, and the fate of 
the Palestinian refugees were to be negotiated.132 
After the PLO-Israeli deal had become public knowledge, 'Arafat and his Foreign 
Minister, Farouq Qaddumi, visited Syria to seek Asad's approval. The move made by 
the Palestinian leader and his team had shocked the Syrian government.133 The decision 
to reach a separate agreement within the ambit of secret discussions was reminiscent of 
Sadat's style of negotiating. Asad had once again been circumvented in the peace 
process, and left to observe with a diminishing sense of influence and importance. 
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This time, Syria could not afford to adopt rejectionism, as it had done after the 
conclusion of the Camp David Accords. Syria's options were no longer so durable; the 
nature of the New World Order, and the predominance of the US in the Middle East 
militated against Syrian rejectionism. In addition, the collapse of the East European 
political systems, and the crippled state of Iraq, stood as constant reminders, to Syria, 
that power-politics determined the co-ordinates of the New World Order. 
The PLO-Israeli accord signified a defining moment in Syria's perception of the 
Palestinian question; it left two distinct impressions. Firstly, it showed the potency of 
the New World Order and its impact upon the Syrian state. In particular, it indicated 
Syria's inability to resist the conclusion of another separate peace deal. Secondly, the 
Syrian public, after five decades of supporting the Palestinian cause was ready to 
accept a separation of Syrian and Palestinian interests.134 The burden of supporting the 
Palestinians had left a heavy toll upon the Syrian population, in terms of personal 
sacrifice and material wealth.1" 
Until this point in history, Asad had referred to the Palestinians as southern cousins, 
and believed that the Palestinian cause belonged to the Arab nation, and not exclusively 
to 'Arafat or Fatah. Since 1970, the nature of Syrian-Palestinian relations have been 
determined by the competition between the pro-Arafat factions within the PLO, and 
Syria's attempt to assert its influence over PLO foreign policy. Syria's policy in 
Lebanon during 1983 provides one such case. 
As referred to in chapter five, Syria's encouragement of the fratricidal conflict between 
the pro-'Arafat and anti-'Arafat Palestinian factions in Lebanon was justified as part of 
Ehteshami, A., and Hinnebusch, R., Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional 
System, (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 178. 
Interview with a Syrian journalist in Damascus, September 1995. 
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Syria's strategy to unify the Arab position. Syria's means to control and influence 
Palestinian activities were frequently justified by the ends. 
Syria's regional credibility, as the co-ordinator of Arab affairs, was under review after 
the PLO had signed a separate deal. Syrian influence over Jordan and Lebanon was 
believed to be unequivocal. On 27 December 1993, the Syrian Foreign Minister 
delivered a message to King Hussein from President Asad, stressing the necessity for 
the co-ordination of action between Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria with the aim of 
isolating 'Arafat. Shar'a was also reported to have issued a warning to Jordan to 
refrain from embarking on a separate peace process. King Hussein had agreed not to 
sign any agreement with Israel before the Syrians and the Lebanese were ready to 
conclude peace with the Israelis.136 
The Palestinian deal may have served the interests of the Palestinians within Gaza and 
the West Bank, but it emasculated the collective Arab bargaining position. The 
Palestinian issue had been central to the peace process. The Arab-Israeli conflict, 
irrespective of the Golan Heights and south Lebanon, was based on the creation of the 
Israeli state and the displacement of the Palestinian population. 'Arafat had tried to 
secure the future of a Palestinian state through an autonomy agreement that was distinct 
from the other bilateral tracks in the peace process. 
Israel, according to the Syrians, had successfully divided the existing unity between 
the Arab states. With the conclusion of 'Arafat and Rabin's deal, the issue of Palestine 
was no longer an Arab issue, but became a PLO one. The PLO had acted on behalf of 
1 3 4 Hawatmeh, G., "Hussein Stands by the PLO," Middle East International, no. 466, 7 January 1994, 
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the Palestinian population and was, therefore, responsible for the Gaza-Jericho First 
Plan.137 
The Syrian press started to use familiar idioms to set a distance between the Palestinian 
and Syrian struggle with Israel. An incisive idiom suggested that the Syrians could not 
be more royal than the king. 1 3 8 As Syrian Foreign Minister, al-Shar'a said: 
Syria's stance has never changed. Syria insisted and continues to insist 
on withdrawal from all the Arab lands occupied in 1967. However, the 
others, or some of the others, have broken away and negotiated for the 
West Bank, Jerusalem and the Jordanian territories. Thus Syria does 
not wish to be more royal than the king.139 
In other words, the Palestinians had determined their own future and the Syrians were 
no longer responsible for their southern cousins. 
According to members of the Syrian public, 'Arafat's move provided the Syrian 
regime with a pretext to reach a peace settlement with Israel divorced from the 
Palestinian issue.140 The return of the Golan, in this instance, would be disengaged 
from the West Bank and Gaza. Syrian state interests started to acquire an importance of 
their own, but regional hegemony and national security still dominated the Syrian 
agenda.141 
The only oppositional course to the Oslo Accords open to Asad was to allow the ten 
Palestinian rejectionist groups to reside in Syria. Just as Hizbollah has been a card 
Butt, G., T h e Deal That Could Change the Middle East," Middle East International, no. 458, 10 
September 1993, pp. 3-4. 
Interview with a Damascene bureaucrat, 5 October 1995. 
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amongst Asad's deck of options, 'the group of ten' became another sensitive card. 
They gave the Syrian regime access to the Palestinian political arena, and the potential 
to disrupt the implementation of the peace deal in the occupied territories.142 Courting 
the rejectionist groups gave Asad important leverage over his adversaries. As one 
Syrian official observed, "These groups can be held on a tight leash or let loose. They 
feel obliged to Syria and they can be persuaded to change course".143 Dirty tricks, after 
all, had enabled Syria to promote its regional interests beyond the scope of its natural 
resources.144 
The Palestinian groups in Damascus had been aware of the limitations placed upon 
them by the Syrians. The relationship between the Syrian state and the Palestinian 
factions was one of patron and client. The determinants of the relationship were 
explicit as Syrian interests took precedence over factional interests, and, therefore, 
subjugated the activities of the groups to Syrian approval.145 
The Palestinian groups, especially the Communist Party (PPP) and the PFLP had been 
punished by the Syrian regime for contradicting the policies of the Syrians. The 
alliance between the Islamic and secular groups, under Syrian tutelage, bore many 
limitations as their collective partnership was based on tactical motives rather than any 
ideological affinity.14* 
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Syria's international interests prevented the rejectionist groups from sabotaging the 
peace process within the occupied territories. 1 4 7 It remained, however, a potential 
source of power for Asad, Cohen observed: 
Although Damascus now represents no substantial military threat to 
Israel, its control of Lebanon and its ability to unleash radical and 
fundamentalist Palestinian forces opposed to a negotiated settlement of 
the conflict gives it a measure of veto power over the peace talks.148 
Thus, one could argue, that the Syrian state was paying 'Arafat, Israel, and the 
international community a service by containing the potential threat of the rejectionist 
factions. 
Although the Syrian regime expressed its dismay at 'Arafat's separate deal, and the 
method by which it was achieved, the regime did not condemn it. Asad outlined the 
basis of Syria's response, as one guided by the determinants of the New World Order. 
He opined: 
If Syria wanted to obstruct the agreement it would have foiled it, and if 
it becomes clear to us that this agreement will create major damage, we 
will do so. But we do not believe it constituted a threat and was just a 
step along a long road.14' 
Syria commenced the waiting game as 'Arafat entered negotiations over the fine details 
of the Oslo Accords. Asad spelled out Syria's position in a speech made to the 
People's Council: 
From the beginning (of the current peace process), our decision was 
clear: coordination with Arab parties participating in the peace process 
1 4 7 Interview with Press Secretary of the PFLP, Damascus, 4 October 1995. 
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... when we raised the matter of coordination, we did so on the premise 
that the other Arab parties, which were involved in a negotiating 
process in an unequal manner with the Israeli side, should benefit from 
Syria's situation - its negotiating strength and its various capabilities on 
the battlefield - in addition to the fact that Syria is the basic element for 
peace in the region.1™ 
Convinced that Syria would achieve a real peace, Asad was insistent that the scale of 
time was not an issue. 
The Clinton-Asad meeting 
The Syrian-Israeli track fell adrift after the Oslo Accords, and Syria's refusal to attend 
another round of talks. Clinton's meeting with Asad in Geneva on 16 January 1994 
was designed to give the Syrian-Israeli track a f i l l ip . 1 5 1 The meeting itself did not 
produce anything concrete, but it did draw Syria closer into the epicentre of the New 
World Order. 
Asad's meeting with Clinton, in Geneva, sent a signal to the international community 
that Syria was gravitating towards the norms of the hegemonic global power. Syria 
achieved its ambitions from the meeting, notably: 
• to push the peace process forward; 
• to improve bilateral US-Syrian relations; 
• to discuss Syria's regional role.151 
1 5 0 Gold, D., "The Syrian-Israeli Track - Taking the Final Step: What Sacrifices Will Assad Make to 
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During their press conference, President Clinton acknowledged that Syria was the key 
to a wider settlement.153 Syria, however, was not removed from the US terrorist list, 
which would have made it eligible for the procurement of American investments, 
loans, and advanced technologies;154 but the meeting gave Asad international prestige, 
and Syria a platform to promote its regional agenda. 
Asad punctuated his public address in Geneva with the following phrase: "In honour 
we fought. In honour we shall negotiate. In honour we shall make peace".155 Asad 
stated that Syria "sees peace with Israel as a strategic choice to secure Arab rights, and 
which enables all peoples in the region to live in security".156 
Syria's commitment to achieving comprehensive peace, irrespective of the PLO-Israeli 
separate deal, formed part of Asad's platform, as he said: 
/ hope that our meeting today will contribute to the realisation of the 
aspirations of the people of the region ... that this new year will be the 
year of achieving the just and comprehensive peace which puts an end 
to the tragedies of violence and wars endured by them for several 
decades.157 
Asad did not commit Syria to the normalisation of relations, as required by the Israelis, 
in return for withdrawal in the Golan. The Syrian President did refer to Syria's 
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acceptance of the principle of normal relations, but this would be a feature of the 
second phase of the peace process when full withdrawal had been completed.158 
Syria's commitment to peace as a strategic choice indicated how the New World Order 
has impinged upon Syria's option for regaining the Golan and liberating the rest of the 
occupied territories. With the demise of the Soviet Union and the advent of the New 
World Order, peace had become a strategic option for Syria. In its pursuit to achieve its 
goals, Syria showed its readiness to improve its bilateral relations with the US, but not 
at the expense of its regional status.159 
The Hebron Massacre 
The Clinton-Asad meeting prompted the Syrians and Israelis to resume their 
negotiations. On 25 February 1994, before the talks began, Baruch Goldstein, an 
Israeli settler from Khan Yunis, had shot 48 Palestinian Muslims praying in the 
Ibrahim mosque in Hebron. Hence, the following round of talks in the peace process 
were suspended by the Arab parties.140 
Although the Syrian-Israeli track stopped simultaneously with the talks of the PLO, 
Jordan, and Lebanon, Syria worked towards easing Syrian-Israeli tensions. In order to 
facilitate such a move, a confidence building gesture was made when 57 Israeli Arabs 
visited Syria between 7-10 March 1994. The delegation was led by 'Abd al-Wahhab 
Darawsha from the Arab Democratic party.1" 
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As in the case with the expelled Palestinians in the winter of 1992/93, after the Hebron 
massacre the Syrians had been waiting to return to the negotiating table, and so 
persuaded the Jordanians and Lebanese to circumvent Palestinian resistance to 
resuming the talks. This factor was revealing in two ways: firstly, it demonstrated 
Syria's readiness to proceed with the negotiations; and secondly, it illuminated Syria's 
dismissive attitude towards the interests of the PLO. 
The Jordanian peace deal 
The momentum of the peace process became a priority for Syria. The Palestinians had 
chosen their own route, but Syria's commitment was constant though the terms of 
reference were unclear. Separate peace was not an acceptable option, but progress on 
the bilateral talks was the aim. The comprehensive dimension of the talks would be 
completed through the simultaneous signing of treaties between Israel and Syria, 
Jordan, and Lebanon. Syria, in this context would hold the key to "setting the new 
structure of the peace into concrete".1" 
Just as Syria's quest for strategic parity was pursued with vigour, Syria's strategic 
choice for peace acquired the same momentum. Syria could not desert the peace 
process after the announcement of the Oslo Accords, nor could it change its strategy 
after Jordan and Israel reached a separate peace deal of their own. 
On 25 July 1994, at the White House in Washington, King Hussein and Prime 
Minister Rabin signed the Washington Declaration.1" The declaration disclosed that the 
1 4 2 Ya'ari, E . , "Syria Next vs. Damascus Last," Middle East Insight, vol. xi , no. 1, 
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state of war between the two states was over.1" This did not constitute a full peace 
treaty, but signalled the possibility that a treaty was within reach. Despite the issue of 
the Washington Declaration, it was considered very unlikely that Jordan could sign a 
separate peace treaty without the support or consent of Syria. Such a move, it was 
thought, could have provoked the Syrians into escalating a crisis with the Jordanian 
government. 
In a move conducted to prevent Syria's isolation, Asad was given prior warning of the 
Jordanian-Israeli summit by the US President. The Syrian President apparently gave a 
discreet nod of acceptance, understanding that progress in the bilateral talks was 
appropriate as long as a peace treaty had not been concluded.1" 
Jordan's new position did not produce any major shock waves within the region.1" 
Relations between Israel and Jordan had covertly existed for many years, and seemed 
to be common knowledge amongst journalists and Middle Eastern observers. The 
reported collusion between Israel, Jordan, and the US during Black September in 1970 
had suggested that an implicit understanding existed between the Israeli and Jordanian 
leaderships.167 
Jordan's decision to pursue its own national agenda was not revelationary either, as the 
PLO's signature to the Oslo Accords had provided the Jordanian government with a 
pretext to focus upon its own problems. The pronouncement of the PLO's government 
in exile in 1988, and the revocation of Jordan's claims to the West Bank formally 
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separated the political and geographical jurisdiction of Jordan and the PLO. 1 6 8 The 
PLCs agreement to Oslo further relieved Jordan of its commitment to the Palestinians, 
and removed any structural obstacles to concluding a peace treaty. The only obstacle 
that remained in the way between Israel and Jordan was Syria. 
The inter-Arab rivalry between Syria and Jordan had produced many permutations of 
support, within the region, and numerous combinations of punishment and reproach. 
Both states were alleged to have participated in clandestine operations against each 
other over the years; they had, in-light of new global and regional realities found a 
modus vivendi. The collapse of the old world order and Jordan's disastrous decision 
to support Saddam Hussein exposed Jordan's vulnerabilities to the policies of the Gulf 
Arab states, in particular Saudi Arabia, and to the recriminatory policies of the US.1 6 9 
Jordan and the PLO found refuge in the diplomatic support of Syria. Syria's 
comprehensive approach, encompassing Jordan's weakness, enabled Jordan to 
maximise its relative strength within the forum of a united position. Syria's own 
position was emboldened, as it adopted its familiar role as the guardian of Arab 
interest.170 
The PLO's engagement in secret peace talks with Israel, and the resulting Oslo 
Accords weakened the unity of the Arab diplomatic front. Jordan enjoyed a distinct 
advantage from the Palestinian-Israeli initiative, whilst for Syria the result brought 
ambiguity and uncertainty. 
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In its desperate bid for international rehabilitation, Jordan charted a course towards the 
US. With a poor resource base, the imposition of international and regional economic 
sanctions, and growing domestic militancy, rehabilitation included a critical financial 
package designed to placate the over-burdened populace. For Jordan, the Oslo Accords 
produced the optimum moment to complete this period of rehabilitation. The price for 
rehabilitation was peace with Israel.171 
As with Egypt, economic crisis precipitated the need for a change in foreign policy; the 
US was the willing party to reduce Jordan's debt.172 King Hussein and Prime Minister 
Rabin addressed the US Congress, on 27 July 1994, stating that the war between 
Israel and Jordan was over. As an inducement for Jordan to sign a separate peace 
treaty, the Congress pledged to reduce Jordan's $700 million debt to $220 million. 1 7 3 
Jordan's decision to sign a separate peace treaty with Israel, on 26 October 1994, 
reflected the changes within the regional and international climate. Syria was unable to 
contest the decision or prevent the implementation of the peace treaty. Syria's response 
was consigned to condemnation of King Hussein and his government. The Syrian 
regime charged the Jordanian regime with betraying the Arabs. In his speech to the 
People's Council, on 10 September 1994, Asad said: 
For decades, Syria waged the Arabs' battle against the Israeli 
occupation, to liberate the land and recover the (Arabs') rights. Our 
people carried the principal burden in the confrontation and we offered 
great sacrifices in lives and suffering, and the conflict was reflected in 
the country's public life ... / do not want to discuss what they (the 
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Palestinians and Jordanians) arrived at, but reality makes 
unambiguously clear the enormity of the damage that unilateralism has 
inflicted on the core of the causes for which we have long fought and 
struggled.™ 
Syria's comprehensive policy had essentially failed. The Israelis and the Americans 
had managed to wean the Palestinian and Jordanian governments away from the Arab 
fold. The prospect of concluding a separate peace treaty was greater than waiting for 
the Syrians to reach a settlement, and then co-ordinate the final round of multilateral 
talks. 
The arrival of the New World Order signified a diminution in Syria's regional power 
projection. The redistribution of global power led to a reduction in Syria's ability to 
influence the decision-making process within the Middle East region. Whereas Syria 
had challenged the PLO and the Jordanians in the past, the hegemonic role played by 
the US in the Middle East, seemed to grant both actors more freedom from Syrian 
tutelage in their decision-making processes. 
The Syrian government looked as if it had become a casualty of the New World Order. 
After following the option for strategic peace and engaging in the Madrid Peace 
Conference, Syria had been circumvented as the Jordanians and Palestinians signed 
separate peace treaties. Syria looked increasingly isolated from the successes of the 
peace process, and its regional hegemony looked to be under threat from Israel. 
Through the peace policy, Rabin and Peres had aimed to shape the new Middle Eastern 
order. Their new order was determined by the primacy of economics; Israel's desire to 
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extend its economic hegemony in the region underpinned its commitment to peace.175 
Peace with Syria was crucial to eliminating the risk of war, and enhancing Israel's 
chance of integrating itself into the region. Peace was a desirable object to both Syria 
and Israel, but their terms of reference were very different. 
The mode of direct and private discussion provided the potential for Syria and Israel to 
reconcile their differences. The Syrian and Israeli chiefs of staff met in Washington to 
discuss security issues.17* The failure of Amnon Shahaq and Hikmat al-Shihabi, the 
Israeli and Syrian chiefs of staff to find common ground in their meeting of December 
1994, however, led to the drawing up of the Aims and Principles of Security 
Arrangements, and the resumption of discrete talks in June 1995.177 This new formula 
of discussion was unable to accommodate the polarised positions of the chiefs of staff 
and required the offices of Syria's and Israel's chief negotiators, and aides. This 
resulted in the private talks at the Wye Plantation, Maryland in the US, during 
December 1995.178 
The Wye Plantation talks 
US Secretary of State Christopher encouraged Syria and Israel to break their deadlock 
through private discussions at the Wye Plantation in Maryland. The Camp David and 
Dayton Accords had been achieved through the auspices of US engineered talks, and, 
therefore, had set a precedent for the resolution of the Syrian-Israeli conflict. The first 
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round of talks commenced on 27 December 1995 and concluded on 29 December, and 
the second round took place between 3-5 January 1996.17' 
The issue on the table was the Golan Heights. Israel's interest in the Golan Heights 
has been attributed to its location as a strategic value as a buffer between Syria and 
Israel. Its substantial water reserves, and its biblical value are also offered as 
justification for the Israeli annexation of the Golan Heights in 1981.180 For the Syrians, 
the Golan Heights have become symbolic of their regional national struggle with 
Israel. The return of the Golan would alleviate the state of its responsibility from the 
1967 debacle, and recover some of the lost honour, associated with the Ba'th 
regime.181 The return of the Golan would also lend the Syrian state a defensive buffer 
zone; this is because Damascus is within a forty mile reach of the Golan Heights. 
Formerly, Syria's commitment to peace with Israel had been based upon a ful l 
withdrawal from all the occupied territories in return for a peace treaty. This position 
had changed during the course of the peace process. Due to the separate peace deals of 
the PLO and the Jordanians, Syria's concept of comprehensive peace had been 
curtailed. Walid Moualem, Syria's chief negotiator and ambassador to the US, 
commented: 
We still want comprehensiveness - comprehensiveness was one basis 
of the Madrid process. Our foreign minister in Madrid went around to 
the various Arab delegations to insist on the same venue and timing for 
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the negotiations, and here in Washington we had regular coordinating 
meetings for the heads of Arab delegations ... But we were taken by 
surprise by Oslo - we did not know about the secret talks until the 
agreement was announced. We were also surprised by the Jordanian 
treaty.182 
Syria's inability to restrain the PLO and Jordan from concluding their peace deals 
caused the leadership to review its negotiating position. 
The separate PLO and Jordanian peace deals had struck a double-edged blow to the 
Syrians. On the one hand, it had relieved Syria from the burden of its historical legacy, 
and presented the state with the opportunity to strike a deal according to its self-
interest. The perceptible change in the attitude of the Syrians towards the Palestinian 
issue was conducive to a change in the official Syrian position. The unconditional 
return of the Golan Heights, therefore, held the prospect of earning the state a new 
source of legitimacy. Full withdrawal from the Golan would also vindicate Asad's 
authoritative domestic policy, and accentuate his foreign policy successes. 
On the other hand, Israel was successful in isolating Syria from the peace process by 
its peace with the PLO and Jordan. Syrian hegemony in the Levant was diminishing as 
Israel had grown in regional stature. The economic dynamism of Israel stood to further 
erode Syria's influence. The new Middle Eastern order, based on the unipolar 
intervention of the US and the success of its client-state, ensured that the region was 
subordinate to the prevailing regional and international hegemonic orders, and effaced 
of its Arab character. 
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A peace treaty with Israel, focused solely upon the Golan, held the possibility of de-
linking Syria from its spheres of influence as the regional competition with Israel 
assumed an economic character. However, Lebanon could not be uncoupled from 
Syria's sphere of influence, nor could a Lebanese-Israeli peace be durable without 
Syrian compliance. To quote Walid Moualem: 
We said that comprehensive peace from our perspective includes Syria 
and Lebanon together at the same time. We sign together, and Israel 
withdraws both from south Lebanon and the Golan Heights.m 
The Syrians were free to pursue a peace deal with Israel based upon the total liberation 
of the Golan Heights for ful l peace. The discussions at the Wye Plantation were 
designed to propel the process towards a hasty conclusion. Apparently, in July 1994, 
Israel agreed to a full withdrawal to the 4 June 1967 lines.184 This paved the way for 
the negotiations to address the cumulative issues of a peace treaty, which included: 
• meaning of withdrawal; 
• timetable of withdrawal; 
• normalisation; 
• security arrangements. 
Meaning of withdrawal 
The meaning of withdrawal, Syria argued, meant an Israeli return to the 4 June 1967 
borders, which left Syria some access to Lake Tiberias."5 Israel insisted that the 
international boundary meant the pre-1948 borders, which placed the lake entirely in its 
Butler, L . , "Fresh Light on the Syrian-Israeli Peace Negotiations: An Interview with Ambassador 
Walid al -Moualem," Journal of Palestine Studies, vol. X X V I , no. 2, Winter 1997, pp. 88-89. 
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SYRIA AND THE PEACE PROCESS 386 
territory: Syria could not be allowed to return to the northern shore of Lake Tiberias, 
Israel's water reserve.186 After the election of Netanyahu, as Israel's prime Minster in 
May 1996, President Asad disclosed that Rabin had conceded to a full withdrawal 
from the Golan in accordance to Syria's conditions.187 The talks at the Wye Plantation 
were based upon this premise, and were, therefore, invested with the potential to 
produce a peace treaty. This claim was first made public in Hebrew in a publication, 
and then by Egypt's president, Mubarak, in an interview with al-Hayat.188 
Timetable of withdrawal 
The timing of withdrawal remained a problem. Syria wanted full withdrawal with a 
reasonable time frame of about a year.189 Pointing to Israel's reluctance to fu l f i l the 
Oslo Accords, Asad rejected any agreement that left the outcome to Israel's discretion 
and refused normalisation prior to full withdrawal. 
During Rabin's premiership, Israel proposed a three stage Golan withdrawal over a 
period of five years. After the inception of the process, Syria would have to establish 
diplomatic relations with Israel, and implement the policy of normalisation. 
Withdrawal would be linked to normalisation. The assassination of Rabin catapulted 
the Syrian-Israeli peace process to the fore of Israeli foreign policy. 
With an impending election, it appeared that Peres was intent on concluding a quick 
deal. Lacking the security credentials of his predecessor, Peres either needed to 
1 8 5 Moore, J. , "An Israeli-Syrian Peace Treaty: So Close and Yet So Far," Middle East Policy, vol. iii, 
no. 3, 1994, pp. 76-77. 
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establish a strong-arm or to secure a foreign policy gain. Incorporating Syria into the 
peace process offered Peres the chance of re-election, but the assassinations of the 
leader of Islamic Jihad, Shaqaqi, in Malta in October 1995, and Yahya 'Ayyash (the 
engineer) on 4 January 1996 changed the course of the peace process."0 
Normalisation 
The issue of normalisation served to separate the Syrian-Israeli negotiating teams, 
though Syria had confirmed its commitment to normalisation."1 Normalisation would 
follow the conclusion of the withdrawal of Israel from the Golan and after the signing 
of a peace treaty. As al-Shar'a said: "Let us put things in the proper sequence. We do 
not want to have loopholes or snags here and there, which would be counter-
productive"."2 
Barak, the Israeli Foreign Minister, included the free flow of goods, services, and 
people, joint water and trade projects and the integration of the two countries' 
electricity grids, into the concept of normalisation."3 Syrian ambassador to the US, 
Moualem, explained Syria's reluctance to conclude economic normalisation: 
They wanted open borders, open markets for their goods, and so on. 
This would have an obvious effect on our own economy. Our 
economic regulations are not against them; we do open our markets to 
any country. And how can you integrate two economies when one has 
a per capita income of $900 per year and the other has a per capita 
income of $15,000 per year? Such integration is not possible, so we 
discussed a transitional period during which we could raise our 
1 , 0 These issues will be discussed at length later in this chapter in "Operation Grapes of Wrath". 
"' Ya'ari, E . , "Syrian Foreign Minister Addresses Israeli Public," Middle East Insight, vol. xi, no. 1, 
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economy to the level where there can be competition without undue 
hardship on our society.1,4 
Security arrangements 
As Israel inched closer to agreeing to a full withdrawal from the Golan, it insisted on 
security substitutes for territory. Its maximum position included dismantling Syrian 
chemical weapons and a radical reduction in the Syrian standing army. While Syria's 
regular army is much larger, such demands would demolish Syria's deterrent posture 
given Israel's nuclear monopoly and Syria's inability to rapidly mobilise reserves."5 
Israel also wanted a limited forces zone requiring a virtual Syrian pullback to 
Damascus. Syria accepted demilitarisation of the Golan but wanted equal limited forces 
zones on both sides of the border, which Israel refused."4 The negotiations stalled over 
an Israeli demand for an early-warning station on Mount Hermon."7 Syria insisted that 
aerial or satellite surveillance was adequate, and that a continued Israeli presence there 
would be an affront to Syrian sovereignty.1" 
Missed opportunities 
The Wye Plantation talks produced the opportunity for a Syrian-Israeli peace deal. It 
had become known in retrospect that Rabin had agreed to a full withdrawal in return 
for full peace. This agreement formed the basis of the Wye Plantation talks. The 
1 M Butler, L . , "Fresh Light on the Syrian-Israeli Peace Negotiations: An Interview with Ambassador 
Walidal-Moualem/your/ia/o/Pa/ej/J/ieS/Mrf/^, vol. X X V I , no. 2, Winter 1997, pp. 86-87. 
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assassination of Rabin accelerated the peace process as his successor, Peres, aimed to 
achieve a rapid solution to the conflict. Both parties were intent on securing peace; the 
issues of normalisation were within reach. 
The intransigence of both parties had been broken. The prospect of peace, although a 
secret, appears to have been an option. Peres1 decision to hold an early election, and 
his need to establish security credentials shattered the progress of the Wye Plantation 
talks. 
Operation Grapes of Wrath 
After the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin on 4 November 1995, the prospective 
Israeli elections dominated the regional political scene. The speculation over Rabin's 
successor, Shimon Peres, had produced some hope for a Syrian-Israeli peace deal, yet 
the Syrian-Israeli track remained in the background of discussions.1" 
Peres had been the Israeli architect of the Oslo Accords, and was attributed with its 
more progressive dimensions. Peres, portrayed as a dove to Rabin's hawk, seemed to 
symbolise hope for the Syrians and for the disenchanted Palestinians. The election 
procedure took precedence over the peace process, and the contest of electioneering 
distorted the political views of both the Labor and Likud parties. 
Rabin had been the military and political component of the partnership, whilst Peres 
played the diplomatic role. Despite their antipathy towards each other, they had 
managed to complement each other's substance and style of leadership. Peres lacked 
the military stature of Rabin; Rabin's military successes, particularly in the 1967 War, 
Ozanne, J . , "Police Sees Arms Stockpile at Home of Rabin's Assassin," Financial Times, Friday 
10 November 1995, pp. 16. 
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had been carved into Israeli folklore, and his leadership skills were legendary. Peres, 
as a trained diplomat, could not compete with Rabin's security credentials.200 
The assassination of Shaqaqi in Malta, in October 1995, by Mossad, and the 
assassination of Yahya 'Ayyash on 4 January 1996 by Shin Bet501 created a 
fundamental problem that looked set to derail the peace process. The retaliatory moves 
came in the form of a series of devastating suicide bombers targeting civilian 
population centres within Israel. Islamic Jihad and Hamas had, until the assassinations 
of Shaqaqi and 'Ayyash, reached an informal agreement with the Palestinian Authority 
to refrain from violent opposition to the peace process.103 
The assassinations provoked a violent response which halted progress on all of the 
peace tracks. President Asad refused to publicly condemn the suicide missions, and as 
a result the Israeli government unilaterally suspended the negotiations on the Syrian-
Israeli track. 
Therefore, Peres faced the prospect of a general election with a distinct disadvantage: 
• increased domestic insecurity; 
• an ailing Palestinian-Israeli interim agreement; 
• no significant progress on the Syrian-Israeli track; 
• no personal record of military integrity. 
The spate of suicide bombings had started to divide public opinion until Peres' 
apparent failure to protect the security of Israeli citizens produced a new consensus of 
2 0 0 Ozanne, J . , "Struggle to Hold It All Together: Shimon Peres, The Acting Israeli leader Face 
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public opinion. The sympathy vote, derived from Rabin's assassination, was rapidly 
diminishing as the national obsession with security started to gain priority in the lives 
of the public. 
Peres' approach to Labor's receding support was dramatic; it came in the form of an 
excessive military retaliation against Hizbollah."5 The intensity of Hizbollah's activities 
had not substantially changed as they were governed by the verbal understanding 
reached between Hizbollah and Israel after Operation Accountability in July 1993. 
Operation Grapes of Wrath was launched in April 1996. It essentially represented two 
objectives: 
(i) it was an election platform for Peres and the Labor party; 
(ii) it was designed to pressure Syria and Lebanon into returning to the peace talks. 
The Clinton administration was firmly committed to the re-election of Peres; 
accordingly it lent Israel its unequivocal support in Operation Grapes of Wrath.20'' Both 
the US and Israeli administrations had presided over the critical stages of the peace 
process, and had invested enormous political capital into the process, although one 
could argue that Clinton's role had remained peripheral and possibly ceremonial. 
It is not possible to gauge the intention of the operation, but Grapes of Wrath seemed 
to have spinned out of control and proved to be far more devastating than was 
originally anticipated. The mission had been dominated by the supremacy of Israeli air 
power, which exceeded the range and capabilities of Hizbollah's Katyusha rockets. It 
was estimated by UN peace-keepers that there were 3,000 aerial sorties by fighter 
Jansen, G., T h e Giant's Failure," Middle East International, no. 525, 10 May 19%, pp. 7. 
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bombers and helicopter gunships over 17 days, 30,000 artillery shells were fired, plus 
hundreds of shells from ships ashore. Hizbollah's arsenal was not so impressive; it 
was estimated to consist of 1,100 Katyusha rockets.305 
Peres' sanctioning of military action appears most likely to have been motivated by 
increasing his prospect of re-election. Security had not been the exclusive preserve of 
Israel's generals, as the military was ultimately responsible to the civilian government. 
The escalation of the Israeli assault, and the resulting massacre at Qana, brought 
international condemnation upon Peres' government and discredited it before the eyes 
of the Israeli public. On the 18 April 1996, 102 sheltering refugees were killed by 
Israeli self-propelled artillery as they sought refuge in the UN base of Qana.2" 
What appeared to be a bid for re-election turned out to be a domestic and international 
disaster for Peres, Israel, and the US. The excessive use of force and the consequent 
human devastation undermined Peres' stature as a sagacious patrician. It also allowed 
the Syrians, Lebanese, and French to assert their influence in the formation, and 
implementation of the cease-fire and its arrangements."7 
The Israeli military initiative was partially designed to eliminate the pernicious threat of 
Hizbollah from northern Israel, thereby terminating one of Syria's principal sources of 
pressure. Without the option of Hizbollah, as a persistent irritant to the Israelis, it was 
estimated that the Syrians would be forced to return to the peace talks. Ironically, the 
Syrians were the main beneficiaries, in terms of accumulating diplomatic credit, and 
exercising control over Hizbollah. 
Jansen. G., "The Giant's Failure," Middle East International, no. 525, 10 May 19%, pp. 7. 
"What Happened at Qana," Middle East International, no. 525, 10 May 19%, pp. 5. 
Jansen, M., "Lebanon Cease-fire Terms," Middle East International, no. 525, 10 May 19%, pp. 5, 
and Swann, R., "Trying Not to Gloat," Middle East International, no. 525, 10 May 19%, pp. 7-8. 
SYRIA AND THE PEACE PROCESS 393 
A consequence of Operation Grapes of Wrath was the propulsion of Syria towards the 
epicentre of the cease-fire process. Though occupying a back seat, the Syrian President 
played a fundamental role in achieving the cease-fire. As the Americans tried to 
formulate their own proposals, the French and the Syrians negotiated the terms and 
conditions of the cease-fire between Israel and Lebanon. On 26 April 1996, Israel and 
the US accepted the terms of the cease-fire, which were based on the existing terms 
reached after Operation Accountability in July 1993.208 
Instead of remaining a verbal agreement, this time a document set out the parameters of 
behaviour. According to this document: 
• armed groups were not to attack Israel with any type of weapons; 
• Israel was prohibited from attacking Lebanese civilians or civilian targets in 
Lebanon; 
• attacks on civilian infrastructure were banned, as was the launching of attacks 
into Israel's occupation zone from areas of civilian habitation; 
• the parties would retain the right of legitimate defence within stipulations of the 
understanding.109 
On 16 May 1996, Israel and the US agreed to the establishment of a monitoring 
committee composed of Israel, Lebanon, Syria, the US, and France; the rotating chair 
belonged to the US and France, hence, elevating the role of France in the region.110 
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This episode demonstrated Syria's durability to operate in the New World Order. In an 
attempt to persuade the Israeli public of his security credentials, Peres had lost the 
political and diplomatic advantage gained through the separate peace agreements with 
the PLO and Jordan. Operation Grapes of Wrath had also failed to eliminate Syria's 
political, diplomatic, and military manoeuvrability. 
Syria's influence over Hizbollah, and, therefore, its access to northern Israel via 
proxy, has remained an avenue to exert pressure on the Israelis. Syria's access, 
indeed, had improved after Operation Grapes of Wrath, as the terms of the cease-fire 
legitimised Hizbollah's attacks within the security zone. Syria's regional influence was 
also enhanced due to the special role it played in brokering the cease-fire. 
Emerging from yet another period of political isolation, Syria managed to elevate its 
regional status through the auspices of its dominance in Lebanon. Throughout the 
1980s, during its period of tactical rejectionism, Syria had fought its campaign through 
Lebanon. Lebanon had become the last stronghold of Syrian influence; its matrix of 
confessions and propensity to violence had provided Syria with a context within which 
it can resist Israeli and US intervention. In the 1990s, Israel had formally removed the 
PLO and Jordan from Syria's influence, and in turn focused its attentions towards 
Lebanon and Hizbollah. 
The environment of the New World Order took away Syria's option for rejecting peace 
after Jordan and the PLO had signed separate agreements. Syria's actions were 
conditioned according to the new distribution of power within the world system. On 
the other hand, Lebanon has stayed a Syrian stronghold, and Asad has remained a key 
player in its orientation. In the 1980s, through persistence and a sustainable loss of 
life, Syria had managed to defeat the Israelis and the US in Lebanon. Operation Grapes 
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of Wrath provided another chance for Syria to achieve such a victory, but in the 1996 
case, the success was diplomatic rather than military. 
In yet another twist of the peace process, Syria had managed to avoid the prospect of 
regional isolation and the capitulation to return to the peace negotiations on Israel's 
terms. Israel's escalation of the conflict has failed to reduce Syria's influence in 
Lebanon and its access to pressure Israel through the activities of Hizbollah. 
Operation Grapes of Wrath had failed to persuade the Israeli public to re-elect the 
Labor party. In the first direct election of an Israeli Prime Minister, Benyamin 
Netanyahu assumed office in June 1996. The change of government within Israel and 
the election of Netanyahu has compounded the problems for the Palestinians. The Oslo 
Accords and the accompanying agreements have subsequently been amended to 
accommodate the demands of Israel's settlers.3" The Jordanian peace is also showing 
signs of weakness as the process of normalisation has not been embraced by the 
Jordanian population,212 nor has the US Congress approved the cancelling of the 
Jordanian debt promised by the Clinton administration as an inducement to peace.2'3 
The platform on which Netanyahu had been elected denied Syria's sovereignty of the 
Golan, and, therefore, has appeared to ended the prospect for a Syrian-Israeli peace 
deal during the term of his office. 2 ' 4 
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Conclusion 
It has been argued throughout this chapter that Syria's commitment to peace has been 
constant since 1974. Achieving comprehensive peace between the Arab states and 
Israel would serve the national interests of Syria in its struggle for regional hegemony 
with Israel. Comprehensive peace would enable Syria to extend its sphere of influence 
over its Levantine neighbours without invoking the prospect of military confrontation 
with Israel. 
The concept of comprehensive peace has entailed the liberation of the Arab occupied 
territories, including the West Bank, Gaza, south Lebanon, and the Golan Heights. 
The restoration of Palestinian rights has also been a component of the comprehensive 
peace.215 Farouq Shar'a, the Syrian Foreign Minister, had made the Syrian position on 
peace very clear when he stated: "What we want is to implement UN Resolutions, in 
particular, UN Security Resolutions 242 and 338. These resolutions call for Israel's 
withdrawal from the occupied Arab lands and safeguarding the Palestinian national 
rights."2'4 
The Syrian commitment to comprehensive peace was asserted by President Asad in an 
interview with CNN on 28 October 1991: 
No one in the region, or outside the region, Europe, the USA, Eastern 
Europe, or other areas of the world has interest in the absence of a 
comprehensive peace in this region. Any separate or partial peace 
process will not achieve peace, security and stability in the region and 
any party continuing the state of war with Israel will bring back 
2 1 5 Ehteshami, A., and R. Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional 
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complicated circumstances to the region and will lead to comprehensive 
wars in the future.111 
The conclusion of separate peace deals has become the zenith of Syria's fears. Syria's 
disdain of separate peace formulas had been displayed throughout the 1980s. The 
creation of the Front for Steadfastness to undermine Egypt's separate peace with 
Israel, and Syria's tactical rejection of the Lebanese-Israeli Accord illustrated its 
conviction to spoil formulas which excluded it from the peace process. 
The end of the Cold War and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait offered a moment for Syria to 
present itself at the centre of a more comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. The Madrid Peace Conference provided the forum for an international 
resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict Syria's compliance to attend the Madrid Peace 
Conference was based on its foundation of UN Resolutions 242, 338, and 425. Syria 
showed its flexibility, a concession to the New World Order dominated by the US, by 
curtailing some of its demands to participate in the peace process. 
During the Madrid Conference, Syria tried to co-ordinate the policies of Jordan, 
Lebanon, and the PLO. Diplomatic unity offered the Arab states the potential to resist 
Israeli pressure in the negotiating process. The bilateral talks, however, set the 
Palestinians and Jordanians down a different track. The PLO and Jordanian 
assignation to the Oslo Accords and the Jordan-Israel peace treaty, respectively, 
represented a serious set back for the Syrians. 
The Palestinians and Jordanians were motivated by the opportunity to achieve short-
term gains to their national interest. Rousseau's fable of the stag hunt provides the 
217 BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, ME/1215, A/3, 29 October 1991. 
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most apposite explanation for their behaviour.218 I f applied to this case, it would 
suggest that existing in an anarchic state of nature, where self-help governs the 
behaviour of states, the PLO and Jordan have made rational decisions based upon their 
immediate concerns. The hunt for the stag (comprehensive peace) was flawed from the 
outset, as the hare (separate peace) held the prospect of short-term gratification. The 
pursuit of the hare has weakened the potential of the pack, and allowed the stag to 
escape to the safety of the folkloric forest. 
The short-term satiation of the hare has left the PLO hungry as the winter sets in; 
meanwhile, the lion of Syria has kept his sights on the stag. The inherent problems 
contained within the Oslo Accords have justified Syria's search for a comprehensive 
peace, and its reluctance to settle for a separate peace deal. The issues of Jerusalem, the 
settlements, and the refugees, for example, have yet to be settled, whilst Israel 
continues to build settlements in the West Bank, and to annex East Jerusalem.2" 
The separate peace deals signed by the PLO and Jordan have undermined Syrian 
influence in the Levant, and has weakened its position in the balance of power with 
Israel.220 Geopolitically isolated, Syria has remained an observer as Israel concluded 
separate peace treaties with the PLO and Jordan. However, the limited nature of the 
peace treaties has left Syria with some leverage in the peace process. 
Since the PLO and Jordan have signed separate peace deals, Syria has been faced with 
two alternatives: 
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(i) to conclude a separate peace deal with Israel, where Israel withdraws from the 
Golan in exchange for peace and normalisation; 
(ii) to wait to conclude a comprehensive peace in the aftermath of the Oslo 
Accords. 
Comprehensive peace is no longer an option in the near future. The PLO and Jordan 
have signed separate peace treaties with Israel; the Gulf Arab states have suspended 
their secondary boycott of Israel. Syria may hold some Palestinian cards, in the form 
of the rejectionist Palestinian groups, but these groups do not constitute a bridge to 
peace. At most, Syria can try to spoil the PLO-Israel peace agreement, but the details 
of Oslo I , Oslo I I , the policies of the Likud government, and the corruption of 
'Arafat's regime are tending to this objective."' 
To wrap up, there has been little progress on the Syrian-Israeli track. Numerous 
obstacles have served to prevent either side from making concessions. The balance of 
power, in diplomatic terms, has continued to determine the stalemate between the two 
adversaries. Each event has empowered one player at the expense of the other. 
The contest between Syria and Israel for regional hegemony found a new expression in 
the Madrid Peace Conference. Attending the conference, however, did not prevent the 
old enemies from engaging in their struggle in Lebanon. Operation Accountability and 
Operation Grapes of Wrath, two Israeli assaults upon Hizbollah, were, in fact, 
attempts at weakening Syria's hand in the peace negotiations. 
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The determinants of a comprehensive peace held the possibility of Syria containing 
Israel's hegemony. Israel has always been aware of this fact, and, therefore, followed 
a separate peace approach, which had been designed to incorporate the Levantine states 
into its orbit of influence. The prospect of a peace had wooed the Arab parties, and 
convinced them to engage in separate peace deals with Israel. 
Evidently Israel's regional hegemony, coupled with its integrated relationship with the 
US, have impinged upon Syria's options. In the aftermath of the second Gulf War, the 
pursuit of peace through the US-led peace process endowed Syria with its only 
opportunity to find a resolution satisfying its minimal requirements. Peace under the 
auspices of the US presented itself as a strategic choice; Syria was not in a political or 
military position to resist the encompassing features of the New World Order. 
CONCLUSION 
Introduction 
In an increasingly complex world of interdependence and dependence, the paradigm of 
realism has fallen from grace. Its analysis has been deemed to be ill-fitting with the 
globalisation of the world economy, and the advancement in global communications. 
The spread of information technology, and the accompanying communications 
revolution have helped to deconstruct the myths of an anarchical world order. 
Furthermore, the globalisation of interests has helped to reduce threats to national 
security as national interests have become increasingly interdependent 
The integration of the world's economies, based on an international division of labour, 
has diffused power throughout the global economy. Power has become a much more 
diffuse commodity, and no longer relates exclusively to military power. This has made 
international capital and information important sources of power. 
The succession of global capitalism, and the advent of the information revolution have 
challenged the primacy of the state as the principle actor in international relations. 
Pluralists propose that the state has started to lose its significance as the adjudicator of 
international relations. The proliferation of the trans-national actors, international 
agencies, and the establishment of trans-national governmental bodies have all 
contributed to the erosion of state autonomy. 
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Globalists work from a less optimistic base. They refute the premise of 
interdependence among states. Alternatively, they perceive international relations 
through a world-systems theory. The relations between the states of the core and the 
periphery, of the global economy, are characterised as dependent. Integration, it is 
argued, has not led to a universal improvement in the livelihoods of the global 
population. To the contrary, global capitalism has exacerbated the impoverishment of 
the states in the periphery of the global economy. 
It has been argued in this thesis, that realism and neo-realism are the most appropriate 
models for explaining Syria's adjustment to the New World Order. Realism is an 
ahistorical paradigm of international relations theory. Realism, and its sister neo-
realism, highlight the uniformity of states' foreign policies. Foreign policy is the 
product of the anarchical system, where states compete in a self-help environment. 
With their focus on the international political system, both paradigms have stressed the 
central role played by the state in conducting international relations. 
The state is the principal actor in Syria. In the anarchical environment of the 
international political system, and the penetrated Middle Eastern sub-system, Syria has 
sought to accumulate power, preserve its national security, and attain a regional balance 
of power with its hegemonic foe. It has attempted to insulate itself both from the 
external and domestic environment. 
The author recognises that realism, however, has some flaws. Alongside pluralism and 
globalism, realism appears to be the most primitive paradigm of international relations 
theory. It cannot adequately account for the rise of TNCs, or the dependency of the 
Third World upon the centre states of the global economy. Moreover, it concentrates 
only on the international political system, and does not pay attention to the domestic 
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process. Nevertheless, domestic politics is a crucial factor when considering states of 
the Third World. 
The deficit of state consolidation in the Third World has exposed foreign policies to the 
irrational impulses of state elites attempting to appease their domestic constituencies. 
As in all Third World states, the lack of a dynamic institutional framework, in Syria, 
suggests that the state has been open to the interests of dominant social groups. Thus, 
there is a need to examine the domestic politics of Syria 
As we have seen, the history of the post-independence Syrian state was fraught with 
instability. The permeability of the state, a feature accentuated by the French 
authorities, had been exploited by other regional and international actors. Their 
interference in Syrian affairs challenged the sovereignty of the state; the state, 
therefore, lacked insulation from the combination of domestic and international actors. 
The arrival of Asad, at the helm of the Syrian state, has led to the transformation of 
Syria's fortunes. He has injected a dose of realism into Syria's foreign policy, and 
engaged in the old art of state-craft. Through a process of state consolidation, Asad has 
skilfully transposed Syria from a weak fractious state into a convincing regional player. 
He has managed to elevate the role of the state in Syrian affairs. Under Asad's rule, the 
state has become the principle actor, and has been unequivocally in control of foreign 
policy. 
The Syrian state has been forged through its struggle with Israel. After 1970, the 
competition between Syria and Israel changed course. Dispensing with guerrilla tactics, 
Syria has engaged in a balance of power game. The ideology of Arab nationalism has 
been relegated to legitimising Syrian foreign policy, whilst the politics of power 
accumulation has been used to consolidate the power potential of the state. 
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Power within the state has been consolidated through a national programme of state-
building. The state, through a complex of corporations, re-ordered state-society 
relations. In principle, the state assumed a monopoly of power, and built its base upon 
the foundations of the military and the Ba'th party. 
In re-ordering state-society relations, the Syrian state has aimed to gain relative 
autonomy from the domestic forces within society. The state resides above all the 
forces within society by balancing the interests of competing groups. Those groups 
owe their allegiance to the state, though they have limited access to the decision-making 
process, according to the levels of patronage. The regime barons, for instance, have 
participated in the affairs of high politics with the president. The state, however, is 
neither constrained by the economic interests of the business class, nor by the 
ideological interests of the Ba'th party. 
The patrimonial system is still prevalent in Syria and militates against the 
implementation of institutional processes in the decision-making process. The 
patrimonial system purchases valuable legitimacy for the state, which is, otherwise, 
lacking in the political system. The transplant of the patrimonial with the institutional 
system would enable the state to formalise its relations with society. At present, the 
state is still dependent upon the Armed Forces and Security Services to guarantee its 
survival. Although the state exists above society, its legitimacy base is weak, and its 
formal institutions lack authority. In other words, although the Syrian state is unitary, 
its status is perpetually in question. 
The absence of institutional depth within Syria has led us to consider omnibalancing as 
a model for examining Syria's foreign policy. Realism operates from the assumption 
that states are the principal actors in international relations, and that their behaviour is 
governed by the international political system, rather than the domestic arena. States are 
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considered to be unitary, and their internal politics are deemed to be irrelevant. This 
element of the paradigm may be applicable to the state of the Western countries, where 
state consolidation has taken place over a period of two or three centuries, but in the 
new state of the Third World, it loses its pertinence. Therefore, omnibalancing, with 
part of its focus on the domestic scene, has afforded us the opportunity to examine 
domestic politics and the international political systems that impinge upon state 
behaviour. 
Omnibalancing has allowed us to incorporate aspects of realism and domestic politics 
models. By using the omnibalancing model, it has been possible to gauge the array of 
influences upon the formulation of Syrian foreign policy. In particular, omnibalancing 
has presented itself as the best model for explaining Syria's adjustment to the New 
World Order. 
The New World Order 
The definition of the New World Order has been critical to this study. It has been 
identified, by the author, as the redistribution of power throughout the international 
political system. The collapse of the Soviet Union in the Autumn of 1991 led to the 
diffusion of its power into the system of states. Examined away from the Utopian 
visions, the New World Order has been presented as a transformation in the structure 
of the international political system from bipolarity to unipolarity. 
The structure of the international political system has been defined by the balance of 
power. The fluctuation in the structure of the system is not yet complete. The world 
order is still in transition. This transition has been attributed to the diverse nature of 
global power. Rosecrance has suggested that the five great bases of power, the US, 
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Russia, the European Union, Japan, and China, control the organisation of the world 
order.1 Krauthammer, however, has contested this concert of powers view: 
Only a few months ago it was conventional wisdom that the new rivals, 
the great pillars of the new multipolar world, would be Japan and 
Germany (and/or Europe). How quickly a myth can explode. The 
notion that economic power inevitably translates into geopolitical 
influence is materialist illusion. 
Nye has combined these two analyses and compared the New World Order to a multi-
layered cake, where the US is the dominant military power, Japan, Europe, and China 
are the emerging economic centres, and the rest of the world's states prop up the 
system. The nature of the New World Order was soon revealed after the invasion of 
Kuwait. 
The second Gulf War 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 was the first challenge to the New World 
Order. The second Gulf War created the opportunity for the Utopians to observe their 
New World Order. The end of the Cold War had removed the prospect of superpower 
conflict and competition. Soviet compliance with the US, albeit, token support, 
signified the arrival of a new era in international relations. The international community 
held the opportunity to resolve the situation through peaceful and diplomatic means. 
On 17 January 1991, diplomacy gave way to military power. High-technology 
armaments, and pervasive information systems dominated the spectacle of war. The 
coalition of interests, represented in the upper layers of the cake, conferred their 
1 Rosecrance, R., "A New Concert of Powers," Foreign Affairs, vol. 71, no. 2, Spring 1992, pp. 65. 
2 Krauthammer, C , "The Unipolar Moment," Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, no. 1, Winter 1991, pp. 24. 
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aspirations, through the exercise of military power; they committed themselves to the 
US-led world order. 
Although there is room for debate when defining the world order, two points of clarity 
have emerged since the dissolution of the Soviet Union: 
i) the balance of power remains the most useful analytical tool for examining the 
international political system; 
ii) the Middle Eastern sub-state system is dominated by the unipolarity of the US. 
The balance of power 
The balance of power continues to provide the most appropriate description of the 
international political system. Despite the spread of trans-nationalism, and the effects of 
the globalisation of production, states remain the sovereign units in international 
relations. The power of TNCs and international agencies may be on the increase, but 
states are still the principal referents of the international political system. 
States exist in an anarchical arena, and the systemic forces that derive from this 
environment impinge upon the behaviour of states. In order to survive, states are 
compelled to function according to a self-help principle, hence producing a uniformity 
of state behaviour. States adopt rational foreign policies based upon their national 
interest The balance of power provides the mechanism for producing world order; the 
absence of an international hierarchy militates against any other mechanism for 
regulating world order. 
The structure of the New world Order has taken on a unipolar form for the immediate 
future, but the rise of new economic centres, such as China, Japan, and Europe will 
gradually transform this unipolar structure into a multipolar one. 
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Unipolarity in the Middle East 
Located at the cross-roads between the Occident and the Orient, the Middle East region 
has found itself unduly subjected to the pressures of the international political system. 
As a regional system, the Middle East has been highly penetrated by international 
actors, and as a consequence, remains vulnerable to external factors. 
During the 1980s, Libya, Iran, and Syria had refused to accommodate US interests in 
the area; accordingly they were labelled as terrorist states. As enemies of the emerging 
dominant hegemonic order, their futures had become uncertain. Libya had faced US 
recrimination in 1986 prior to the dissolution of the Soviet system. 
Throughout the bipolar era, Syria had been a pernicious thorn in America's side. With 
the rise of US hegemony in the region, Syria has been forced to adjust its policy 
orientation. In order to counter the perennial threat from Israel, Syria was required to 
leave the eclipsing shadow of the Soviet Union, and seek shade on the periphery of US 
influence. 
The Gulf War provided Syria with an opportunity to traverse from the collapsing world 
order to the unipolar world order. The force of the hegemonic world order pushed 
Syria towards international rehabilitation, and an acceptance of US domination of the 
world order. This realignment has allowed Syria to invest in a new regional order. 
Instead of becoming a victim of the New World Order, Syria extracted itself from the 
policies formulated in the climate of the Cold War, and adjusted to the demands of the 
unipolar configuration of global power. 
The demise of Soviet influence in world affairs, and the fluctuation in the international 
reconfiguration of power, enhanced the role of the US as the world's only 
superpower. When Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, the US found itself in a 
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unique position; it was able to adopt an instrumental role in shaping the policies of the 
new Middle Eastern order. 
The US-led coalition 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait led to the Saudi invitation to the US-led coalition forces to 
launch an offensive on Iraq from Saudi soil. The US presence in Saudi Arabia gave it 
unprecedented access to the region. It became the unipolar force in the region, and 
represented a threat to the client states of the former Soviet Union. The destruction of 
Iraq, one of the region's large military powers, established the credentials of the new 
regional order and the potency of the New World Order. The unipolarity of US 
hegemony in the Middle East became dangerous for the pariah states of the region. 
Syria's participation in the liberation of Kuwait, therefore, was an expression of a 
rational choice. The decision was justified to the Syrian population in Arab nationalist 
terms; yet by observing the structural factors of the international and regional systems, 
one is able to identify a policy based upon the determinants of power politics. 
Syria's choice to join the Gulf War coalition was formulated in accordance with its 
national security. It was not hampered by ideology, nor constrained by Arab 
nationalism. It was arrived at through a careful calculation of costs and benefits. The 
dominance of the international political system, namely, the transformation in the 
international configuration of power impinged upon Syria's options. The political 
survival of the state, in an environment of self-help, rested upon its ability to 
accommodate the change in the international political environment, and to insulate itself 
from domestic repercussions. 
The Syrian state enjoyed sufficient autonomy to pursue a policy that contravened the 
public mood. This does not, however, eliminate the vulnerability of the Syrian state. 
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The centrifugal forces that had torn the East European states apart are a constant 
reminder of the vulnerability of states resting upon facade institutions and coercion. 
The rewards for Syria's participation were an important source of vindication for the 
political elite, and a necessary sweetener for the uncertain regime barons. 
Syria's decision to join the US oriented liberation of Kuwait has empowered the Syrian 
state to avoid the putative fate of Iraq, and it gave it a chance to participate in the post-
war regional order. Syrian complicity with the coalition forces was based on a rational 
decision-making process. The systemic factors pushed Syria towards adopting a policy 
founded upon self-help. The international balance of power of the Cold War era no 
longer offered Syria protection from the hegemonic ambitions of Israel and the US. 
National security, which is a primary constituent of a rational foreign policy decision-
making process, compelled the Syrian elite to choose a US-friendly path. 
The reward for Syria's rational decision to enter the war, in collusion with an imperial 
force, against its Ba'thi neighbour, was a role in the post-war regional order, and the 
convention of an international peace process. 
Syria and the Peace Process 
The New World Order had changed the structure of the international political system, 
and the co-ordinates of the region. With the dissolution of Soviet power, the US has 
been empowered to enforce a peace process upon the region, a process flexible enough 
to include Syria. 
Syria's entry into the Madrid Peace Conference in October 1991, and its participation 
in the following rounds of the peace process have demonstrated Syria's commitment to 
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peace. It has been the assertion of the author that Syria's commitment to peace has been 
consistent since 1970. 
The fulfilment of comprehensive peace has held the prospect of terminating the state of 
war between the Arab states and Israel. Comprehensive peace for Syria, where Gaza, 
the West Bank, southern Lebanon, and the Golan heights were to be returned for 
peace, according to the land for peace formula, contained the possibility of extending 
Syrian influence throughout the Levant in return for peace. In other words, peace 
would not mean a conclusion of the struggle between Syria and Israel. Peace would 
only move the contest onto another plane of competition. The structural determinants of 
the region have ensured that both states are locked in an interminable regional struggle 
for hegemony. 
The US understood the centrality of Syria to the Levant, and that its exclusion from the 
peace process would prove to be disruptive. Syrian compliance, meanwhile, was also 
based on the US-led war with Iraq, which had provided a portent for Syria. Rationality 
dictated a policy grounded in national interest. 
The fluctuation in the configuration of global power had left Syria in a vulnerable state. 
The pursuit of strategic parity was essentially over; Syria's strategies were exhausted, 
and the dominance of the US in world affairs meant that pariah status was dangerous 
without the umbrella of the Soviet Union. The structural forces of the international 
political system pushed Syria towards the peace process. Attending the Madrid Peace 
Conference was, therefore, based on a rational decision. 
Syria's position has not been ideologically driven, but based on an understanding of 
power politics, and the regional balance of power. The Levant Security Doctrine had 
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catered for Syrian security through the incorporation of Lebanon, Jordan, and the 
PLCs foreign policies into a unified polity. Comprehensive peace held the same goals. 
Although Syria had been required to make procedural concessions, in attending the 
Madrid conference, it remained resolute in its demand of the land for peace formula. 
Comprehensive peace formed the bedrock of its negotiating position. President Asad 
stressed the co-ordination among the Arab states, and Syria's determination to resist 
separate peace. 
The Syrian state sought to sell the peace to its population. The years of indoctrination 
had fostered a deep disdain for the Israeli state and its citizens, and the Syrian state 
needed to modify this residual base of mistrust in order to justify its peace negotiations. 
The peace was made easier to sell after Israel and the PLO had announced the results of 
their secret talks.3 
Despite attempting to co-ordinate the positions of the Arab parties, in their negotiations 
with the Israelis, Syria was unable to restrain the PLO and Jordan from concluding 
separate peace deals with Israel. Their separate peace deals undermined the Syrian 
position, and in effect, isolated it from the peace process. Unity had provided the Arab 
states with a semblance of balance with the Israelis. Asad's commitment to securing the 
Levant Doctrine moved from the field of confrontation to the peace process. 
Syria's response revealed the extent of its regional and international vulnerability. The 
impact of the New World Order had taken its toll on Syria's ability to resist the 
imposition of separate peace deals. In the past, tactical rejectionism had empowered 
3 After talking to a number of Syrian businessmen, bureaucrats, and shabab in Damascus, it started to 
become clear that the actions of the PLO had alleviated the Syrian population of its commitment to 
Palestine. The Syrian youth were not really interested in Palestine; consumerism has arrived in 
Damascus, music, fashion, and Western interests are more important than politics. 
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Syria in its disruption of separate peace formulas, but its hands were tied by the New 
World Order. Adjusting to the New World Order entailed exercising restraint. 
As a rational actor, the Syrian state quietly accepted the fait accompli of Arafat's secret 
talks. Asad had been outmanoeuvred by the Israelis. They had employed the classic 
divide and rule policy of the former imperial powers. Syria observed the events and 
promised not to interfere unless its interests were directly harmed. Asad, however, 
maintained a deck of negotiating cards in Syria, the Damascus 10, but they were 
confined to the bottom drawer of diplomacy. 
The conclusion of the PLO and Jordanian peace deals presented the Syrians with the 
opportunity to seal a separate deal of its own. Prior to the PLO's move, Syria's self-
interest fell under the spotlight after Rabin had become Israeli prime minister in 1992. 
It is unwise to speculate in the field of politics, but we can be certain that Syria would 
have acted according to its perceived long-term interests. We cannot be certain whether 
it would have signed a separate peace before the PLO, but i f one looks at history, 
Syria's rejection of separate peace had been in line with its national interests. 
Syria's national interests have been interwoven with Lebanon, Jordan, and the 
Palestinians since the dismemberment of Bilad al-Sham, and the creation of Israel. The 
rise of Asad, to his self-styled presidential monarchy, marked a transition in Syrian 
history. Through the politics of power accumulation, the preservation of national 
security, and the promotion of national interest, Syria has extricated itself from regional 
vulnerability, and, in turn, projected itself as the keystone of regional stability. 
Until the metamorphosis of the world order, Syria's foreign policy had been based on 
a strategy of attaining a balance of power with Israel. Lebanon, Jordan, and the 
Palestinians formed a critical part of the strategy, but its Achilles Heal had remained the 
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possibility of separate peace. Separate peace has held the potential of destabilising 
Syria's influence in the region, thus harming its national interests. 
The separate peace deals of the PLO and Jordan thus harmed Syria's national interest. 
It significantly impaired Syria's ability to parry Israel's hegemony. Syria was 
compelled, however, by the determinants of the international political system to remain 
in the peace process. Exclusion would have meant regional and international isolation. 
It would have also entailed the disengagement of Syria's interests with Jordan and the 
PLO. Hence, a new peace was pursued, one pertaining to the liberation of the Golan 
and southern Lebanon. 
Syria's adjustment to the New World Order required a downgrading of its ambitions. 
The PLO and Jordan have undermined Syria's stature as the repository of Arab power 
in the Levant. Comprehensive peace drained down the channels of the separate peace 
tracks, and left Syria with the residue of a Golan and Lebanon deal. Syria's terms of 
reference on the Golan, however, have remained unequivocal; full withdrawal for full 
peace. 
The Wye Plantation talks were designed to resolve the Syrian-Israeli impasse over the 
Golan Heights. In the light of the problems emanating from Oslo I and Oslo I I , the 
Israeli government aimed to secure a peace deal with the Syrians. The talks showed 
how both Syria and Israel had reached an understanding of each other's concerns and 
needs. 
We have learnt in retrospect that Israel had accepted the principle of complete 
withdrawal for full peace. The decision had been deposited with the US administration 
along with the incremental concessions attained during the process of talks. With this 
admission by the Syrians, we are able to see how close Syria and Israel had moved to 
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peace. Peres was eager to conclude a deal on the Golan to enhance his political 
prestige, and to advance Israel's hegemonic interests in the region. Asad had the 
credentials to deliver Syria into the peace process. 
The structural determinants of the international political system, and the vagaries of the 
Middle Eastern sub-system have pushed Syria and Israel towards concluding a peace 
deal. But the moment slipped through the fingers of both leaders, as Asad played for 
time, and Peres sought an early election victory. 
Adjusting to the New World Order 
In conclusion, Syrian foreign policy has been determined by the international political 
system. Foreign policy has been based upon securing national security, conceived 
within the terms of the Levant Security Doctrine, in an anarchic arena. Attaining a 
balance of power with Israel, its historic foe, has determined the policy initiatives of 
the state. 
Syria's foreign policy has been consistent since 1970. The maximisation of power has 
guided the principle behind containing the threat of Israel, and extending its own 
hegemony over the Levant. Syria's commitment to peace has been concomitant to its 
foreign policy goals, namely, the recovery of the Arab territories seized in 1967 by 
Israel. 
Since 1970, three identifiable strategies have been employed, whilst a myriad of tactics 
have been discernible. Each strategy and tactic has been justified by Syria's consistent 
foreign policy goals. The prospect of separate peace has proved to be the nemesis of 
Syria, but comprehensive peace (cold) has been a long-term objective of the Syrians. 
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Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the structural determinants of the international 
political system militated against progress on the comprehensive track. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the birth of the New World Order has opened a 
window of opportunity for Syria and the Middle East region. The second Gulf War 
offered Syria the optimum moment to realign itself with the US, and to seize the peace 
initiative. Comprehensive peace offered Syria the possibility to contain Israel's 
hegemonic ambitions, but separate peace represented a challenge to Syria's own 
hegemonic ambitions. 
Without a major patron, Syria's vulnerability had increased; thereupon, it was 
compelled to adjust to the New World Order. Syria's adjustment to the New World 
Order has been based upon a rational set of criteria by balancing the interests of its 
domestic groups against the constraints of the international political system. Syria had 
witnessed, and experienced the heat at the epicentre of the New World Order's 
authority; courting an alternative axis existed beyond the realms of rationality. 
Assimilation to the dominant hegemonic order, even if partial, provided Syria with a 
life-line of survival in the anarchic and hostile state of nature. 
Domestically, Syria was able to accommodate its adjustment to the New World Order 
without incurring undue damage to the state. By balancing the interests of the social 
forces within the Syrian Bonapartist state, Syria has managed to remove the area of 
high politics far from the public eye. The autonomy from domestic forces, therefore, 
has invested the Syrian state with the ability to formulate foreign policy decisions away 
from internal constraints. The decision to re-orient Syria's foreign policy towards the 
US was sufficiently insulated from the domestic censure. 
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Thus, Syria's adjustment to the New World Order entailed manoeuvring from the 
bipolar to the unipolar world order and transferring its struggle with Israel from the 
battle-field to the negotiating room. 
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